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Cette thèse se concentre sur ce que j'appelle  «l’espace négatif» de la représentation 
dans la poésie de Stevens comme étant un véritable espace  d'engagement politique, une 
interprétation qui se distingue de la plus grande partie de la critique sur Stevens. En suivant  
les écrits philosophiques d'Emmanuel Levinas, j'affirme que l'emphase que Stevens place 
sur la représentation de la représentation elle-même ouvre un espace au-delà des limites 
rigides de l'identité-ce que Levinas appelle « le je [sujet] semblable », permettant un contact 
authentique avec « l'Autre» ainsi qu’avec  le concept de  « l'infini ».  Bien que Stevens s’est 
farouchement opposé à la notion Romantique de la sublime transcendance, c’est-à-dire d'un 
espace censé exister en dehors des limites de l'imagination humaine, il se concerne 
néanmoins avec l'exploration d'un espace au-delà de l'identité individuelle. Pour Stevens, 
cependant, « la transcendance» est toujours, nécessairement, liée par les restrictions 
reconnues du langage humain et de l'imagination, et donc par la réalité du monde 
perceptible. Toute « transcendance» qui est recherchée ou atteinte, dans la poésie de 
Stevens ne devrait donc pas - ma thèse affirme - être entendu dans le sens sublime 
déterminé auparavant par les Romantiques. Une connexion plus appropriée peut plutôt être 
faite avec la transcendance concrète et immédiate décrit par Lévinas comme le «face à 
face ». L’attention que Stevens accordent aux notions concrètes et immédiates est souvent 
exprimé à travers son attention sur les qualités esthétiques de la langue. Sa poésie a en effet 
la poésie pour sujet, mais pas dans le sens solipsiste qui lui est souvent attribué. En se 
concentrant sur le processus actif et créateur inhérent à l'écriture et à la lecture de la poésie, 
Stevens explore la nature de l'Etre lui-même. Je compare cette exploration dans le travail de 
Stevens à celle du dessinateur, ou de l'artiste, et dans ma conclusion, je suggère les liens 
entre l'approche d'enquête de Stevens et celle d’artistes visuels contemporains qui se sont 
également engagés à la figuration du processus créatif. L’ artiste sud-africain William 
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Kentridge est mon exemple principal , en raison de sa conviction que la méthode est 
intrinsèquement liée à l'engagement politique et social. 
Mots Clés: Littérature americain; Poésie; Philosophie; Wallace Stevens; Emmanuel 
Levinas; Art contemporain; photographie; Théorie; Représentation; Éthiques.	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This dissertation focuses on what I refer to as a “negative-space” of representation 
in the poetry of Wallace Stevens’s in order to explore what, contrary to the bulk of Stevens 
research to date, I understand to be a genuine politics of engagement.   Drawing on the 
philosophical writings of Emmanuel Levinas, I argue that Stevens’s emphasis on the 
representation of representation itself opens up a space beyond the rigid limitations of 
identity—what Levinas refers to as the “I of the same”—allowing genuine contact with the 
concept of “the infinite,” or “the Other.” Though Stevens staunchly opposed himself to the 
Romantic notion of sublime transcendence—of a space purported to exist outside the limits 
of the human imagination—he nonetheless concerns himself with the exploration of just 
such a space “beyond” individual identity. For Stevens, however, “transcendence” is 
always, necessarily, bound by the acknowledged restrictions of human language and 
imagination and therefore by the reality of the perceivable world. Any “transcendence” that 
is sought, or achieved, in Stevens’s work should not, therefore, be understood in the 
sublime sense intended by the earlier Romantics—a more apt connection can instead be 
made with the concrete and immediate transcendence described by Levinas as the “face to 
face.” Stevens’s concern for the concrete and the immediate is often expressed through his 
attention to the aesthetic qualities of language. His is indeed a poetry about poetry—but not 
in the limited, solipsistic sense that is often assumed.  In concentrating on the active, 
creative process inherent to writing and reading poetry, Stevens explores the nature of 
Being itself.  I compare this exploration in Stevens’s work to that of the draftsman, or to the 
artist’s sketch, and in my conclusion suggest the connections between Stevens’s 
investigative approach and contemporary visual artists who are also committed to the 
figuration of the creative process.  South African artist William Kentridge provides my 
chief example, due to his conviction that the method is linked intrinsically to political and 
social engagement. 
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Dedication 
 
 
 
For John 
 
 
 
 
   What self, for example, did he contain that had not yet been 
    loosed, 
           Snarling in him for discovery as his attentions spread, 
                            As if all his hereditary lights were suddenly increased 
                            By an access of color, a new and unobserved, slight 
    dithering, 
 
  The smallest lamp, which added its puissant flick, to which 
    he gave 
           A name and privilege over the ordinary of his 
    commonplace— 
 
A flick which added to what was real and its vocabulary, 
            The way some first thing coming into Northern trees 
   Adds to them the whole vocabulary of the South, 
   The way the earliest single light in the evening sky, in 
    spring, 
     Creates a fresh universe out of nothingness by adding itself, 
    The way a look or a touch reveals its unexpected 
    magnitudes. 
 
   —Wallace Stevens, from “Prologues to What is Possible”  
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Introduction: “That which is always beginning” 
 
Perhaps it is of more value to infuriate philosophers than to go along with them  
          —Wallace Stevens (CP 906). 
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 “If…poetry,” Benedetto Croce asked in his 1933 Oxford lecture, “is intuition and 
expression, the fusion of sound and imagery, what is the material which takes on the form 
of sound and imagery?”  Echoed in Wallace Stevens’s 1940 prose piece, “The Noble Rider 
and the Sound of Words,” this question is central to Stevens’s own investigations. The 
material structure of poetry—a concern, in other words, with language as such—would 
ever more urgently become Stevens’s chief poetic concern. Rather than offering language 
as a fact or an end in itself, however, Stevens concerns himself instead with what Croce, as 
if in reply to his own question, had asserted in 1930 constituted the true material essence of 
poetry:  
[T]he whole man: the man who thinks and wills, and loves and hates; who is strong 
and weak, sublime and pathetic, good and wicked; man in the exultation and agony 
of living; and together with the man, integral with him, it is all nature in its 
perpetual labour of evolution... Poetry... is the triumph of contemplation...Poetic 
genius chooses a straight path in which passion is calmed and calm is passionate 
(CP 652). 
It is no surprise that Croce’s words sufficiently resonated with Stevens to include 
this quotation in full. Croce’s assertion exemplifies Stevens’s own conception of poetry as 
“the triumph of contemplation”—the route by which “man” may come to discover the 
fullness of his reality, replete with its chiasms and contradictions; in short, its resistance to 
being known at all. Poetry’s ability to expand and explore the intermediate spaces revealed 
among those chiasms and contradictions fundamental to human nature and experience is 
what allows it access—according to both Croce and Stevens—to the “fullness” of the real.  
Contradiction, then—“a state or condition of opposition in things compared; variance; 
inconsistency; contrariety” (OED, vol. II 916)—is as important to any understanding of 
Stevens’s poetics as the transcendence of that argument in a conceivable “whole.”  This 
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project asserts that what emerges in Stevens’s work, in the absence of any positive solution 
or reply to the most fundamental questions of Being, is a negative-space of engagement and 
encounter with the representation of reality, and thus with Being itself. Though visual 
language and metaphor are central to Stevens’s poetry, and the term “negative-space” 
certainly plays on that, it is important to this project that the term be conceived neither as an 
image or a negative-image in any purely ocular sense, but instead as an exploration of the 
sensible space from which any given reality or image of that reality may arise.  Negative-
space as it will be used in the following pages denotes the representation, in other words, of 
the processes of representation itself, and therefore offers a grasp of the very structure of 
subjectivity.  It should be conceived of as a speculative rather than an established or formal 
space—one that opens up the possibility of considering and confronting the processes of 
perception and understanding through which the concepts presence and absence, reality and 
the imagination, are formed—rather than constituting or delimiting the space of any one of 
these concepts as such.  
What is an examination of “representation itself,” after all, but an exploration of the 
manner in which the world appears to, and is subsequently represented by, the subject—of 
the process, therefore, by which the subject continuously re-defines the limits of his own 
subjectivity? Maurice Blanchot, following Barthes, conceives of this continuous process of 
re-definition both materially and linguistically through what he calls the “stammer” of 
language1: “It is upon losing what we have to say that we speak” (21), he writes in The 
Writing of the Disaster. For Blanchot, as for Barthes, the generative source of both 
language and Being can be located in this absent, intermediate space at the centre of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Speech is irreversible; that is its fatality” writes Barthes in “The Rustle of Language” (RL 76). It is 
constituted by “singular annulations-by-addition,” which “condemns” it to “stammering” (77). Somewhat 
differently, but laying equal weight on the necessarily repetitive process-oriented nature—this time of written 
language—Barthes writes in “Right in the Eyes” that “a sign is what repeats itself.  Without repetition there is 
no sign, for we could not recognize it, and recognition establishes the sign”  (RL 237). 
 
	   
4	  
repetitive structure of language—between what we have to say (due to either obligation or 
desire) and the spoken. This perpetual state of prolepsis that Blanchot evokes as the 
(absent) core of language combines both an anticipatory, desirous and reactive state—that 
which is endlessly propelled forward, like a stutter, in the hopes of correcting what has 
already been said and simultaneously beginning again what one had wanted to say—and 
the Epicurean or Stoic concept of a state of consciousness that arises independent of any 
conscious desire: a thought, that is, provoked not by intellectual but rather by sense 
perception.  Likewise, Stevens’s poetry is deeply concerned with the relationship between 
these two states—so much so that in a letter to Bernard Heringman of 1953 he referred to 
the persistent play on this relation in his work as his “reality-imagination complex” (L 792). 
As Frank Doggett affirms, however, for Stevens there was no real conflict; unlike the 
philosophers, he would continue throughout his career to put his “final trust in sentience” 
(Doggett 142).  Stevens, Doggett writes, “is governed by the inherent bias of the poet for 
the body’s faith in the palpable certainty of the world of immediate experience” (142). His 
work is invested in, and embedded within, an intellectual and philosophic tradition, but the 
root of the intellectual and philosophic for Stevens is always sentient2, and based on 
individualized and experiential contact with the world. Ultimately, it was always the 
imagination that was, for Stevens, “the liberating faculty in a deterministic world” 
(Peterson 52).  
Yet Stevens was never interested in disorienting and subverting the empirical 
faculties as was often the ambition of the Symbolists—a poetic method once described by 
Rimbaud as a “long, intimidating, immense and rational derangement of all the senses” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The internal ambiguity of the term “sense” is in itself interesting here.  The word is potentially inclusive of 
everything from the vaguest impressions received by the senses to the most carefully considered and 
contrived intellectual activity; from the most deeply entrenched use-values of signs and language to the most 
“innate” and presumably uninstructed reactions to, and interpretations of, practical situations.	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(Peyre 34).  Stevens’s concern was instead for what he saw to be the integral relationship 
among reality, sense perception, and the imagination. Margaret Peterson argues that, in 
essence, it is an “adaptation of Coleridge’s faculty psychology” that is at the root of 
Stevens’s “effort to reinstate poetry in the ‘center of consciousness’ as the ‘sum of our 
faculties,’” and she interprets Stevens’s primary poetic ambition to be, therefore, the 
reassertion of Coleridge’s claim that the imagination “brings the whole soul of man into 
activity” (52).3  Stevens’s reiteration of Croce’s Oxford lecture in “The Noble Rider” would 
indeed suggest this most plainly. In addition, Stevens’s emphasis on perception as “a 
bilateral rather than a unilateral activity” (Hill 3)4 confirms his allegiance to a sensibility 
(worthily represented by Coleridge) that emerged within the context of the empirical 
tradition advanced by philosophers like Hobbes, Locke, and Hume (Hill 3).  Finally, the 
much-identified concern for the integration of poetry and philosophy in Stevens’s work can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  In Chapter XIV of Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria he defines poetry in the following way: “My own 
conclusions on the nature of poetry, in the strictest use of the word, have been in part anticipated in the 
preceding disquisition on the fancy and imagination [in Chapter XIII]. What is poetry? is so nearly the same 
question with, what is a poem? that the answer to the one is involved in the solution of the other. For it is a 
distinction resulting from the poetic genius itself, which sustains and modifies the images, thoughts, and 
emotions of the poet’s own mind. A poet, described in ideal perfection, brings the whole soul of man into 
activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each other, according to their relative worth and dignity. He 
diffuses a tone, and spirit of unity, that blends, and (as it were) fuses, each into each, by that synthetic and 
magical power, to which we have exclusively appropriated the name of imagination. This power, first put in 
action by the will and understanding, and retained under their irremissive, though gentle and unnoticed, 
control (laxis effertur habenis [it is carried onwards with loose reins]) reveals itself in the balance or 
reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities: of sameness, with difference; of the general, with the 
concrete; the idea, with the image; the individual, with the representative; the sense of novelty and freshness, 
with old and familiar objects; a more than usual state of emotion, with more than usual order; judgement ever 
awake and steady self-possession, with enthusiasm and feeling profound or vehement; and while it blends and 
harmonizes the natural and the artificial, still subordinates art to nature; the manner to the matter; and our 
admiration of the poet to our sympathy with the poetry […] Finally, GOOD SENSE is the BODY of poetic 
genius, FANCY its DRAPERY, MOTION its LIFE, and IMAGINATION the SOUL that is everywhere, and 
in each; and forms all into one graceful and intelligent whole. (180)  
4John Spencer Hill characterizes Coleridge’s conception of sense experience as “a stimulus that evokes a 
response and involves (to borrow a phrase from Wordsworth) ‘A balance, an ennobling interchange of action 
from within and from without.’” “Thus the product in any given act of perception,” he continues, “is a 
modified combination of the percipient and the thing-perceived and is, as Coleridge asserts in Biographia 
Chap xii, neither a subject (perceiver) nor an object (thing-perceived) exclusively, but rather the most original 
union of both.   In and through the act of blending ‘thoughts’ and ‘things,’ the (primary) Imagination 
functions as a fusing, synthesizing power -- an esemplastic power whose operation generates a new reality by 
shaping parts into wholes, by reconciling opposites and drawing unity from diversity” (3). 
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also be usefully traced back to the Romantics.5 Although his lineage is, therefore, 
undeniably Romantic, Stevens—as he himself, as well as plenty of critics who doggedly 
defend him as “the quintessential modernist poet” (Thrift 52, emphasis added) would be 
quick to remind us—was not. Indeed, Stevens sharply distinguished himself from the 
Romantic tradition as well as from any religious or transcendentalist influence.  Though he 
wrote in “a time of disbelief,” that time was also “a time of truth-loving” (CP 849). The 
parameters of “truth” were firmly established, for Stevens, within the immediate world of 
“men”—men who, in the absence of “belief,” turn to “a fundamental glory of their own and 
from that create a style of bearing themselves in reality...a new style of a new bearing in a 
new reality” (CP 844).  
In the preface to Williams’ Collected Poems, Stevens wrote, “All poets are, to some 
extent, romantic poets” (CP 770), but in a review of Marianne Moore’s work, published in 
Life and Letters To-day in December 1935, he clarified this statement, explaining that he 
meant: 
the romantic in the other sense, meaning always the living and at the same time the 
imaginative, the youthful, the delicate and a variety of things which it is not 
necessary to try to particularize at the moment, constitutes the vital element in 
poetry.  It is absurd to wince at being called a romantic poet.  Unless one is that, one 
is not a poet at all. (CP 778)   
This said, he had no tolerance for “metaphysical” pretensions, nor for a “humanism” 
that he suspected merely substituted the restrictive terms of institutionalized religion with 
new, equally restrictive, terms.  His opposition to the rigidity of the Church is well known. 
“Reply to Papini” (1950) provides an obvious example of Stevens’s views, where in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  “The Romantic poets wrote about philosophy by writing about poetry,” writes Paul Hamilton. He identifies a 
reaction against “Empiricist metaphors” as the cause of what he (rather short-sightedly) terms this “unusual 
complicity” (29).	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uncharacteristically programmatic terms, he attacks institutionalized religion and proposes 
a substitution:  the more elastic and accommodating approach of the poet.  
Stevens’s opinions aside, Harold Bloom’s characterization of him as the single 
modern bearer of the Romantic tradition has had a lasting influence, albeit one that many 
contemporary critics have found as arbitrary as it is limiting. In his study of Wallace 
Stevens’s relation to the “literary canons” John Timberman Newcomb objects to Bloom’s 
interpretation of Stevens as having “forsak(en) the image”—claiming that the analysis was 
“created for the critic’s own purposes” and demonstrates only a very narrow understanding 
of the work as a whole. The objection is underscored by Newcomb’s observation that the 
quotation Bloom chose in order to establish his “anti-Imagist” argument (a quotation from 
“Esthetique de Mal” that begins: “The greatest poverty is not to live/ In a physical world” 
[CP 286]) “actually appeared to affirm the physicality and corporeality of this world—a 
habit of Stevens’s which Bloom acknowledged at other points in the book” (222). Too 
often, as the debate between Bloom and Newcomb shows, the enthusiastic defense of 
Stevens’s work according to the guiding principles of one group or style of criticism, or 
against the claims of another, results in the willful dismissal of much of the poetry’s 
richness and complexity.   
Perhaps the most common mistake that is repeatedly made by Stevens scholars is to 
polarize the philosophic and poetic concerns of the work.  Critics who accuse Stevens on 
the one hand of being too philosophical for poetry and on the other for being too poetic for 
philosophy risk missing the point.6  The intermediary space that Stevens’s poetry seeks to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	   In her discussion on Stevens’s relationship with his philosophical influences, whom she identifies as 
Benedetto Croce, Henri Bergson, William James, and George Santayana, Margaret Peterson states that “it is 
difficult to specify relevant ideas in an area (modern philosophy) in which Stevens managed to be unspecific 
with remarkable consistency” (60).  She resignedly announces, therefore, that “the most that can be hoped for 
is some grasp (admittedly limited) of the relation between Stevens’s aesthetic problem and the modern 
development of the problem of knowledge as it bears upon the idealist tradition” (60).  I would attest that the 
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establish between empirical knowledge and sensory experience should not be understood in 
positive, additive terms—“a little of this, a little of that”—making it possible, therefore, to 
isolate one thing from the other and argue over percentage values, but instead as a negative-
space from which, or against which both the philosophical and poetic concerns of the work 
arise.  It is not, in other words, a space of “the said” but of, as Blanchot puts it, “the 
wanting to say, the saying,” from which, or against which, “the said” can be observed to 
emerge.  Put still differently—this time in the words of the painter, Paul Klee—Stevens’s 
object is not “to render the visible, but to render visible” (Deleuze, FB 40). The space 
within which “visibility” is rendered is a space that does not and cannot exclude the 
intellect, but is, more properly, as Klee’s dictum suggests, the native space of the senses.  
For Stevens, no sense figures more prominently than the sense of sight. More like a 
painter’s sketch than a philosopher’s or even a poet’s discerning and singular choice of the 
signifying word, what is most important for Stevens is not the representation of the “seen,” 
but the development of a space from or against which a consciousness of the process 
through which that which is “render(ed) visible” might arise. It is this concentration on the 
sensory information through and against which we arrive at our knowledge of the world 
and our place within it—any depiction of which can only mark, as in “Thirteen Ways of 
Looking at a Blackbird,” “the edge/ Of one of many circles” (CP 76)—that gives rise to the 
negative-space of representation in Stevens’s poetry explored throughout this project. The 
elaboration of this space affords Stevens and his readers the opportunity to consider 
language intimately, and at its deepest level, revealing the ethical space of both difference 
and contact—between the speaking “I” and the “Other” against which the “I” is spoken—
that constitutes the heart of signification and representation itself. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“limitations” are here delineated by an insistence on reading Stevens within and against the rigid, rationalist 
structures of a philosophic tradition his poetry specifically sought to subvert and transcend.	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The Letter as Such 
Stevens’s lifelong interest and identification with the contemporary art world is 
testament to the benefits of considering his work in terms of a process of visual figuration, 
but even more crucial to this project is the figuration within Stevens’s work of the 
processes of figuration itself.  Through the use of this technique Stevens pushes past the 
representing figure—the speaking “I”—toward the “Other” who exists, necessarily, beyond 
the limits of the “I”’s capacity for representation. Emmanuel Levinas’s thinking is 
particularly useful to developing these considerations, but—as many critics such as Richard 
A. Macksey have justly warned, there is both “a peculiar temptation to enlist analogies 
from the philosophers in reading Wallace Stevens’s poetry—and a peculiar danger” (191).  
Some of these dangers are made evident enough by Stevens’s own remarks, cited above, 
regarding his resistance to “metaphysics”: albeit a “thinking” poet, he is, he insists, above 
all, a poet.  Nonetheless, to restrict an analysis of Stevens’s work strictly to language and 
the text itself is just as dangerous; essential to any thorough approach to Stevens’s work is, 
I believe, the conscientious attempt to establish a ground of reading as concordant as 
possible with the ground he himself tried so hard to establish for his writing: a ground of 
“reality” that would be inclusive of, but not limited to, the world of language and the 
imagination.   
This project focuses on Stevens’s relationship with the materiality of language, but 
just as Heidegger developed his “tool analysis” in Being and Time, not to analyze tools in 
themselves, but as part of a greater project that had to do with our manner of living and 
being in the world as a whole, so the emphasis placed on the function and material of 
language in Stevens’s poetry is only a “part” of what Stevens endeavoured to explore.   His 
minute analysis of both the possibilities and impossibilities of sound and meaning through 
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an emphasis on the “letter as such” (“The never rounding O,” “the dominant X”), and the 
introduction into his text of nonsense and foreign words (“Monocle de Mon Oncle,” “Lol-
lolling the endlessness of poetry” [391])—both of which draw attention to the surface or 
“aesthetic” features of his poetry—has led many critics, especially in the work’s initial 
reception, to dismiss Stevens as an “aesthete” or “hedonist.”7 This emphasis on the 
aesthetic qualities of language is crucial to Stevens’s larger aim, but it is indeed only a 
“part” of it.  As Macksey writes, what Stevens confronts in his work is, in proper Hegelian 
fashion, “pure Being.”  Though “it vanishes before his attention”—displaced by what 
Macksey terms “its antithesis, the nothingness which is to play an increasingly vital role in 
his thought”—Stevens does manage, according to Macksey, and the Hegelian formulation 
of the dialectic, to finally locate through his poetry:   
the concrete synthesis of Being and Not-Being in Becoming, the dynamism of both 
his worlds which saves the one from the curse of changelessness and propels the 
other ceaselessly toward the ‘ultimate poem’ which is always one concept to its 
contrary, from thesis to antithesis, and then to union. (190)  
 Indeed, change and movement are so fundamental to Stevens’s poetry that for him 
the danger is in becoming too reliant on this imagery—on “change” itself becoming a static 
form in his work. What alleviates this is his corresponding interest in and impulse toward 
exteriorization, toward the figuration of a space wherein, in Levinas’s words, “absolute 
exteriority presents itself in expressing itself, in a movement at each instant recovering and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  As Joseph N. Riddel has observed, “If anything distinguished the popular criticism of Stevens it is this 
insistence that his poetry was disengaged from reality, was “hermetic art.”   Although Eliot was also, 
contemporaneously, considered “a dandy, a wit,” his apocalyptic mode, along with his professed admiration 
of Laforgue and Baudelaire, permitted his poetry to be perceived to have “brought the age into critical focus 
even as it detached the poetic self from the age’s chaos.”   Stevens’s “hedonism” on the other hand was 
perceived of as “invading language, (it) made such beautiful music that it destroyed meaning.  This 
withdrawal of self into the imagination’s finery, it appeared, denied him the privilege of facing the age 
objectively and critically.  His detachment took the form of irresponsible escape.” (251) 
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deciphering the very signs it emits” (OTB 172).  His challenge, therefore, was to find a 
method of imag(in)ing movement in his work that would not reduce that movement to 
static form (to words or images alone), but would at the same time be brought to the fore; 
indeed, be imaged, thus resisting an equally alluring retreat into a nebulous and ultimately 
solipsistic interior space.  He would strike this balance most convincingly in his last 
collection, The Rock; here, movement is rendered not for its own sake, but for the sake of 
the immediate ethical encounter effected through radical exteriorization, an emphasis on the 
signifying element of language and representation as such8.   
 
The Same and the Other 
Emmanuel Levinas’s interrogation into the question of representation as the space 
of contact between the “I” of “the Same” and the “Other”9—a relation which, in the 
opening chapter of Totality and Infinity, he asserts “is language” (39)—will be a crucial 
touch-point for this project as it is precisely this space that Stevens works to elaborate 
within his own work.  Where Levinas is interested in uncovering and exploring 
representation at a primordial level (the manner in which subjectivities approach, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  According to Derrida in Of Grammatology, “The exteriority of the signifier is the exteriority of writing in 
general. […] Without that exteriority, the very idea of the sign falls into decay” (14).  In our epoch, Derrida 
explains, writing is always secondary, “preceded by truth.”  The “literal” meaning of writing is 
“metaphoricity itself.”  The signifier is thus always outside, external to, the truth, the signified, and that 
exteriority is essential to its function as signifier.  The “totality” of the signifier can never be a totality, “unless 
a totality constituted by the signifier preexists it, supervises its inscriptions and its signs, and is independent of 
it in ideality” (18).  The essential point here is that the idea of exteriority is crucial to the possibility of its 
opposite: interiority.  The “exterior” allows for an “inside,” and thus for the meaningfulness, of signification.	  
9	  In Totality and Infinity Levinas clarifies what he means by “the Same”: “The I is not a being that always 
remains the same, but is the being whose existing consists in identifying itself, in recovering its identity 
through all that happens to it.  It is the primal identity, the primordial work of identification” (36).  That which 
interrupts the “I” and thus defines its subjectivity “is the Other.” Of this entity, Levinas writes: “He and I do 
not form a number.  The collectivity in which I say ‘you’ or ‘we’ is not a plural of the ‘I.’  I, you—these are 
not individuals in a common concept.   Neither possession nor unity of number nor the unity of concepts links 
me to the Stranger [l’Etranger], the Stranger who disturbs the being at home with oneself [le chez soi].  But 
stranger also means the free one.  Over him I have no power.  He escapes my grasp by an essential dimension 
even if I have him at my disposal.  He is not wholly in my sight.  But I, who have no concept in common with 
the Stranger, am, like him, without genus.  We are the same and the other.  The conjunction and here 
designates neither addition nor power of one term over the other” (39).	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appropriate and reflect what exists as “Other,” beyond the limits of their particular 
sensibilities) Stevens explores representation at the level of the text (the manner in which 
the speaker arrives at his ideas and perceptions and that the poem, therefore, arrives at its 
content).  In order to elaborate this perceptual space, however, Stevens also—necessarily—
grapples with the primordial questions of representation engaged by Levinas.  
In order for a subject to understand itself as “being” a subject at all, writes Levinas, 
it must first “signify.” This signification is based on the primordial relationship of the “I” to 
the “Other,” which is at the root of sensibility, and thus representation. In Otherwise Than 
Being this relationship is explored by Levinas in depth. He explains: “This changing of 
being into signification, that is, into substitution, is the subject’s subjectivity, of its 
subjection to everything, its susceptibility, its vulnerability, that is, its sensibility” (14).  It 
is this very primordial “breakup of identity”—which constitutes subjectivity itself—that is, 
for Levinas, the very definition of “ethics.” “Responsibility for the other,” he expounds, “in 
its antecedence to my freedom, its antecedence to the present and to representation, is a 
passivity more passive than all passivity, an exposure to the other without this exposure 
being assumed, an exposure without holding back, exposure of exposedness, expression, 
saying” (15). In the extremity of its passivity and exposedness, the subject is always-
already a representation or “expression” of itself for the other.  It is this being “for the 
other” that is being at all, but it is a responsibility “that goes beyond being,” and remains, 
even “in its activity, a passivity, more passive than all passivity, for it is a sacrifice without 
reserve” (OTB 15). Being is defined by Levinas, in other words, by what is always beyond 
being, impossible to articulate, but nevertheless always implicit, indeed at the root of, the 
processes of representation by which and through which it is defined.  Ethics is precisely 
that which refuses representation, the negative-space of every subjectivity, the originary 
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fracturing of that which lies beyond signification from and against which the signified is 
constituted.   
It is precisely this space that Stevens works, through his poetry, not to define but to 
expose. Even his pronouncement in his posthumously published notebooks, that “[e]thics 
are no more a part of poetry than they are of painting” (904), reveals despite (indeed 
because of) its insistence on a negative construction of the relationship among poetry, 
painting and ethics, a shared space of relationship among them. In fact, bringing the three 
together in this pronouncement is testament to the fact that—though it is by no means 
defined, and indeed is here half-heartedly denied—the relationship existed for Stevens. 
This project endeavours to open up the space of this relation in Stevens’s poetry in terms of 
what is common to all three: an engagement with the “Other” through the processes of 
representation itself.  
A major difference exists, however, between the negative-space of representation in 
the visual arts and the negative-space fundamental to Stevens’s poetics.  In contrast to the 
way that the particular arises within a painting or photograph—even in the most abstract of 
images—against the negative-space of what it is not, Stevens attempts the reverse.  He 
focuses on the particular—the image, the letter, the word; what has, in short, already been 
“render(ed) visible”—in order to gain access to that which exceeds the visible.  Through a 
focus on the particularly, materiality and functionality of language, Stevens attempts to 
locate a method by which the ultimate passivity of representation itself—in the words of 
Blanchot, a “time without present, (an) I without I” (15)— might be confronted and 
explored.   The goal for Stevens is to grasp the particular at the point where it marks, like 
an absent blackbird, the edge of an endless continuance of spiralling circles—not in order 
to depict or fix that edge, or the circles themselves, but in order to figure the process of that 
ever-outward, ever-continual, spiral of perception and representation. This is a process that 
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is, after all, the very work of being, and also therefore of ethics: the work of perceiving, 
filtering, identifying, and eventually (in one form or another) addressing one’s experiences 
to “the Other.”  
Another name for the figuration of this process is, of course, as Levinas and others 
have pointed out, language.10 Just as it was delineated at the beginning of his career in 
“Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird,” Stevens’s project was to discover a space in 
which to explore representation through a “render(ing) visible” of language itself, 
accomplished by investigating and accounting for both the sensory experience of the eye 
and the intellectual filtering processes of the mind.  Language, for Stevens, like vision, is a 
collaborative activity of both the intellect and the senses.  An exploration of language 
therefore reveals the integral relationship between body and mind, reality and imagination.  
 
World and Thing 
Consistent with Martin Heidegger’s formulation of “world” and “thing,” whereby a 
mutual penetration results in an intermediate space of what Heidegger terms their “dif-
ference,”11 Stevens’s poetry is characterized by the constant inter-penetration between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	   “It is supplementarity,” according to Derrida, “that constitutes the property [propre] of man,” and makes 
possible “speech, society, passion, etc” (OG 244).  That is, it is not the sign, but the possibility of the sign’s 
repetition that pre-figures language. “But,” we might ask, along with Derrida, “what is this property [propre] 
of man? On the one hand, it is that of which the possibility must be thought before man, and outside of him.  
Man allows himself to be announced to himself after the fact of supplementarity, which is thus not an 
attribute—accidental or essential—of man.  For on the other hand, supplementarity, which is nothing, neither 
a presence nor an absence, is neither a substance nor an essence of man.  It is precisely the play of presence 
and absence, the opening of this play that no metaphysical or ontological concept can comprehend. Therefore 
this property [propre] of man is not a property of man: it is the dislocation of the proper in general. […]  Man 
calls himself man only by drawing limits excluding his other from the play of supplementarity: the purity of 
animality, primitivism, childhood, madness, divinity.  The approach to these limits is at once feared as a threat 
of death, and desired as access to a life without différance (OG 244).	  
	  
11	  Heidegger’s “dif-ference” is, of course, a precursor of Derrida’s “différance.” Heidegger uses the term “dif-
ference” in his essay, “Language” to discuss the “separation of the between” in the intimate relationship 
between “world” (“the ever non-objective”[PLT 43]) and “thing” (the object, that which is “not simply 
nothing”[PLT 21]; “something always already there”[PLT 22]).  He writes: “In the midst of the two, in the 
between of world and thing, in their inter, division prevails: a dif-ference” (PLT 199).  It is important to 
Heidegger that the word used to describe this in-between space is “removed from its usual and customary 
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several seeming dichotomies:  “reality” (the sensory world understood through the 
intellectual processes of the mind) and “the imagination” (an intermediate zone into which 
sensory input is received and the intellectual processes, including language, take place); the 
“peculiar” and the “general;” and the “minor” (or “singular”) and the “major” man.  Again, 
in his preface to Williams’ Collected Poems, Stevens would write: “Something of the 
unreal is necessary to fecundate the real; something of the sentimental is necessary to 
fecundate the anti-poetic” (CP 770).  The development of Stevens’s own work traces his 
efforts toward establishing a tangible space in which to figure a “Reality” that would be 
inclusive of these contradictions.  His is an exploration of Being itself as neither “real” nor 
“imaginary,” “peculiar” nor “general,” but instead—moving beyond an ultimately 
solipsistic enquiry into the possibilities and limitations of the Cartesian cogito—a space of 
Levinasian encounter between the speaking “I” and the “Other.”12 Stevens figures a space, 
that is, of transcendence, though not in any religious or, as he once wrote, “derogatory” 
Romantic sense (CP 778). As is the case for Levinas’s thinking, “transcendence” in relation 
to Stevens’s poetry must be understood in a positive, but ultimately limited, sense—bound 
always by the restrictions of human imagination and therefore by the reality of the 
perceivable world—within the space of a consideration of language and representation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
usage” (PLT 200).  Derrida takes this further, insisting that différance “is literally neither a word nor a 
concept” (MOP 3).  It is instead a movement—a continual displacing/displacement of the trace, which opens 
a temporal interval, but also a spatial one.  It is crucial that the substitution of an a for an e “remains purely 
graphic: it is read, or it is written, but it cannot be heard.  It cannot be  [apprehended] in speech, and […] 
bypasses the order of apprehension in general” (MOP 3-4). It is always an opening, and always in motion; it 
can never be grasped.  Derrida even goes so far as to suggest that his différance refers “to an order which no 
longer belongs to sensibility” (MOP 5), and “derives from no category of being, whether present or absent” 
(MOP 6).  This is certainly not far from Heidegger’s sense of “dif-ference” as that “which is neither 
distinction nor relation,” a “dimension” that “no longer means a precinct already present independently in 
which this or that comes to settle” (PLT 200), but Derrida goes even farther to insist upon the absolute alterity 
of his term.  	  
12	  This is an argument that has been suggested by critic David Jarraway in his 1993 publication Wallace 
Stevens and the Question of Belief. In his commentary on Stevens’s poem “The Countryman,” Jarraway cites 
Levinas’s view that “a work conceived radically is a movement of the same toward the Other which never 
returns to the same” (289).   The implications of this statement and the drive in Stevens’s work toward an 
exteriorization which is simultaneously a drive toward encounter with the “Other” in this Levinasian sense 
remains to be more comprehensively explored.	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itself.   Because of this, it will be useful to again turn to Levinas for a more explicit 
vocabulary with which to express the particular quality of “transcendence” that is 
unremittingly sought and, by times, achieved, through Stevens’s poetry.   It is a 
“transcendence” that should be understood neither in high Romantic, nor in the hyperbolic 
high Modernist terms implemented by Newcomb to describe the modern poet’s “overriding 
‘need’… to establish a space of transcendence in the absence of gods” which drives him 
deeper and deeper into the “yawning emptiness of the self” (Newcomb 220-221), but 
instead in Levinasian terms of the “face to face.”13   
 
Language as Desire 
The positive deployment of (the) pacific relation with the other, without frontier or 
any negativity, is produced in language.  Language does not belong among the 
relations that could appear through the structures of formal logic; it is contact across 
distance, relation with the untouchable, across a void.  It takes place in the 
dimension of absolute desire by which the same is in relation with an other that was 
not simply lost by the same. (TI 172)   
Levinas’s formulation of language as a space of desire can also be exceptionally 
illuminating when brought to bear on the negativity at the root of much of Stevens’s poetry.  
This negativity is perhaps most complexly explored, and therefore also particularly striking, 
in the later post-war collections, Transport to Summer (1947), The Auroras of Autumn 
(1950) and The Rock (1954).  The negative-space that is achieved in these collections 
through further emphasis on the processes of representation itself—processes as equally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  “The notion of the face...makes possible the description of the notion of the immediate.  The philosophy of 
the immediate is realized neither in Berkeley’s idealism nor in modern ontology.  To say that the existent is 
disclosed only in the openness of Being is to say that we are never directly with the existent as such.  The 
immediate is the interpellation and, if we may speak thus, the imperative of language.  The idea of contact 
does not represent the primordial mode of the immediate.  Contact is already a thematization and a reference 
to a horizon.  The immediate is the face to face” (Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 52)	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inclusive of the represented object or idea as the sensory material and intellectual practices 
from which that object or idea arises—provides an opportunity for the investigation of 
language as part of the more fundamental structure of desire described by Levinas. This is 
not a space of “seeing or grasping” (which, as Levinas explains, are modes merely of 
“enjoyment, sensibility, and possession” [OTB 172]), but instead that space where 
“absolute exteriority presents itself in expressing itself” (OTB 172).  It is a space, in other 
words, wherein what can at any time be “seen” or “grasped” by the limited senses is 
exposed.  This allows for the “transcendence” of those limitations through the same 
excessive desire by which they (and thus sensibility itself) are defined, as well as the 
potential figuration of that state of prolepsis Blanchot describes as the very (absent) core of 
language.  
Indeed, Stevens charges that the true measure of a poet is not the measure of his 
power to “grasp” or delimit anything in a positive sense, but “his power to abstract himself, 
and to withdraw with him into his abstraction the reality on which the lovers of truth insist” 
(CP 657).  The poet, Stevens insists, “must be able to abstract himself and also to abstract 
reality, which he does by placing it in his imagination” (CP 657).  The absorbent space of 
the imagination that Stevens evokes here functions as a space of “transcendence” in which 
“truth”—the immediate and absolute exteriority of the world and our experience within it—
is made accessible not at the remove of mere “enjoyment, sensibility, or possession” but 
instead through genuine contact and reflection.    
 
“The pressure of reality” 
Stevens’s “Noble Rider”—although echoing the words of Croce’s Oxford Lecture 
as cited above—begins with the words of another philosopher, Plato, whom Stevens also 
quotes at length.  The passage is from the Phaedrus and describes the soul as a composite 
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figure of a pair of winged horses (one noble, one ignoble) and a charioteer. In describing 
the method by which we are seized by Plato’s description (identifying immediately with the 
charioteer) but then soon dropped from the sky, the images dissolving in the realization of 
their ultimate unreality, Stevens asserts:  
The imagination loses vitality as it ceases to adhere to what is real.  When it adheres 
to the unreal and intensifies what is unreal, while its first effect may be 
extraordinary, that effect is the maximum effect that it will ever have.  In Plato’s 
figure, his imagination does not adhere to what is real.  On the contrary, having 
created something unreal, it adheres to it and intensifies its unreality.14(CP 645)   
For Stevens, it is not so much, as this excerpt endeavours to explain, that there 
exists a visible hard and fast distinction between the “real” and the “unreal,” but rather that 
the “unreality” to which Plato has affixed his images must also be understood as a part of 
“reality.”  “Unreal things have a reality of their own, in poetry as elsewhere,” (CP 644) 
Stevens writes—an idea compellingly rendered in “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven”: 
“Everything as unreal as real could be, // In the inexquisite eye” (CP 399).  For Stevens, as 
usual, what is at stake is a question not of “real” or “unreal,” but of the process of 
figuration: the process by which that perceived as “real” or “unreal” is interpreted and 
conveyed.  Understood in this sense, “unreal” things (that is, those things invisible to the 
“inexquisite eye”—“inexquisite” here meaning that which has not been selected or chosen 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  In Derrida’s discussion of this work in his important early essay, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” he interrogates the 
play of language in the Plato’s text, a play that Plato himself was only partially in control of.  Derrida 
metaphorically refers to writing in this essay as a “pharmakon”—a word that, in Greek, can mean both drug 
or poison, can imply either the cure for or the cause of a disease. “The word pharmakon is caught in a chain 
of significations” (ADR 124), writes Derrida, and “no absolute privilege allows us absolutely to master its 
textual system” (ADR 125). Writing is always tied to the central ambiguity by which it is represented in 
Phaedrus, always-already cloaked in mythos and betraying its fundamental metaphoric structure.  “The god of 
writing is thus also a god of medicine,” writes Derrida (ADR 123).  In just this way, Stevens highlights the 
ambiguous relationship between imagination and reality.  There is no way of unraveling the one from the 
other, “no absolute privilege” that would allow us to master the system within which the two are united, no 
ultimate “Reality” that could provide the key to the puzzling metaphoricity at the root of the relationship 
between the two.  
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by the intellect) have just as much potential as “real” things for being figured palpably 
enough to adhere to Stevens’s more expansive and general sense of the “real.”  “Reality,” 
that is, “as a thing seen by the mind: 
Not that which is but that which is apprehended,  
a mirror, a lake of reflections in a room,  
A glassy ocean lying at the door. (CP 399)   
 
It was imperative for Stevens, throughout his career, that imagination and reality be 
considered in dialectical relation to one another, as vital parts of a potentially synthetic 
space of inter-action.  The “idea of nobility” in art, which Stevens delineates in “The Noble 
Rider,” had all but disappeared in his estimation due to the mistaken privileging in 
contemporary society of an impoverished sense of phenomenal “reality” over the life of the 
mind and the value of the contemplative imagination.  If the early to mid twentieth century 
art world familiar to Stevens had, indeed, retained any sense of the “nobility” Stevens 
describes, it was only in “degenerate forms or in a much diminished state” due to a “failure 
in the relation between the imagination and reality” (CP 649, emphasis added).  This failure 
was attributable in turn to what Stevens refers to in “The Noble Rider”—in a phrase that 
would echo resoundingly through subsequent generations of artists, its influence renewed 
in the 1950s by the Abstract Expressionist movement in the United States—as “the pressure 
of reality” (CP 650).  In the artistic realm of the 1930s and 1940s, this “pressure,” which 
Stevens describes as resulting from “an external event or events on the consciousness to the 
exclusion of any power of contemplation,” resulted not so much from the occurrence of any 
singular “external event” in itself (though the economic and political atmosphere of the day, 
cannot, of course, be separated from the production and concerns of the working artists) but 
from the cultural reaction to this strain.  This reaction contributed to the exaltation and 
popularization of a literature of social realism, which defined the styles of a much wider 
and more various array of artists than merely those who, like Theodore Dreiser and Upton 
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Sinclair, identified stylistically as “social realists,” or those associated, in the realm of the 
visual art, with either the Ashcan school or the later “regionalist” style typified by Thomas 
Hart Benton.   
“Social Realism”—the depiction of the gritty reality of working class life in the 
1930s and 1940s—had indeed become the dominant mode of perceiving and thinking about 
art and the world.  Those working in between the two World Wars were hard pressed, as 
Stevens observed, to conceive of the task of the artist as other than a direct medium for the 
immediate, visible world that surrounded him.15  The reaction to the “pressure” of this 
reality, and the obvious limits to artistic representation that it posed, was various.  One 
striking example was the poet George Oppen, who would give up poetry for a span of thirty 
years from the 1930s until the 1960s, because of his conviction that the political pressures 
of his time bore more obvious and immediate weight—as well as the fear that his having 
given way (necessarily, as he saw it) to a more “pressing” political reality would make him 
a writer of “bad poetry—poetry tied to a moral or a political (same thing) judgement” (66).  
Later, Oppen would return to poetry, in part from a sense of defeat in the political realm 
(“I...returned to poetry only when we knew that we had failed” [quoted in Nicholls 40], he 
once wrote), but also from a new sense of optimism born of his realization, through poetry, 
of a means with which he might  “rediscover” politics—“this time in the ‘existential’ world 
of being and making rather than in that other world in which ‘knowledge’ had been 
devalued to the currency of surveillance” [Nicholls 42]).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 “When I was at Harvard, a long time ago,” recounts Stevens in his 1936 Harvard address, “it was a 
commonplace to say that all the poetry had been written and all the paintings painted” (CP 783).  Robert 
Buttell comments that Stevens’s conception was that poetry had begun around that time to seem “less and less 
significant in a world of science, industrialism, and middle class culture.  The Decadent’s response was to 
establish a cult of isolated beauty” (Stevens’s mentor Santayana, with whose thinking Stevens would always 
sit uncomfortably, would fall in this camp), “while at the opposite extreme the realistic and naturalistic 
novelists were making a determined effort to deal with the actual world, as sordid as it might be” (Pearce and 
Miller 29).	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What gave Oppen cause for cautious hope with his return to poetry in the 1960s, 
however—with a new formula by which he conceived that the “pressure of reality” (CP 
650) might be integrated with the generative potency of the imagination16—was one that 
Stevens had been working out since the days of Harmonium (1923).  What Stevens referred 
to as his “reality-imagination complex” (L 792) indeed formed the generative thrust of his 
poetry from the beginning of his career.  The space of their interpenetration—the emphasis 
placed, that is, on neither “reality,” nor the “imagination,” but instead on the shared 
negative-space of sensibility and representation between them—is explored, however, with 
greater and greater intensity as his career progresses.   
 
A Necessary Angel 
Though I will continue, throughout this project, to rely on the use of word 
“between”—which is unfortunately suggestive of a separately delineated “third space”—it 
is crucial to remember that the negative-space that provided the generative source for 
Stevens’s poetry throughout his career should not be considered a separate space at any 
final remove from the conflict between “imagination” and “reality.”  It should also be kept 
firmly in mind that the investigation of this space is not geared finally toward any 
“solution” (or to use the language of “The Rock,” a “cure”) to the conflict it seeks to 
encompass and embody. Instead, it serves to articulate a hyphenated space of “dif-ference” 
between imagination and reality, time and space. Indeed, it strives to articulate the very 
chiastic interval wherein imagination exists as reality and reality as the imagination, where 
space is encountered as time and time is encountered as space. The particular relevance of 
Levinas’s thinking in relation to this opening of a space between these tightly interlocked 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  “Poetry has to be protean,” wrote Oppen in a letter to his sister June dated 1959, “meaning must begin 
there...A poem has got to be written into the future” (22)	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concepts is that for him, as for Stevens, it is never simply a question of dialectics.  The 
exploration of this chiastic interval between reality and the imagination, as between 
subjects, is an ethically charged movement toward contact and comprehension.  
 
In his useful essay, “Wallace Stevens and the Symbolist Imagination”— which laid 
to rest the last lingering suspicions of a legitimate correspondence between Stevens work 
and the French Symbolists—Michel Benamou remarks that where Baudelaire remembers a 
world “before the fall,” Stevens projects an “Adamic hopefulness”; that where Mallarmé 
sought out a land of the mind “beyond reality,” Stevens sought “a land beyond the mind, as 
part of reality” (92). Disillusion is described by Stevens in “An Ordinary Evening in New 
Haven” as “the last illusion.”  His “fiction of the absolute” strives to move past even this, to 
rid itself of the apocalyptic rhetoric of his era, not necessarily in order to assert a new vision 
or an optimism for the future, but in order to access the space in which our realities—that 
is, our disillusions as equally as our illusions—are made.    
Stanley Burnshaw’s infamous dismissal of Stevens’s long-awaited second volume 
of poetry, Ideas of Order, in the October 1935 issue of New Masses, has had lasting 
influence on Stevens criticism—though, over seventy-five years later, it has itself been 
dismissed countless times, and even renounced by the author himself.17 Burnshaw, who had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 In his preface to the review (reprinted in The Stanley Burnshaw Reader in 1990), Burnshaw insists that the 
piece was included only because of “the documentary relevance to the Stevens poem that it evoked” (“Mr. 
Burnshaw and the Statue”) and “is offered without the slightest pride of authorship.”  Earlier in the preface he 
contextualizes his critical position at the time as an (admittedly naïve) American writer and critic of the far 
Left.  Speaking of himself in the third person, Burnshaw writes: “He had also been advised that formal 
analysis could lead to futile complexities, and that a too-temperate stance was simply a foolish timidity.  And 
yet, nobody had tried to speed up his slow ‘political’ development by flashing a party-membership card under 
his nose.  And none of his words had ever been corrected by the red pencil of a commissar. He could do as he 
pleased—for he would do no wrong.  Like the others around him he deeply believed in the necessity for 
promoting the Ultimate Good, whatever the circumstances.  But within a year after writing the Stevens 
review, his private angel had pinned his shoulders to the ground.  Until his departure, however, he continued 
to do as he had done, without wavering from his public position, perhaps hoping unconsciously that the very 
act of repeating beliefs might make them unquestionable for him” (26). 
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admired Stevens’s earlier collection, Harmonium18—referring to it as “mainly sense poetry, 
but not as Keats’s is sense poetry”—criticized Stevens sharply for what he saw in Ideas of 
Order to be a lack of engagement with social and political realities. Stevens’s once  
“harmonious cosmos” is, according to Burnshaw, in his second collection, “suddenly 
screeching with confusion.” Ideas of Order, complained Burnshaw, is merely “the record of 
a man who, having lost his footing, now scrambles to stand up and find his balance” (30).  
Despite the irrelevant political overtone to the critique—which would very shortly 
inspire Burnshaw to disown it—the review touches on a legitimate disjuncture in the work 
between the fictive world of the singular imagination and the social reality beyond it.  The 
summary dismissal of the “confusion” that this disjuncture causes, however, overlooks the 
book’s most fundamental concern.  “Will Stevens sweep his contradictory notions into a 
valid Idea of Order?” Burnshaw had asked—replying himself that the answer would depend 
not only on the “personal predisposition of the poet” but on the “alternatives” facing him as 
a poet.  For Burnshaw in 1935, the disjuncture between social pressures and the life of the 
mind is one that can only be solved by deductive reasoning processes like those he 
recognized within Harmonium—certainly not by the “confusions” and “contradictions” that 
pepper Ideas of Order. Published after a ten year silence (a silence that, unlike Oppen’s, 
had more to do with Stevens’s responsibilities at the Hartford Insurance company and as a 
new father than any overt artistic or political concerns) this highly anticipated collection 
was, as Burnshaw’s review makes apparent, initially misunderstood because of its refusal to 
adhere to the expectations of the more overtly socially and politically engaged poetry that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Burnshaw argued that in Harmonium Stevens manages to suffuse his sensory imagery with subjective 
emotion—that the poetry is “scientific,” its sensuousness objectified: “separated from its kernel of fire, and 
allowed to settle, cool off, and harden in the poet’s mind until it emerges a strange amazing crystal” (29).    
Reading Stevens’s early poetry, Burnshaw concluded, “becomes a venture in crystallography” (29).  	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was emblematic of the time.19 Although the book is widely appreciated now as one of 
Stevens’s finest, the idea promoted by Burnshaw’s New Masses review—that Stevens 
cloistered himself from the “reality” of his day—lingers, revealing perhaps that our 
contemporary critical understanding of “reality” is not much more nuanced than it was in 
1935. But, as David Jarraway writes, even in the politically-charged climate of the 1930s, 
“Stevens must have secretly known,” that “writing more socially correct poetry […] could 
have done nothing to resolve conflicts that were rooted at a more psychic and inspirational 
level” (72). Far from retreating from, or disengaging with, the issues of his day, Stevens 
instead sought an approach by which they might be explored more meditatively—through 
an exploration of the fundamental disjuncture between the internal life of the mind (its 
desires, expectations and inhibitions) and the external pressures and limitations that delimit 
and shape that interiority.  
Even in Harmonium, it is the “spurning-craving” of psychic desire that constitutes 
the drive of the poems—a tension between the self-satisfied Hoon (“I was the world in 
which I walked” [CP 51]) and the impossible plight of “The Snow Man,” who, as 
“…nothing himself, beholds / Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is” (CP 8). It is 
this space of tension, typical of the modernist “crisis of representation” formulated by 
Fredric Jameson, that is, in Stevens’s later collections, burst asunder, turning this “crisis”—
in the disruptive fashion that would be later identified with the “postmodern” 20—on its 
head.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  This engagement ranged from the language-oriented approach of Objectivist poets like Oppen, Zukofsky 
and Niedecker, who sought to offer—through a concentration on the “object” of the poem itself—a more 
honest and clear-sighted view of the world, to the overtly political and propagandist poetics favoured by 
Leftist magazines like Partisan Review and New Masses.	  	  
20	  Jarraway makes a striking comparison between Stevens’s formulation of reality as the object seen in “its 
greatest common sense” and Lyotard’s articulation, in The Postmodern Condition, of “the rule that there is no 
reality unless testified by a consensus between partners over a certain knowledge and certain commitments.”  
Jarraway goes on to suggest, quoting Jameson, that a “text” for Stevens thus “liberates us from the empirical 
object…by displacing our attention to its constitution as an object and its relationship to the other objects thus 
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According to Jameson, the “crisis of representation” through which Stevens lived 
and produced is characterized by “an essentially realistic epistemology, which conceives of 
representation as the reproduction, for subjectivity, of an objectivity that lies outside it—(it) 
projects a mirror theory of knowledge and art, whose fundamental evaluative categories are 
those of adequacy, accuracy and Truth itself” (as quoted in Jarraway 40).  Stevens’s entire 
poetic project if observed as a whole—from the reality-imagination dichotomy of the early 
collections, epitomized by “Anecdote of a Jar,” to the “dizzle-dazzle” (CP 449) of the later 
poems’ endless refractions—can be conceived of as an explosion of this “mirror theory of 
knowledge,” in which the mirror, and along with it the notion of a single or empirical 
Reality that might be reflected therein, as well as the idea of a one-to-one correspondence 
between the outer (Real) and the inner (imaginative) worlds, was finally shattered.   
Lost through this shattering was not a sense of the legitimacy of the Real world, but 
of the legitimacy of any illusory faith in a totalizing explanation or representation of that 
Reality.  Writing that abandoned an effort to connect to the Real, as Stevens saw to be the 
case with the Symbolists, was equally as undesirable to him as limiting himself to the 
empirical facts: “Reality,” for Stevens, “was therefore a necessary angel.  Without it, there 
could be no way for the imagination to distinguish itself, in its presupposing ‘both 
distinction from and relation to otherness’” (Jarraway 74).  Even at the earliest stages of his 
career, then, and in direct contrast to the bulk of criticism of the past seventy-five years, 
which has dubbed Stevens variously as an “anti-realist ... solipsist ... escapist” (Chiasson 
63), Stevens’s poetry is characterized by a far broader conception of Reality—or more 
accurately, a will to conception—than was in common currency at the time: a Reality in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
constituted” (75).  But this is, of course, an observation that could be made just as easily about Emily 
Dickinson as Stevens, and indeed the “crisis of representation” Jarraway deems fundamental to Stevens’s era 
is a critical argument that dates at least as far back as M.H. Abram’s study of Romanticism, “The Mirror and 
the Lamp.”  Regardless, Jarraway’s insistence on the manner in which Stevens (continues to) destabilize 
empirical reality in order to illuminate and access a more ambiguous and thus inclusive version of reality is 
instructive in regards to Stevens’s moment and the particularities of his poetic approach. 	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which language—the “the sound of words”—as well as the life of the mind, were not 
separate, but instead a definitive part.  
 
But rather than an emphasis on cohesion and wholeness Stevens’s emphasis was 
instead on disjuncture and difference. This is a poetic as well as an ethical impulse that 
goes back at least as far as Aristotle, who argued that in order for pity to arise between two 
subjects it was necessary that a gap should be established between them. For Plato, 
empathy of any kind between subjects had been a threat to the stable definition of the self—
it was for this reason that he infamously decreed that the poet would be banned from his 
Republic.  Aristotle makes an important step in ethical thinking, therefore, when he posits 
that pity is not immersive but something instead to be encountered, confronted—and that it 
therefore does not threaten to absorb the subject completely and therefore absolve him of 
his essential subjectivity as Plato had presumably feared.  The basis of the ethical relation, 
for Aristotle, lay precisely in the introduction and maintenance not of direct identification, 
but of a definable space of difference that was revealed between subjectivities.  In Tragedy, 
for example, pity functions only when a certain distance is achieved between he that pities 
and he that is pitied.  This is why Aristotle instructs in his Poetics that pity and fear are 
more affectively, and therefore effectively, achieved through drama by building them into 
“the structure of events” rather than by introducing spectacle.  He explains: “The plot 
should be constructed in such a way that, even without seeing it, anyone who hears the 
events which occur shudders and feels pity at what happens; this is how someone would 
react on hearing the plot of the Oedipus.” (22). The tragic “effect” is stronger when a 
distance from the event itself and the subjectivities involved has been achieved. Off-stage, 
this same distance is what allows empathy between two subjects to “affectively”—as well 
“effectively”—arise.   
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By the time of Aristotle, the concept of banishing the “poets” had become 
preposterous, if not outright impossible: for Aristotle, everything was poetry, or potential 
poetry—but this was not necessarily a good thing. It had become even more necessary to 
maintain a certain amount of distance from the subject in order to avoid getting locked into 
the absorbing egoism of the lyrical “I.” It is this distance that Stevens also strives to 
achieve—a dimension that, like the inter of Heidegger’s “dif-ference,” “no longer means a 
precinct already present independently in which this or that comes to settle” (PLT 200), 
and, like Derrida’s différance, would derive “from no category of being, whether present or 
absent” (MOP 6).  It is this distance that establishes, as it does for Aristotle, the possibility 
of contact within Stevens’s poetry.  
 
 Make it Strange 
Stevens’s concern for a method of expressing the hyphenated space of difference 
between reality and the imagination through the figuration of an overlapping negative-
space, simultaneously reveals a correlative concern for the disruption of each—for the 
disruption, indeed, of the characterization of any experience or mode of perception as stable 
or isolate.  This latter impulse can usefully be understood in terms of the Russian formalist 
project of ostranenie, or “defamiliarization,” first articulated by Victor Shklovsky in his 
1917 essay, “Art as Device.”  Poetry, for Shklovsky was an essential method whereby 
ordinary “prose” language, in being made conspicuous, difficult, or “strange,” could 
become perceivable again, thus re-investing the world with meaning; it was a way, in 
Shklovsky’s words, to “make the stone stony again” (16)21.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Two years earlier, in her preface to Some Imagist Poets, Amy Lowell had written that one of the express 
purposes of Imagist poetics was “to produce poetry that is hard and clear, never blurred or indefinite” (vi).  
(Think of Burnshaw’s disappointment that Stevens’s Ideas of Order had lost the “crystalline” sharpness he 
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“The purpose of art,” Shklovsky writes, “is to impart the sensation of things as they 
are perceived and not as they are known. The technique of art is to make objects 
‘unfamiliar,’ to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception 
because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged” (16). 
In “Two or Three Ideas”—an essay that was first delivered as a lecture at Mount Holyoke 
College—these ideas are echoed by Stevens in a discussion on poetic “style.”  His major 
claim in the piece is that “the style of the poem and the poem itself are one” (CP 839), and 
to illustrate this point he uses the example of Baudelaire’s “La Vie Antérieure” and Yeats’ 
“Lake-Isle of Innisfree,” arguing that in both “[t]he familiar experience is made 
unfamiliar.”  It is precisely this rendering of the familiar as “unfamiliar” that allows us, 
Steven contends, to return via the poem to “the [abode] of the imagination” (CP 840). “It is 
plain that when, in this world of weak feeling and blank thinking,” he explains further, “we 
encounter some integration of the poem that pierces and dazzles us, the effect is an effect of 
style and not of the poem itself or at least not of the poem alone.  The effective integration 
is not a disengaging of the subject.  It is a question of the style in which the subject is 
presented” (CP 840). It is not that the subject itself is “made strange” or unfamiliar, in other 
words, but that the formation of the reader’s perception of the subject is pronounced.  The 
idea of elaborating the processes by which one arrives at a given perception so that this 
process is prolonged in the way that Shklovsky describes—that art could be a figuring of 
the processes of perception itself—would indeed have resonated with Stevens.  For him, the 
goal was never to achieve a quality, in imagist or objectivist fashion, of “stoniness” for the 
sake of the “stone,” the “thing-in-itself22,” but neither was it, in Russian formalist fashion, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
had detected in Harmonium). The poetic sensibility of the day was toward as concrete a rendering of the 
“solid,” the “real,” as language could be imagined to allow.	  	  
22	  The imagists were invested in the “object-ness” of objects in order that we could see them as they are, in 
their plasticity and relation to other objects.  For Stevens, there was only one “object” for poetry and that was 
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question of the representation of abstract form.  Instead, his interest was, again, in 
“render(ing) visible” the processes of perception and representation in order that the 
fundamental integration between the concrete and the abstract might be more fully realized 
and explored. As Stevens remarked in a lecture delivered at the University of Chicago in 
1951 titled “A Collect of Philosophy,” it is the belief in and dependence upon this 
fundamental integration that unites philosophy and poetry.  Both poets and philosophers, he 
writes, are in “the habit of forming concepts,” and that habit is a “habit of the mind by 
which it probes for an integration” (862).  For Stevens, the question did not revolve around 
either “stone” or “stoniness” itself, but the way that the concept “stone” is rendered through 
an “integration” of both.  His interest, therefore, in making the stone “stony again” was an 
interest in the question of how the stone being stony at all (in the sense of Plato’s 
noumenon) might be encountered (by the senses, as phenomenon) and, more importantly, 
how that encounter might, subsequently, be conveyed.   
Stevens’s approach in this regard is often through an elaboration and interrogation 
into the privileged sense of sight and its role in the interpretation and representation of 
subjectivity.  For this reason, his poetry can often be more interestingly illuminated through 
a concurrent exploration of the visual arts world of the mid-twentieth century, rather than 
the contemporaneous literary world.  In the opening chapter of this project I will endeavour 
to show the way that Stevens’s elaboration of a negative-space of representation can be 
understood in terms of what Rosalind Krauss refers to as “redoubled vision”—a “seeing 
and a knowing that one sees, a kind of cogito of vision” (OU 19). Krauss’s The Optical 
Unconscious will be an indispensible guide for this chapter, as will Glen McLeod’s detailed 
study, Wallace Stevens and Modern Art, which delineates the relationship between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the figuration of the processes of perceiving objectivity itself.  In other words, he was interested in figuring 
the intersection of subjectivity and the world—of rendering in language not what was solid and encounterable 
via perception but instead the processes of perception (of Being) itself.	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Stevens’s knowledge of and interactions with the visual art world and his own developing 
poetics.  My own approach will concentrate less on the specific adherences and 
incongruities between Stevens’s work and the visual arts, and more on the way in which his 
work endeavours to render in spatial, visual terms, the negative-space by which the mind’s 
imaginative capacity and the phenomenal reality beyond the mind may be integrated in a 
“new knowledge of reality” (CP 452).  Such a “new knowledge” would recognize, first and 
foremost, that the “reality” it seeks is finally neither estranged from, nor contingent upon, a 
solipsistic life of the mind.  In other words, what I will be most concerned with is the way 
in which Stevens works to establish an inter-relational territory, in much the same manner 
as an abstract painting, between reality and the imagination.  It is a concrete rendering of 
the abstract in Stevens’s poetry that allows both elements—in the same manner that 
Rosalind Krauss describes for the figure versus ground relation in visual art—to be 
“preserved and cancelled. Preserved all the more surely in that they are cancelled” (OU 15).   
 
“It must not be fixed” 
But what is this “new knowledge of reality?” At root, Stevens’s poetry is a 
contemplation of both language and “Being” itself (as it is impossible to separate one from 
the other).  Though “Being” was understood by Stevens in a positive sense, he was wary of 
any description or definition of it, and sought instead a state of “ambiguity” for the 
consideration of both thought and language.  In Chapter Two, “The Image,” I shall explore 
the “ambiguous” roles of presence and absence in Stevens’s work through Roland Barthes’s 
analogous examination of the photograph in Camera Lucida.  The “absence-as-presence” 
(106) described for the photograph— its simultaneous being and non-being—will provide a 
tangible approach to Stevens’s use of negative-space, within which he addresses and 
explores the question of Being.  Gaston Bachelard’s study, The Poetics of Space, will 
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support the exploration and elaboration of this idea as it relates more particularly to the 
literary realm.   
It is clear that for Stevens there is something to Being—a certain “something,” that 
is, rather than a “nothing” 23— but this  “something” could only be defined negatively, for 
example the striking depiction in “The Snow Man” of “the nothing that is” (CP 8), if a 
definition was to be attempted at all.  What is particularly compelling about this phrase, 
“the nothing that is,” is the way that the attachment of the definite article “is” to the simple 
form of “to be” works to negate the negation, without the subject (“the nothing”) either 
being utterly cancelled or translated into “something.”  Instead these four simple words 
serve to open up a space of dialogue between “the nothing” and “something,” presence and 
absence.  It is within this space that we are continuously invited by Stevens to move, and 
reflect. “If it is defined, it will be fixed and it must not be fixed,” he had declared in “The 
Noble Rider.” Continuing: “As in the case of an external thing, nobility resolves itself into 
an enormous number of vibrations, movements, changes.  To fix it is to put an end to it” 
(664).  Stevens’s accommodation for “the nothing that is” within “The Snowman,” and 
throughout his oeuvre, opens up a fluid space of contemplation that is beyond but inclusive 
of the concepts of presence and absence, reality and imagination.    
Poetry was understood by Stevens as a protean, living thing—as that which, as he 
writes in “St. Armourer’s Church from the Outside,” “is always beginning because it is part 
/ Of that which is always beginning, over and over (CP 449).  This “part” of reality had the 
potential to encompass the whole of reality, to speak to, and from, the “whole man.” Poetry 
was, therefore, inherently political, inherently engaged, in that it requires us to think about 
the relationality of things, in both abstract and concrete ways. Poetry does not, that is, via 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  “...There it is,” he writes in “The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words.” It is the very fact of “it’s” being 
there, which, he continues, “makes possible to invite to the reading and writing of poetry men of intelligence 
and desire for life” (CP 664).  	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language attempt to access the “political” as thing, or as a specific event, but instead, 
through a careful exploration of the space of language and Being itself, it locates an 
opening in thought where politics and ethics arise as part of a total conception of the 
Reality of a Being-political, Being-social, indeed, of a Being-human at all.  It is this 
opening that Chapter Three, “The Word,” will endeavour to expose and explore.  Derrida’s 
conception of différance and other aspects of his thinking, especially those observations 
included in Languages of the Unsayable and Margins of Philosophy, are particularly useful 
here, along with Barthes’s considerations of the text and language in The Responsibility of 
Form and The Rustle of Language. 
 
“It Must Be Abstract” 
Like Oppen and the generation of poets who came after him,24 Stevens was captured 
by the ideas and energy of the Abstract Expressionist movement in the 1940s.25  His first 
concerted attempt, in 1947, at formulating a poetic “theory” exemplified this affinity when, 
in Transport to Summer’s  “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction,” he declared: “It Must Be 
Abstract” (CP 329). The exultant refusal of representational painting by Abstract-
Expressionists like Willem de Kooning and Mark Rothko, as well as the fusion of art and 
politics within a larger, more encompassing world-view and artistic mandate, encouraged 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Importantly, John Ashbery and the other New York School poets were influenced by the Abstract 
Expressionist painters—as well as (and congruently) by Stevens himself. Language poetry, with its emphasis 
on the connections between politics and semiotics (the “sound of words” and the constructed “sense” of 
meaning), must also be understood as a part of this lineage.	  
25 The Abstract expressionists, indeed, formed their own idea of political engagement through Stevens’s 
notion of “pressures of reality.” Robert Motherwell and Ad Reinhardt, who edited the text Modern Artists	  in 
America in 1951, quoted Stevens in order to help explain the sudden rise in the popularity, as well as the 
political relevance, of abstract art: “This is where the ‘pressure of reality,’ in Wallace Stevens’s phrase, has 
led the majority of our most imaginative and fertile artists: ‘It is not that there is a new imagination but that 
there is a new reality’”  (As quoted in McLeod 140).	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Stevens to embrace his tendency toward the “abstract” in a new way. From Transport to 
Summer on, abstraction is affirmatively accepted by Stevens as the generative structure and 
force at the root of all conceptions and representations of reality.  The developing holism of 
Stevens’s sensibility, advented by his concentrated turn to abstraction in the 1940s, actually 
renders his poetry more rather than less intrinsically concerned and engaged with the social 
as his career progresses.  It would indeed be impossible, according to the influential 
conception of poetry advanced by Stevens’s “Notes,” for the poet—although he may 
continue to explore the “spurning-craving” of a seemingly solipsistic interior world—to be 
actually solipsistic, or removed from the “real world.”  By engaging with and elaborating 
the processes by which reality is actualized and potentially altered (i.e., the life of the mind) 
one is brought closer to the “real world” than any concentration on “the actual” could ever 
allow.  
Much later, in Revolution in Poetic Language, Julia Kristeva would describe poetic 
text as “a practise that could be compared to political revolution” (17); in fact, Stevens’s 
understanding of poetry was not dissimilar.  To be sure, poetry, for him, was 
“revolutionary” not in terms of any particular political program or event, but in terms of the 
constantly renewed energy that it generated for any active as well as practical consideration 
of the world.  Poetry was, essentially, “practise” for Stevens—an active “saying” rather 
than anything that could be or might ultimately be “said.”  It is always the gerund form of 
every verb that constituted, for Stevens, the “acutest speech” and poetry’s “continuous 
present.”  
As the oft quoted stanza XIX of “Chocorua To Its Neighbour” further expounds:  
To say more than human things with human voice, 
That cannot be; to say human things with more 
Than human voice, that, also, cannot be;  
To speak humanly from the height or from the depth  
Of human things, that is acutest speech. (CP 266-267) 
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For Stevens, this “acutest speech” arises from the voice that is actively engaged in the 
process of its own speaking; it is a voice that arrives not from any conceivable “still point” 
either beyond the human or from the dead centre of “human things,” but is, instead, 
engaged in the practise of its own speech, therefore of its own being, and—through the 
distance achieved by a shift of perspective, either a plunge to the depth or an ascent to the 
heights—a knowing of that being.  In Chapter Four, “The Mind,” we shall turn our attention 
to these processes of knowing—looking again to the analogy of the photograph in order to 
more tangibly address and interrogate “the impossible science of the unique being” 
(Barthes, CL, 71).    
 
An Absolute Reality 
Stevens was “revolutionary” in the sense that his deep investment in, and 
exploration of, “human things” never resorted to “humanism,” which he saw too easily 
replaced the old hierarchies.  What he sought instead, and this is what “Chocorua” begins to 
sketch out, is a new space in which these “human things” could be newly imagined. 
Removed from “man,” his voice emanating instead as the “voice” of the Mountain, the 
speaker delineates a negative-space in which the relation between man and nature, between 
the “singular” (“How singular he was as man, how large”) and the expansive abstract vista 
that the mountain’s voice evokes (“If nothing more than that, for the moment, large in my 
presence” [CP 268]) might be figured. The mountain is indeed what gives the man his 
shape, just as the man (Stevens)—at the level of the world he “creates” for himself through 
his own experience and vision, and also at the level of the text created to reveal that 
world—gives shape to the mountain.  What Stevens is interested in here, and this will 
remain his driving interest for the rest of his career, is the creation of an interim space 
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between “world” and “human thing” in which the “acutest speech”—that is, the 
interrelationship between “world” and “thing,” or indeed relationality tout court—can be 
figured and spoken.  
But again—rather than the creation of a smooth, uniform space through this 
amalgamation—Stevens was primarily concerned with the disjunctions of thought and 
language, the interruptions of perceived phenomenal reality.  The “practise of poetry” was 
for him a way to explore the underlying ambiguity of reality—an ambiguity at last more 
“Real” than the limited scope of any singular subjective “reality” to which the 
contemporary art world believed itself bound.  
As—in a rare moment of immodesty—he once claimed for his prose, Stevens’s 
poetry is intent on “the enlargements of life” beyond the frame of the singular perspective 
and a strict adherence to the limits of the phenomenal world.  At the same time, however, it 
avoids—indeed has a horror of—leaving that world behind or becoming “metaphysical.” In 
“The Figure of the Youth as Virile Poet,” a prose piece from 1942, Stevens writes that it is 
when we find ourselves in agreement with reality that we “cease to be metaphysicians”—
and that this should be precisely the goal. In contrast to other poets of the period, 
however—even the “metaphysical” poet, T.S. Eliot, for whom a poem’s success was 
defined by the success with which it translated thought into feeling and thus overcame the 
“dissociation of sensibility” (TLS 669-670)—Stevens believed that “the greater the mind 
the greater the poet” and reminded us in his essay, “Relations Between Poetry and 
Painting,” that “the evil of thinking as poetry is not the same thing as the good of thinking 
in poetry” (CP 744).  Stevens was adamant, however, that the poet should be, first and 
foremost, a poet, and not a philosopher: we “do not want to be metaphysicians,” he 
decisively wrote in “The Figure or the Youth as Virile Poet” (CP 679). Stevens’s ultimate 
project was thus, unquestionably, not to abstract the poet from the real, phenomenal 
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world—but rather to find a way of inhabiting the Real “absolutely.”  The final chapter of 
this project—Chapter Five, “The Act”—concerns Stevens’s effort to do just that. Not 
surprisingly, Stevens’s “absolute” Reality is one that requires an inclusion of the “unreal” 
of the imagination, as well as a certain amount of what Shklovsky had described as a 
process of defamiliarization, through which—by interrupting the established relationships 
between foreground and background, “real” and “unreal,” presence and absence—a broader 
“Reality” both inclusive and excessive of those relationships might be conveyed. 
 
An Endless Projection 
As Yeats once wrote, “We make with the quarrel with others, rhetoric, with the 
quarrel with ourselves, poetry” (492). Stevens knew this, of course.  Though less overtly 
than Oppen, he was particularly fearful of, and resistant to, the idea of writing “poetry tied 
to a moral or a political...judgement” (SL 66).  But it was precisely by engaging in a 
“quarrel with himself,” by opening a “gap” via the figuration of his own processes of 
perception, that Stevens was permitted to leave the isolating realm of the singular “I.” And 
if Stevens’s poetry can be understood in so systemizing a form of philosophic thought as 
Hegel’s dialectic, it is certainly in the synthesis of the space of the “I” with the “non-I” or 
“Other”—in the negative-space of their contact through poetic thinking.26 If, as Shklovsky 
theorized in his Theory of Prose (201), poetry is employed to “lay bare” the devices of 
language, it also renders material the spaces and relations between words. It is these absent, 
“negative” spaces, what the poem does not, finally, and perhaps cannot, say, but that is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Jarraway points out the similarity between Stevens’s “new direction” in thinking indicated by Parts of a 
World, in which he begins to question “the very notion of belief based on logocentric premises,” and 
Heidegger’s remarks that we “do not seek that force [of earlier thinking] in what has already been thought.  
We seek it in something that has not been thought, and from which what has been thought receives its 
essential space” (95).	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figured in the poetry nevertheless, with which this project—and the bulk of Stevens’s 
oeuvre—is primarily concerned.  
Stevens’s emphasis in The Rock, for example—a collection which, as the title 
suggests, places a heavy emphasis on concrete “reality”—should not be considered as 
working toward a rejection of the abstraction that typifies his previous few collections 
(notably the preceding Auroras of Autumn, which has been criticized for its perceived 
departure from any grounding in concrete reality at all27). Instead, The Rock, and perhaps 
more successfully than any of his prior collections, works to elaborate and express 
Stevens’s “reality-imagination” complex—the self-professed drive of his entire poetic 
career.  Indeed, what is finally concrete in The Rock is not the reality of the world 
represented by the poetry, or the objects within that world (no more so, at any rate, than 
throughout his earlier works), but instead, the figuration of the imagination itself.  In a key 
example, “The Poem that Took the Place of a Mountain,” which can be read in many ways 
as an elaboration of “Chocorua,” Stevens begins: “There it was, word for word, the poem 
that took the place of a mountain”—in this way explicitly formulating from the beginning 
the “redoubled vision” that had already been evident in “Chocorua” and would become a 
trade-mark in these later poems. This “redoubled vision”—whereby the speaker distances 
himself first from the represented reality of the poem, and then, further, from the poem as 
art-object—opens a space for both speaker and reader in which the constructedness of both 
the poem and the reality of the outside phenomenal world becomes apparent. The poem 
continues:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Even the critic Glen McLeod, who lauds the collection as a “meditation in the fullest sense, a poetry purely 
contemplative, issuing from a mind which is exploring itself, not a set of ideas” still deems it “a questionable 
poetry even by the most generous estimate” (225)	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He breathed its oxygen,  
Even when the book lay turned in the dust of his table.   
 
It reminded him how he had needed  
A place to go to in his own direction,  
 
How he had recomposed the pines,  
Shifted the rocks and picked his way among the clouds,   
 
For the outlook that would be right,  
Where he could be complete in an unexplained completion:  
 
The exact rock where his inexactnesses  
Would discover, at last, the view toward which they had  
edged,  
 
Where he could lie and, gazing down at the sea,  
Recognize his unique and Solitary home. (435)  
 
Stevens recognizes and articulates within this poem the concrete formal qualities of both 
reality and the imagination, managing to maintain them in the dialectical relation that for 
him was so essential to either of their subjective existence.  This is achieved most notably 
through the juxtaposition of the subject’s “inexactness” with the “exactness” of the rock 
within the grammatical mood of the conditional.  It is toward this juxtaposition that the 
poem “edges”; indeed it is via precisely this juxtaposition that an edge can be 
(conditionally) delineated and encountered within the poem, and that an expansive view 
beyond and inclusive of both the “exactness” and “inexactness” fundamental to the subject 
and his perceptions can be (also conditionally) achieved. In another letter to Heringman 
Stevens had written:  “Sometimes I believe most in the imagination for a long time and 
then, without reasoning about it, turn to reality and believe in that and that alone.  But both 
of these things project themselves endlessly and I want them to do just that” (L 710).  In 
“The Poem That Took the Place of a Mountain,” Stevens realizes the “inexact” in “exact” 
form, not through the formulation of either as such, but instead, by figuring between them a 
space of just such endless projection.  
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The “redoubled vision” that Stevens effects in the poem allows for the 
representation not of “the mountain” itself, but instead of the process by which “the 
mountain” is perceived and represented (first to the poet himself, then to the poet’s 
projected reader, and then lastly of course to the reader of Stevens himself).  In this way, 
the poem opens up a tangible space within which “reality” and the “imagination” may 
indeed be “endlessly projected.”  It is precisely this space with which this project is 
concerned. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One: The Eye 
 
Things seen are things as seen.  Absolute real. 
  —Wallace Stevens (CP 902) 
 There is no wing like meaning. 
 —Wallace Stevens (CP 903) 
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Wallace Stevens’s concern for ways of seeing and the representation of perspective 
is apparent in his earliest collection, Harmonium.  Indeed, many of the strategies that he 
employs throughout the collection, as well as throughout his career, in examining 
subjectivity through close attention to ocular perception, are laid out in “Thirteen Ways of 
Looking at a Blackbird”—a poem which serves as a kind of Ars Poetica for Stevens, 
describing as it does a familiar trajectory in his poetry whereby the autonomous singular 
voice or frame is deconstructed to reveal a perspectival contingency. The initial 
representation of the blackbird as the “only moving thing” certainly constrains the 
perspectival frame in the poem’s opening lines:  “Among twenty snowy mountains,/ The 
only moving thing / Was the eye of the black bird” (CP 74).  This perspective is, however, 
over the course of the rest of the poem, fractured, disseminated, and finally wholly 
dispersed.  In the second section, the text shifts from the insular framework of the 
blackbird’s eye as “only moving thing”—a perspective which had previously reduced the 
complexities of range and movement contained within twenty snowy mountains to its 
seemingly autonomous gaze—to a more diverse perspectival range: “I was of three minds,” 
the speaker writes, “Like a tree/ In which there are three blackbirds” (CP 74).  Though the 
absolutism of the first section has been abandoned in that we encounter here not one but 
three perspectives, it is important to note that each of these perspectives—the “three minds” 
of the speaker’s consciousness, peering out from the branches of the tree at three fixed 
points—retain for themselves a fixed singularity. This fixity is exploded in the third 
section: “The blackbird whirled in the autumn winds. / It was a small part of the 
pantomime” (CP 75). Here, for the first time, the outside world is permitted to enter the 
frame. The whirl of the autumn winds shifts the speaker’s perspective, dispersing it from 
the singular frame of the blackbird.  The blackbird becomes at this juncture only “a small 
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part” of a larger and more complex structure of (perceived and perceiving) bodies who 
constitute together the “pantomime” of living things.  This multiplicity is further reinforced 
and rendered more complex by the fourth section where the perspectives of “man” and 
“woman” are established as equal and level with the perspective of the blackbird: “A man 
and a woman/ Are one. /  A man and a woman and a blackbird / Are one” (CP 75). What 
results is a flattening of the recently complicated perspective, which is taken a step further 
with section five:  
I do not know which to prefer, 
The beauty of inflections 
Or the beauty of innuendoes, 
The blackbird whistling 
Or just after. (CP 75) 
 
Here, the speaker’s sensory perceptions are removed from the blackbird itself.  That is, he 
is once again established more firmly in his own autonomous territory and therefore free to 
reflect, “I do not know...”  The not-knowing originates from within the fixed framework of 
a single subjectivity. The reference to the “or just after” of the blackbird’s whistle, 
however—the idea that the absence of sensory input might be in fact preferable to its 
presence—introduces another level of perspectival analysis to the poem.  The speaker is 
now dislodged from the immediacy of the material and sensory world; he, along with the 
reader, is now finally open to the consideration of that which was and would remain most 
vital to Stevens throughout his career: the world of the imagination.   The emphasis shifts to 
choice and preference, thus allowing for the first time the possibility that it is both 
inflections and innuendos that are beautiful; the possibility that both are, in fact, absolutely 
integral to the beauty the listener perceives within the blackbird’s call.  
Sections six and seven further diffuse the perspectival range of the blackbird into 
the realm of the imagination.  In section six, we see not the blackbird but its shadow—
visible in front of the window, having “[c]rossed it, to and fro. / The mood / Traced in the 
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shadow / An indecipherable cause” (CP 75).  In section seven an absent, abstract, audience 
is for the first time addressed: the men of Haddam (presumably the small town of Haddam, 
Connecticut).  Not only is the reader now invited to leave the fixed space of the speaker and 
the blackbird to engage in the shadowy space of unknown and unknowable men, but she is 
further asked to reflect upon the (perhaps misguided, it is suggested) imaginations of these 
already-imagined men: “Why do you imagine golden birds? / Do you not see how the 
blackbird / Walks around the feet / Of the women about you?” (CP 75).   
What is introduced in these sections, in terms of an elaboration of the role of the 
imagination in the structure of reality (the “mood” and “indecipherable cause” of section 
six, and the men of Haddam’s inability to perceive their own reality due to the loftiness of 
their imaginations) is further elaborated upon in section eight:  
I know noble accents 
And lucid, inescapable rhythms; 
But I know, too, 
That the blackbird is involved  
In what I know. (CP 75-76) 
 
Not only is the perspective of the blackbird equal or level to the perspective of man or 
woman here, they are suddenly fused.  From here on, the multiplicity of perspectives in the 
poem are demonstrated to be inextricably linked.   
The perspectival trajectory in section nine evokes the trajectory of Stevens’s entire 
opus, culminating in his final collections, The Auroras of Autumn and The Rock. “When the 
blackbird flew out of sight,” Stevens writes, “It marked the edge / Of one of many circles” 
(CP 76).  It is through a consideration of the simultaneous absence and presence of the 
blackbird in this passage—that is to say, the blackbird’s remove from the perimeter of the 
visible, while remaining within range of imaginative grasp—that we can best understand 
Stevens’s poetic project over the course of his career.  In the conceptualization of a 
movement by which the blackbird’s flight both delineates and transcends the boundary its 
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own flight path describes, Stevens points to a continuity of perspective that no longer 
contains a vanishing point, linear trajectory, or unifying center.  By the time we have 
reached this moment in “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird,” we have indeed 
travelled so far from the more restrictive eye evoked in the first section of the poem, that 
there is no longer any center at all, only movement. More than that, it is only the process by 
which that movement is represented that is now described. After this point in the poem—
sections ten through twelve—the actual figure of the blackbird becomes even more 
abstract. In section eleven, for example, the blackbird is only a fearful misapprehension: “In 
that he mistook / The shadow of his equipage / For blackbirds” (CP 76). 
Though section twelve installs us back more firmly in the autonomous perspective 
of a singular bird, it also introduces a strange perspectival vertigo, disrupting any presumed 
singularity: “The river is moving. / The blackbird must be flying” (CP 76).  A complete 
reverse from the opening section’s fixed gaze is effected here, so that what becomes 
undeniably clear at this point in the poem is the contingency of perspective, and therefore 
our dependency on analogy, which serves to re-establish a language of equivalencies that 
will aid (or conversely upset) intelligibility and representation. Whereas in the first section, 
“the only moving thing / Was the eye of the blackbird” (CP 74), section twelve begins with 
the massive, incessant movement—unperceivable and unimaginable as a whole—of the 
river and only then works backwards to deduce that the blackbird must also be moving. It is 
this shift that results in a sort of vertigo whereby the reader must shift her focus from the 
movement of the river to the movement of the blackbird.  This shift, which aims at 
restoring power to the autonomous gaze of the blackbird does not wholly succeed. The 
movement of the river evoked by the first line is too strong to be cancelled out by the shift 
to the blackbird. We know that the river is still moving even as we make the shift: that it 
has been and will continue to move, independent of the blackbird.  Even as we are 
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repositioned in the eye of the blackbird, therefore, and asked to see the river’s movement as 
a cause of the blackbird’s motion, an unconquerable distance due to the antecedent 
introduction of the river has been introduced.  We know that the power and range of the 
blackbird’s perspective is ultimately unmatched to, and therefore leaves unchanged, the 
steady motion of the river.   
So certain of this are we that, in the final, thirteenth section, when we are returned 
to the singular form of the bird in a singular tree, we meet him at quite a different level than 
we met the blackbird of the first section.  The passivity of the blackbird in this final section 
underscores a temporal passivity established by the first three lines: “It was evening all 
afternoon. / It was snowing / And it was going to snow” (CP 76).  By passivity I do not 
intend to suggest weakness, but instead the sort of supreme passivity that Maurice 
Blanchot, drawing on the writings of Emmanuel Levinas, describes in The Writing of the 
Disaster: “a passivity which is the pas [“not”] in the utterly passive, and which has 
therefore abandoned the level of life where passive would simply be the opposite of active.  
In this way we fall outside inertia” (13-14).  Blanchot goes on to reflect that such true 
passivity can only be evoked in a language that “reverses itself.”  To write of suffering, for 
example, but in “reverse,” taps into what Blanchot calls an “un-power, the I excluded from 
mastery and from its status as subject (as first person)—the I destitute even of obligation” 
(15). This “I,” as Blanchot goes on to explain, effectively disappears not only from the text 
but from suffering itself:  
[I]t is not borne into the present (still less is it experienced in the present).  It is 
without present, just as it is without beginning or end; time has radically changed its 
meaning and its flow.  Time, without present, I without I: this is not anything of 
which one could say that experience—a form of knowledge—would either reveal or 
conceal it. (15)    
	   
46	  
It is a similar “reverse” that is effected by Stevens’s “Thirteen Ways of Looking at 
A Blackbird”—as well as in his work as a whole.  We are dislodged from the particular in 
order to access the abstract, the general—a space, that is, as cleared of the temporal present 
as it has been of the singular, totalizing or cohering “I.” As opposed to Stevens’s far less 
complex, “Anecdote of the Jar,” also from Harmonium—where the jar retains its fixity and 
manages to communicate most impressively through that fixity not the authoritative, but 
rather the arbitrary quality of its perspectival frame—the blackbird’s perspective 
continuously shifts, continuously disrupts any notion of a fixed center.  In its seeming 
arbitrariness the blackbird actually suggests a far wider-ranging and authoritative 
perspective.  But, just like the thirteenth and final section of Stevens’s poem, we are never 
able to escape the “arbitrariness” of singularity entirely. The lone blackbird remains in his 
tree, while all the while, “it was snowing and going to snow.”  Everything is always 
happening and going to happen in Stevens’s poetry, and it is the extremity of this passivity, 
the establishment within the work of an ex-temporal “I without an I,” that is the definitive 
(dis)stance of Stevens’s work. What is remarkable in “Thirteen Ways” is that Stevens is, 
throughout all thirteen phases in which the perspective shifts and disbands, able to 
maintain—indeed, the passive “thirteenth” voice depends upon it—that original, 
autonomous, totalitarian gaze from whose perspective we began.  Stevens’s feat, I argue, is 
that he is able to create a space in his work where the particularities and limitations of the 
“I” are maintained to such a degree that they are permitted to come into direct contact with 
the abstract—the ex-temporal “I without an I,” or “non-I.” This is effected through the 
careful elaboration of the figurative process of that representation.  It is within this space of 
figuration, the elaboration of a middle-space between conception and form, that Stevens 
moves in a passive “pas” or “step” beyond the inertia of the singular into an ex-temporal 
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framework which includes the possibility—which is the possibility, perhaps—of contact 
with the Other.   
 
A Redoubled Vision 
Similarly to the manner in which a visual artist endeavours not just to record the 
information of the physical world around her but bring it to life as if “whole” on the page, 
Stevens endeavours to shape through language an image of a consciousness that includes 
both reality and the imagination. He avoids, therefore, the figuration of any direct 
opposition between “reality” and the “imagination” in his work—as though the only avenue 
between them was a straightforward flight from point A to point B, then back again.  
Instead, what he often manages is a perspectival figuration comparable to what Rosalind 
Krauss refers to as a “redoubled vision: of a seeing and a knowing that one sees” (OU 19).    
Between the particular and the general, the fixed “I” and the “non-I,” Stevens affords a 
space of projection in which perspective can refract in multiple directions.  Ultimately, 
therefore, it is not A or B, reality or the imagination, that is represented as such by Stevens, 
but rather the process of their interaction: the “pure presentness,” to again use Krauss’s 
terms, of the relation between.   
Relying on the trope of vision so central to Stevens, consider the analogy of the 
flash of a baseball that Rosalind Krauss employs in The Optical Unconscious1 in order to 
explain the process by which, in a moment of “pure vision,” the eye registers objects not in 
successive stages of their motion but in an “all-at-onceness that re-structures 
successiveness” (15). It is through this process that “the blur of that white smudge” (the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Krauss relates a conversation she had with Michael Fried in which Fried asked, “Do you know who Frank 
[Stella] thinks is the greatest living American?” “Ted Williams” was the correct reply.  “Ted Williams sees 
faster than any other living human,” Fried explained: “He see so fast that when the ball comes over the 
plate—90 miles an hour—he can see the stitches.  So he hits the ball right out of the park.  That’s why Frank 
thinks he’s a genius” (OU 7). 
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travelling baseball) may be transformed into “pure contact, pure simultaneity, pure optical 
pattern: vision in touch with its own resources” (7), and along similar lines that Stevens can 
be understood to re-structure the relationship between “reality” and the “imagination”—re-
envisioning them instead in an “all-at-onceness” of their interrelation: in an image of  “the 
whole man” (Steves, CP 652)2.  Stevens takes up Benedetto Croce’s charge that man, 
considered in “wholeness” is not an end but “all nature in its perpetual labour of 
evolution”—as well as the charge that poetry, in its “triumph of contemplation,” might 
come to reflect, and even enact, through its process of perpetual re-presentation, precisely 
that “labour of evolution” (CP 652).   
 
Krauss explains that it is, indeed, the “all-at-onceness” of vision that allows the 
possibility of perceiving any image as a whole, rather than as flat and “dumbly physical” 
(98).  To illustrate this fundamental of perception Krauss elaborates the simple figure 
versus ground relationship, into a Klein group (figure 1)3 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  As Peterson has suggested much of the impulse and the ambition behind Stevens’s poetry is for a “Re-
statement of Romance” (CP 118).  More specifically, for a “reassertion of Coleridge’s claim that the 
imagination ‘brings the whole soul of man into activity’” (Peterson 52).   The re-structuring that takes place in 
Stevens’s work hinges on his ability to emphasize and enact within his poetry the “activity” described in the 
passage Peterson quotes from Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria.  In this way, Stanley Burnshaw is right to 
have differentiated Stevens’s “sense poetry” from Keats. The stasis and autonomy of Keats’s Grecian urn 
“suffuse(d) […] with subjective emotion” (Burnshaw 29) gives way to Stevens’s active, perception-driven 
“Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird” where experience itself is “objectified,” available to be looked at 
from various, continually shifting angles. 
3 The Klein group, in mathematical group theory, is the smallest possible non-cyclic group (that is, the 
smallest possible group of relations made up of more than one element).	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As this formulation shows, the governing principle (figure vs. ground) of vision, assures 
that, indeed, there is never any “erasure of terms”; instead, both “figure” and “ground” are 
simultaneously “preserved and cancelled. Preserved all the more surely in that they are 
cancelled” (OU 15).  This means that the image seen actually exceeds the boundary of the 
empirical limit, and “outside and inside take on a deductive relation to one another” (OU 
16).  Indeed, Krauss explains, the fundamental principle of vision that the Klein graph 
illustrates is a “redoubled vision” that “dispenses with narrative” entirely (OU 19).   This 
“redoubled vision” is illustrated by Stevens in the eighth of his “Thirteen Ways of Looking 
at a Blackbird”: 
I know noble accents 
And lucid, inescapable rhythms;  
But I know, too 
That the blackbird is involved  
In what I know. (CP 75-76)   
 
It is here that the perspective of the poem “doubles back” on itself: from this point on the 
singular perspective with which we began becomes self-conscious, “redoubled.”  It is 
aware, now, not only of what it sees but of the fact that its ‘seeing’ is structured by and 
dependent on—“the blackbird”— its perspectival limitations.  
 
Stevens’s exploration does not stop there, and neither does Krauss’s.  Krauss goes 
on to explain that if the figure/ground axis is contrasted against the pair “not-figure/not-
ground,” the Klein group that results consists instead of “double negatives.” It is this 
figuration that has allowed, according to Krauss, an “alternative” art history to develop over 
the course of the twentieth century, one that “flouted” modernist assumptions about optics 
and opticality, about “essences and purifications,” and above all, refused its concerns with 
“the presumed ontological ground of the visual (OU 21).”  The trompe-l’oeil “precision 
optics” of Marcel Duchamp’s surrealist collage, Krauss argues, exemplify this “double 
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negative” effect, and result in the representation of a sort of “spacetime”—that is, a fusion 
of the temporal and the spatial.  It is not surprising that Stevens was interested in the work 
of Duchamp given his own fascination with this effect, an exploration of which is prevalent 
in his own work: his conclusion, for example, in “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a 
Blackbird,” that “It was snowing and it was going to snow” (CP 76).  As opposed to his 
forebears who were more interested in drawing time and space along different lyrical or 
narrative axes, Stevens was interested in depicting the integral “all at onceness” of their 
relation.  
Indeed, the “redoubled vision” reflected in the final three sections of “Thirteen 
Ways” and throughout Stevens’s later work, should be understood in similar terms as the 
space explored by Duchamp’s work “in-between” figure and ground, the elaboration of 
which would serve to forever destabilize the art world’s traditional figure/ground relation.4  
The “redoubled vision” effected by the final sections of “Thirteen Ways,” or still more 
stridently in a later poem like “The Poem that Took the Place of a Mountain,” “flouts” the 
literary equivalent of the figure vs. ground relation, which the modernist movement had 
largely maintained: a subject (figure) at odds with his world (ground).  Stevens’s 
“redoubled vision” disrupts this relation: the  “I” of the “same”— the speaker of the 
poem—transcending the bounds of subjectivity to be incorporated in an “enlarged vision,” 
inclusive of the “non-I” (the poem’s “object,” the poem itself, and the reader) in which the 
terms of the “I” and the “non-I” are effectively both “preserved and cancelled.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  In Working Space, Frank Stella argues against the accepted idea that contemporary abstraction in the visual 
arts finds its roots in Cubism, positing that its foundations can be traced at least as far back as Caravaggio, 
given his ability to “dissolve us into the space presented, the ability to make a domed mansion of the void, 
and the ability to establish a positive and definite sense of space” (19).  “[T]he aim of art is to create space,” 
Stella writes.  “Space that is not compromised by decoration or illustration, space in which the subjects of 
painting can live.  This is what painting has always been about” (5).  Caravaggio, according to Stella, pre-
figures modern abstraction in his concern for the creation of “internal space” in his work.  “If there is one 
thing that can be said with certainty about Caravaggio,” Stella affirms, “it is that he was better at creating 
internal space, space among the figures constituting the action and subject of his pictures, than anyone that 
came either before or after him” (18).
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“Intelligibility,” writes Levinas in Totality and Infinity, a word he further defines as, 
“the very occurrence of representation,” is what allows “precisely the possibility for the 
other to be determined by the same without determining the same, without introducing 
alterity into it” (124). What makes something intelligible, in other words, is its 
“representation,” and “representation” is always of that which is other than the subject for 
whom the object appears, as the “poem of the mountain” is to the prospective reader of 
“The Poem That Took The Place of a Mountain,” or as the “mountain” is to the poet for 
that matter. “Representation” is what allows the poet to perceive the mountain at all, and 
the reader the poem, from her own unique vantage point without either the mountain having 
to perceive the poet or the poem the reader. The reader can remain, that is, beside the book, 
overturned “in the dust of his table” (CP 435) just as the poet must, necessarily, remain 
beside the object that he wishes to represent. One must always, in this sense, be a little 
“beside oneself” in order to render that “self” and its perceptions intelligible.  If one 
becomes too significantly absorbed within any particular experience, that experience will 
doubtless remain unintelligible, impossible for the individual to represent. We encounter 
the world through the very distance that we (the figure) are able to achieve from the 
observable scene (the ground). The “all-at-onceness” of our vision immediately establishes 
a kind of depth that is contingent on that oblique relation and eradicated were those lines of 
intersection either to merge or fail to intersect.  
In the case of “The Poem That Took the Place of a Mountain” and other poems of a 
similar structure, what Stevens must remain at an oblique angle to is representation itself.  
But it is precisely this, his remaining “beside” representation, and being conscious of 
remaining beside it, that allows the possibility in the poem of a “pure vision” of his “unique 
and solitary home” (CP 435). 
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In opposition to a solipsistic interpretation of this “unique and solitary home5,” I 
propose instead that what is at work in this poem and in much of Stevens’s work is what 
Levinas calls “the free exercise of the same,” that is, the “disappearance, within the same of 
the I opposed to the non-I” (TI 124), in an “all-at-onceness” of “pure vision.”  Instead of an 
isolated “I” that must be kept separate from the represented “other” (the mountain, the 
poem itself, the reader of the poem), the figuration of the process of representation itself 
creates a space in which the opposition between the subject and object functionally 
disappears.  The collapse of distance in Stevens’s work between the “I” and the “other”—a 
collapse that, importantly, preserves (all the more) at the same time that it cancels both 
terms—simultaneously generates the persistent desire in Stevens’s poetry to bridge that 
distance, while rendering that same desire structurally insatiable.  As in “The Snow Man,” 
where what is desirable to “behold” is established not only at the distance of an absent 
“listener” (described as “nothing himself”), but by the double negative, “the nothing that is 
not there and the nothing that is”(CP 8), which seems to cancel out the territory of any sort 
of perceivable place at all.  Or, to use again the example of “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a 
Blackbird,” where the continuously shifting perspective (which would seem to suggest a 
wide perspectival range) finds itself at odds with the poem’s framing apparatus, which is 
actually intensely narrow—the singular eye of the blackbird the poem’s “only moving 
thing” (CP 74).  These poems illustrate through perspective and imagery what “The Well 
Dressed Man with a Beard,” a poem included in the 1942 collection Parts of a World, 
stipulates quite plainly: “It can never be satisfied, the mind, never” (224).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Though the emphasis on Stevens’s work as ultimately solipsist and escapist is palpably shifting, thanks to 
critics like John Logenbach, who convincingly brings to the fore the dominant social and political concerns 
that he sees especially evident in the early poetry, and Simon Critchley, whose philosophical investigation of 
Stevens’s work cast him instead as a concerned and engaged as well as a “legitimate” thinker, the notion that 
Stevens’s work remains aloof from, for example, Williams’s world of “things as they are,” and instead in the 
realm of a disengaged imagination, continues to persist.	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For critic Simon Critchley, this statement indeed characterizes a “central motif” in 
Stevens’s work. “The mind’s desire will always exceed the beauty that the poetry can bring 
to reality,” he writes, and thus Stevens’s words “are chosen out of a desire that outstrips 
them” (TMA 81). This insatiability so critical to Stevens’s conception of the mind, stems 
not only, in Lacanian terms, from a fundamental lack at the root of human consciousness, 
but also (and not unrelated) at the root of language itself. “We are the obstacle,” writes 
Lacan, and thus, “a function of an optics we will never master” (quoted in Krauss OU 184).  
Stevens’s concern is for acknowledging himself, and his language, as the “obstacle” of his 
own poems—of acknowledging the primacy of an umasterable “optics” to every process of 
perception, and therefore every representation.   “But I know, too, / That the blackbird is 
involved / In what I know” (CP 75-76) is what opens up a space within Stevens’s poetry in 
which to perceive not only the “obstacle” itself (whether it be ourselves, the poet, or the 
poem) but the “endless projection” between these obstacles—the space in which we 
glimpse, in other words, the very processes by which representation continually shapes and 
re-shapes our perceptions, shared and unshared, of the world around us6. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Lacan’s discussion of “the gaze” is also pertinent here.  In the second chapter of The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis Lacan reflects on the phrase in Valéry’s Jeune Parque, “I saw myself seeing 
myself.”  He writes: “What isolates this apprehension of thought is a sign of doubt, which has been called 
methodological doubt, which concerns whatever might give support to thought in representation. How is it, 
then, that the I see myself seeing myself remains its envelope and base, and, perhaps more than one thinks, 
grounds its certainty?” (80).  Lacan goes on to argue that “it is quite clear that I see outside, that perception is 
not in me, that it is on the objects that it apprehends” without disallowing for the fact that the impression that 
one “sees oneself seeing oneself” is immanent in the subject’s perceptions.  “The privilege of the subject 
seems to be established here from that bipolar reflexive relation by which, as soon as I perceive, my 
representations belong to me” (81), writes Lacan, explaining further that, “consciousness, in its illusion of 
seeing itself seeing itself, find its basis in the inside-outside structure of the gaze” (82). Painting, according to 
Lacan, always has a relation to “the gaze.”  The painter’s object is to paint the gaze into the picture, to 
position it “at the centre” (100).  A self-portrait should capture the gaze—the manner in which the artist looks 
back at himself—but this should be visible to other viewers as well.  The artist should confront the viewer, 
should “impose himself on us” (100).  There should be no “coincidence” between the gaze and the eye of 
either the artist or the viewer, instead there should be “a lure.” “When, in love, I solicit a look,” explains 
Lacan, “what is profoundly unsatisfying and always missing is that—You never look at me from the place 
from which I see you” as well as “what I look at is never what I wish to see” (103).  But still, one continues to 
look—that is what Lacan means by “the lure” of the gaze. 	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Paradoxically, it is through Stevens’s exploration of a “lack” and the corresponding 
“blindness” central to human consciousness and expression—as well as his perennial “as 
if,” and the forever unnameable “thing”—that the reader is provided with the feeling that, at 
least in brief moments, the “thing”—though that “thing” is perhaps nothing other than the 
desire to name it—has indeed been named.  What Dan Chiasson, in a review of the new 
Selected Poems (2009) calls Stevens’s “abstracted abstractions” (61), function not, 
therefore, to ultimately distance themselves from the “thing” described, but instead to 
assert the manner in which the abstraction of that “thing” is integral to its constitution in 
perceived reality.  As Stevens himself contends in The Necessary Angel, the fictive world is 
without a doubt a world of fact, but it is an enlarged world of fact—a system of things as 
they are, rather than an arrangement of objects as such7.  The “mountain,” therefore, as 
seen by the poet, is not a static land formation to be described from the fixed-point 
perspective of the viewer, which would be the same in any case, but is instead always 
inevitably engaged in a process of representation wherein the opposition of the fixed-point, 
the “I,” and the unknown of the “non-I,” disappear into the space of their relation. This 
“disappearance” of opposition is, as previously emphasized, not to be understood as a 
“sublime” transcendence outside of the realm of the immediate encounter, but to say, after 
Kant, that the thing that is sought is immanent within the object and the subject’s 
relationality to the object itself.8 Stevens is too pragmatic for any genuine preservation of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  In his introduction to The Necessary Angel Stevens writes: “These are not pages of criticism nor of 
philosophy.  Nor are they merely literary pages.  They are pages that have to do with one of the enlargements 
of life.  They are without pretence beyond my desire to add my own definition to poetry’s many existing 
definitions” (640). Stevens’s “modest” claim for the work (“to add my own definition...”) is in fact crucial to 
his conception of how the truth: “things as they are” (that is, “as they are” directly experienced), may be 
represented and conveyed. 	  
8	  In his Critique of Judgment, Kant proposes that “things” are possible only as a “purpose,” that they are 
always engaged in an active and interpretive system of cause and effect.  “Seeing that a thing is possible only 
as a purpose requires that the thing’s form could not have arisen according to mere natural laws, laws we can 
cognize by understanding alone as applied to objects of sense, but requires that even empirical cognition of 
this form in terms of its cause and effect presupposes concepts of reason.  [Therefore] the form of such a thing 
is, as far as reason is concerned, contingent in terms of all empirical laws.  But reason, even if it tries to gain 
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Romantic, pre-modern sense of transcendence in the work.  In Stevens, it is “always the 
same that determines the other” (Levinas 124), while the same (the “I”) itself remains 
undetermined and unchanged.  “Transcendence” for Stevens is achieved through a radical 
exteriorization of the “same” and the “other”; that is, the process is located neither in the 
subject nor in the object but precisely in their relationality.    The figuration of this process 
in Stevens’s work is what I have already proposed as a “representation of representation”; it 
is a “transcendence” that remains a pragmatic relationship, where the “other” is determined 
and understood in the purely subjective terms of the “same.”  It is this “subjective” 
relationality that constitutes the very essence of truth not only for the early pragmatists that 
influenced Stevens, but also for Levinas:  “To be sure,” writes Levinas:  
representation is the seat of truth: the movement proper to truth consists in the 
thinker being determined by the object presented to him, without weighing on 
him—such that the thinker who submits to what is thought does so “gracefully,” as 
though the object, even in the surprises it has in store for cognition, had been 
anticipated by the subject (TI 124).  
 
Turning to another late poem, Stevens’s “To an Old Philosopher in Rome,” may 
give us a better idea of what Stevens means by the “enlarged” world of fact that poetry 
affords.  The poem invokes the philosopher Georges Santayana, a former teacher and 
mentor of Stevens at Harvard, whose aestheticism and philosophical insularity Stevens had 
distanced himself from early on in his own career. James Logenbach remarks that, in the 
poem, “Santayana’s life, so narrow and so pure, represents a negative ideal for Stevens” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
insight only into the conditions attached to the production of a natural product, must always cognize not only 
the product’s form but the form’s necessity as well.  And yet in that given form it cannot assume that 
necessity.  Hence that very contingency of the thing’s form is a basis for regarding the product as if it had 
come about through a causality that only reason can have.  Such a causality would be the ability to act 
according to purposes (i.e. a will), and in presenting an object as possible only through such an ability we 
would be presenting it as possible only as a purpose” (CJ 248).	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(300).  The poem does less to engage with Santayana’s ideas than to engage with the idea 
of Santayana’s philosophical approach.  “The old philosopher” becomes symbolic of the 
possibilities and limitations inherent to thinking, to “inquisition” in any form, in the face of 
a greater, and utterly unresponsive unknown (death).  Nevertheless, that Santayana’s 
traditional philosophical approach was more or less in direct conflict with Stevens’s own is 
made clear not least through an emphasis on the word “total”—for Stevens, a dubious word 
at best—which is used three times by the end of the poem.   As Logenbach relates, Stevens 
resisted an “oversystematized account” of his own methods and poetry, and in a late letter 
dismissed the idea of any such structuring notion.  “I have no wish,” Stevens wrote 
definitively, “to arrive at a conclusion” (L 710).   But “To An Old Philosopher in Rome” 
can in no way be read as a condemnation of either Santayana, his philosophical approach, 
or his aestheticism.  As Logenbach writes, the poem “remains poignant rather than 
judgmental,” exposing the “seductions as well as (the) limitations”(301) of the old 
philosopher’s world.  This ambiguous relationship is expressed in Stevens’sdescription of 
“a total grandeur at the end,” where “every visible thing” would be “enlarged and yet / No 
more than a bed, a chair and moving nuns” (CP 434). Where there would be, that is, “no 
erasure of terms,” but where the frame of each object would nonetheless exist “enlarged”—
no longer bound by its “empirical limit.”  The world of objects, and their arrangement to 
one another are imagined by Stevens to, at last, “dispense with narrative” (Krauss, OU 19), 
to exist as they are, not “as such,” not as indeed “total” at all, but—just as the fixed gaze of 
the blackbird in “Thirteen Ways” was systematically destabilized—in the very continuous, 
imaginative process of that “total construction.”  The “edifice” that is created within the 
poem is total not in the sense that it is “complete” or has been (or could be) “completed.” 
Instead, the emphasis Stevens places on the objects in the poem—evoking their 
ordinariness and thereby suggesting that they might easily be substituted for others, 
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continually replaced—creates a matrix within which the ordinary and subjective details, 
qualities and experiences that are not, and could not, be named in the poem because they lie 
outside the philosopher’s as well as the poet’s ken, are nonetheless included.  The “totality” 
that is suggested here is one founded not by what is included, or indeed what it would be 
possible to include in the poem, but by it’s excess.  
The most important aspect of the “total grandeur” of the final form, however, and 
reminiscent of the concluding stanzas of “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird,” is that 
it is chosen by the perceiver himself: “the total grandeur of the total edifice, / Chosen by an 
inquisitor of structures / For himself” (CP 434).  It is knowingly constructed by he who is 
aware of, and inquisitive of, the fundamentals of that construction—by he who, in other 
words, in a “redoubled vision,” both sees and knows that he sees (Krauss, OU 19).  It is 
upon this “threshold”—an awareness of both the “seductions and the limitations” of his 
vision—that the old philosopher, “stops...As if the design of all his words takes form /And 
frame from thinking and is realized” (CP 434).  The very processes of seeing and thinking, 
as this conclusion avers, produce the structures of both mind and world.  In placing the 
emphasis, once again, upon the imaginative process by which even a “total edifice” is 
realized, Stevens undercutsthe value of the “total” entirely, establishing for the old 
philosopher (rather than any final product or result) a space of continuously generative 
thinking—a space that must be understood, according to Stevens, as proper to the life of the 
mind.  
Stevens’s own misgivings regarding the perceived solipsism of Santayana’s 
philosophy and his own self-diagnosed “imagination-reality complex” add to the ambiguity 
of these final lines. That the “total grandeur” of the final form is realized by the thinker, the 
constructor of the form, “for himself,” supports a solipsistic interpretation that each 
individual mind, as the philosopher’s, may ultimately remain trapped within the delimiting 
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structure that he himself is responsible for maintaining, providing no opportunity for 
contact with the world beyond.   But the fact that the structure is created by an “inquisitor 
of structures” is an important distinction, and one which at once both binds and frees the 
philosopher from the delimitation that the structure imposes. Also crucial to an 
understanding of this poem is the fact that thinking does not arrive at “form and frame” as 
either pre-existing or transcendent.  At no point is structure imposed upon thinking; instead, 
it is thinking that is always already the source of any form or frame by which it is 
eventually represented. Rather than building an isolated structure within which to house the 
intellect, this figuration of thinking as dependent upon component parts that always come 
before point a way out of solipsism and the imagined autocracy of the mind.  
“Form and frame” are to be understood here quite specifically—as “the design of all 
his words” makes clear—as language itself.   Once more, therefore, we find ourselves, as in 
“The Poem That Took the Place of a Mountain,” within a space of “redoubled vision” 
where the words of the poet on the page (they themselves formed “for” himself by the 
structures of his own mind) take the place of the projected moment of the final “realization” 
of the philosopher’s thinking. Again, the revelation of representation as a process— 
continuously “projecting” in this way—serves to highlight not the solipsism of thinking but 
its endless generative force.  
“There is,” as Levinas contends, “an absolute, creative freedom, prior to the 
venturesome course of the hand, which chances on to the goal it seeks” (TI 124-125).  It is 
this always ever creative freedom of the mind that at once binds and liberates the subject—
the “I” of the same—to “frame and form.”  Even that “frame and form” by which the “I” 
represents the Other, or non-I (including in this respect his own subjectivity and thinking), 
is therefore arrived at secondarily and is contingent on a fundamental freedom from form 
which directs the processes by which form itself is eventually acquired and understood. 
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That form constitutes both liberty and constraint is reflected in the very doubleness of the 
word re-presentation.   “Representation is...projection, inventing the goal that will be 
presented to the still groping act as won a priori.  The ‘act’ of representation discovers, 
properly speaking, nothing before itself” (Levinas, TI 125).  In other words, he who would 
represent either himself or the Other is always encountering the “obstacle” of his own 
“creative freedom,” “representation” itself already brought to light by the “vision of that 
goal (which) had cleared a passage for it” and which he had already  “projected forth” 
(Levinas, TI 125).   
 
The Pure Present 
At the same time, it is this a priori “creative freedom” that allows for the 
dissolution of the obstacle and for the opposition between “I” and “non-I” (in both 
preserving their terms), to disappear in a moment of “total vision.”   Seeming to echo 
Krauss’s analogy of the baseball—seen not in the successive stages of its trajectory but in 
an “all-at-onceness” of immediate perception—Levinas writes:  
representation is pure present. The positing of a pure present without even 
tangential ties with time is the marvel of representation.  It is a void of time, 
interpreted as eternity. To be sure the I who conducts his thoughts becomes (or more 
exactly ages) in time, in which his successive thoughts, across which he thinks in 
the present, are spread forth.  But this becoming in time does not appear on the 
plane of representation: representation involves no passivity. (TI 125)   
It is this “pure present” toward which Stevens, throughout his poetic career, aspired; a 
“pure present,” that could not possibly (“without even tangential ties to time”) retreat into a 
solipsism of the “I” that can only be understood temporally, but instead moves toward a 
direct a-temporal encounter between the “I” and the “Other.”  This contact results not due 
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to a collapse of distance or transcendence into a realm where distance is no longer 
perceivable or relevant, but instead due to the radical exteriorization of both I and Other (an 
emphasis, that is, on their absolute difference).  It is this realization of ultimate 
incompatibility that allows a shift in emphasis to the relationality between the two terms, 
and subsequently the (inherent) possibility of bridging the distance that relationality has 
incurred in an immediate, spatial, encounter.   
 
Distance is a theme by which Stevens often works out precisely this question of the 
radical limits imposed upon the “optics” of subjectivity.  In the first of “Two Illustrations 
That the World Is What You Make of It,” 9 for example, which includes the significant sub-
title, “The Constant Disquisition of the Wind,” the speaker remarks on his own sudden 
sense of the “distance of the sun” to the earth—a sense that he describes as “[t]he shadow 
of a sense of his own” (CP 436).  The speaker acknowledges in this way the primacy of his 
own perception even over that of the outside, apparently objective, relation of objects in the 
world.  Even the indisputable vastness of the distance between earth and sun is eclipsed by 
“a sense of his own, /A knowledge that the actual day was so much less” (CP 436, emphasis 
added). Through the acknowledgement, that is, of the very smallness of his own range of 
perception, the speaker asserts its constitutive power.  “It is always the same that 
determines the other” (Levinas, TI 124); it is always “the same” that projects itself onto the 
objects of the world.  It is therefore the speaker’s own perception of the “smallness” of that 
which is projected onto that world that corresponds to his perception of the “smallness” of 
the world itself (or rather his “sense,” in this case, of the smallness of the distance between 
sun and earth).  He realizes that the world is but a “shadow” of his own projection. The sun 
is not, in this sense, either the “thing itself” or the true subject of the poem, but neither is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  This poem is also from The Rock, the last collection published in Stevens’s lifetime.	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the subject himself (this contrary to critics who would cast Stevens as a poet of the “act of 
the mind” [CP 219] with the emphasis on mind as object rather than act). Instead, and again 
via a trompe-d’oeil of the “double negative,” it is the space of the projection between the 
sun and the speaker that is the true subject of the poem, and where the boundaries between 
them ultimately disappear.  Stevens renders this “in-between” space tangible through the 
elaboration of a third term: the wind—the intangible element in the poem that serves to 
spatialize and exteriorize the other two terms.  It is the elaboration of this third, 
intermediate term (think also of  “Blackbird’s” “I was of three minds” [CP 74]), that allows 
the poem at last to dissolve the “distance” between the “I” and the “non-I.”  
The first section of the poem in its entirety reads: 
  I 
The Constant Disquisition of the Wind 
 
The sky seemed so small that winter day, 
A dirty light on a lifeless world, 
Contracted like a withering stick. 
 
It was not the shadow of cloud and cold, 
But a sense of the distance of the sun— 
The shadow of a sense of his own, 
 
A knowledge that the actual day 
Was so much less.  Only the wind 
Seemed large and loud and high and strong. 
 
And as he thought within the thought 
Of the wind, not knowing that thought 
Was not his thought or anyone’s 
 
The appropriate image of himself, 
So formed, became himself and he breathed, 
The breath of another nature as his own, 
 
But only its momentary breath, 
Outside of and beyond the dirty light, 
That never could be animal, 
 
A nature still without shape, 
Except his own—perhaps, his own 
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In a Sunday’s violent idleness. (CP 434-435) 
 
The “thought within the thought” depicted in the fourth stanza is what finally 
allows, then, for the “redoubled vision” by which a tangible interim space arises between 
the two opposing terms of self and world.   What is resolved in “the appropriate image of 
himself,” is not, therefore, an image that is “his” (the speaker’s, the “I”’s) alone, which 
would involve him in a (still oppositional) encounter with “another nature.” It is important 
to note that the “nature” the speaker experiences never does become his own.  Instead, it 
remains “as his own,” just as the encounter itself remains necessarily “without shape—
except his own.”  It is crucial that the relationship never does succeed in taking concrete 
“animal” form, as doing so would annul the necessary intermediate space of the 
“momentary breath” by which the contact between terms was made possible.  The form that 
is achieved, or represented as achieved, in stanza five, as “(t)he appropriate image of 
himself, / So formed, (which) became himself…” is one that is immediately re-imaged as 
“the breath of another.”  “[H]e breathed/ The breath of another nature as his own” (CP 436, 
emphasis added) immediately displaces the achieved form of “himself” into that of 
“another.”  The “form” of the speaker’s subjectivity is here both achieved and displaced—
or, rather, achieved through its very displacement. Through the illustration of the speaker’s 
breathing “the breath of another nature as his own” the poem deconstructs not only an 
essentialized notion of subjectivity, but also the essentialized notion of form.  What is 
“illustrated” in this poem is not any form or subjectivity in itself, or, conversely, its lack, 
but rather “the sense of the distance” necessary to perceiving or establishing either one10.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  “What, or rather, who is the subject?” Asks Simon Critchley in Ethics, a critical examination of the works 
of Derrida, Levinas and others.  He explains: “ ‘Subject’ derives form the Latin sub-jectum, literally, ‘that 
which is thrown under.’  Thus, the subject is that which is thrown under as a prior support or more 
fundamental stratum upon which other qualities, such as predicates, accidents and attributes may be based. 
Subjectum translated the Greek hupokeimenon, ‘that which lies under,’  ‘the substratum’; a term which refers 
in Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics to that of which all other entities are predicated but which is itself not 
predicated of anything else.  In a classical context, then, the subject is the subject of predication; the 
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Without the concrete establishment in the poem of this “sense of…distance” the “Sunday’s 
violent idleness” depicted in the poem would have to be understood—in completed object 
form—only in terms of the past.  The conceptualization of a “sense of…distance” allows, in 
the evocation of a “pure present,” an encounter between two opposing terms. What results 
is therefore not a representation of either the self or the other, but a representation of the 
encounter between them, an a-temporal space of “wholeness” from which the possibility of 
representation itself arises. 
 
But what is the possibility of an imagined (let alone real) “wholeness” for a poet 
who resisted an “oversystematized account” of poetry or of life for that matter, and who 
had “no wish to arrive at a conclusion” (L 710)?11    In “Things of August,” from the 
notoriously abstract collection, The Auroras of Autumn, it is precisely this question that is 
taken up: 
When was it that the particles became 
The whole man, that tempers and beliefs became 
Temper and belief and that differences lost 
Difference and were one? (CP 421). 
 
The reply, that “[i]t had to be / In the presence of a solitude of self, / An expanse and the 
abstraction of an expanse”(CP 421) establishes once again the negative-space between the 
“I” and the “Other,”  in which the differences between them are—as the line above would 
suggest: “that differences lost / Difference and were one”—both preserved and cancelled. 
Through the repetition of the word “difference”—as well as the line-break prior to the 
second “difference” (resulting in its emphatic capitalization)—Stevens manages to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
hupokeimenon is that which persists through change, the substratum, and which as a function analogous to 
matter (hule).  It is matter that persists through the changes that form (morphe) imposes upon it” (51).	  
11	  This impulse toward representing inconclusiveness is much older than the “crisis of representation” by 
which Stevens’s modernist moment has been defined; it was registered most literally, for example, by 
Stevens’s forebear, Emily Dickinson, in “The World is Not Conclusion.” 	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emphasize that, though “differences” may be lost to become “one,” that “one” is 
incontestably made up of “Difference” itself.  The poem continues: 
When was it that we heard the voice of union? 
 
Was it as we sat in the park and the archaic form 
Of a woman with a cloud on her shoulder rose against the sky 
And the sense of the archaic touched us at once 
In a movement of the outlines of similarity?  
 
We resembled one another at the sight.  
The forgetful color of the autumn day 
Was full of these archaic forms, giants 
Of sense, evoking one thing in many men, 
Evoking an archaic space, vanishing  
In the space, leaving an outline of the size 
Of the impersonal person, the wanderer,  
The father, the ancestor, the bearded peer, 
The total of human shadows bright as glass.  (CP 421) 
 
 These shared “outlines of similarity” are nothing other than the route by which they 
are expressed—language itself. “We resembled one another at the sight,” yes, but it is only 
in the communication of that “sight,” that the “voice” of union is heard. The “archaic 
space” described here can be understood as the abstract space of language before it 
manifests itself in the “said”—that contains, therefore, in its negative-space of abstraction, 
“the impersonal person…the total of human shadows bright as glass” (CP 421).  These 
multiple human “shadows” are what constitute the “particles” by which a “wholeness” 
might potentially be evoked through the very process of their emerging from the shadows: 
being named. “The wanderer, / The father, the ancestor, the bearded peer…” These are all 
possibilities that may be conjured into shared experience not through our ability to see and 
understand them in “particle” form, but by our ability to generalize and transform them into 
the abstraction of the  “impersonal person,” “the already said”12.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  “It is through,” writes Levinas, “the already said that words, elements of a historically constituted 
vocabulary, will come to function as signs and acquire a usage and bring about the proliferation so all the 
possibilities of vocabulary” (OTB 37).  Later on we are reminded, however, that “every nameable identity can 
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The poem begins with the idea that amidst the cacophony of “locusts by 
day…crickets by night” there is an infinite array of new and ever-changing combinations 
and discoveries to be made between the notes that resound, and their different (potential) 
meanings: “Nothing is lost, loud locusts,” Stevens declares.  “No note fails.  These / Sounds 
are long in the living of the ear. / The honky-tonk out of the somnolent grasses / Is a 
memorizing, a trying out, to keep” (CP 417).  What is at stake here, as in the rest of the 
poem, is the method by which we manage to make “sense” out of a process of sensory 
perception that is—for as long a duration as “the living of the ear”—always ongoing. 
“Nothing is lost,” but the question that is implied by the selective process—a “trying out, to 
keep”—referred to at the end of this section is of course, how and why do we keep what we 
keep? What do we, and how do we separate from the “saying” of language, that which is 
simply “said.” Similarly to the manner in which the “honky tonk out of the somnolent 
grasses” is “memorized,” retained within the “living ear” though not necessarily “kept,” 
Stevens writes further on, in section V of the poem:  
The thinking as reader reads what has been written. 
He wears the words he reads to look upon 
Within his being, 
 
……………………………………………………………… 
 
A finger with a ring to guide his eye 
From line to line, as we lie on the grass and listen 
To that which has no speech, 
 
The voluble intentions of the symbols, 
The ghostly celebrations of the picnic, 
The secretions of insight (CP 419-420).   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
turn into a verb” but that this potentiality that must be understood within the “said” should not be understood 
to “reduce the difference between being and entities to a frivolous play of syntax [...] by interpreting the fact 
that essence exposes and is exposed, that temporalization is stated, resounds, is said, it is to not give priority 
to the said over the saying.  It is first to awaken in the said the saying which is absorbed in it and, thus 
absorbed, enters into the history that the said imposes” (OTB 43).	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Language, then, is figured as an infinite catalogue from which we have the 
opportunity to draw, a catalogue that is ultimately inclusive of “that which has no speech,” 
rather than restrictive to that which is “said” or even “sayable.”  It is the “expanse and the 
abstraction of an expanse / A zone of time without the ticking of clocks, / A color that 
moved us with forgetfulness” (CP 421) out of which a specific expanse, the specific tick of 
a clock or the remembrance of a color,” may emerge, but which is inclusive of all things, 
all “voluble intentions” of experience or of expression of that experience. “The world,” 
then, “imagines for the beholder”:  
He is born the blank mechanic of the mountains,  
 
The blank frere of the fields, the matin labourer.  
He is the possessed of sense not the possessor (CP 420).  
 
The beholder is at last beholden to, that is, not proprietor of the steady influx of sensory 
data; he does not create the image of the mountains but remains between the image and its 
perpetual inscription on his senses.  Just as the blackbird, in the penultimate section of 
“Thirteen Ways” flies over a river which we already know to be moving of its own accord, 
our perception is at last beholden to that which exceeds us and not the other way around. 
Also, that perception of the river—the actual sensory data received—is not what is 
ultimately shared or shareable.  Were the river to remain in the autonomous eye of the 
blackbird, or the mountain in the eye of the poet as beholder, it would be the river and the 
mountains that had the last word.  It would be the “world” alone that would and could 
imagine itself for us; differences would not “lose” difference to become—a space of 
“Difference”—“one” (CP 421).  It is language—language not as the “said” but as the 
possibility of “saying”—that is responsible for the adherence of “particles” in the “the 
whole man,” or for the possibility of, as Stevens goes on to write in the penultimate section 
of “Things of August,” “a new text of the world”:   
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A scribble of fret and fear and fate, 
From a bravura of the mind,  
A courage of the eye (CP 421-422). 
 
Note that the new “text” that Stevens imagines to be possible is one that requires both 
“bravura of the mind” and “a courage of the eye” indicating that what is lacking in the old 
text is nothing substantial—all the “particles” are there. It is the quality of attention or 
dedication to the possibilities inherent within these “particles” that is lacking. What Stevens 
reads as necessary is the courage and confidence to use our sensory and intellectual 
faculties in new ways that would break us out of the patterns of seeing and thinking that 
have been learned by rote, and allow new patterns, new “texts,” to develop—the meanings 
of which, as he goes on to say, will be “our own:” 
In which, for all the breathings 
From the edge of the night,  
And for all the white voices 
That were rosen once, 
 
The meanings are our own— (CP 422). 
 
As if to emphasize this new-found self-reliance and confidence, Stevens follows this 
passage with the conditional, claiming:  “It is a text that we shall be needing / To be the 
footing of noon, The pillar of midnight…” (CP 422).   Stevens’s resistance to the 
imperative, present-tense positions the text in a space outside of the constraints of human 
knowing altogether—constraints that include, of course, any sense of regulated time, as 
well as language.  By locating the “necessity” of the poem outside of its measured temporal 
structure Stevens casts the text at the remove “necessary” to the articulation of the 
“required” (CP 422, emphasis added) text, a text he describes in the poem as that which 
“comes from ourselves, 
neither from knowing 
Nor not knowing, yet free from question, 
Because we wanted it so 
And it had to be, 
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A text of intelligent men 
At the center of the unintelligible, 
As in a hermitage, for us to think, 
Writing and reading the rigid inscription (CP 422). 
 
The text is depicted as removed from the regular and regulated temporal and language 
structures of “men,” but at the same time it is shown to be integral to those structures: 
“Because we wanted it so, / And it had to be” (CP 422).  The paradox that is inherent in 
this, the penultimate stanza of “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven,” underlines the 
paradox central to the entire poem, as well as to Stevens’s broader poetic project: the 
elaboration of a space within the text of his own poetry where we might understand the 
meanings to be at once both “rigid inscription” and “our own.”  
Most importantly, though, it is text, or rather the possibility of a text: “a text of the 
new world” that becomes the all-inclusive intermediate space between “intelligent men / At 
the center of the unintelligible” at the end of the section. And what is the possibility of text 
but the idea of that text: the pure promise of language itself? The encounter between the 
two—the intelligible and the unintelligible—is not restricted to the abstract austerity of 
either the “outline of the size of the impersonal person” or to any singular person or thing 
(once it emerges and is named).  Instead, the encounter brought about in Stevens’s poem 
between concrete representation, understanding and abstraction is bound up in the always-
deferred, always-promised negative-space in between.  As Levinas, in Otherwise Than 
Being, distances himself from describing “time consciousness, and consciousness as such,” 
in the phenomenological terms of Husserl, as within “the temporality of sensation”13 (32), 
so does Stevens ultimately distance himself in “Things of August” from the idea of 
consciousness contained within the flow of its own sensory experience.  Though, as Stevens 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Levinas explains that in Husserl’s thinking “time, the sensorial impression and consciousness” are 
inextricably linked so that “consciousness remains an intentionality” and this intentionality “is time itself.” 
(OTB 32)	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writes, “the meanings are our own,” the text—that “rigid inscription”—is not.  And so, as 
the final lines of “Things of August” depict, it is with time.  The unnamed female presence 
that emerges in the last section can only be understood in terms of organic life and sex 
(“Here the adult one is still banded with fulgor, // Is still warm with the love with which she 
came”).  She is, like the “text,” portrayed as existing, fatally, outside of time and 
continuance.  She is said to have “given too much, but not enough. / She is exhausted and a 
little old” (CP 422), indicating that her efforts are un-absorbable into any ultimate 
temporality; she remains finite, ultimately exhausted and exhaustible.  Consciousness and 
Being remain for Stevens, therefore, at the end of “Things of August,” definitively outside 
of any concept of temporality in an infinite mode.  But it is by retaining in this way the 
conception of a finite consciousness that is ultimately separate from an infinite mode of 
Being that Stevens allows himself to conceive of the possibility of “wholeness” in his work.  
“The temporal modification,” as Levinas writes, “is not an event, nor an action, nor the 
effect of a cause.  It is the verb to be” (OTB 34).  “To be,” therefore, is a “saying” of being 
that is ultimately separate from the experienced, the effected, the “said.”   In focusing on 
the division between the saying and the said, on the gap that exists necessarily within a 
consciousness that any “saying” will consistently miss its intended mark and reiterate only 
that which has been already said, Stevens opens up space in which to render the individual 
consciousness in its “wholeness”—in the “pure present” of its refraction between “reality” 
(the sensory, the said) and the “imagination” (making sense, saying).  Were temporality 
absorbed into the consciousness of the “I” of the same, were sense impressions understood 
as that which “is other within identity” (OTB 32, emphasis added), there would be no 
possibility of representing consciousness in its wholeness as there would be no vantage-
point from which such a representation might be either glimpsed or recorded.  By 
establishing, instead, a space beyond the individual consciousness, 
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from which the individual consciousness, sense, and language may be conceived to have 
emerged as parts (hence a space that is ultimately shared), Stevens retains the possibility 
not only of conceiving an individual as a “whole man” (given that any number of possible 
arrangements of those parts, though fatal in themselves, correspond to a greater body) but 
also introduces the Levinasian idea of genuine contact between individuals.  
Just as temporality must, according to Levinas, be understood as verbal rather than 
eventual, effectual or causal, so in Totality and Infinity he argues that the encounter 
between the “I” and the “Other” is not “works”—not, that is, “actions, gestures, manners, 
objects utilized and fabricated” (176). If Being were to be understood in this way it would 
relegate the relation between “I” and “Other” to the world of labour and economy. 
Language, Levinas posits, so fundamental to Being, must be “instituted above and beyond 
works,” as “[t]he State which realizes its essence in works slips toward tyranny, and thus 
attests my absence from those works” (TI 176). It is through language that Being is 
afforded the possibility of coming to presence in its own right, through expression. “The 
word alone,” writes Levinas, “—but disengaged from its density as a linguistic product can 
put an end to this absence.” As long as, that is, language remains entrenched within a 
system of representation where A (I) represents B (other), it remains within an interior, 
phenomenal system that cannot result in any genuine encounter. Language constitutes the 
“unique possibility” of bridging that distance—of an existence for the “I” that would be 
“more than his interior existence” (TI 182).  To return, via language, to this exteriority, 
then, is what Levinas refers to as “the straightforwardness of the face to face,” which places 
the “center of gravitation” of a being outside of that being, toward the other.  “The 
surpassing of phenomenal or inward existence does not consist in receiving the recognition 
of the Other, but in offering him one’s being.  To be in oneself is to express oneself, that is, 
already to serve the Other.  The ground of expression is goodness” (TI 183).   
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Stevens’s poetry, and especially his works from 1947 with Transport to Summer on, 
offers a figuration of expression understood in this sense: an active return from interiority 
to the exteriority of the face to face encounter, in which the center of gravity is oriented 
ultimately not inward, but outward—toward the Other—and finally where the ground of 
that expression “is goodness.”   Where Logenbach argues that Stevens’s later career is 
constituted by a retreat from the political realm, I argue that it is in these later books that 
Stevens’s “abstracted abstractions” offer an exploration of language and representation as 
the very site of that engagement.  Much of the exploration of this engagement is necessarily 
focussed on the manner in which the self is separated from the world with which it attempts 
to engage and represent, but this separation is one that language again and again offers to 
bridge.  Such distance must not therefore be understood as an ultimate sentencing of the 
subject to solitude and solipsism but instead as a necessary step (an acknowledgement of 
that distance and a preservation of its defining terms) toward the “total vision” that 
expression might allow.  
 
An “Essential Ambiguity"  
That Stevens’s work can often best be understood in terms of the concerns of the 
visual art world rather than the literary world that was contemporary to him is particularly 
clear when considering his intense focus on the relationship between content and form, as 
well as on (as has already been explored by looking closely at “Thirteen Ways of Looking 
at a Blackbird”) perspective and the manner in which that relationship is necessarily 
understood through, and contingent upon, the mechanics of vision. The questions that 
Stevens explores in The Necessary Angel, as well as in much of his poetry from 
Harmonium on, concerning “form versus subject” (McLeod 13) can be profitably compared 
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with the inquiries of his contemporaries—in particular Marcel Duchamp—in the New York 
visual art world.  Duchamp’s friendship with Stevens’s old college friend, the wealthy art 
collector, Walter Arensberg, allowed Stevens—upon his visits to Arensberg’s New York 
apartment in the 1910s—to examine first-hand a notable addition to Arensberg’s collection: 
Duchamp’s “Nude Descending Staircase, No. 2” from 1912 (McLeod 13).  The work was 
remarkable and even controversial at the time due to its incorporation of both a cubist 
concern for the object’s static form, and a futurist evocation of vibrant, kinetic energy. 
Duchamp himself acknowledged both influences, and he remarked of a similar painting, 
“Nude King and Queen surrounded by Swift Nudes” (completed shortly after “Nude 
Descending Staircase, No. 2”): “It is a theme of motion in a frame of static entities.  In 
other words the static entities are represented by the king and queen, while the swift nudes 
are based on the theme of motion” (quoted in McLeod 17).  This double concern for “stasis 
and motion,” which expresses “the interplay of imagination and reality,” is also one of “the 
principle themes” of Harmonium—a work published, as McLeod notes, at the height of 
Stevens’s engagement with the New York art world.  Indeed, in the words of Michel 
Benamou, Stevens often presents within Harmonium, “conflicts of ideas as conflicts of 
forms and shapes” (quoted in McLeod 17)—the classic example being of course, 
“Anecdote of the Jar.” 14  But a concern for an expression of both ideas and things in 
tangible form would continue throughout Stevens’s career, as “The Poem that Took the 
Place of a Mountain” makes clear, and it is perhaps Duchamp’s shift away from painted 
representation entirely, to a concentration on representation through the form of his famous 
“readymades,” that most closely parallels Stevens’s poetic concerns.  Though the 
“readymade” took the shape of a formal object it was not about—or not solely about—a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  The ordering properties of the jar placed on a hill in Tennessee—which “made the slovenly wilderness / 
Surround that hill” and “took dominion everywhere” (CP 60-61)—are well known.	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question of that form itself.  The “functionalism” of his readymades was, Duchamp 
avowed, eliminated by the fact that the objects had been removed from their worldly 
environment and re-situated on “the planet of aesthetics.”  For Duchamp, then, the role of 
the artist was not restricted to the shaping and crafting of the art-object; art was, instead, as 
for Stevens, “an act of the mind” (CP 219). 
 Duchamp and Stevens’s shared concern for the process of selection, the active 
choice made by the artist in arriving at the object of his art15 discloses in both artists’ 
thinking a sympathy with the Levinasian view that:  
expression does not manifest the presence of being by referring from the sign to the 
signified; it presents the signifier.  The signifier, he who gives the sign, is not 
signified.  It is necessary to have already been in the society of signifiers for the 
sign to be able to appear as a sign.  Hence the signifier must present himself before 
every sign, by himself—present a face. (181-182) 
Before any “face to face” engagement can occur, that is, which might allow a “surpassing 
of phenomenal or inward existence” there must first be this: the revelation of a face. 16 In 
terms of the strictly visual, as Krauss avers, the artist must never “overlook” the base of the 
artistic medium itself.  “There must be no self-forgetting,” she writes.  The subjective 
interiority of the poets’ mind—like “the four corners of a sheet of paper”—constitute more 
than a “physical limit”; they are a “logical premise,” the very “conditions of possibility” for 
representation itself (OU 48). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  As	  opposed, that is, to the imagistic concern, typified by Williams, for the manner in which an art object 
may come to, as fully as possible, represent an object in itself, an impulse articulated most famously perhaps 
in Williams’s maxim, “no ideas but in things.”  
16 In other words, for a signifier to signify it first must be recognized as such; it must be established within a 
symbolic matrix. 
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But a focus, in this sense, on signifier rather than signified as the organizing 
principle of a work, introduces “an essential ambiguity” (McLeod 22) in Stevens’s poetry 
between the two—an ambiguity that is, as McLeod points out, as fundamental to Stevens’s 
“Earthy Anecdote” as it is to Duchamp’s “Fountain” (22).   Stevens, of course, was well 
aware of this, and as his career progressed he became increasingly acceptant of, and 
dependant on, ambiguity as the key to his poetics. “One of the essentials of poetry is 
ambiguity,” he wrote once to R. P. Blackmur, and: “I don’t feel that I have touched the 
thing until I touch it in ambiguous form” (quoted in Holly Stevens’s Flux 773).  It is this 
“essential ambiguity” that gives rise, of course, to the interpretation of Stevens’s work as 
“anti-realist ... solipsist ... escapist” (Chiasson 63), but it is also this “essential ambiguity” 
that gives rise to interpretations, like Logenbach’s, of the work as socio-economically and 
politically driven and engaged.  I would prefer, rather than swerving too quickly in either 
direction, to explore instead the space of ambiguity itself, which Stevens—far more than 
any comprehensive political or aesthetic message—was so intent on providing.   What is 
revealed in a focus on this “in-between” space of ambiguity in Stevens’s work is ultimately 
both an aesthetic and a political project intent on unsettling the rigidities by which each 
category has been traditionally conceived.   
By emphasizing and formulating his own processes of perception and 
representation, Stevens offers us (the reader, the Other) a representation of his active 
“being” (Levinas 183), and in so doing highlights the process by which such expression 
offers the possibility of “disengaging” from the economic system of language and “works” 
in order to effect, through genuine expression grounded in what Levinas conceives of as 
“goodness,” a genuine contact with the Other: the “face to face.”   
The ambiguity that is crucial to this exploration in Stevens’s work—between 
subject and object, self and world—is achieved, as in works like “The Poem That Took the 
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Place of a Mountain” and “Two Illustrations That the World Is What You Make Of It,” 
through an attention to the visual apprehension both of static form, and the kinetic motion 
inherent to all form.   But again, this double concern in Stevens’s work moves past a simple 
dichotomy.  It avoids the collapse, on the one hand, into the “dumbly physical” (Krauss, 
OU 98) and on the other, an escape from the physical world “by an angel’s flight” 
(Benamou 107) associated with the Romantic sublime.  By grounding itself instead in 
“exactness,” Stevens allows for the “discovery” rather than the “imposition”17 of an 
“inexactness”: a “pure presentness” of total vision (Krauss, OU 7).   
Put differently, a concentration on what Heidegger terms the “thingly character of 
the work of art” (PLT 19) makes room for a consideration of the equally integral space of 
difference that resides between the thing and the “something else over and above the 
thingly element (which) constitutes its artistic nature”(PLT 19). It is, indeed, precisely this 
space of distance—between thing and “something else,” between an articulated presence 
and that which cannot be articulated”—which Stevens elaborates as the ambiguous in-
between space of “representation itself.” This space is also the grounds for demonstrating 
the choice that is inherent to artistic representation, which Duchamp draws our attention to 
with his ready-mades. The demonstrative “There it was, word for word,” that opens “The 
Poem That Took the Place of a Mountain,” gives way to a broader, more sweeping view not 
of what the opening lines indicate or demonstrate but of what they do not show, what we 
ourselves must discover or are already involved in the process of discovering through our 
interaction with the text. What is demonstrated in the poem, in other words, is exactly what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  This in reference to Stevens’s critique of surrealism, that it: “invents without discovering.  To make a clam 
play an accordion is to invent not to discover.  The observation of the unconscious, so far as it can be 
observed, should reveal things of which we have previously been unconscious, not the familiar things of 
which we have been conscious plus imagination” (CP 919).  	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is first indicated by the demonstrative, “There it was, word for word” (CP 435) of the 
poem’s opening line.  There is nothing in the poem that exceeds what is first introduced: 
“the poem that took the place of a mountain,” but the emphasis is not on the finality of the 
declaration, the “there it was” or the  “word for word,” but instead on the active “took the 
place” (emphasis added).  The process of substitution is ongoing.  It is the reader, engaged 
in the “word for word,” that makes—through her own cognitive and imaginative 
processes—the substitution of poem for mountain possible.  The distance that is introduced 
between the declarative introduction to the poem (which functions as if to say, “this is all 
there is of the ‘reality’ of this poem, only these words on the page—I have nothing more to 
offer you”) and the sweeping landscape that is revealed (not only of the “mountain” that the 
words evoke but also of the speaker as he gazes down and “recognizes his unique and 
solitary home” [CP 435]) is the distance within which the reader also “recognizes” for 
herself what is not and cannot be articulated by the poem.  That is, the manner in which she 
is, herself, engaged with the systems of representation at work in the poem, and the 
limitations and possibilities of her own subjectivity—her own “unique and solitary home.” 
The “double-remove” effected by the poem reveals at least two “unique and solitary 
homes” then, thus indicating that the uniqueness and solitude of the vantage-point is less 
than it imagines itself to be.  What is effected is not a “shared” moment between the reader 
and the subject of the poem, or reader and poet, but neither is it a moment of isolation.  
Instead it is a moment wherein the distance between reader and subject, subject and poet, 
language and image, reality and the imagination, is briefly revealed.  
 
For Heidegger, whose phenomenology Levinas would ultimately distance himself 
from, but which would nevertheless remain fundamental to his own thinking—a “thing” is 
that which designates what is “not simply nothing.” A work of art, then, is considered a 
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thing insofar as it is, indeed, “not simply nothing.” To define the “thing” any further, 
however—in positive terms—requires a calculation for Heidegger of that “something else” 
which designates the thing in the first place as “not nothing.”  This is a calculation that is 
effectively impossible, however, because the “something else” that requires definition for 
this purpose is, at least in phenomenological terms, the “nothing” itself.   We arrive here, 
then, at a point at which we might declare, as Heidegger does in the opening pages of his 
essay, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” that “Anyone can easily see that we are moving in 
a circle” (PLT 18).  It is precisely this circle, that, in Stevens, as in Heidegger, we are 
“compelled to follow”: “To enter upon this path,” writes Heidegger, is, indeed “the strength 
of thought” (PLT 18), and it is also upon this path (or the elaboration of this path through 
poetry, as Heidegger explores through his passionate analyses of the work of Hölderlin) 
that we may arrive sometimes at the impossible “nothing” by which the “something else” 
of art is defined.  
Nearly ten years before “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Being and Time, 
Heidegger had similarly stated that “what is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to 
come into it in the right way” (195).  What Heidegger suggests, in other words, is that we 
are already, and will remain, necessarily, within the circular structure of creation and 
Being.  What is required is neither resignation to this fact nor an exit strategy, but—
instead—a method of continually approaching a realization of this circular structure of 
Being.   
To approach Being through the conception of Language—an approach Stevens 
shares with Levinas—is one method of ensuring that this circular structure is retained at the 
root of our understanding and our approach to the question of Being.  As Levinas writes 
regarding temporality, which he understands as “the verb to be”:  
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Language is…not reducible to a system of signs doubling up beings and relations: 
that conception would be incumbent on us if words were nouns.  Language seems 
rather to be an excrescence of the verb. And qua verb it already bears sensible life – 
temporalization and being’s essence.  The lived sensation, being and time, is already 
understood in a verb.” (OTB 35)   
Language, Levinas admits, is also a system of nouns; also, that is, a manner of identifying 
and naming, of turning abstracts into particulars, of establishing outlines, of identifying 
shapes from the abstractions of inherited “archaic forms.”  But it is language’s verbal 
mode—a resistance to being definitively and finally named, categorized as either action, 
effect, or event—that prevails and by which, ultimately, “the signification of saying goes 
beyond the said” (OTB 37).   It is this—the continuous “going beyond” of language—that 
allows any rigorous exploration of it.  
The exploration conducted by Stevens18 indeed retains within it this circular 
structure: there is no other way to approach language, his poetry continuously reminds us, 
other than to continuously approach. This continuity, along with the verbal resistance of 
Being to the named, is the explicit subject of another of Stevens’s late poems, “Looking 
Across the Fields and Watching the Birds Fly,” from The Rock.  The “redoubled vision” 
that is effected by this poem is similar to that of “The Poem That Took the Place of a 
Mountain” in that the speaker is placed at a double-remove from the poem’s object: this 
time the remove is effected through the characterization of a certain “Mr. Homburg,” 
apparent author of an “irritating minor idea,” which the poem then endeavours to explore.  
This “irritating idea” of Mr. Homburg’s is— reduced to its simplest form—that there exists, 
outside of himself, a power greater than his own imagination.  “To think away the grass, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  I mean this not, or at least not only, in any philosophical, theoretical sense, but in the practical sense, in 
terms of “The honky-tonk out of the somnolent grasses, ” the very processes by which we arrive at  “the 
said.”	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trees, the clouds, / Not to transform them into other things, / Is only what the sun does 
every day” (CP 439) he reflects.  
The sun, here conceived of as “free from man’s ghost, larger and yet a little like, / 
Without his literature and without his gods...”, leaves the man himself free to contemplate 
his own conception of the sun—and of himself.  If there exists an imaginative power 
greater than man, that can “think away the grass, the trees, the clouds, (and) / 
Not...transform them into other things,” than man himself—though he may ultimately be 
“thought away” in his specificity—is indeed “a part,” integrated within that imaginative 
whole.   
What we know in what we see, what we feel in what we  
Hear, what we are, beyond mystic disputation, 
In the tumult of integrations out of the sky, 
 
And what we think, a breathing like the wind, 
A moving part of a motion, a discovery 
Part of a discovery, a change part of a change, 
 
A sharing of color and being part of it.  
The afternoon is visibly a source,  
Too wide, too irised, to be more than calm, 
 
Too much like thinking to be less than thought, 
Obscurest parent, obscurest patriarch, 
A daily majesty of meditation, 
 
That comes and goes in silences of its own. (CP 440) 
 
What the poem demonstrates is precisely the return of the mind (“Mr. Homburg’s” mind), 
from “interiority,” to “exteriority.” Where the poem is begun with an “irritating” thought 
that there exists a greater force outside “Mr. Homburg’s” own mind, by the end of the 
poem, he becomes a “a part of” that greater “discovery.” In other words, a contemplation of 
the fields that begins within, turns outward, until “Mr. Homburg” himself becomes a part of 
that “exterior” landscape. But once more we are returned from the field to an interiorized 
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thinking of the field: “We think, then, as the sun shines or does not.  / We think as wind 
skitters on a pond in a field // Or we put mantles on our words because / The same wing, 
rising and rising, makes a sound / Like the last muting of winter as it ends.”  Once more we 
are returned to “Mr. Homburg” himself, “The spirit comes from the body of the world, / Or 
so Mr. Homburg thought”(CP 440).   There is no ultimate transcendence in the poem, but 
only an elaboration of the question of the “the circular structure of Being.”  The abstract 
“spirit” is not denied—it instead constitutes a direct experience of reality, central to the 
poem.  But its reality is finally, intrinsically, grounded in another reality: that of “the body 
of the world.” (“Or so Mr. Homburg thought.”)  Our spirits, our thoughts, our bodies, our  
“Mr. Homburg’s,” are all a part of  “the mannerism of nature” and therefore subjected to 
her “blunt laws”; they are not false, but neither are they ultimately transcendent, they exist 
in the middle-space elaborated here within the image of “a glass aswarm with things going 
as far as they can” (CP 440).  
Heidegger’s “circular structure” of Being is thus revealed in Stevens’s work as a 
framework that can be—though never departed from entirely—understood, and 
“transcended” through the very knowledge of and acceptance of being “part” of that greater 
“body of the world” (CP 440). Just as Levinas would become discontented within his own 
thinking with the rigorous structure of Heidegger’s “circular structure” (which begins after 
several loops round to feel more like a trap than an exercise of Being) so Stevens would 
seek—without discarding that circular structure (“preserving” the term)—to seek a way out. 
He would continue, throughout his career, to push “toward a supreme fiction” that would 
serve as his own reply to the question of how to get in, as well as—and more aptly—out of 
the solipsistic loop of mere Being.  Accepting that to a certain extent one remains, “caught 
in a glass,” and that replies to such a question remain “fictions” even when and if 
“supreme,” is the first and most essential step in effecting a move beyond that framework 
	   
81	  
toward the world beyond the “glass”—toward an ethics of the “Other,” and encounter with 
that “Other.” To be “caught in a glass” assumes that there is an outside of the glass, and 
therefore a method by which one may move there (or, at least, a perspective from which 
that move remains possible, whether or not the being caught within it is actually able either 
to perceive or effect it).  
“Perspective is the visual correlate of causality—” writes Rosalind Krauss in “A 
View of Modernism,” 19 “that one thing follows the next in space according to rule.  In that 
sense, despite differences of historical development, it can be likened to the literary 
tradition of the omniscient narrator and the conventional plot” (123).  But like the work of 
novelist Robbe-Grillet—which, Krauss argues, disrupts this conventional narrative 
tradition—Stevens’s poems (and “Looking Across the Fields” is testament to this) are often 
“constantly eclipsed by the point of view of the teller, holding up this point of view, turning 
it around, examining it, taking responsibility for it, never allowing either himself or the 
reader at any moment to be innocent about it” (Krauss, PI 127).  Through his process of 
figuring the jar, in other words, Stevens breaks free of it—past a conception of a modernist 
tradition that would have him ensconced within his own omniscient narration.  
Krauss’s description of Robbe-Grillet’s narrative strategy is in fact developed as a 
counter-point to her subsequent discussion on the work of sculptor Richard Serra, which—
she explains— “makes a viewer realize that the hidden meanings she reads into the 
corporate body of the world are her own projections and that interiority she had thought 
belonged to the sculpture is in fact her own interiority—the manifestations, from the still 
point, of her own point of view” (127).  As “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird” 
explicitly shows, Stevens was, from the very beginning of his career, invested in a similar 
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  The	  article,	  first	  published	  in	  Artforum	  11	  in	  September	  1972,	  was	  later	  re-­‐collected	  in	  Krauss’s	  retrospective,	  Perpetual	  Inventory	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attempt to examine perspective not from the “interior”—from within the framework of a 
given perspective—but from without.  Stevens remains, especially in his early poems, 
interested in a subjective examination and ordering of the world, but that interest is 
consistently accompanied by a related interest in establishing a vantage point where that 
subjectivity might be perceived and contextualized within a broader network of possible 
subjectivities and actions. This dual concern is again exemplified in Stevens’s famous 
“Anecdote of the Jar,” which begins with the clear establishment not only of a subjective 
perspective, but of a determinate act: “I placed a jar in Tennessee.” After the initial stanza 
of “Anecdote of a Jar,” the perspective zooms out from the initial fixity of the determinate 
subjective act and perspective to the sprawling wilderness around the jar.  Anywhere the 
determinate object of the “jar” is placed will result similarly in a “sprawl” of wilderness 
(what is not “jar”) radiating from and ordered by that singular point.  The latter stanzas of 
this short poem significantly shift the focus from the initiating “I” to the landscape 
supported by that “I.”  It is not that the subjective framework is ever undermined or 
overthrown, it is just that the interest of the poem is in viewing the subjective framework 
from without.  The framework itself is objectified, made “jar-like,” so that we are able to 
see and reflect upon the processes of perspective and representation integral to the poem’s 
focalizing point, and thus both reader and writer’s active engagement within the poem’s 
language and imagery.  By establishing a constellation of perspectival “still points”—the 
“jar in Tennessee,” the blackbird at the beginning of “Thirteen Ways,” or the character of 
“Mr. Homburg”—Stevens delineates a vantage point from which the speaker often reads 
himself at the “interior” of the poem.  The reader is thus prompted to read herself within 
this delineated “interior” space as well—exploring the manner in which her own 
perspective is intrinsically engaged in, and therefore expressed by, the work itself.  It is 
this—enfolding of the reader into the text itself—that lends to Stevens’s work the 
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“wholeness” toward which he aspires.  Without the gaze of an “Other”—who is obliged to 
remain outside of the “glass”—without the “all-at-onceness” of vision that such a 
perspective allows, constituting from the endless refractions between point A (reality) and 
point B (imagination), an image, the space of projection would remain flat and “dumbly 
physical” (Krauss OU 98).  The “I” of the same would not be rendered individual—indeed, 
it would be no “I” at all, but would instead remain impenetrable and absolute.  The words 
would not be made “whole,” thus lifted from the page.    
 
It is important, however, that the “all-at-onceness” Stevens’s work aspires to and 
oftentimes affords not to be understood as the rather mystical variety of “all-at-onceness” 
evoked by Michael Fried when, in “Art and Objecthood,” he argues that modernist art must 
effect: “a continuous and entire presentness, amounting, as it were, to the perpetual creation 
of itself, that one might experience as a kind of instantanousness”(845).  Instead, Stevens’s 
“pure present” is established through the very acknowledgement of its being ultimately 
bound to the limits of and constraints of both time and perception. Just as the eye that 
registers the flash of the baseball as an “all-at-onceness” does not discount, and indeed is 
dependent on the successiveness of the baseball’s path in order to register that path at all 
(though it does not, in the end, register it as “successive”), Stevens’s most challenging work 
is dependent on the processes of perception and reception inherent to language and 
representation, and is intent on expressing that inter-dependency as well as the 
responsibility toward the Other that both take for granted. Like the eye, which, in the “all-
at-onceness” of its vision retains multiplicity and successiveness without manifesting them 
in the seen, in the image itself, so language at all times retains within itself the multiplicity 
and successiveness of its saying in everything that is said.  Stevens’s poetry functions at 
times like stop-motion film in that it reveals through an emphasis on each and various 
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perspectival “still-points” the manner in which, and the process by which, the particular 
comprises the “whole.” Also revealed through attention to this intermediate space of 
representation—that space between imagination and reality, the received and the seen, the 
saying and the said—is, of course, the integral role of the tromp d’oeil; that is, the way in 
which the viewer’s own perspectival assumptions, limitations and engagements constitute 
that “whole.” By taking the particulars of his own processes of perception, reflection and 
poetic construction, and holding them—and in this way the poem and the language of the 
poem itself—at some distance: “turning it around, examining it, taking responsibility for it” 
(Krauss, PI 127), Stevens offers his readers the same possibility that his “angel of reality,” 
in “Angel Surrounded by Paysans” (the final poem of The Auroras of Autumn) offers those 
who, for the briefest of moments, might glimpse her in the door: “in my sight,” the angel 
says, “you see the earth again” (CP 423). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two: The Image 
 
What we see in the mind is as real to us as what we see by the eye 
   —Wallace Stevens (CP 903). 
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That one might “see the earth again”—this “re-doubling” of vision offered by 
Stevens’s “Angel Surrounded by Paysans”—is the very promise of language.  Language 
“doubles” the visible in order that it might be seen again, and communicated. Perhaps, 
then, it is language itself that is, most accurately, the “angel of reality,” which in Stevens’s 
poem bears this message: 
I am the angel of reality, 
Seen for a moment standing in the door. 
 
I have neither ashen wing nor wear of ore 
And live without a tepid aureole,  
 
Or stars that follow me, not to attend, 
But of my being and its knowing, part.  
 
The  “re-doubling” of visible and experience-able Reality through representation—both in 
image and language—is inseparable for Stevens’s from the experience of Being itself.  It is 
this indivisibility that creates the “apparition-like” quality—the presence-as-absence—that 
Stevens’s consistently depicts as the “voice” of a Reality he understands as a confluence of 
both the visible and the invisible, the concrete and the imagined.   
I am one of you and being one of you 
Is being and knowing what I am and know. 
 
Yet I am the necessary angel of earth,  
Since, in my sight, you see the earth again  
 
[…] 
 
Am I not, 
Myself, only half of a figure of a sort, 
 
A figure half seen, or seen for a moment, a man 
Of the mind, an apparition apparelled in 
 
Apparels of such lightest look that a turn 
Of my shoulder and quickly, too quickly, I am gone? (CP 423) 
 
From the very first, with Harmonium—where for the speaker in Stevens’s “The 
Snow Man,” for example, “nothing” exists not because it is negated, but because it is 
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validated: “And nothing himself beholds/ Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is” 
(CP 8)—absence exists in Stevens’s work not in dichotomous opposition to presence, but in 
dialectic relation.  Each term is “both preserved and cancelled. Preserved all the more 
surely in that they are cancelled” (Krauss OU 15).  Absence, that is, is not coterminous with 
the “nothing” that is evoked in “The Snow Man”; instead, as the poem builds through a 
progressive process toward a realization of “the nothing,” it achieves an autonomy of its 
own.   The use of the definite article is essential to a conceptualization of “the nothing that 
is” as an autonomous state of being which includes an “absence” that, at once, both is and 
is not.   
This dialectical relation constitutes the “enlarged” territory in which Stevens 
undertakes to “discover” through his poetry the relationship between subject and object, 
content and form. The territory that is subsequently opened through this exploration is, 
therefore, essentially ambiguous—poised uniquely between the exactness of the Imagist 
“thing” and a sublime inexactness: an escape from the “thing” to the “something else” that 
exists beyond.  It is a space of exactness from which the subject’s inexactness might, as 
Stevens states in “The Poem That Took the Place of a Mountain,” “discover, at last, the 
view toward which they had edged” (CP 435), a territory of “see(ing) the world again” (CP 
423); of “seeing and a knowing that one sees” (Krauss OU 19). 
The emphasis in Stevens’s later work shifts away from visual perception as the 
primary method of understanding the world without, however, diminishing its importance 
to the overall processes of representation.  Paramount for Stevens are those cognitive 
processes that align visual perception (reality) with intelligible understanding (literally, the 
imagination)—with, that is, the process of representation itself.  What is “an image” or a 
process of (literal) “imagination,” but that which is rendered intelligible from the sensory 
information available to the eye?  If the original sensory experience is removed and the 
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image is recreated at the distance of some remove—a photograph, for example, or a 
metaphor—the process by which it is constituted is not much altered, at least conceptually: 
the “image” is still constituted by the eye’s perception and recognition of the material 
elements of the sensory experience to which it is exposed (as well of course by the 
language and technology that mediate the image in literal, as well as figurative, ways). In 
Totality and Infinity Levinas writes1:  
Vision presupposes light.  The eye does not see the light, but the object in the light.  
Vision is therefore a relation with a “something” established within a relation with 
what is not a “something.”  We are in the light inasmuch as we encounter the thing 
in nothingness.  The light makes the thing appear by driving it out of the shadows; it 
empties space.  It makes space arise specifically as a void (189). 
 
In keeping with Levinas’s analysis, the “in-between” space of “re-doubled vision” 
in Stevens’s work—in which is figured the very process of figuration (understood through 
the dominant senses of vision and touch)—can be conceived of as analogous to the “light” 
that “makes space arise specifically as a void.” By understanding it thus, we avoid 
confusing Stevens’s efforts with a construction of an autonomous space of absence to an 
already-self-evident presence, and instead focus our attention on the way Stevens explores 
the creative process of representation itself.   
 
By “emptying space” around the “thing,” both “thing” and the “something else” 
beyond it are simultaneously exposed.  As Levinas writes in Otherwise Than Being: “For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Like Stevens, and diverging from Heidegger’s interpretation of Being as that which there is and 
could be no beyond, the “essence” of Dasein residing in its very existence (B&T 42), Levinas conceives of 
Being as a “something" of which there is necessarily a beyond.  This “something” can, however, only be 
understood in negative terms.  This negation, or “lack” that is so central—so “taken for granted” in Stevens’s 
poetry—is not, as Randall Jarrell would have it, “automatically supplied” as though it were a supplementary 
“thing” but instead is uncovered as a fundamental aspect of our conception of Being.  Jarrell, otherwise 
sympathetic to Stevens’s work, had written in a 1951 edition of The Partisan Review: “His poetry is obsessed 
with lack.  A lack at last almost taken for granted, that he himself automatically supplies; if sometimes he has 
restored by imagination of abstraction or re-creation, at other times he has restored by collection, almost as 
J.P. Morgan did—Stevens likes something, buys it (at the expense of a little spirit), and ships it home in a 
poem” (336). 
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subjectivity to signify unreservedly, it would then be necessary that the passivity of its 
exposure to the other not be immediately inverted into activity, but expose itself in its turn; 
a passivity of passivity is necessary” (142-143).  It is this “passivity of passivity”— the 
passive exposure to the Other, rather than the activity of representation— that contains for 
Stevens, as for Levinas, the possibility of poetry, of a regenerative “saying” rather than the 
prosaic “already said”:   
Saying is this passivity of passivity and this dedication to the other, this sincerity.  
Not the communication of the said, which would immediately cover over and 
extinguish or absorb the said, but saying holding open its openness, without 
excuses, evasions or alibis (Levinas OTB 143).    
 
Like the Dutch artist Piet Mondrian—whose art and the thinking behind it provided 
Stevens at last with the inspiration, according to McLeod, to “come to terms with the 
abstract tendencies of his own art” (120)—Stevens’s conception and representation of 
“reality” was dependent not on the depiction of either the “I” or the “Other,” the “thing” or 
the “something else,” but on making evident the relationship between them.  As Mondrian 
would write: “Colour can exist only through other colours, dimension through other 
dimensions, position through other positions that oppose them.  That is why I regard 
relationship as the principal thing” (as quoted in Reynolds, 154).  Only, that is, via a 
depiction of the relation between the “thing” and the “something else” might the reality that 
would be inclusive of both be exposed.    
In the final section of “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction,” where Stevens reflects: 
“Fat girl, terrestrial, my summer, my night, / How is it I find you in difference” (351), 
Stevens provides just one of many examples that illustrate his interest in expressing this 
relationship between “things,” and exploring through this emphasis how the very possibility 
of representation is derived through relationship.  Each “image,” each object that is 
rendered intelligible to the eye, is, of course, necessarily extracted from a larger 
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background to which that object exists in relation.  Think again of “The Snow Man” where 
“the nothing that is not there and the nothing that is” is arrived at through the establishment 
of the “listener” having already been established as “nothing himself.” The crucial 
revelation of presence-as-absence in this poem’s “the nothing that is” is made possible only 
through the establishment of a relationship between the speaker, reader, and “listener” 
wherein “nothing” is already understood in positive terms.  Stevens calls on the reader in 
the opening line to clear a space for this positive sense of “the nothing” by declaring, “One 
must have a mind of winter…”  It is up to the reader, the poem suggests, to create the space 
wherein the dual presence of “the nothing that is not there and the nothing that is” might be 
(as for the “listener”) arrived at in the final line. Each moment of intelligible understanding 
for both speaker and “listener,” poet and reader, is only—as the speaker in the final Canto 
of “Notes” attests—part of “a moving contour”; “a change not quite completed.”  “Notes” 
explores perception—through the use of a string of metaphors that depict the speaker’s 
various “imaginings” of earth2—in its widest sense.  The “change not quite completed” by 
which the singular image is described in the poem must be understood accordingly as 
fundamental to the processes of “imagination” and representation itself.   
This idea, that the process of representation is permanently incomplete, develops 
from the previous Canto with its emphasis on “repetition.” In Canto IX, all moments—all 
expressions of moments—are conceived of as “mere repetitions” (350), but each of these 
repetitions: “the going round / And round and round, the merely going round” are, in 
themselves, “a final good.” That is, it is not each to itself, but each to itself in the process of 
its repetition that is understood as a final good, because the process of repetition as a whole 
is understood that way.  Representation is a moment of intelligibility grasped in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  “...When I think of you as tired/ Bent over work, anxious, content, alone,/ You remain the more than natural 
figure.” From Canto X, “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction” (CP 351). 
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“difference” from a larger context of that which is always changing. The image is therefore 
always partial, but at the same time always what it is— intelligible in itself: “That I should 
name you flatly, waste no words, / Check your evasions, hold you to yourself” (CP 351).  
For an object to be “held to itself,” to be named, rendered intelligible to the eye, it must be 
already “familiar,” it must exist in relation to something previously intelligible to the 
subject.  In other words, the only reason that an object is intelligible in itself is because it is 
implicitly understood as a part of a larger whole.   Representation, therefore, is always a 
process by which the eye “distorts” the sensory information (light, absence of light, 
material, absence of material) into recognizable form (“absence” is not “seen” except in 
relation to what is).  In this way our “Reality” is always created from that which exceeds it, 
from that which exceeds, that is, the representation of that reality as “image.” Just as the 
path of a baseball is rendered invisible by the single, momentary, flash with which it is 
registered as a singular object by the eye, every image is established from material that 
exceeds our cognitive or optical ability to express it as an autonomous form.   
 
A photograph provides a useful material example of the process by which the image 
is established against that which is and must be excluded from the frame. The function of 
the photograph is to transform the sensory information to which it has, in the negative, been 
exposed, to a positive—a “presence” in direct oppositional relation to the “absence” of the 
actual “thing” it comes to represent.  The ability to continue to represent a “thing” (that 
which is figured in the photograph) by virtue precisely of its absence makes the photograph 
particularly relevant to the discussion of representation in Stevens’s poetry.  A photograph 
both preserves and cancels the terms of “presence” and “absence” for the figure it 
represents and, just so, Stevens preserves and cancels these terms in his exploration of 
subjectivity.  He elaborates a negative-space where the opposition between the “I” and the 
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“non-I,” which Levinas describes as disappearing in the process of representation, is instead 
preserved (TI, 124). It is this apparent emphasis in Stevens’s work on preserving division 
and opposition that provides the possibility of cancelling that difference: of an ethical 
contact across that divide.  
 
The Close-Up and the Letter as Such 
The seismic philosophical shift that took place in the Seventeenth century—from a 
static conception of fixed Reality outside the “I” to a subjective reality within, which Kant 
would define a century later as a shared and ultimately contingent system of 
representation3—was rendered tangible in a peculiar way by the advent of photography in 
the mid-nineteenth century.  With the photograph, it became possible for a flickering 
moment of time to be rendered formal and inert, attesting at once both to the Reality of its 
Being as well as to the fundamentally elusive nature of that Reality.  In this way, the 
photograph was, from its beginnings, implicitly and necessarily understood, as part of 
“shared system of representation” rather than as the “thing in itself.”  The key here, which 
would be fundamental to Stevens’s poetics, is the term “shared.”  Far from driving the 
subjectivity into a static conception of a fixed reality within himself, a philosophical 
emphasis on subjective reality emphasized for Stevens the way the “I” of the same is 
fundamentally related to the “Other.”   
“No doubt we live beyond ourselves in air,” he writes in “Looking Across the Fields 
and Watching the Birds Fly”—indicating that subjectivity remains uncontained by its form.  
But his next line, “In an element that does not do for us, / So well, that which we do for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  “It is therefore from the human point of view only,” attests Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason, “that we 
can speak of space, extended objects, &c.  If we depart from the subjective condition, under which we alone 
can obtain external intuition, or, in other words, by means of which we are affected by objects, the 
representation of space has no meaning whatsoever.  This predicate [of space] is only applicable to things 
insofar as they appear to us, that is, are objects of sensibility”(26).	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ourselves” (CP 439), indicates equally that it is ultimately the return to “ourselves,” to the 
exteriority of the body, that constitutes “goodness” and that is our true “element.” Though 
the (importantly, plural) subjectivity may be unmoored, “beyond ourselves in air,” Stevens 
inevitably returns to the collective choice of “that which we do for ourselves”—of 
“imagery, belief,” and language itself as a method of expressing both.  In returning to this 
notion of the collective, “shared system of representation” that underlies representation, 
Stevens encourages a conceptual shift past a pre-cognitive space “beyond ourselves” to a 
cognitive space in which we may communicate that shared experience.    
 
The elaboration of the relationship in between subject and object, “I” and “non-I,” 
which the poem traverses in order to effect this return (an “enlarged” spatial field, 
excerpted from time) functions here as the negative-space out of which the “duration” and 
“limitation” of a specific subjectivity might be exposed.  It is via “abstraction,” in other 
words, that the speaking “I” is located within a broader governing framework of his 
relations with the “Other,” rather than having that relationship absorbed in the moment of 
identification and representation.  What is effected is a “close-up” of the singular, which 
works to expose the literal “platitude” of representation, allowing the particularizing “I” to 
“transcend” its perceived bounds. As Joseph N. Riddel puts it, it is via “abstraction” that 
we—as readers of Stevens’s work— may also, within that governing structure, “find 
ourselves” (11).   
 
 “With the close-up, space expands,” wrote Walter Benjamin in 1935 in “The Work 
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” “With slow motion,” he continues, 
“movement is extended.  The enlargement of a snapshot does not simply render more 
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precise what otherwise was visible, though unclear: it reveals entirely new structural 
formations of the subject” (236). Benjamin’s presentation of the temporal moment of the 
photograph in spatial terms is indicative of his ambitions toward the development of a 
critical vocabulary freed from conventional notions of temporal linearity. His efforts at 
elaborating a space between subject and object within which “new structural formations” 
might be discovered can be profitably compared to Stevens’s efforts in the “double-
remove” poems: “The Poem that Took the Place of a Mountain,” for example,  or “Looking 
Across the Field and Watching Birds Fly.”  By rendering language itself spatial through a 
focus on the letter as such, Stevens—like Benjamin’s close-up photographer—reveals and 
explores an enlarged structural territory within the subject itself.  In “The Motive for 
Metaphor,” for example, it is the close attention paid to the poem’s signifying elements, its 
“A B C of being” (CP 257), that demonstrates the poem’s necessary conformity to the 
limits of its own signifying terms, and allows the poem to approach, and move past in its 
final lines, the “vital, arrogant, fatal, dominant X” (CP 257).  It is important that this 
“dominant X,” in this case, as well as other instances in Stevens’s poetry where the letter 
“as such” arises, should be understood simultaneously in two different but highly 
interconnected ways: first, as abstraction itself— in Lacanian terms, as “the real thing, the 
unattainable X, the object-cause of desire” (Žižek 96)— and second, as the concrete visual 
imprint of the letter itself as “thing” on the page. 4 In “Motive for Metaphor,” which in 
keeping with “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction” can be seen as a concerted effort on 
Stevens’s part to develop and articulate a theory of poetry that would break through the 
limited strictures of the past, these two interconnected interpretations of the letter 
importantly converge. Indeed, it is through an emphasis on the concrete figuration of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  This should be understood as separate from the morphological sound-form of the signifier per se, but yet 
cannot fully be separated from the reader’s personal associative connections (morphological or otherwise) to 
the visual imprint of the signifier on the page.	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letter X as object, as “thing in itself,” that Stevens simultaneously signifies “the object-
cause of desire.”  The X understood in terms of fundamental and unattainable desire, in 
other words, is paradoxically attained in “The Motive for Metaphor” through the realization 
of its being perpetually unattainable. “[B]ecause,” writes Žižek, “the Real itself offers no 
support for a direct symbolization of it—because every symbolization is in the last resort 
contingent—[…] the only way the experience...can achieve its unity is through the agency 
of a signifier, through reference to a ‘pure’ signifier” (97).    
It was just such a search for the “‘pure’ signifier,” by which the “Real” itself might 
be achieved and expressed, that led Stevens to concentrate on the structure of language and 
the letter as such, and that contributed to the development of his own, very particular, 
notion of “pure poetry.”5  “Poetry is the subject of the poem,” Stevens famously asserts in 
“The Man With The Blue Guitar,” published in 1937—a claim that he would elaborate 
upon in a letter of 1940, in which he explained to Hi Simons: “here poetry is used as the 
poetic, without the slightest pejorative innuendo. I have in mind pure poetry,” (L 363). This 
idea was anticipated by the description he supplied of his own work for the jacket of Ideas 
of Order—a description that, in the American literary circles of and around 1936, was about 
as far away as you could get from à la mode: “The book is essentially a book of pure 
poetry,” Stevens wrote.  “I believe that, in any society, the poet should be the exponent of 
the imagination of that society” (151).  For Stevens, “pure” does not indicate something 
supremely or sublimely removed from a blunt reality, as in the French Symbolist sense of 
the term, but instead in the semiotic sense implemented by Žižek in the passage quoted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  It should be kept very firmly in mind that Stevens’s “particular” take on, and interest in, what he termed  
“pure poetry” has little in common with the “pure poetry” developed by the French Symbolists, and in fact 
Stevens’s conception of the term is in direct opposition to the Symbolist vocabulary of stock tropes and 
images, which subjective meaning was invited to transcend.	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above: rather than a “heightened” experience, the “pure” is the essential element at the very 
root of any experience at all.   
“The difference between Stevens and the French tradition,” as Michel Benamou has 
explained, “hinges on the metaphysical meaning of the word pure.  It is a contrast between 
feeling purity in the world, and reaching purity out of this world by an angel’s flight” (as 
quoted in Logenbach 187). The “pure poetry” that Stevens endeavoured to produce in Ideas 
of Order is perhaps better expressed in the oft-quoted opening line to “Of Modern Poetry” 
in Parts of the World than in his introduction to the previous collection: “The poem of the 
mind in the act of finding / What will suffice.”  It is not the achievement of a “sufficiency” 
itself—understood as a “thing” outside itself, a supplementary product, and therefore a 
remove from the processes of the realities of the poem and its language, or the real 
experiences and realities of the mind that produced it—but instead the “act of finding” that 
sufficiency, with an emphasis on act.  It is the active, reflective  “light,” which each 
individual brings to bear upon his experiences and by which they are “illuminated,” and not 
out of the experience as “thing” in itself (which would without “light” remain in shadow) 
that all experience is perceived and represented, and therefore all reality ultimately 
constructed and conveyed.  
“It has to be living,” Stevens insists, “to learn the speech of the place. / It has to face 
the men of the time and to meet / The women of the time.  It has to think about war / And it 
has to find what will suffice” (219).  An active pursuit of “what will suffice” is not by any 
means, therefore, a retreat from the world, but an active, living engagement that 
endeavours to explore living realities, and—as Stevens would write in “The Necessary 
Angel”—the “pressures” of that reality.   
Notably, this phrase of Stevens’s—“the pressures of reality”—would become 
central to the Abstract Expressionists who, a generation later, saw their art as a part of a 
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tradition of “noble resistance” to those pressures (McLeod 140). The poem, understood as a 
representation of an “act of the mind” (CP 219) must also be understood as an effort to find 
the point of “exactness” that Stevens would later articulate in “The Rock”—a point from 
which the subject’s “inexactness” could “edge” toward a more comprehensive “view” of 
the territory in which both “exactness,” the I, and “inexactness,” the non-I, might 
intertwine. Stevens’s poetry is a call for engagement within, rather than a retreat from, the 
boundary between self and other, Real and Live, world and thing.  
 
The Real and the Live 
In Camera Lucida, Barthes writes that it is the very immobility of the photograph 
that results in “a perverse confusion between two concepts: the Real and the Live. By 
attesting that the object has been real, the photograph surreptitiously induces us to believe 
that it is alive, because of that delusion which makes us attribute to Reality an absolutely 
superior, somehow eternal value” (79).  The photograph, like the poem, is not, of course, 
alive.  It is, instead, as Barthes writes, “flat, platitudinous in the true sense of the word” 
(106), and so its space, not being Live, can claim no “Reality” other than its own immediate 
space of representation; its flatness.  This flatness—the image-as-such— must function for 
the photograph as the Real, but this particular “reality” is one that must now be understood 
to exist in direct opposition to any “superior, eternal value”; it is within (upon) this 
circumscribed space of the “Real” that the photograph is obliged to announce, and to 
restrict, its meaning.6   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  In his remarkable essay on the two available versions of Roger Fenton’s iconic photo of the Crimean War, 
“The Valley of the Shadow of Death,” Errol Morris writes “Photographs […] are nothing more than silver 
crystals arranged on paper or, in the case of digital photography, nothing more than a concatenation of 1s and 
0s resident on a hard drive.  Yet, when it’s a portrait, a person looking back out at us from a photograph, we 
could believe that the photograph has captured something of the sitter’s essence—something of the stuff that 
is in his head.  I, too, look at the two Fenton photographs and try to imagine what Fenton’s intentions might 
have been.  It’s unavoidable.  People have been programmed to do so by natural selection—to project 
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Similarly, of course, language can be understood to split the Real and the Live.  
Attesting to a “Reality” beyond itself—an “absolutely superior, somehow eternal value”—
it simultaneously remains arbitrary, certainly not-living: a “platitudinous” configuration of 
space on the page.  In Stevens’s poetry it is the conflict between the Real (what the poem is 
actually able to say—the real words used, that is, which correspond to real things; for 
example, the depicted objects in Transport to Summer’s “The Motive for Metaphor”: “trees 
in autumn...the single bird, the obscure moon” [257]) and the Live (what the poem is 
unable to say—the absence, that is, of the things that the poem describes; for example, the 
absent and disembodied “you” to whom “The Motive for Metaphor” is addressed) that 
often produces the “in-between” space of “double-remove” through which it achieves its 
goal as an “an act of the mind” (CP 219).  In “Motive for Metaphor,” the conflict results in 
a concretization of this “in-between” space in the form of a “pure signifier ... in short... ‘a 
signifier without the signified’”  (Žižek 99), by remaindering, in material form, what must 
remain unsaid: 
The obscure moon lighting an obscure world 
Of things that would never be quite expressed,  
Where you yourself were never quite yourself 
And did not want nor have to be. (257) 
 
It is this, the “unsaid” of the poem—that which can be described as that which is “never 
quite expressed” yet is no longer content to be described that way, or at all; that which is no 
longer content to remain caught, as in the stanza quoted above, between the realm of the 
“Real” and the “Live”—that is, in the final line of this poem, literalized in “the vital, 
arrogant, fatal, dominant X” (257).  Though still entangled in the “perverse confusions” of 
the “Real” and the “Live,” the poem works toward a literalization of the contradiction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ourselves into the world—and to imagine Fenton’s world as we imagine ours.  We want to know where we 
end and the world begins.  We want to know where that line is.  It’s the deepest problem of epistemology 
(37).	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inherent in the very form of the X, emphasizing the delineation in “thing” form of that that 
“something else” that exceeds the “thing”—that exceeds, therefore, even the fatality and 
finality of the signifying X.    
Though, indeed, it is through abstraction that Stevens allows that we may come to 
“find ourselves” (Riddell 11), both Stevens and Barthes run up against a similar problem in 
that neither photograph nor language cannot possibly say “what it lets us see” (Barthes 
100).  The photograph, like a poem, points always and necessarily to the “pressures of 
reality” beyond the circumscribed frame of image or page.  It can therefore never name that 
reality exactly or represent it entirely. Instead, the photograph is indexical: it points toward 
a space beyond the subjective frame. For the mute photograph, this dilemma is fairly 
straightforward: the tension is between what the absent image once really said and what it 
can no longer say, a distinction independent from any potential viewer.  With poetry the 
tension becomes much more subtle and ambiguous. It is a tension no longer between what 
the poem can and cannot say—a simple question of yes and no—but between what it may 
desire to say and what it is able, or perceived to be able, to say.  It becomes a question, in 
other words, of the way that desire is intuited, taken up, and responded to by first the poet, 
then by the reader or listener.   
 
“The Never-Rounding O” 
In his book The End of The Mind, Desales Harrison explores the way Stevens works 
to push past intelligibility into an intuitive reality beyond the mind and, therefore, beyond 
the conventional bounds of communication—a territory in which we learn what we “cannot 
learn, cannot know, cannot do with words” (68).  “Stevens,” Harrison says, “dedicates 
himself to the task of determining how his writing can preserve a degree of 
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‘imagelessness,’ of hesitation on the brink of representation” (76)7.  He does so by resisting 
any attempt to describe “imagelessness,” instead attempting to enact or embody it (77).  In 
“Montrachet-le-Jardin,” included in Parts of the World, for example, Stevens describes the 
wind as a “never rounding O” (237); Harrison asserts that the challenge for any poet is to 
preserve within the letter—as, he argues, Stevens has successfully managed in this poem—
an “attribute of voicelessness, of the zero, or the surd” (77). 8   
Stevens’s use of “alphabetical elements” (Harrison 77) indeed denotes in his poetry 
not specificity but, instead, ultimate abstraction. In this way, these purely signifying 
“elements” mimic the fate of the photograph—which, due to its extreme ability to signify 
an object in all its specificity, ultimately loses its grasp on significance entirely. As Roland 
Barthes reminds us in Camera Lucida, with photography the following question becomes 
primary: “of all the objects in the world: why choose (why photograph) this object, this 
photograph, rather than some other?” (6).   
What “[t]he A B C of being” (CP 257), as expressed in Stevens’s poem “The 
Motive for Metaphor,” identifies is the “literally literal ‘here’ of speech,” in which Stevens 
seeks to locate what Harrison calls the “primary nakedness” of language (77). At the end of 
poem, the “vital, arrogant, fatal, dominant X” (CP 357) serves precisely to signify this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 It would not be a mistake to read this impulse in Stevens’s work as a reaction against the literal pictoralism 
of the Imagists.  Stevens was wary of the totalizing power of the image.  He wished instead to emphasize the 
processes by which the image is (continuously) re-imagined.  
8	  This “zero degree” that describes not an achieved quantity but an ever-generative force has much in 
common with Lacan’s “drive,” a concept he developed from the work of Freud.  Freud had maintained that 
certain elements of every surface or field were “invested as drive.”  As Lacan explains, “this investment 
places us on the terrain of an energy—and not any energy—a potential energy, for—Freud articulated it in the 
most pressing way—the characteristic of the drive is to be a konstante Kraft, a constant force.  He cannot 
conceive of it as a momentane Stosskraft (momentary impulse)” (164).  Lacan goes on to explain that the 
drive can only be satisfied by reaching one’s aim, but that “[t]his satisfaction is paradoxical” and when we 
consider it “something new comes into play—the category of the impossible” (166).  Lacan’s subsequent 
discussion of this new category is also interesting in the context of our current discussion, and his advice 
should be kept in mind as we continue: “This function of the impossible is not to be approached without 
prudence, like any function that is presented in a negative form.  I would simply suggest to you that the best 
way of approaching these notions is not to take them by negation.  This method would bring us here to the 
question of the possible, and the impossible is not necessarily the contrary of the possible, or, since the 
opposite of the possible is certainly the real, we could be lead to define the real as the impossible” (167).	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“primary nakedness”—the blankness Stevens both turns toward and resists, again and 
again, in his poems.  It expresses, again in Harrison’s words, a “tear or pucker in speech,” 
the expression of which can be managed only by “writing X instead of saying what X stands 
for” (80). It is in this way that the poem itself—not the letter or the word, but the effect of 
the poem as a whole—serves as image, as letter as such, manifesting in itself the same 
“absence-as-presence” identifiable in the photograph.    
But, as Harrison further points out, “The X is not a site to be filled with any number 
of possible substitutions, but the site of a removal, a fundamental absence, by definition 
undecipherable, imageless, a ‘never-rounding’ O” (80).  The X, that is, is ultimately also 
“platitudinous” (Barthes, CL 106), its “reality” composed of and constrained by that 
flatness; its status as “thing” (as that which is “not nothing”) may be rendered immediately 
perceivable, but any further examination of the form will necessarily reveal that there is 
“nothing to discover.”  “Nothing” here, however, can be understood to possess a certain 
value—to exist as an “enactment” of a “fundamental absence”: “nothing” as thing, a 
designation that necessarily renders it “not simply nothing” but rather a “nothing that is.”  
Thus rendered, “nothing” here serves to delineate more profoundly the “something else” of 
which that “nothing” (as “thing”) is constituted, therefore providing access to that more 
fundamental nothing (as “something else”), which otherwise it would be impossible to 
signify.  The “nothing that is” does not become simply object, knowable, a “thing in itself,” 
but instead—existing in an abstract, present continuous, state of being—it exists in a 
constant process of its own being and becoming.  This continuousness is often evoked in 
the images that Stevens chooses: “the jar was round upon the ground” (61); “the aureole 
above the humming house…” (224); “Fat girl, terrestrial…” (351).  The “roundness” of 
these images, and the continuousness that they help to suggest, is explored as the very 
condition of language in “Large Red Man Reading” from Auroras of Autumn:   
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[T]he outlines of its being and its expressing, the syllables of its 
law: 
Poesis, poesis, the literal characters, the vatic lines, 
 
Which in those ears and in those thin, those spended hearts, 
Took on color, took on shape and the size of things as they 
Are 
And spoke the feeling for them, which was what they had lacked (365).   
 
That “feeling” the “literal characters” in Stevens’s poem lack is, of course, precisely 
the “something else” that constitutes their “artistic nature.” Importantly, though—as both 
Heidegger and Stevens are intrinsically aware—that which is lacking, that artistic nature, 
does not, cannot lie in the “something else” alone, just as it cannot be found in the literal 
character of the “things themselves.”   It must, instead, exist in the space between—not in 
the circle, but, as Heidegger would have it, in the process of the circle’s approach.9  
Stevens’s use of the word “vatic”— stemming from the Latin vātēs, meaning “prophet”—
serves to further emphasize the continuousness of this approach.  It introduces to the 
discussion of language the temporal relationship between the present and the future. In 
imagining for the present a manner in, or a vocabulary with, which one might describe or 
predict the future is to understand the present as part of a “moving contour” (CP 351)—
curving toward the unknown, the not yet achieved.  It is to wrest both language and time 
from a vocabulary of stasis and linear causality and present them as engaged in a 
continuous process of approach.  It is the representation of this process of approach—the 
maintenance of the “never rounding O” of language itself as both vacuum and source—that 
Harrison identifies as the “true challenge of the poet” (77).  He explains: “As vacuum, [the 
O] draws description toward itself, though it can never be filled.  As source, it resembles a 
white-hot solar origin, like ‘the inconceivable idea of the sun’” (81).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Recall here Heidegger’s charge that, “What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the 
right way” (BT 195) 	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Similarly, the photograph refers endlessly to its own absence, thus creating its own 
“vacuum of referentiality” that it can never substantially fill.   “The Photograph,” writes 
Barthes, “mechanically repeats what could never be repeated existentially.  In the 
Photograph, the event is never transcended for the sake of something else: The Photograph 
always leads the corpus I need back to the body I see; it is the absolute particular, the 
sovereign contingency, matte and somehow stupid, the This (CL 4).  However, it is due to 
the specificity, the very extremity of the “this-ness” offered to him by the Winter Garden 
Photograph in which his recently deceased mother is shown as a young girl, that Barthes 
finally stumbles in Camera Lucida on what he calls the “lineaments of truth” (100).10  
It is also toward an ultimate “this-ness” that the “dominant X” in Stevens’s poetry 
points: the “absolute particular...the This” (Barthes 4), which is also—both literally and 
figuratively—the “major abstraction” (336) that constitutes Stevens’s “supreme fiction.” 
This simultaneous specificity and vagueness is characteristic to the sort of ambivalence that 
Stevens cultivated in his work. In “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction” he speaks of “a 
peculiar potency of the general” (CP 343)—as a poetic technique this is perhaps most 
strikingly demonstrated in Stevens’s own work in the closing lines of “The Man on the 
Dump”:  “Where was it one first heard of truth?”  The reply, on which the poems concludes 
is simply: “The the.”  (186).   
Again, it is the very extremity of the designation that allows a retreat from 
designation entirely.  Just as “the nothing that is” turns around the definite article— the 
“the” designating for “nothing” an autonomous space of being— so “the the,” in going one 
step further, designates an autonomous space for designation and thus representation itself.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  The “truth” that Barthes hits upon certainly extends in a sense beyond the subjective “truth for me.”  In 
articulating the “truth” obtained “for (himself)” Barthes has communicated that “truth” to others.  In Derrida’s 
Work of Mourning he writes that Barthes’s mother, so lovingly and convincingly depicted “smiling back” at 
Barthes from the Winter Garden Photograph also smiles “in” him (36)—the image, “the radiant invisibility of 
a look,” or in Barthes’s terms, “the truth” itself, is thus made palpable, it inhabits.	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Following along similar lines, consider the opening of “The creations of Sound,” which 
begins:  
If the poetry of X was music 
So that it came to him of its own 
Without understanding, out of the wall 
 
Or in the ceiling, in sounds not chosen,  
or chosen quickly, in a freedom 
That was their element, we should not know 
 
That X is an obstruction...(274).   
 
Here, not knowing that X is an obstruction indeed indicates a fluid reception of 
sound and its subsequent translation into meaning. Stevens’s project is thus not to write the 
“poetry of X,” where X would disappear into pure receptivity, but to write the X and to 
know the X, in writing it, as an obstruction, and to make it known as one.  To make it known 
that, just as Heidegger writes of the “thing” in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” so too for 
language  
[i]n any case (the) first interpretation of the thingness of the thing, the thing as 
bearer of its characteristic traits, is not as natural as it appears to be.  What seems 
natural to us is probably just something familiar in a long tradition that has 
forgotten the unfamiliar source from which it arose.  And yet this unfamiliar source 
once struck man as strange and caused him to think and wonder (PLT 24).  
To write X—that is, to write poetry—is to write not from within (to use Barthes’ 
photographic formulation) the studium of a given language that will go unquestioned and 
unexamined, but in a language instead of the punctum11—a language that may serve to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Barthes could not think of any French word that could adequately convey his meaning, and so he chose 
from the Latin.  Studium is used to describe a sort of “average affect” in a photograph and punctum for that 
which “breaks” or “punctuates” the studium (26).  Some photographs are “even speckled with these sensitive 
points; precisely, these marks, these wounds are so many points,” writes Barthes. Explaining further, he 
writes:  “punctum is also: sting, speck, cut, little hole—and also a cast of the dice.  A photograph’s punctum is 
that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me)” (CL 27).	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“prick” or even “bruise” us at times.  A language that, as Stevens writes in “Notes Toward 
a Supreme Fiction,” may allow us to “... share, / For a moment, the first idea...It satisfies 
Belief in an immaculate beginning // And sends us, winged by an unconscious will, / To an 
immaculate end.  We move between these points...” (CP 330-331). 
Though the X in Stevens’s work—like the subject of a photograph—remains 
fundamentally unattainable, it signifies through that perpetual unattainability its own 
approach, that which is fundamental to its being at all.  Perhaps it can still best be 
understood as the ever-shifting focalizing perspective offered in “Thirteen Ways of 
Looking at a Blackbird”—the point that is continuously “circled around” but refuses to be 
named. The X signifies the very process of that continuous “circling” drive, by which it is 
itself encircled in a “never rounding O.” The X defines, that is, the very “structural 
formation” of the drive—that generative space between—managing, at times, through its 
“peculiar potency of the general,” to expose those same “lineaments of truth” that Barthes 
touched upon in regarding the Winter Garden Photograph. Simultaneously freed from, and 
bound to, the constraints of its material form, the X marks but cannot express “the real 
thing” (Žižek 96).  What it can express, however, is the point at which the circle may again 
be approached, in order that it may, perhaps, one day be entered “in the right way.”   
Again: it is not the circle itself, but the circle’s approach, or rather the circle as 
approach, that is, according to Heidegger, the very “strength of thought” (Heidegger PLT 
18), and it is precisely this space of approach that Stevens’s poetry valuably affords.  The 
push “past representation,” which Harrison suggests for Stevens’s poetry, is never 
achieved, and that is precisely the point.  Such a project is, Stevens’s poetry demonstrates, 
ultimately impossible, doomed to fail.  Stevens is forever conscious of this—of the way 
that he must remain within the circle, within the bounds of both language and 
representation.  His is not, as Harrison argues, an effort to move beyond the frame of 
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representation and language itself, but to enter into it “in the right way,” as an outward-
facing and engaged “act of the mind” (CP 219).  By elaborating the process of the mind’s 
active and continual “approach” to its reality, Stevens illuminates the “exactness” and the 
“inexactness” by which that “reality” is necessarily comprised—just as light, which 
“empties space” and drives the object from the shadows, illuminates both the presence and 
the absence of a form that was always present, though unseen.   
 
 “Le Vrai Espace” 
 “The visible brings the world to us,” writes John Berger,  “But at the same time it 
reminds us ceaselessly that it is a world in which we risk being lost.  The visible with its 
space also takes the world away from us.  Nothing is more two-faced” (50).  Similarly, it is 
the representation of the distance between what a poem is able to “see” and represent and 
what it is not that creates a spatial sense within Stevens’s poetry.  It is through the “obscure 
moon” in “Motive for Metaphor,” for example, and its relation to the “obscure world” that 
we are able to imagine an equivalent distance between what can and cannot be expressed in 
the poem.  Both the moon and the earth remain “obscure” due to the quality of the moon’s 
own “obscure” reflective light (though it does manage to shed some light, it does so only on 
the “obscure world / Of things that would never be quite expressed”[257]).  The moon, at 
any rate, has none of the—autonomous, illuminating—power of the sun, which might (the 
poem seems to negatively suggest) elicit from the earth some frank expression.  Because of 
this the moon acts as an ideal metaphor for the “human ambiguity of the visible” described 
by John Berger, an important part of which is “the visual experience of absence, whereby 
we no longer see what we saw” and where we face “a disappearance” (50).   
But even in the experience of such a loss, we are not absolved of the knowledge of 
what we saw, and therefore of a persistent faith in the Reality of what we saw.  Like a 
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photograph, our “inner eye” (50), as Berger calls it, preserves the image of the Live, and 
intimates through its preservation the Real, while at the same time allowing the Real to 
remain wholly imaginary and ephemeral. This, according to Berger, is what promotes the 
development of the imagination, that “inner eye” where we are to some degree able to 
protect the Live image in an interiority of such an Unreality that it “may be forever partly 
protected against the ambush of space, which is absence” (50).  
  
A corresponding exploration of this “ambush” of space, creating absence, this time 
in specifically literary terms, is undertaken in Gaston Bachelard’s The Space of Poetry.  
Elaborating a line from a poem by Henri Michaux, “L’espace, mais vous ne pouvez 
concevoir, cet horrible en dedans-en dehors qu’est le vrai espace,” Bachelard asserts that 
the “space” evoked by the poet is one of such ambiguity that “the mind has lost its 
geometrical homeland and the spirit is drifting” (216-218). Importantly, however, the 
poem’s heavy reliance on imagery conversely grounds the ephemeral and ambiguous 
nature of the anguished being in the brief moment that the encapsulated space of the images 
provide.  This allows the abstract emotion of anguish to be tangibly addressed in the 
moment of its being rather than in the linear and causal trajectory that is assigned to it by 
more philosophical approaches. “Phenomenology can learn a lot from the brevity of the 
image” (219), writes Bachelard, “because of the way that it can act as a little piece of 
experimental folly, like a virtual grain of hashish without which it is impossible to enter 
into the reign of the imagination” (219).  It is this possibility of entering into a realm 
beyond the seemingly restrictive particular of an image, thereby achieving further clarity, 
that liberates poetry from any final ambiguity and aligns it, as Alain Badiou has powerfully 
suggested, with mathematics.  For Badiou, mathematics “is the science of being qua being” 
in that “logic pertains to the coherence of appearance” and (as “formalized” by Hegel but 
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earlier established by Plato) “it is of the essence of being to appear” (15).  Mathematics and 
poetry are aligned in their concern for the “coherence of appearance” but also in their 
commitment to a “transcendental order” where “being qua being” might be revealed.  As 
Badiou claims for mathematics, poetry does not postulate or theorize, it “speaks,” it “says,” 
and in doing so it “teaches us about what must be said concerning what is; not about what it 
is permissible to say concerning what we think there is” (Badiou 16).  Badiou’s statement, 
that “mathematics does not understand the meaning of the claim ‘I cannot know,’” also 
holds true for poetry.  Like “the mathematical realm” the poetic realm “does not 
acknowledge the existence of spiritualist categories such as those of the unthinkable and the 
unthought, supposedly exceeding the meagre resources of human reason; or of those 
sceptical categories which claim we cannot ever provide a definitive solution to a problem 
or a definitive answer to a serious question (Badiou 16). 
 In his essay, “The Effects of Analogy,” Stevens writes, “[e]very image is the 
elaboration of a particular of the subject of the image.  If this is true it is a realistic 
explanation of the origin of images” (CP 720).  But this “realistic explanation” of the 
particular, from which the image stems, constitutes only that particular “from which it is 
possible to enter into” the generative, abstract, “reign of the imagination.” “Thus poetry 
becomes and is,” concludes Stevens, “a transcendent analogy composed of the particulars 
of reality, created by the poet’s sense of the world, that is to say, his attitude, as he 
intervenes and interposes the appearances of that sense” (CP 723).  The “poet’s sense” is 
one that, refusing to acknowledge the “unthought” or “unthinkable,” instead manipulates 
and exaggerates the particulars of appearances, the available “reality,” in order to reveal the 
Reality (“being qua being”) within.  This intense focus or exaggeration on the particular in 
turn presents the double possibility of personalizing that experience and exploring it at a 
level of remove—avoiding the tendency that Bachelard describes toward the reduction of 
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image and experience.  “With space images, we are in the region where reduction is easy, 
commonplace,” Bachelard explains.  “There will always be someone who will want to do 
away with all complications and oblige us to leave as soon as there is a mention of space—
whether figurative or not—or of the opposition of outside and inside” (CP 219). 
Exaggeration—the territory of that “irrepressible revolutionist”: the imagination (CP 
736)—most importantly allows room for the distinction between what Bachelard calls 
“reflexive reduction” and “pure imagination” (219).  The imagination, in short, allows 
room for the concept of the infinite.  It resists the concept’s “reduction” by refusing to 
conceive of it as—or as subservient to—language or metaphor. For poetry, the infinite is 
both real and realizable, if not always or immediately within reach—because of this poetry 
and the “realm of mathematics” and inextricably intertwined.  As Badiou writes, it is on the 
basis of the concept of the infinite that mathematics allows “for an immanentization of the 
infinite, separating it from the One of theology” (18).  Rather than establishing a fixed and 
static figure of “Truth,” mathematics, or what Badiou calls, “the mathematical revolution—
the rendering explicit of what had always been implicit within mathematics since the time 
of the Greeks, which is to say, the thorough-going rationalization of the infinite” is always 
and will always be “yet to come”(18). “Nevertheless,” Badiou assures us, “we do know 
why mathematics radically subverts both empiricist moderation and elegant scepticism: 
mathematics teaches us that there is no reason whatsoever to confine thinking within the 
ambit of finitude. With mathematics we know that, as Hegel would have said, the infinite is 
nearby” (18).  But any engagement with mathematics, as any engagement with poetry, is 
one that “must constantly be reconstituted” because—for both—“the idea of the infinite 
only manifests itself through the moving surface of its […] reconfigurations” (18).  It is on 
this point that Badiou disagrees sharply with the great Symbolist poet, Stephane Mallarmé. 
In Igitur the speaker confronts the “mathematical realm” directly, announcing: “Infinity is 
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born of chance, which you have denied.  You, expired mathematicians—I, absolute 
projection. Should end in Infinity.” “The idea is clear,” Badiou expounds:  
Mallarmé accuses mathematicians of denying chance and thereby of fixing the 
infinite in the hereditary rigidity of calculation. […] [W]hat Mallarmé has failed to 
see is how the operations through which mathematics has reconfigured the conception 
of the infinite are constantly affirming chance through the contingency of their 
recommencement. It is up to philosophy to gather together or conjoin the poetic 
affirmation of infinity drawn metaphorically from chance, and the mathematical 
construction of the infinite, drawn formally from an axiomatic intuition. As a result, 
the injunction to mathematical beauty intersects with the injunction to poetic truth. 
And vice versa. (19-20) 
Bachelard also suggests an alignment between poetry and rigorous mathematical or 
scientific investigation, and once again the analogy is made not in order to suggest for 
either “realm” a fixity in process or results, but precisely the opposite.  Bachelard proposes 
for philosophy a route (inspired just as equally by the poets as by the “man with the 
microscope” [155]) first and foremost, of admiration.   After first immersing ourselves 
within this primary poetic element, we may—he assures us—resort once again to our more 
customary habits of reduction and criticism (219).  The ambition of this approach lies 
precisely in its interest in reducing what Bachelard perceives as a geometrical schism 
between inside and outside.  It suggests instead an expanded concept of space-composition 
where geometrically “opposed” faces might reflect off one another. The resulting refraction 
would reduce the possibility of the more rational “examination” of the structure of the 
object and its constituent parts (inside, outside, top, bottom) and lend itself instead to an 
overall appreciation of their integration—their prismatic glow.  
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“A philosopher of the imagination,” Bachelard writes (providing an apt term for 
describing Stevens’s approach to the poem as “an act of the mind” [CP 219]), “should 
follow the poet to the ultimate extremity of his images, without ever reducing this 
extremism” (220).  He should—following Rilke—“really live a poetic image” (as quoted in 
Bachelard 220); he should inhabit the very space of it as one might inhabit the space of a 
photograph.  He should forget, in the moment of looking, the “platitudinous” divide 
between the Real and the Live, between finitude and infinitude, and exist, instead—for the 
moment—in the apparition, “being qua being” (Badiou 15), of the image itself.   
 
“The cure of the ground” 
In elaborating the subtitle of the second section of the title poem of his last 
collection, “The Rock”: “The Poem as Icon,” Stevens writes: “It is not enough to cover the 
rock with leaves.”  The poem, Stevens argues, must become the rock itself.  This is not in 
order to obscure the imaginative realm, the “poet’s sense,” but in order to create a space in 
the “fiction” of the rock and the leaves that is ultimately inclusive of the imaginative as well 
as the concrete and factual elements of the poem from which the imaginative realm 
necessarily stems.  “The fiction of the leaves is the icon // Of the poem, the figuration of 
blessedness, / And the icon is the man” (CP 446).   All of these elements are “figured” as 
one, not in an effort to transcend or escape their respective bounds, but to realize them 
each—individually—more completely, not to escape into any “distance” beyond the limits 
of the human, but “to be at the end of distances, // The body quickened and the mind in 
root” (CP 446).  It is in this “rooted” space—where the imagination is at last understood as 
an accepted, structural part of the man: the imagination, the poem and the man as one—that 
the “cure / Of leaves and of the ground and of ourselves” (CP 447) is constituted. When we 
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are able, that is, to really “live” the image—a process that Stevens “figures” palpably in this 
poem—we “learn to know, in one of (the image’s) tiny fibres, a becoming of being that is 
an awareness of the being’s inner disturbance.  Here being is so sensitive that it is upset by 
a word” (Bachelard 220). We sense precisely this delicate absorption of word, poem, body 
and mind in Stevens’s poem when he writes:  
 These leaves are the poem, the icon and the man 
These are the cure of the ground and of ourselves, 
 
In the predicate that there is nothing else. 
They bud and bloom and bear their fruit without change. 
They are more than leaves that cover the barren rock. (446) 
 
What these two stanzas approach, or seek to approach, is the absolute zero degree of 
the real, that which cannot be reduced any further, and yields no further explanation.  The 
concern is therefore not for what can be described or explicated but for what simply is. But 
to be “concerned with,” to “approach,” or “seek to approach,” is to necessarily describe, 
necessarily explicate.  It is, precisely, to “predicate.”  These lines subtly make use of this 
apparent contradiction.  “In the predicate that there is nothing else” establishes and conveys 
the perception of an “absolute zero degree of the real” while at the same time establishing 
or acknowledging that this “real” is predicated upon perception itself. The poem can thus 
be understood as “predicated” on the subjective perception of the speaker—“that there is 
nothing else.” The constitutive elements of the poem (the leaves, the icon, the man—each 
of which maintains an equivocal and direct relationship to that which simply “is”) must 
duly, therefore, be understood this way, too.  By this route, the poem establishes that which 
“is,” the zero degree of the real, in the territory of the subjective and linguistic.  The poem 
continues: 
They bud the whitest eye, the pallidest sprout,  
New senses in the engendering of sense, 
The desire to be at the end of distances. (CP 446) 
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The continuity of the cyclic formulation, “New senses in the engendering of sense” is 
directly counter-balanced by “The desire to be at the end of distances.”  The by now 
familiar impulse in Stevens’s poetry toward the elaboration of a process of continuous 
approach is offset by an equally strong impulse to be “at the end” of any sort of—imagistic, 
descriptive—elaboration.  Rather than plunge into the interior of the circular formulation 
that he himself establishes, Stevens is, like Bachelard, instead intent on a surfacing, on the 
“stern particular(s)” (CP 447) of sensory experience, rather than on the depths of, or the 
“roots” of the image, on the (active) “engendering of senses” (CP 447) rather on the 
reliance of any (static) information gathered by them.    
The image itself, Bachelard argues—any image—has no doubt already been 
entrenched with so much metaphoric value (think of Stevens’s moon in “Motive for 
Metaphor”) that it is precisely the “roots” (222) of the image that the philosopher of the 
imagination should be required to avoid.  A phenomenology of the poetic imagination, 
therefore, rather than plumbing the depths allows the philosopher to explore being as 
surface. It is in that space of surfaces, “where being wants to be both visible and hidden,” 
that it becomes enterable, accessible, and that “the movements of opening and closing are 
so numerous, so frequently inverted, and so charged with hesitation, that we could conclude 
on the following formula: man is half-open being” (Bachelard 222).   
It is into this “half-open” space that Stevens enters in his poem “Description without 
Place” (296).  As the title suggests, the poem describes a non-place, but it is a non-place 
that exists as place, nevertheless—substantially enough, that is, to be described.  It exists 
not in reality, but in the space of Berger’s “inner-eye” where it is protected from the 
“ambush of space, which is absence” (Berger 50).  In that protected space it able to exist in 
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all of its frequent “inversions” and “hesitations” between the Real and the Live—in a state, 
that is, like that of a photograph, not of being, but of seeming to be. 
It is possible that to seem – it is to be,                  
As the sun is something seeming and it is, 
 
The sun is an example.  What it seems 
It is and in such seeming all things are. (296) 
 
Here the sun counters the “obscure moon” of “The Motive for Metaphor”—it 
unquestionably announces itself: “What it seems it is” (296), and no apologies are made for 
any discrepancies that might be read into those lines.  But the “reality” of both images is 
always displaced by the image itself, as it is that image that points to the limit of its own 
power to “throw light” on the phenomenon it attempts to represent or describe.  “One is 
taught to oppose the real to the imaginary,” writes Berger, “as though the first were always 
at hand and the second distant, far away. This opposition is false.  Events are always at 
hand” (72).  By reversing the formula and positioning the imaginary at hand, the real at a 
distance, Stevens explodes the “false opposition” that Berger describes.  In Stevens, “what 
it seems” (the imaginary) becomes “what it is” (the real).  This is demonstrated further a 
few lines down in the same poem: “Her green mind made the world around her green” (CP 
296).  Here we see quite clearly that it is the mind that makes the world real by exerting a 
power over it capable of effecting real change: “In the seeming of the summer of her sun/ 
By her own seeming made the summer change” (CP 296).   
Either way the opposition is constructed, however, it remains an opposition.  
Imaginative “events are always at hand” in Stevens’s poetry, but the reality they refer to is 
necessarily displaced.  According to Berger, it is the “coherence” of these “at hand” events 
(“which is what one means by reality” [72]) that is “an imaginative construct.  Reality 
always lies beyond” (72). This is clearly seen in Berger’s example, where “real” events are 
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necessarily interpreted through the imagination, so that their “reality” is necessarily 
displaced from the event itself into the beyond of the imagination.  The difference when the 
opposition is reversed is that we begin from a position of abstraction, from within an 
“imaginative construct,” so that the “reality beyond” exists within the poem itself—not in 
any substantial form, but as an allowance made for a space of absence.  The pure signifier 
is, after all, only that element which “holds the place for a certain lack, which is in its 
bodily presence nothing but an embodiment of a certain lack...perceived as a point of 
extreme plenitude” (Žižek 99).  Having commenced within a non-place of the imagination, 
within the “inner-eye,” the image in Stevens’s poem is—as Berger describes—protected 
from the imposition of space-as-absence as it imagines within itself a space of absence 
capable of absorbing the “reality beyond” without needing to go outside of itself to obtain 
it. In other words, like a photograph, the poem contains its own negation.  
 
Though Stevens had, at the beginning of his career, considered his tendency toward 
the abstract a weakness, by the end of his career he had not only fully come to terms with 
this tendency but began to consider it (as described above by Berger in terms of the visual 
image) a fundamental structural element of his poetry.  This shift in perspective was due 
largely to the ascendency of the abstract expressionist movement in the visual art world—a 
movement that Stevens himself had helped to inspire with his categorical declaration in 
“Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction” that: “It Must Be Abstract.” By the time he wrote 
“Notes,” Stevens no longer guiltily perceived “abstraction” as an evasion of the “real 
world.”  Inspiring generations of artists and poets who followed, Stevens began to view 
“abstraction,” instead, as a valuable method by which to access the Real.12   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  American abstraction gained popularity after World War II over regionalism and social realism with the 
emergence of the Abstract Expressionists.  As James Logenbach has observed:  “It is not merely coincidence 
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In a letter to José Rodriguez Feo, of June 20, 1945, Stevens wrote: “Reality is the 
great fond, and it is because it is that the purely literary amounts to so little.  Moreover, in 
the world of actuality ... one is always living a little out of it” (CP 949). He goes on to 
quote what he tellingly refers to as a “precious sentence” from Henry James—a sentence 
that could indeed be understood to express the poetic principle at the root of Stevens’s 
poetry—especially that of his late career: “To live in the world of creation—to get into it 
and stay in it—to frequent it and haunt it—to think intensely and fruitfully—to woo 
combinations and inspirations into being by a depth and continuity of attention and 
meditation—this is the only thing”  (CP 949).    
Stevens’s acknowledgement in his letter to Rodriguez Feo, however, that despite 
one’s best efforts at accessing the sort of immediacy of experience and “actuality” that 
James describes, “one is always living a little out of it,” confirms that even during this latter 
phase of Stevens’s career—characterized by an unabashed embrace of abstraction—he 
would never give up what he had once dubbed his “reality-imagination complex.” For 
Stevens—even, or perhaps especially when he turns more notably toward abstraction—the 
two:  a concrete “reality” and an abstract “imagination,” are inextricably tied.  He would 
remark, for example, in admiration of the use of abstraction in the modern art of the day, 
that “the physical never seems newer than when it is emerging from the metaphysical” and 
that a “momentum toward abstraction” often serves to produce in the viewer the opposite 
effect: an increased, rather than dispersed or deflected, intensity of feeling (Logenbach 
265).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that Stevens chose the terms abstract to describe his own poetic aims at this particular historical moment.  
There is a significant relationship between these parallel developments in American painting and poetry.” 
(104).	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This marriage of the physical and metaphysical, a momentum on the one hand 
toward the abstract, and on the other toward a distilled intensity of feeling, is once again 
rendered curiously tangible through the consideration of photography.  Perhaps one of the 
most striking reflections contained within Barthes’s Camera Lucida centers around a 
nineteenth century photograph that depicts a young inmate awaiting execution.  “I observe 
with horror,” Barthes writes of his experience regarding the photograph, “an anterior future 
of which death is the stake. By giving me the absolute past of the pose (aorist), the 
photograph tells me death in the future.... In front of the photograph of my mother as a 
child, I tell myself: she is going to die: I shudder...over a catastrophe which has already 
occurred. Whether or not the subject is already dead, every photograph is this catastrophe” 
(96).  Each photographic image, Barthes contends—in simultaneously containing futurity 
and historicity, a “this will be and this has been” (96), within a single frame—is constituted 
fundamentally by a space of absence (or, in Barthes’ interpretation: a space of death).   
Could this empty space be the “new structural formation of the subject” that, according to 
Benjamin, photography reveals (236)? To talk, uncannily, about an “anterior future” is 
really to talk about temporality per se.  The spatial vocabulary that photography lends 
should not be equated to a genuine shift from a discussion of the temporal.  The ideas 
presented and explored by Barthes and Benjamin through their discussions of 
photography—“space of absence,” “space of death”—are still, of course, in the largest part 
metaphorical.  It is to temporality, to tense, and more specifically to a perceived 
belatedness, that these spatial metaphors refer.  The point is not to discredit this vocabulary, 
or to criticize it for an insufficient attention to the “properly” spatial, but instead to raise the 
question about the ways in which temporal and spatial language and conceptions are 
mutually dependant, and that therefore any representation of space “spans” a representation 
of time, and temporality of the subject, and vice versa.  Any representation of time 
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circumscribes a particular spatial territory: it is this spatial circumscription of the temporal 
that is literalized by photography.  
 
It is true that the close-up snapshot, slow motion film and a microscope all allow an 
image to become “new” due to the revelation of “new structural formation(s) of the 
subject” previously undetectable to the human eye, but in each of these cases what is “new” 
is, of course, still only the image of the subject—not (as Benjamin seems here to suggest) 
the subject itself.  The structural formations may reveal themselves through technology as 
more complex, but there is no separate substance, or reality, to be discovered in attending to 
the subject more closely that did not already exist (if undetected) prior to its close 
examination under the microscope or the stilled frame. “Alas, however hard I look, I 
discover nothing,” writes Barthes as he searches for some evidence of the “truth” of his 
mother in her childhood photograph: “If I enlarge, I see nothing but the grain of the paper: I 
undo the image for the sake of its substance; and if I do not enlarge, if I content myself with 
scrutinizing, I obtain this sole knowledge, long since possessed at first glance: that this 
indeed has been: the turn of the screw has produced nothing...Such is the photograph: it 
cannot say what it lets us see” (100).    
The space of the poem, enacted as a photograph—as a territory of seems—also 
produces “nothing,” but it is precisely this “nothing” that creates an imaginative 
spatiality—a non-place situated in the schism between the arbitrary signification of 
language and its meaning, a “reality...beyond” (Berger 72) what it is able to say—within 
which the poem is able to let us see.  In order to do this, however, the poem must develop a 
space of perfect insignificance, which might serve to reverse the opposition between the 
real and the imaginary, as the following excerpt—again from Stevens’s “Description 
Without Place”—manages to do:              
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And another breath emerging out of death,        
That speaks for him such seemings as death gives. 
 
There might be, too, a change immenser than 
A poet’s metaphors in which being would 
 
Come true, a point in the fire of music where 
Dazzle yields to clarity and we observe, 
 
And observing is completing and we are content, 
In a world that shrinks to an immediate whole, 
 
That we do not need to understand, complete 
Without secret arrangements of it in the mind. (298) 
 
The “seeming” that Stevens evokes in this passage expresses the “space of absence” within 
the speaker’s consideration of death.  It expresses, that is, not death itself, but a space of 
breath—a space of possibility that emerges from death, which arises from a subject that no 
longer exists as such. By following the poet to the “ultimate extremity of his images” (222) 
as Bachelard encourages us to do (in this case, past the subject itself into an absence of the 
subject, into an absence even of the death of that subject: what is breath that arises out of 
death, but a transgression of the limit of death itself?), we are able to perceive the world as 
“an immediate whole, that we do not need to understand...”  (298). The “ultimate 
extremity” to which we are obliged to follow Stevens in this and many other of his poems 
is the extremity of his conditionals.  As in the passage above where the grammar fixes the 
hypothetical “There might be, too, a change immenser…” to the conditional, “ than / A 
poet’s metaphors in which being would / Come true.” This construction seems to literalize 
Badiou’s claim that linguistic expression is “ultimately no more than a superficial 
translation” of the transcendental logic of mathematics (15).  Stevens’s phrases are often 
formulated in this way—their cumulative hypotheses, subjunctives and conditionals 
reading like linguistic variables in a (constantly “reconfiguring”) mathematical equation. 
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As Bachelard suggests, it is the intense exaggeration of any image that allows a 
glimpse into the empty spaces contained within the structure of the image itself. Similarly, 
Stevens’s “close-up” attention to language—his emphasis, for example, on “the letter as 
such” and the compound-conditional—allows us to “glimpse” the “abstraction” not within, 
or at the “root” of language, but at its surface. Stevens’s “reveal” is not of the spaces or 
gaps between meaning or signifying units but of language as language.  It is not a 
descriptive or metaphorical space, but instead a space of the “is.” This “is,” as always, is 
predicated on the conditional and the subjective, but that does not disallow, and in fact 
creates the very conditions for, the sort of unconditional, objective certainty achieved in 
moments when, as in the passage above, “dazzle yields to clarity” (298).   
It is true that through the “microscope” as through Stevens’s poem, we have not 
discovered anything “substantially” different, but we have looked at the subject “as though 
it were quite new” (Bachelard 155).  We have therefore allowed the enlargement of the 
small—that which has been exaggerated to a point of its absence—to stand in for the 
whole, providing a way of imagining and thinking about the immensity of the subject 
without reducing it in size or complexity.  As Stevens writes in “Notes Toward a Supreme 
Fiction”: “The freshness of transformation is / The freshness of a world.”  For him, poetry 
was a method of effecting that transformation, therefore of renewing “the world.”  In the 
poem—as in the photograph—the small contains the possibility of becoming immense,13 
absence contains the possibility of presence, and negative-space contains the possibility of 
effecting a positive-space of meaning. “The reality...beyond” (Berger 72) is encapsulated in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  As Susan Stewart writes in her study, On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, 
the Collection, “our transcendent viewpoint makes us perceive the miniature as object and this has a double 
effect.  First, the object in its perfect stasis nevertheless suggests use, implementation, and contextualization.  
And second, the representative quality of the miniature makes that contextualization an allusive one; the 
miniature becomes a stage on which we project, by means of association or intertextuality, a deliberately 
framed series of actions […] and hence a narrativity (54).	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the reality within, but only as the precise space where the subject-image is demarcated 
against a larger space. 
“The being-here is maintained by a being from elsewhere.  Space, vast space, is the 
friend of being,” writes Bachelard.  “How much philosophers would learn, if they would 
consent to read the poets!” (208). It is, Bachelard argues, through the poetic imagination 
that immensity itself may be enlarged, “magnified through contemplation” (210), lending a 
reality to the experience of that immensity which would otherwise be reduced by 
psychology, or declared “ephemeral” (Bachelard 210).  “Poems are human realities,” 
Bachelard writes.   “They must be lived in their poetic immensity” (210).  But that 
immensity is not, in keeping with Stevens’s sense of his own poetic project, something that 
exists necessarily “beyond”: “Immensity is within ourselves.  It is attached to a sort of 
expansion of being that life curbs and caution arrests, but which starts again when we are 
alone.  As soon as we become motionless, we are elsewhere; we are dreaming in a world 
that is immense.  Indeed, immensity is the movement of the motionless man” (184).   
Consider this in relation to Stevens’s “The House was Quiet and the World Was 
Calm,” from Transport to Summer: “The reader became the book; and summer night / Was 
like the conscious being of the book” (311).   It is the reader’s very motionlessness—the 
stillness of subject and surroundings—that allows him to become the book and thereby 
access the “conscious being” of the night itself, and of the world. The stillness and the quiet 
are a “part of the meaning, part of the mind: the access of perfection to the page” (312); it is 
stillness that allows the reader to absent himself so as to make room for meaning, which 
can only apparently assert itself when “there is no other meaning” (312).  The reader must 
forfeit any of his own personal meaning before he is able to become the book, but it is 
through this very process that meaning returns to him:  
And the world was calm.  The truth in a calm world,         
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In which there is no other meaning, itself 
 
Is calm, itself is summer and night, itself 
Is the reader leaning late and reading there (312).  
 
By effecting a now familiar “double remove” within this poem, Stevens creates a space of 
absence for “the reader,” and thereby permits an entry for meaning. The “reader’s” being, 
always “half-open” (Bachelard 222), has in this case swung the door wide. And, although 
the language of the poem again points to a “reality...beyond” (Berger 72) which the poem 
itself can take us (we remain grounded in the image of the “reader leaning late and reading 
there” [312]), we are able to create our own “truth in a calm world” by becoming that 
reader; by becoming, that is to say, ourselves.  The circular model that is often adopted in 
Stevens’s imagery is here drawn so tight as to become almost a still-point. It is within this 
tightly circumscribed space that we confront “ourselves,” our own readerliness. Having 
been directed toward a “truth” beyond the frame of the poem as it is presented on the page 
(a “truth,” importantly, that we as readers cannot access: this inability to access the 
“reader’s” book or experience his “calm world” is what points us beyond it) we discover 
that we ourselves are the “reader”—that the “book” is the one we have open in our hands.   
 
A “Double Ineffableness” and the Face to Face 
“The boon of language,” writes Berger, “is that potentially it is complete, it has the 
potentiality of holding with words the totality of human experience—everything that has 
occurred and everything that may occur. It even allows space for the unspeakable” (95).  
“The House Was Quiet and the World Was Calm” contains just this potentiality of 
completeness. It holds the possibility of both the immensity “beyond” and “within” as it 
directs our attention both to the unknown and un-embodied other and to ourselves.  It is 
what it is able to say:  “The truth...is the reader leaning late and reading there” (312), and 
	   
123	  
also (because the imagined reader has entered a world that remains unuttered in the poem) 
what it is unable to say. By incorporating the latter, the poem provides a space of blankness 
onto which the reader herself creates meaning, imposing her own experience as reader onto 
the page; an experience that the poem as such cannot know, and cannot speak, but can, 
nevertheless, contain.  What is presented, then, is not what is or could ever be contained, 
but the container itself—though the relationship between the two must here be understood 
as dialectical rather than oppositional.14  
This space for what the poem cannot contain, cannot say, exists through a constant 
tension in the poem between the image’s motion and motionlessness. As Bachelard 
explains, the image must be “active in both directions...the direction that enlarges and the 
direction that concentrates” (171), and it is through a maintenance of this tension that the 
poet is able to keep the image “from becoming motionless” (171), thereby creating within 
the poem the very condition of daydreaming: what Bachelard calls “the movement of 
motionless man” (184).  
As in Stevens’s final lines of “Man Carrying Thing”—“We must endure our 
thoughts all night, until / The bright obvious stands motionless in the cold” (306)—the 
“bright obvious” is an image that is at once the enlarged, exaggerated, “unspeakable,” and 
also the concentrated, motionless object of our poetic attention and imagination.  “Man 
Carrying Thing” provides us with an excellent example of not only the divergence between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Think here of Heidegger’s jug, which, as he describes in his essay “Das Ding,” “remains a vessel whether 
we represent it in our minds or not.  As a vessel the jug stands on its own as self-supporting. But what does it 
mean to say that the container stands on its own? Does the vessel’s self-support alone define the jug as a 
thing?  Clearly the jug stands as a vessel only because it has been brought to a stand.  This happened during, 
and happens by means of, a process of setting, of setting forth, namely, by producing the jug” (PLT 165). 
Later on, Heidegger is brought up short by the realization that “we failed to give thought to what the jug holds 
and how it holds. How does the jug’s void hold?” He asks. The answer: “The void holds in a twofold manner: 
taking and keeping” (PLT 169). In so “containing” its own void, and thus also the possibility of the “gift” of a 
poured substance—whether or not the substance is actually at any moment contained—the jug “presences as a 
thing” (PLT 171): “The thing stays—gathers and unites—the fourfold” (PLT178), which Heidegger defines 
as “earth and sky, divinities and mortals” (PLT 175-176).  Further: “The thing things world.  Each thing stays 
the fourfold into a happening of the simple onehood of the world” (PLT 178).	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the enlarged and concentrated image, but also the “poetic event” as defined by Giorgio 
Agamben in The End of the Poem: “the divergence between intellect and language” (38). In 
fact, the first lines of this poem describe Agamben’s thesis quite plainly: “The poem must 
resist the intelligence / Almost successfully” (306).  It is precisely there—in the not-quite-
successful resistance to intelligence—that the poem happens: in a “double 
‘ineffableness’...in which the intellect cannot grasp (‘end’) what language says and in 
which language does not ‘completely follow’ what the intellect comprehends” (Agamben 
38).  Both language and intellect, in this way, go above and beyond what the other is 
capable of comprehending, so there exists a gap that is not so much an absence, but rather a 
hyper-presence—that “supreme plenitude” (99) that Žižek ascribes to the abstract (both the 
unspeakable and the unthinkable).  
It is precisely this “double-ineffableness” that is made tangible by the photograph, 
providing us with an excellent model for understanding Stevens’s poetic imagination.  
Substitute “the image” for “language” above and we see that the same formula applies: “in 
which the intellect cannot grasp (‘end’) what (the image) says and in which (the image) 
does not ‘completely follow’ what the intellect comprehends” (Agamben 38).  What 
Barthes describes in Camera Lucida as the photograph’s punctum is precisely that aspect of 
the photograph that cannot be “grasped”: “The punctum, then,” writes Barthes, “is a kind 
of subtle beyond—as if the image launched desire beyond what it permits us to see...toward 
the absolute excellence of a being, body and soul together” (59).15  The image itself, its 
“Live” aspect, can in no way “completely follow” what the intellect, in receiving the image, 
comprehends as “Real”; in this way the photograph literalizes the “double ineffableness” of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  As previously noted, the punctum “pricks,” it wounds.  It is the site of an uncomfortable or painful affect 
that jolts the subject from his ordinary patterns of being-in and seeing the world. It is in this way that he enters 
the “subtle beyond,” permitting him to see the world anew.  This could be anything from the simple 
experience of being suddenly, unexplainably moved by a photograph, to the sort of visionary seeing Barthes 
describes in the text quoted above.	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the poetic event described by Agamben, where “language speaks without comprehending” 
and “the intellect comprehends without being able to speak” (39).  It is just as language 
struggles to free itself through a comprehending body that comprehension struggles to free 
itself in an expressive language, and they are able to “communicate with each other in their 
limitation, such that...their imperfection actually coincides with their perfection” (Agamben 
39). In just this way, going back to “The Poem as Icon” from The Rock, the incongruity 
between the rock and what it is called to stand in for as “icon” constitutes its generativeness 
as an image: “In this plenty, the poem makes meanings of the rock, / Of such missed 
motion and such imagery/ That its barrenness becomes a thousand things” (CP 447, 
emphasis added). 
Where Berger speaks of the poetic moment as a split between the imaginative and 
the real, however, Agamben is concerned with the dichotomy between sense and sound.  In 
every “genuine poetic enunciation” (41), according to Agamben, there is a simultaneous 
movement on the one hand of language to sense, and on the other of comprehension to 
sound, without either reaching its destination (for the former that destination would be the 
achievement of prose, and the latter would be the achievement of “pure sound” [Agamben 
41]). “Instead,” explains Agamben,  
in a decisive exchange, it is as if, having met each other, each of the two movements 
then followed the other’s tracks, such that language found itself led back in the end 
to language and comprehension to comprehension.  This inverted chiasm—this and 
nothing else—is what we call poetry.  This chiasm is, beyond every vagueness, 
poetry’s crossing with thought, the thinking essence of poetry and poeticizing 
essence of thought (41).    
Think again of Stevens’s articulation of this in “Man Carrying Thing” and the illustration 
he provides for the poem’s necessary almost-successful resistance to intelligence:  
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A brune figure in winter evening resists 
Identity.  The thing he carries resists 
 
The most necessitous sense.  Accept them, then,  
As secondary (parts not quite perceived 
 
Of the obvious whole...(306) 
 
The resistance to sense articulated here—the “brune figure’s” ability to remain “brune,” 
vague, and undefined; the object that it carries to remain an object, a poetic gesture, rather 
than a thing itself—allows the poem to cohere, from its “parts,” the “poetic enunciation” of 
the last lines: “We must endure our thoughts all night, until / The bright obvious stands 
motionless in the cold” (306).  Put another way: it is the sensible alignment of parts to an 
“obvious whole” (“the thinking essence” [Agamben 41] of the poem) as it crosses paths 
with the pure “sonority” (“the poeticizing essence” [Agamben 41] of the poem) that results 
in the “bright obvious” of the final line.  
Where at first the “obvious whole” is depicted as “obvious” because it is only 
sensible that parts cohere to a whole, the “bright obvious,” which “stands motionless in the 
cold,” is no longer that which is sensible but that which has been remaindered by the 
interchange between both sense and sound, between the poeticizing and the thinking 
essences, by the real and the imaginary, the “Real” and the “Live.”  It is this created 
blankness—this photographic platititude (“in the true sense of the word” [Barthes 106]) 
upon which “dazzle yields to clarity” (Stevens 298)—that produces poetic meaning. The 
intellect immediately comprehends the “vital, arrogant, fatal, dominant X” (CP 257), the 
ideal formulaic expression of that which “resists intelligence almost successfully” (CP 
306): it enacts a “double remove,” what Agamben calls a “double ineffableness,” whereby 
the intellect is unable to understand the significance of X and at the same time X is unable 
to fulfill itself, condemned to remain forever the signifier, never the signified.   
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Again, it is attention to the literal “sense” of the poem that acts in the same way that 
a powerful close-up would for a film, or a microscope for a cell, revealing “entirely new 
structural formations” of the subject. Only when this sense of the Real of the poem (its X-
ness) is crossed with the Live of the poem (an absolute inability for that X to contain the 
poetic meaning that the mind immediately comprehends) is the poet able to achieve what 
Bachelard refers to as “the poetic phenomenon of pure liberation, of absolute sublimation” 
(69).  In this state, “The image is no longer under the domination of things, nor is it subject 
to the pressures of the unconscious.  It floats and soars, immense, in the free atmosphere of 
a great poem” (69).  It is important that this chiastic “crossing” of the Real and the Live is 
understood as such. The X is not a crossing-out, a chasm of meaning, but a crossing-over—
a chiasmus.  But that is not to say that the restrictions imposed by the X are not extreme, 
more even than if it could be understood as a negation.  Meaning is suspended between two 
poles, between the contained and the container; it becomes in this way, “thing,” existent 
within its form—but, like Heidegger’s jug, only “insofar as it things” (PLT 175). That is, it 
exists as “thing” only insofar as it presences itself “from out of the worlding world” (PLT 
178); only insofar as it makes legible the “dif-ference” (PLT 199) between objective form 
that “stands before us and can be seen” and the “ever-non-objective to which we are subject 
as long as the paths of birth and death, blessing and curse keep us transported into Being” 
(PLT 43).   
 
The “liberation” that can be achieved by a poem, according to Bachelard, is 
proportional to the “repose” from which the image frees itself. When the poem originates 
from the “narrow gate” of an initially constricting imagistic space the “liberation” it 
achieves can be extreme.  Bachelard explores, for example, the role of corners, nests, shells, 
drawers, and other imagined spaces from which the poet is able to “open up” the world 
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(Bachelard 155).  “The more concentrated the repose,” he writes, “the more hermetic the 
chrysalis, the more the being that emerges from it is a being from elsewhere, the greater is 
his expansion” (66).16 
The attention that Stevens pays in “The Motive for Metaphor” to the limiting 
structures of the medium of language, indeed offers precisely this opportunity for 
“liberation.”  It is through the “close-up” attention to detail, to the ‘X-ness’ of its language, 
that a blankness is rendered available in the poem, becoming a signifying space in its own 
right. Always “half-open” (Bachelard 222), we are able, in the instances of such poetic 
liberation, to “open (our) doors to the world” (Bachelard 69).  It is within this created space 
of openness, of immensity, that it becomes possible to glimpse—if only for a moment—
“the bright obvious” that stands before us: “motionless in the cold” (Stevens CP 306).  
 
Transcendence, according to Levinas, “consists in speaking the world to the 
Other...The generality of the word institutes a common world” (TI 173).  It is toward “the 
generality” of this “common world” that Stevens tends, but importantly it is a generality 
manifested through the particular: through the word, which constitutes Stevens’s “peculiar 
potency of the general” referred to in “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction.” Consideration of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  The “condensation” by which Freud argues a dream is constructed could prove an interesting model for 
thinking about the contrast between the “repose” and “expansion” of poetic images discussed here by 
Bachelard. “The content of the dream is given as it were in the form of hieroglyphs whose signs are to be 
translated one by one into the language of the dream-thoughts” (211), writes Freud in chapter six of The 
Interpretation of Dreams. He continues on to say that “[w]e would obviously be mis-led if we were to read 
these signs according to their pictorial value and not according to their referentiality as signs” and also warns 
against the premature assumption that a dream has been interpreted in its entirety. “Even when the solution 
seems satisfying and complete,” he counsels, “it is always possible for a further meaning to announce its 
presence through the same dream.  The quota of condensation is thus, strictly speaking, indeterminable” 
(212).  But, “how does this condensation come about?” (214).  Contrary to what might be assumed, 
condensation of dream material does not arise through exclusion but rather through a consistent process of 
over-determination.  “Whatever dream I submit to this kind of analysis,” writes Freud, “I always find the 
same principles confirmed: the elements formed into the dream are drawn from the entire mass of the dream-
thoughts, and in its relation to the dream-thoughts, each one of the elements seems to be determined many 
times over” (217).   	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the word as object, as “generic” form, draws attention in Stevens’s work to what Levinas 
calls the “primordial putting in common” that language affords.  That is, the “transcendent” 
space of the poem that Stevens conceives of—a space achieved not via any achieved 
signification but via the very signifyingness of language and representation—is the 
intimate, primordial space revealed through a “double ineffableness” between the “I” and 
the “non-I.” What is this “double ineffableness” but the poetic (poesis) moment in which 
there is a simultaneous movement toward intelligibility (sense) on the one hand (the 
absorption of the “Other” into the “I” of the same in the moment of representation) and to 
sensibility (sound) on the other, and where in the midst of this double movement, in which 
neither reaches its destination (either pure sense, or pure sensibility) but each is led back to 
itself there exists a chiasm “beyond every vagueness” in the “I’s” relation to the “Other,” a 
negative-space constituted, similarly to Agamben’s definition of poetry, by “the thinking 
essence of poetry and poeticizing essence of thought” (EP 41).    
The process of delineating this relationship, exposing the lines by which this 
“double-movement” occurs, allows the “I” to transcend its own bounds and effect an ethical 
movement toward the “Other.”  Without the exposure of the “lineaments” of 
representation—attention to the platitudinous (“in the true sense of the word”) “face” of the 
image, the word, or the human being (“I” or “the Other”)—there can be no possibility of 
transcending those bounds. “The ‘vision’ of the face,” writes Levinas, “is inseparable from 
this offering language is.  To see the face is to speak the world.  Transcendence is not an 
optics, but the first ethical gesture” (TI 174).  Through a poetry intent on traversing this 
negative-space and therefore remaining in the territory of the “saying,” rather than “ending” 
itself in the “said,” Stevens’s project is “thus to make signs of (the) very signifyingness of 
the exposure; it is to expose the exposure instead of remaining in it as the act of exposing” 
(TI 143). This impulse toward an exposure of exposure itself, the figuration of figuration 
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itself, is what constitutes Stevens’ ethical drive—a drive past “optics,” past exposure or 
figuration itself—toward (“passivity of passivity”) the perpetual signifyingness of that 
which is always-already exposed. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Three: The Word 
The word must be the thing it represents otherwise it is a symbol.  It is a question of 
identity  
 
—Wallace Stevens (CP 907). 
 
Proposita:  
1.God and the imagination are one. 
2. The thing imagined is the imaginer.  
The second equals the thing imagined and the imaginer are one. Hence, I suppose, 
the imaginer is God  
 
—Wallace Stevens (CP 914). 
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But what is this gesture? Toward what does it move us? In many ways, Levinas’s 
expression of language as a “primordial donation”—emphasizing the material fundament of 
human interaction and exchange at the root of all language—does not seem to move us very 
far from the circuitous formulation that Heidegger offers us in his 1950 essay, “Language.” 
“Language itself is language, and nothing else besides” (PLT 188), Heidegger writes. But 
though this may appear “an empty tautology” (PLT 188), Heidegger attests that his 
formulation expresses the fact that, when it comes to the question of language: “... [w]e do 
not want to get anywhere.  We would like only for once, to get to just where we were 
already” (PLT 188, emphasis added).   Indeed, it is the fundamental passivity that this 
statement points to that Levinas’s interpretation of language as a transcendence of the face-
to-face is able to—more substantially—articulate.  A similar passivity is expressed by 
Stevens when, in a 1948 interview with the Partisan Review, he wrote that, “poetry is 
nothing if it is not an experiment in language” (CP 823); nothing, that is, if it does not bring 
us back to the fundamental question of representation that language poses, and endeavour 
to test the limits it imposes.  Poetry, in this sense, does not “want to get anywhere.”  Its 
active “experimentation” with language purposes to reveal nothing other than the 
experience of “language itself.”1 “The poet records his experience as poet in subjects and 
words which are part of that experience,” Stevens further explains in the Partisan 
interview.  “He knows that nothing but the truth of that experience means anything to him 
or to anyone else.  Experiment in respect to subjects and words is the effort on his part to 
record the truth of that experience” (CP 823).   
The year 1948—one year after the publication of Stevens’s most concerted effort to 
delineate a theory of his own poetics with “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction” in Transport 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  “Experiment” according to the Oxford English Dictionary: “To have experience of; to experience; to feel; 
suffer” (Vol. III 431).	  
	   
133	  
to Summer—marked a crucial turning point for Stevens.  The two collections which follow, 
The Auroras of Autumn (1950), and The Rock (1952), embark from the theoretical point of 
departure established by “Notes” and constitute Stevens’s most successful attempt at 
incorporating and expressing language’s dual—both figurative and material—nature.  For 
Stevens, the question of form penetrated far beyond the poem on the page. It was a 
question, instead, of the approach to the question of the poem on the page.  In an essay 
presented at the American Federation of Arts Convention in October 1954, Stevens 
declared that “[f]orm alone and of itself is an ever-youthful, ever-vital thing” (CP 875).  By 
“form” Stevens somewhat confusingly intends here not any tangible achieved result in the 
arts—painting, poetry or music—to which he explicitly refers, but instead, what might be 
more aptly called, a “will to form.”  In any case, Stevens’s emphasis is clearly not on 
material object-ness and its relationship to the arts, but on what he calls an inherited “vigor 
of art,” which “is itself formless.” This amorphous energy can only be passed on, he 
explains, from “those in whom the principle (of art) is active, so that generations of form 
come from generations of men” (CP 875). It would seem that Stevens is connecting the 
tangible material “form” produced by particular artists to the conception of a larger super-
structure, the energy and influence of which helps to shape individual artistic efforts—and 
therefore their results—but is itself necessarily un-formlike, un-formed. As usual for 
Stevens, the idea is worked out far more convincingly in poetry. The opening—title—poem 
of Auroras of Autumn begins: “This is where the serpent lives, the bodiless.” And a little 
further along, in stanza four, Stevens writes: 
This is form gulping after formlessness 
Skin flashing to wished-for disappearances 
And the serpent body flashing without the skin (355).  
 
The governing “principle” beyond all form is—we see here, with the help of the “serpent 
body” image—“formlessness.” The ambiguity introduced by the word “after” (does “form 
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gulping after formlessness” connote that “form” is desirous of some future “formlessness” 
or, instead, that form’s “gulping” occurs in the wake or as a result of “formlessness”?) is 
important in the sense that it results in a nearly chiastic intersection between form and 
formlessness where the directionality is purposely obscured, but it does nothing to interrupt 
or obscure the line’s—and indeed the poem’s—central concern.  It is only by remaining 
active according to the poem’s “principle”—remaining, indeed, always one step ahead of 
anything fixed—that “form” may, in fact, be constituted at all; that it may, in “gulping 
after”—toward, or as a result of—“formlessness” that its own “wished-for disappearances” 
appear to us at all.  The visual formation of this apparition is expressed quite plainly in 
“figure/ground” terms in stanza five:  
This is the height emerging and its base 
These lights may finally attain a pole  
In the midmost midnight and find the serpent there, 
 
In another nest, the master of the maze 
Of body and air and forms and images, 
Relentlessly in possession of happiness (CP 355). 
What is the “snake” but our perception of form itself? What is its “poison” but that “we 
should disbelieve”—given our knowledge that even the center, the “midmost midnight,” 
will not hold? 
 
“Poesis” 
In “A Collect of Philosophy,” Stevens argues that what he terms “poetic” 
philosophical concepts should not be degraded or dismissed for their “poeticism” as this is 
precisely the point.  Philosophy is poetry (poesis stemming from the early Greek variant for 
“a making, creation” [OED, Vol. VII 1042]): the first sensory, then cognitive process of 
making sense of the world.  “According to the traditional views of sensory perception,” 
Stevens writes in this lecture, “we do not see the world immediately but only as the result 
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of a process of seeing and after the completion of that process, that is to say, we never see 
the world except the moment after...The material world, for all the assurances of the eye, 
has become immaterial.  It has become an image in the mind” (CP 857). Just as the “form” 
of the world—what is formally visible to us from moment to moment, is always, in this 
way, arising from and “gulping after formlessness,” so, too, is language.   
Indeed, language as expressed in “the word,”2 is nothing other than the “expression” 
of man’s—always belated—formal “experience.” The elaboration of a space of language as 
“language itself” provides, for this reason, an ideal space for an exploration in Stevens’s 
poetry of both perception and representation.   Language is, of course, “in itself” a literal 
“visualization of form,” but it is also—due to the blatant disconnect between signifier and 
signified contained within the space of the letter itself, much like Barthes’s “platitudinous” 
photograph—a simultaneous “visualization” of formlessness.  Poetry, as Stevens had 
asserted, is nothing if it is not an “experiment” within that space—between form and 
formlessness—of language.  A space where, “the cancelling, / The negations are never 
final” (CP 357) as Canto IV of “The Auroras Autumn” puts it.   
Language is always, for Stevens, “A Description Without Place,” where—as that 
poem, from Transport to Summer begins—“It is possible that to seem—it is to be /As the 
sun is something seeming and it is” (CP 296).  This “seeming” of course is a major theme 
that runs the course of Stevens’s poetry from the early days of Harmonium—most notably 
perhaps in the conclusion to “The Emperor of Ice Cream” (a poem that was a particular 
favourite of Stevens[CP 768]), where we are permitted to “[l]et be be finale of seem” (CP 
50).  Though an emphasis on the subjective or inconstant nature of Being persists in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  This belatedness is indeed inscribed within “The Gospel According to St. John,” which begins: “In the 
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.  The same was in the 
beginning with God.  All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing made that was made” 
(The King James Bible, St. John 1, 1-3).  “The Word” can here be understood to exist inextricably from the 
Creator, as the Creator, and prior to all form.	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Stevens’s work, the marked shift in the later poems could be expressed in terms of a 
reversal of “The Emperor of Ice Cream” formula, where we are no longer permitted to “let 
be be finale of seem,” or in fact to “let be be finale” of anything at all.  In Stevens’s late 
collections, particularly in The Auroras of Autumn, we are, indeed, deeply within the 
territory of seems—which is also, of course, the territory of the surface-value of the word, 
and of language itself. “It is a theatre floating through the clouds” begins Canto VI of the 
collection’s title poem: 
Itself a cloud, although of misted rock 
And mountains running like water, wave on wave 
 
Through waves of light.  It is of cloud transformed 
To cloud transformed again, idly, the way 
A season changes color to no end, 
 
Except the lavishing of itself in change, 
As light changes yellow into gold and gold 
To its opal elements and fire’s delight, 
 
Splashed wide-wise because it likes magnificence 
And the solemn pleasures of magnificent space (CP 359). 
 
We are no longer in “A Description Without Place” here, but in the “place” of “description” 
itself.  “Poetic form in its proper sense is a question of what appears with the poem itself,” 
Stevens had commented in his Partisan Review interview.  This question—pertaining to 
style, sound, rhythm, and finally to the nature of language itself—was one that Stevens 
must have posed to himself as he undertook the project that would result in his collection, 
The Auroras of Autumn.  If poetry, the collection as a whole seems to ask the reader, is an 
experimentation with language, and such experimentation is a worthwhile pursuit—as 
Stevens was always thoroughly convinced that it was (in keeping with Heidegger: “We 
would like only for once, to get to just where we were already” [PLT 188])—what, then, is 
language? Where, indeed, are we?  From what point does language speak?  What point, in 
speaking, do we find ourselves already and so would like to either return or remain?   
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 Unlike Heidegger, however, who posits, “...we shall do well to find something 
spoken purely” (PLT 192),” for Stevens, especially in The Auroras of Autumn, his first 
collection post-“Notes to a Supreme Fiction,” there is no possibility of a “purely.” 
Language is instead always poesis; a making, the process of making. Whatever is spoken is 
necessarily, therefore, tied to the process of its being spoken at all, the words—the spoken 
itself—impossible to extricate from their speaking. Though Stevens himself had dubbed his 
work “pure poetry” what he intends is that the emphasis in his process is on the process of 
the poem, and not on the poem as a product or end in itself.  What is “pure” in the poetry is 
not the spoken (noun) but an active, verbal speaking. To write and to read are a thinking 
through for Stevens—“through” here intended in both senses of the term.  They chart a 
course, or particular line of thought, through a larger and more continuous process of 
contemplation, and are themselves a part of that process.  It could be said that they 
constitute the “temporal” measure of the a-temporal—immeasurable and un-recordable—
structure of subjective experience and its contemplation. In Canto VIII of “The Auroras of 
Autumn, Stevens declares that “[t]here may be always a time of innocence,” but that there 
is never “a place.”  The refusal to designate a “place” for “innocence” while maintaining an 
abstract and idealized idea of a larger, ever-generative, ever-vigorous “principle” in 
opposition to the spatial sets up a clear distinction in the poem between a limited 
temporality that remains tied to specific measure and location, and a temporality that 
exceeds these limitations. The establishment of an excessive, abstracted temporality 
removed from “objective” measurement is in fact crucial to Stevens’s ultimate dismissal of 
any notion of an objective, achievable, “purity.” The Canto continues:  
There may be always a time of innocence. 
But there is never a place.  Or if there is no time, 
If it is not a thing of time, nor of place, 
 
Existing in the idea of it, alone,  
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In the sense against calamity, it is not 
Less real. For the oldest and coldest philosopher, 
 
There is or may be a time of innocence  
As pure principle.  It nature is its end, 
That it should be, and yet not be, a thing 
 
That pinches the pity of the pitiful man, 
Like a book at evening beautiful but untrue, 
Like a book on rising beautiful and true (CP 361).  
 
The layers of perceptual remove that are introduced in the opening stanza of this Canto 
serve to establish any notion of “pure principle” on such shaky ground that we are not 
surprised when in stanza five it is described as “a thing of ether that exists /Almost as a 
predicate” (361).  This is not Heidegger’s “purely spoken,” but instead the speaking itself, 
but that does not make it any “less real.”  It is, we will not be surprised to be reminded here, 
the poem itself, replete with its gaps and rhetorical failures, which is the “pure principle.” It 
is the always-potential, always abstract “promise” of language that serves “almost as a 
predicate” for form itself.  That the “nature” of this principle can only be described in terms 
that are—simultaneously—conditional (“That it should be…”) dialectical (“and yet not be”; 
“..beautiful but untrue,/…beautiful and true”) and symbolic ( “Like a book at evening…”) 
(361, emphasis added) is significant. These are, of course, the terms of the “pure principle” 
itself. The closest we come in the poem to defining the “principle” directly is as “a time of 
innocence”—that is, a temporality that would be detached from limited spatio-temporal 
terms.  At first, the equation is introduced as one maintained only by “the oldest and coldest 
philosopher” [361]), but a few stanzas later it is affirmed that this “principle,” this “time of 
innocence”—this temporality that exceeds all limits and measure, even (properly) of 
language—“exists, / It exists, it is visible, it is, it is” (361).  That this is finally 
communicated only in the stutter, “it is, it is,” underscores both the promise of language—
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its engagement in a continual process of “cancelling, / “(where) [t]he negations are never 
final,” and its limited ability to fulfill that promise.  
 
As opposed to Heidegger, to whom, “what is spoken purely is that in which the 
completion of speaking that is proper to what is spoken is, in its turn, an original,” for 
Stevens, there is no “completion of speaking.” However; it is precisely because there is no 
completion of speaking that there would seem to be a point of agreement between 
Heidegger and Stevens: For Stevens, “[w]hat is spoken purely is the poem” (PLT 192), not 
because the poem is or could ever be “original” in the sense of having a univocal meaning 
or fixed form, but because of an underlying energy, and impulse forward…: “poesis.”  
In “Large Red Man Reading” from The Auroras of Autumn, Stevens writes: “the 
outlines of its being and its expressing, the syllables of its / law: / Poesis, poesis, the literal 
characters, the vatic lines... ”  (CP 365).  It is the process of the poem—which is, for 
Stevens, the poem itself—that is always original, generative and new.  Though the route by 
which it arrives at its “purity” is importantly, and fundamentally, different, the result for 
both Heidegger and for Stevens, is that poetry allows language to exist as “language and 
nothing else besides” (PLT 188); allows, that is, language itself to speak.  Stevens’s 
conception of this process as constituted by an endless process of “cancellings” and 
“negations” rather than the “peal of stillness” that Heidegger describes3 (PLT 205) (and 
which is also evoked in the poetry of the High Romantics as well as in unquestionably post-
Romantic poetry, most overtly of course in Eliot), is crucial to an understanding of the 
manner in which Stevens works to shift the orientation of Western “poetic concepts” away 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  “Language speaks as the peal of stillness.  Stillness stills by the carrying out, the bearing and enduring, of 
the world and things in their presence. […]  The peal of stillness is not anything human.  But on the contrary, 
the human is indeed in its nature given to speech—it is linguistic.  The word “linguistic” as it is here used 
means: having taken place out of the speaking of language.  What has thus taken place, human being, has 
been brought into its own by language, so that it remains given over or appropriated to the nature of language, 
the peal of stillness” (Heidegger, PLT 205). 	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from any still-point, to an endlessly variegated and shifting process of “permanent 
realization” (CP 366).  It is precisely this type of realization that is expressed in the 
exquisite “St. Armourer’s Church from the Outside,” from The Rock:  
This vif, this dizzle-dazzle of being new 
And of becoming, for which the chapel spreads out 
Its arches in its vivid element,  
 
In the air of newness of that element, 
In an air of freshness, clearness, greenness, blueness, 
That which is always beginning because it is part 
Of that which is always beginning, over and over (CP 449). 
   
Similarly, in Stevens’s important essay, “The Irrational Element in Poetry,” he 
encouragingly explains:  “You can compose poetry in whatever form you like. If it seems a 
seventeenth-century habit to begin lines with capital letters, you can go in for the liquid 
transitions of greater simplicity; and so on. It is not that nobody cares. It matters 
immensely. The slightest sound matters. The most momentary rhythm matters. You can do 
as you please, yet everything matters” (CP 789).  I believe that this last line, “You can do as 
you please, yet everything matters,” could serve as a short-hand for Stevens’s approach to 
both poetry and the world. In it is maintained the paradoxical relationship between freedom 
and responsibility, world and thing, reality and the imagination, that Stevens was intent on 
sustaining in his work. A fixation on the idea of pleasure is also implicit here, as well as the 
literal connotation of the word “matter,” which is of course suggestive of Stevens’s 
fascination with, and emphasis on, the phenomenal reality of the world.  “Of what one 
sees,” he writes in “Note on Moonlight,” also from The Rock, “the purpose that comes first, 
/ The surface, is the purpose to be seen” (CP 449).    
Language speaks not to have been spoken, but to exist, “in its vivid element ... 
always beginning, over and over” (CP 449).  It is the process of communication between 
subjects, or between the subject and himself as he translates “what [he] sees” (the material 
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content of the phenomenal world), into language—that form that is forever “gulping after 
formlessness” (CP 355). An elaboration of this split within language itself——between 
form and formlessness, or between the freedom that language grants to “do as you please” 
and the promise that “everything matters”—provides Stevens with the space to explore, 
with increased intensity as his career progresses, the  “pure poetry” of language.  
 
Stevens’s conception of “pure poetry,” removed as it is from the “stillness” of 
Heidegger’s interpretation, as well as the sublime heights of the Symbolists, is perhaps 
more in line with Walter Benjamin’s conception of a “pure” state of language, which he 
develops in his 1923 preface to his translation of Baudelaire.  The translator, Benjamin 
contends, should accomplish the bringing to light not of meaning but of the existence of 
language as such; a “pure” state, which would extend beyond the limits of any one specific 
tongue’s content or expression and achieve a unity between “literalness and freedom” (82), 
just as in the “original language.” Though the result may, Benjamin argues, be the same, 
the manner by which this “unity” is achieved through translation must be considered very 
differently than the unity (already) existent in the original language.  In the original 
language, “language and revelation are one without any tension” (82) because language is 
immediately subsumed by an excess of meaning.  In translation this same unity should 
occur, but for the much different reason that language has been freed, purified of that 
excess in order to exist in its “original” state as language itself.   Through the process of 
literal translation that Benjamin recommends, language should be rendered not 
“transparent” but opaque, objectified (similarly to Shklovsky’s charge, the poet’s must be 
an effort to “make the stone stony again” [16]) as language, and therefore “structurally 
reinforced by its own medium” (79). 
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Considered in this light, Stevens’s penchant for using words from foreign 
languages—especially French—in his poetry, as well as adding his own “tintinnabulations” 
(CP 789) from made-up words of his own, is particularly interesting. In an effort to free the 
text from “excess” meaning, Stevens reveals what Heidegger in his famous section 32 of 
Being and Time calls the “as-structure” of understanding and interpretation.  Though there 
is no reason to suspect that Stevens was familiar with this section, it is clear that he was 
keenly involved with his own, concurrent investigation into this underlying structure of 
interpretation.   First, consider a section from Heidegger’s analysis:  
In dealing with what is environmentally ready-to-hand by interpreting it 
circumspectly, we ‘see’ it as a table, a door, a carriage, or a bridge; but what we 
have thus interpreted need not necessarily be also taken apart by making an 
assertion which definitely characterizes it.  Any mere pre-predicative seeing of the 
ready-to-hand is, in itself, something which already understands and interprets.  But 
does not the absence of such an ‘as’ make up the mereness of any pure perception of 
something?  Whenever we see with this kind of sight, we already do so 
understandingly and interpretatively. In the mere encountering of something, it is 
understood in terms of a totality of involvements; and such seeing hides in itself the 
explicitness of the assignment-relations (of the “in-order-to”) which belong to that 
totality (189).  
Stevens’s poetic efforts can be understood, as Helen Vendler has suggested, as a 
telescopic consideration of this process of perception and understanding.  In Stevens’s 
poetry it is the “as if” that, Vendler writes, “forms a bridge between perception and 
reflection: we stop the film to analyze it” (174).  The “opacity” of foreign and fabricated 
words in his poetry work to expose the “mereness of any pure perception of something” as 
well as the “mereness” of language itself.  They function, as Vendler suggests, to stop the 
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“film” between perception and reflection, thus illuminating an in between space of their 
“interpretation.” Also, and in keeping, again, with Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age 
of Mechanical Reproduction,” they work like an “enlargement of a snapshot” not simply to 
“render more precise what otherwise was visible, though unclear,” but to reveal “entirely 
new structural formations of the subject” (236).  In “freeing” language from its “excessive” 
meaning, Stevens works not to absolve language of its tensions, but, conversely, to bring it 
to such a vibrating tautness that its “structural formation” is stretched and revealed in order 
that it may be “analyzed”—“taken apart” in such a way that, in Heidegger’s words: “we 
concern ourselves with it in accordance with what becomes visible through this process” 
(BT 189). Stevens looks at language as something that can, indeed, be “circumspectly taken 
apart...taken apart with regard to its ‘in-order-to,’ and taken apart as such—(which) has the 
structure of something as something” (189).  
It is within this interstitial space of language and interpretation itself—the 
“something as something”—before, that is, meaning has been established and fixed, where, 
according to Heidegger, “we are already” (PLT 188), and that Stevens would have us  
“return.”  Our natural abode is “inconstancy...thus the constant,” as Stevens writes in 
section II of Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction.   
Violets, doves, girls, bees and hyacinths 
Are constant objects of inconstant cause  
In a universe of inconstancy.  This means 
 
Night-blue is an inconstant thing.  The seraph 
Is satyr in Saturn, according to his thoughts.   
It means the distaste we feel for this withered scene 
 
Is that it has not changed enough.  It remains, 
It is a repetition.  The bees come booming 
As if—The pigeons clatter in the air (337).  
 
	   
144	  
“That it has not changed enough” is crucial here. The world appears to us in the 
form of perceivable, nameable things from that which is “environmentally ready-to-hand” 
(Heidegger BT 189): “Violets, doves, girls, bees and hyacinths.” The speaker perceives 
these items immediately in terms of their phenomenal “surface” value, but retains a 
“distaste” for what he refers to as the “withered scene” constituted only by these “constant 
objects.” He insists upon a greater, and presumably more deeply satisfying, “inconstant 
cause” behind each object, which constancy, “hide(s).” What “remains”—besides the 
materiality of the “constant objects” themselves (the bees, the pigeons, and the industrial 
noise that is associated with them)—is also the “as structure” of language: at bottom, it is 
language that is fundamental to an “understanding and interpretation” of the objects and the 
noise, that “remains...a repetition” (CP 337).  This “as-structure” is never more explicitly 
revealed in Stevens’s work than in the line, “The bees come booming/ As if—”.  The 
aposiopesis affords the possibility of a new descriptive beginning: “The pigeons clatter in 
the air” without having established what the bees’ “booming” corresponds to 
metaphorically. The “as if” is left unanswered, exposed both to its possibilities as well as to 
its improbabilities.  The space of this exposure, if it could be figured, is precisely that “in-
between” space of representation between form and formlessness with which Stevens is 
primarily concerned. It is a space that can be easily obscured, “hidden” in an “excess” of 
meaning.  Usually it is hidden this way due to our ability to immediately apprehend objects, 
as well as the language that familiarly corresponds to them, “understandingly and 
interpretively...in terms of a totality of involvements” (Heidegger BT 189). “Pure” 
language, or poetry, in Stevens’s conception of it, is a recovery of—a revelation of—
language stripped of this excess, and revealed to be simultaneously substance and process, 
absolute freedom, and absolute “matter.”   
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Another Heideggerian concept may be useful in order to elaborate upon this 
simultaneity: the distinction between world and thing.4  If world is understood in the sense 
of significance and meaning, and thing in the sense of the sign or the word, we can 
understand language as constituted by the constant and mutual movement between these 
poles, which can never result in “a fusion.”  Instead, and thus moving outside of the realm 
of paradox, language traverses that intermediary “middle” space where sign and 
signification “are at one” (Heidegger PLT 199).  Within this space they may be considered 
to be “intimate,” but importantly, this intimacy is always achieved via what remains a 
fundamental incompatibility; by what Heidegger calls the “division (that) prevails: a dif-
ference” (PLT 199).  Significantly, however, this “dif-ference” is not to be understood as 
either “distinction” or “relation,” but instead must be considered as “dimension for world 
and thing” (PLT 200, emphasis added); a dimension, that is to say, within which language 
speaks, and that the poem, not in having been spoken (which would seem to suggest that it 
had already weighted itself toward the “thing”) but in speaking, may also be understood to 
dwell.  
A third method that Stevens develops in his work for elaborating this “opaque” 
textual space where language may be revealed as “language and nothing else besides” 
(Heidegger PLT 188) is the use, again, of the letter as such. What may have begun in 
Harmonium’s “Anecdote of Canna” (“Huge are the canna in the dreams of / X, the mighty 
thought, the mighty man”) as a straight-forward one-to-one relation—that, though it 
disrupts the poem on the level of informational content, does not interrupt the meaning of 
the poem, or the relation between signifier and signified—develops over the course of 
Stevens’s career into a more elaborate interruptive textual mark, resulting in the “never 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Recall that “world” should here be understood as that which is “the ever non-objective” (PLT 43) where 
“thing” should be understood in direct opposition to this, as utterly objective “formed matter” (PLT 26), or 
“whatever is not simply nothing” (PLT 21).	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rounding O” of “Montrechet-le-Jardin” from Parts of A World and “Motive for Metaphor” 
from Transport to Summer’s “vital, arrogant, fatal dominant X” (257). The delineation and 
elaboration of the “opaque” space of the letter-as-such in these two important examples 
opens up, within Stevens’s work, as well as more broadly within twentieth century 
American poetry, a new territory of exploration within the “structural formation” of 
representation itself.  
 
“The infinite symbol” 
“The letter is in essence analytic,” writes Roland Barthes, in his 1973 essay, “Erté, 
or À la lettre.”  Quoting French poet Paul Claudel, he continues:  “Every word it constitutes 
is a successive utterance of affirmations which the eye and the voice spell out: to the unit it 
adds, on the same line, another unit, and the precarious vocable is created and modified in a 
perpetual variation” (RF 119).   This description reveals what Barthes deems the “strictly 
poetic path” of the element of the “letter as such”—a path that does not lead necessarily “to 
discourse, to the logos, to the (always syntagmatic) ratio,” but instead, to “the infinite 
symbol” (RF 119).  “Such,” Barthes writes, “is the alphabet’s power: to rediscover a kind 
of natural state of the letter.  For the letter, if it is alone, is innocent: the Fall begins when 
we align letters to make them into words” (RF 119).    
The context of Barthes’s analysis is an essay that focuses on the work of the 
Russian born French artist, Romain de Tirtoff—whose pseudonym, Erté, stems from the 
phoneticization of his initials, R.T. Erté’s eclectic body of work, extending into the realms 
of fashion, jewellery, interior and graphic design, includes a graphic alphabet. In each of 
the twenty-six works, one for each of the letters of the Roman alphabet, the denotative 
letter is signified not simply by an arrangement of graphic lines but a diversity of 
connotative graphic images as well.   “Z,” for example, is achieved by the form of a woman 
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who, kneeling and leaning back with her arms extended, takes on that letter’s form.  “E” is 
comprised of two winged angels—overlayed, one a little higher than the other—whose 
wings, extending narrowly backwards, form the two upper horizontal lines of the E (the 
third, lower, line is formed by the bent knees of the angel in the foreground, as well as the 
cloud upon which the two figures are apparently suspended).  
What does it mean to describe Erté’s letters as “poetic”?  Barthes explains: “The 
‘poetic’ is, very exactly, a form’s symbolic capacity; this capacity has value only if it 
permits the form to ‘depart’ in many directions and thereby potentially to manifest the 
infinite advance of the symbol, which one can never make into a final signified and which 
is, in short, always the signifier of another signifier” (RF 124).  For this reason, Barthes 
does not propose—indeed, he deems it impossible—an Ertéan “thematics” (“only banalities 
are susceptible of being thus inventoried” [RF 124]) but instead asserts that it “suffices to 
affirm the departure potential of [Erté’s] forms.  This potential is also a potential for 
returns, however, since the symbolic path is circular.  What Erté leads us toward, in other 
words, is perhaps the very thing from which invention of the letter is established” (RF 124).    
 
This description of “departure potential” aptly elucidates the intention behind “the 
never rounding O”—as well as (though in a less straightforward fashion) the “vital, 
arrogant, fatal, dominant X.”  Clearly, in endeavouring to establish a point from which we 
may understand the letter to both depart and return, Stevens, along with Barthes, aligns 
himself with a concept of the “purely spoken,” which is also a space from which, according 
to Heidegger (in being “in its turn an original” [PLT 192]), we are constantly venturing to 
both depart and return. The “purely” poetic is what serves to uncover this originary 
structure—“originary,” that is, in the sense that we have already established in terms of 
Stevens’s work: an always changing, always re-generative force, or in other words, process 
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itself.  It is “the literal characters, the vatic lines,” as it is expressed in “Large Red Man 
Reading,” that constitute the “law” of “poesis, poesis” (CP 365); of a “making” that 
(though it results in form, in the “constant objects” [CP 337] of “literal characters,” in 
“syllables”) stems in fact from an “inconstant” and “infinite” cause.  Indeed, the repetition 
of “poesis” here is essential—not only to the poem, but also to Stevens’s developing 
“theory” of language.  
The description of what Barthes, in “A Rustle of Language,” calls the “strictly 
poetic path” of speech is also worthy of note here. “Speech,” he writes, “is irreversible, that 
is its fatality.  What has been said cannot be unsaid, except by adding to it” (RL 76).   
These “singular annulations-by-addition” Barthes refers to as a “stammering,” and he 
makes the comparison here to the “knocks of a motor,” which serve to indicate that a 
machine is no longer functioning properly; the “stammer,” that is, is “an auditory sign of 
failure” (RL 76).  Conversely, however, Barthes goes on to explain that when the machine 
is working well this “good functioning ... is displayed in a musical being: the rustle” (RL 
76).  This “rustle” is what Barthes terms, a “limit-noise,” something that in terms of 
auditory awareness has no noise at all. “To rustle,” writes Barthes, “is to make audible the 
very evaporation of noise: the tenuous, the blurred, the tremulous are received as the signs 
of an auditory annulations” (RL 77).  But, Barthes asks, and this next question is crucial to 
our current considerations: “can language rustle?” (RL 77). No, he replies: “Speech remains 
condemned to stammering; writing to silence and to the distinction of signs: in any case, 
there always remains too much meaning for language to fulfill a delectation appropriate to 
its substance” (RL 77).    
The stammered repetition of the words, “it is, it is” (CP 361) with which Stevens 
affirms that the “pure principle” of a “time of innocence” exists in Canto VIII of “The 
Auroras of Autumn,” would seem to agree with Barthes’s conclusion that language cannot 
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“rustle”; that it is condemned to “too much meaning” for that.  This is evidenced not only 
in the verbal stammer itself (which additively cancels itself), but in the very fact that 
Stevens feels compelled in the poem to insist on averring the existence of a “thing of 
ether,” or of what is making meaning of that “ether,” though the poem gives no indication 
that meaning is necessary, or indeed even possible—save, that is, for the speaker’s own 
desire to enunciate it for himself.   
Still, the space of the question: “does language rustle?” is carved into the whole of 
Stevens’s work just as it is into this poem.  It is indeed Stevens’s stammer, his insistence on 
the rhythmic repetitive quality of language as language itself—that is, as something that 
can be “taken apart” rather than existing within an exterior and unassailable system of the 
“in-order-to”—which opens up the possibility of a “rustle” of language at least as “pure 
principle,” as in section VIII of “The Auroras of Autumn,” where  “lights” become not a 
“spell of light, / A saying out of a cloud, but innocence” (CP361).  In this passage, “lights” 
are permitted to exceed the contractual language agreement (where each word is obligated 
to illuminate the object to which it corresponds), existing beyond paradox and agreement.  
“Innocence” is established as a pre-linguistic state, but is certainly not conceived of as a 
silence; instead, the “time and place” of innocence is one in which there would be no end to 
movement, singing, breath, and noise: 
An innocence of the earth and no false sign 
 
Or symbol of malice.  That we partake thereof, 
Lie down like children in this holiness, 
As if, awake, we lay in the quiet of sleep, 
 
As if the innocent mother sang in the dark 
Of the room and on an accordion, half-heard,  
Created the time and place in which we breathed...(361) 
 
Despite the fact that this “innocence” is, in high-Romantic mode, associated with the 
quietness and holiness of little children, Stevens’s repeated “as if’s” interrupt this silence 
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and construct a series of removes from the High Romance of the scene, so that instead of a 
sublime centre what we get is a continual, stammering, spinning-out, away from any idea of 
a centre.  In the end, the “idea of innocence” is neither arrived at nor defined. Perhaps it 
does not exist at all except in the single insistence of the speaker’s, “it is, it is”—the 
repetition of the affirmation serving, simultaneously, to undercut its assurance.  In effect, 
what we arrive at is once again a figuration of the perceptual process of the speaker’s 
imagination of this time of innocence; revealed are the layers of his own inherited 
imagination and his cognitive processes as he sifts through the layers of these images and 
constructs through words another, continuously shifting image of his own “understanding 
and interpretation” of the world.  That the stanza, and therefore also the entire Canto VIII of 
“The Auroras of Autumn,” ends with an ellipsis is of course crucial to the representation of 
the continual “as-structure” of the speaker’s world.   The ellipsis also sheds light, 
retrospectively, on the opening lines, which we have already briefly considered: “There 
may always be a time of innocence. / There is never a place” (CP 360). Stevens has 
wrenched the “sublime” away from that which is and must be conceived of outside of time, 
and established it firmly within a repetitive, stammering, human temporality—which, even 
by the end of the Canto, refuses to resolve itself.  He maintains the “pure principle” but 
entrenches it within the “stammer” of human process and endeavour.  Or, perhaps more 
aptly, he raises the stammer to the level of “pure principle.”  But he also readily concedes 
that there may be “no time” at all: “Or if there is no time, / If it is not a thing of time, nor of 
place ...” (CP 360)—that it may be that our human systems of scientific or mechanical 
measurement in terms of an anti-sublime, quotidian human scale, may be just as arbitrary as 
the imaginative measurement of the Romantic sublime.  For all the speaker’s stumbling 
uncertainty as to the details of the measurement and location of “innocence,” however 
(having just retracted his declaration: “[t]here is never a place” with the allowance, “[o]r 
	   
151	  
if...” in what Barthes would call a “singular [annulation]-by-addition” [RL 76]), he 
assertively declares of that “innocence” that “it is not / Less real” (CP 361).  In other words: 
if there is neither a human conception of time nor of space for the “pure principle,” for the 
“idea of (innocence), alone” as that which is separate and remote from the “calamity” of 
interpretation, that idea is “not / Less real.”  Rather than limiting himself to the “stutter” of 
a singular voice, Stevens in this way allows the stutter to direct him past the limitations of a 
direct correlation between word and meaning to the “rustle” of a “pure principle” of 
movement and sound.5   
To put this again in terms of the essential disjuncture between Heidegger’s “world” 
and “thing,” we see that what Stevens is essentially working out here is the manner in 
which the world, to which the thing of language (the letter or the word) is directed is always 
in excess of the thing (always escapes its own naming): 
Its nature is its end, 
That it should be, and yet not be, a thing 
 
That pinched the pity of the pitiful man,  
Like a book at evening beautiful but untrue, 
Like a book on rising beautiful and true (CP 361). 
 
We see the way that the “pure principle” is articulated here in terms of an ultimate 
incompatibility where “it should be, and yet not be, a thing,” and can exist at once—and 
without agreement, but also without paradox—as both “true” and “untrue.” The doubled, 
“Like a book” emphasizes the “stutter” inherent to language but also underscores the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  In Chapter Thirteen, “He Stuttered,” of Deleuze’s Essays Critical and Clinical, the achieved effect of the 
“stutter” within a written text is discussed as a mark of literary acumen and originality. The successful 
“stutter” is an example within a text of “when saying is doing” (107). “This is what happens,” Deleuze 
explains, “when the stuttering no longer affects pre-existing words, but itself introduces the words it affects; 
these words no longer exist independently of the stutter, which selects and links them through itself.  It is no 
longer the character who stutters in speech; it is the writer who becomes a stutterer in language.  He makes 
the language as such stutter: an affective and intensive language, and no longer an affectation of the one who 
speaks” (107). Deleuze continues on to write, “Creative stuttering is what makes language grow from the 
middle, like grass; it is what makes language a rhizome instead of a tree, what puts language in perpetual 
disequilibrium: Ill Seen, Ill Said (content and expression).  Being well spoken has never been the distinctive 
feature or the concern of great writers” (111).	  
	   
152	  
dialectical rather than oppositional or temporal relation introduced by these terms.  Though 
temporality is introduced through the differentiation between “at evening” and “on rising” 
the repetitive structure diminishes the temporal, foregrounding the immediacy of their 
relation.   Ultimately, it is not only the “pure principle” that is shown here to be in excess of 
language—which falls into the inarticulable space of the “dif-ference” between world and 
thing—language itself (“like a book”) is revealed to be always in debt to the meaning that it 
itself provides.  It is this that results in the ultimate, intimate, incompatibility of 
Heidegger’s “dif-ference”(PLT 199)—and this “dif-ference” that can be understood as the 
generative “principle,” or “departure potential,” of Stevens’s poetry. Just as Barthes’s 
avowal that it is impossible for speech to avoid “stammering” is countered by his assertion 
that “what is impossible is not inconceivable,” Stevens’s poetry builds on the intermediate 
space between sense and sound, as though he is constantly testing the boundaries between 
the two, and asking the question, “does language rustle?” Or, at a further remove: “Who am 
I even to be asking this question, to be perceiving and acknowledging these categories at 
all?”   
“The Auroras of Autumn,” certainly works within the space of this question—the 
voice at a constant unease with itself as it oscillates between the definitive statements that 
reflect its perceptions of the world and the de-centering “Or’s” and “as if’s” with which it 
spins further and further away from a stable place from which to speak.  The conception of 
a subjectivity that would be firm and fast, where one might exist like “Danes in Denmark 
all day long” (CP 361), comfortable with both one’s own and the “other’s” identity: “And 
we knew each other well, hale-hearted landsmen, / For whom the outlandish was another 
day // Queerer than Sunday” (CP 361), gives way to a sweeping collective that knows 
neither the relationship to “brother,” country, race, nor finally to language itself, and 
disappears into “a haggling of wind and weather” (CP 363).   Our “fate” is revealed to exist 
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at such an extremity to the “drama that we live” that even the distinctions between life and 
death, human cruelty and the cruelty of nature itself, are blurred:  
Shall we be found hanging in the trees next spring? 
Of what disaster in this the immanence:  
Bare limbs, bare trees and a wind as sharp as salt (CP 362) 
 
The world is not a human world: it is always in excess of the meaning that we 
would seek from it or impose upon it.  Though the poem’s subjects were a moment ago as 
“Danes in Denmark,” they may well be African-Americans lynched by an angry mob “next 
spring.”  This is not by any means a political or moral treatise; it resists what Stevens might 
have called, along with Nietzsche, the “stupidity of moral indignation”(37), and gestures 
toward a space beyond the human appellations of “good and evil.”   The appearance of the 
Rabbi in the final Canto of the poem (“An unhappy people in a happy world-- / Read, rabbi, 
the phases of this difference” (CP 362) is of particular interest, if, as Susan A. Handelman 
writes:  
Rabbinic interpretation never dispenses with the particular form in which the idea is 
clothed.  The text, for the Rabbis, is a continuous generator of meaning, which 
arises from the innate logic of the divine language, the letter itself, and is not sought 
in a non-linguistic realm external to the text. Language and the text are, to use a 
contemporary term, the space of differences, and truth as conceived by the Rabbis 
was not an instantaneous unveiling of the One, but a continuous process of 
interpretation (as quoted in Jarraway, 151).  
For Stevens, the impossible is conceivable. It is conceived in the limitations and 
possibilities of “the letter as such,” in the exploration of “language and nothing else 
besides.”  
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The word “happy” around which Canto X revolves, should, of course, be 
understood in terms of sensory pleasure, but it must also be considered in terms of its root 
word, “chance,” which—derived from the Latin, cadentia, “falling”—is linked to the idea 
both of cadence, rhythm, and of the “the falling out or happening of events […](one’s) hap, 
fortune, luck, lot (OED, Vol. II 263). “A happy people in an unhappy world— / It cannot 
be ...”, Stevens writes.  And why? “There’s nothing there to roll / On the expressive tongue, 
the finding fang” (CP 362). It is, the poem finds, impossible to reverse the relationship 
between the “unhappy” fated human (understood here in the sense of an ultimate fatality) 
and the “happy” world of chance (indifference, continuity).  Any attempt at resolution 
between these two directional pulls meets with immediate failure.  Were the human able to 
assert any final authority over the world, to conceive of an “idea of order” that was truly 
solipsistic (where, that is, his own pleasure trumped the “happiness” of the world) there 
would be indeed “nothing there to roll on the expressive tongue, the finding fang” as there 
would be no longer “a space of differences” that could result in the “continuous process of 
interpretation” that is language itself; there would be nothing “real” for language to sink its 
teeth into.  
The same of course is true of the next (impossible) formulation suggested: “A 
happy people in a happy world.”  We are here swung fully in the opposite direction and 
hopelessly entrenched within the realm of the imaginary: “Buffo! A ball, an opera, a bar” 
(CP 362).  For Stevens, once again, what is essential is the interplay between these two— 
between, that is, reality and the imagination, order and chance, the opaque letter and the 
transparent word:  
Turn back to where we were when we began: 
An unhappy people in a happy world. 
Now solemnize the secretive syllables (362).  
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The “turn” here is inevitable for Stevens.  The “space of difference” that he seeks to 
explore is inevitably a space of repetition, of stammering. But there is also a sacredness to 
this space, as the entreaty to the Rabbi indicates: “Read, rabbi, the phases of this 
difference” (CP 362).  The sacred text that we are asked to return to and “solemnize” is not 
conceived of outside of language, or as revelatory of a truth that would be “an 
instantaneous unveiling of the One.” Instead, what we are offered is precisely the opposite: 
an opaque incantation of “secretive syllables.” These syllables are not definitely attached to 
any meaning or even any desire for meaning, but exist apart in a “utopic state”—a sort of 
Barthesian rustle of language.  The double-sense of “secretive” is important here.  It refers 
both to the “secretive”—what is or could be kept secret, hidden, and to what is 
“secreted”—the secretion of syllables through the stammering process of language. The 
conceptual “space” between these two meanings can be understood as the “space of 
difference” so critical to Stevens’s poetics, as well as to Barthes’s utopic “rustle” of 
language. According to Barthes, the  “rustle” becomes possible when language becomes 
(and think here of Benjamin’s description of the innovative, “utopic,” space of the close-
up): “enlarged, I should even say denatured to the point of forming a vast auditory fabric in 
which the semantic apparatus would be made unreal” (RL 77).   This semantic “unreality” 
needs to be achieved, however, without meaning being “brutally dismissed”—and this, 
admits Barthes, “is what is difficult” (RL 77).   It is at this juncture—between the 
conceivable conception of the “utopic state” of language and the inconceivable “semantic 
unreality” that refuses to “brutally dismiss” meaning—that Stevens poises himself in “The 
Auroras of Autumn,” and indeed where he remains poised for the remainder of his career.  
The “utopic” space that both Barthes and Stevens conceive of is a space where 
world and thing, meaning and sound, can exist together in an intimate space of “dif-
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ference.”  The thing6 of the word would here be no longer subsumed by a world of 
meaning, but nor would it be “fused” with it.  Instead, it would be freed within a mutual 
inter-space of penetration, so that—just as the “rustle” of a machine is only the “absence of 
noise,” that is, the absence of any “sign of failure”—the resulting “rustle of language” 
would connote “an exemption of meaning or—the same thing—that non-meaning which 
produces in the distance a meaning henceforth liberated from all the aggressions of which 
the sign, formed in the ‘sad and fierce history of men,’ is the Pandora’s box” (Barthes, RL 
78). Understood in these terms, “meaning” is always potential, always possible—it 
becomes a question, just as it was for Stevens, not of whether meaning exists or does not 
exist, but of the manner by which it is apprehended as it arises, and at a necessary distance, 
through the stammering, ever-generative processes of the poetic, of words. Think of the 
“listener” from “The Snowman” who “beholds” in only “the sound of the wind, / In the 
sound of a few leaves” what amounts to the clearest articulation of “everything” I have yet 
to encounter: “The nothing that is not there and the nothing that is” (8). 
 
Once again, we see resurfacing in Barthes’s thinking—just as it continuously does 
in Stevens’s poetry—the notion of a “pure” language, which might “conceivably” at least 
be released from the tyranny of the sign and allowed to exist in the space of “language 
itself.”   “Denoted meaning passes for true meaning, a law,” Barthes writes in his essay 
1976 essay “On Reading,” collected within The Rustle of Language—adding, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Once again, recall that “thing,” in Heidegger’s sense of the word, is that which “stands before us and can be 
seen” as opposed to the “ever-non-objective to which we are subject,” which he defines as “world” (PLT 43). 
This definition must be understood as distinct from the “thing” Lacan posits as “the central lack” (FFC 77) at 
the heart of desire—the “objet a” that desire repeatedly attempts to seize upon but that is ultimately only a 
place holder for the ultimate object of desire that remains impossible to seize, let alone conceptualize—but 
not entirely.  The “thing” that Heidegger posits as that which “can be seen” is also a place-holder of sorts—
“the thing things” only by presencing itself from “out of the worlding world”  (PLT 178, emphasis added).  
The “thing,” according to both Heidegger and Lacan’s interpretation, therefore, is an image, an apparition, 
constituted from, and ultimately subservient to that other—non-objective, non-conceptualized, and finally un-
graspable—element.	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parenthesis, “how many men have died for a meaning?” (35).  Connotation,7 on the other 
hand—and it is this which Erté’s letters, and a poetry of language’s  “opacity” is 
concerned—allows for “positing a law with multiple meanings,” thereby liberating the text 
from any denotative law (which might “cover the original”; “block its light” [Benjamin 
79]), and providing, instead, a spaciousness within which a “pure” translation of the text 
may be read “between the lines” (Benjamin 82).  It is “between” the lines, indeed, that the 
rabbi of “The Auroras of Autumn” must read.   
Read to the congregation for today 
And for tomorrow, this extremity, 
This contrivance of the spectre of the spheres, 
 
Contriving balance to contrive a whole, 
The vital, the never-failing genius, 
Fulfilling his meditations, great and small.   
 
In these unhappy he meditates a whole, 
The full of fortune and the full of fate, 
As if he lived all lives, that he might know, 
 
In hall harridan, not hushful paradise, 
To a haggling of wind and weather, by these lights 
Like a blaze of summer straw in winter’s nick (CP 363). 
 
It is within the unwritten, ever-interpretive and interpretable space of the text, the 
“letter itself,” that the possibility of empathy: “as if he lived all lives” ever-generatively 
remains.  But it is important to remember that this infinite connotative power—though it 
opens onto an in-between space of “pure” language ultimately and thoroughly resistant to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  In D.A. Miller’s essay, “Anal Rope,” connotation is defined “in contrast to the immediate self-evidence” 
(123) of denotation, however ultimately de-constructible that “immediate self-evidence” may prove to be 
upon closer scrutiny or reflection.  “Connotation,” Miller explains, “will always manifest a certain semiotic 
insufficiency” (123-124).  Where denotation will always seem to be pointing to something literal and true, 
connotation will always appear, “doubtful, debateable, possibly a mere effluvium of rumination. […]  The 
dubiety, being constitutive, can never be resolved ” (124).  Where denotation is the closing of possibility in 
proof, and thus in a singular event, connation is the opening of that same possibility into a multiplicity of 
conceivable options.  Connotation “excites the desire for proof,” but does not supply it.  Instead—as long as 
the desire for proof “develops within the connotative register”—it enlists every signifier into “what 
nonetheless remains a hopeless task.  Hence,” Miller further explains, “the desire assumes another, 
complementary form in the dream (impossible to realize, but impossible not to entertain) that connotation 
would quit its dusky existence for fluorescent literality, would become denotation” (129).	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denotative law, remaining ever open to interpretation and therefore even to the conception 
of the “impossible,” an empathetic collective, the “whole”—is a space that can only be 
accessed through attention to the opaque, the obscure, the literal. As Benjamin writes, 
arguing in favour of literal translation: “We say of words that they have emotional 
connotations.  A literal rendering of the syntax completely demolishes the theory of 
reproduction of meaning and is a direct threat to comprehensibility” (78).  As counter-
intuitive as this may originally seem, this demolition of readily reproducible meaning is 
precisely what Benjamin calls for.  After all: “How many men have died for a meaning?” 
(Barthes ROL 35)   
Similarly, in an essay on the work of André Masson, Barthes writes that what 
Masson’s work demonstrates is that, “for writing to be manifest in its truth (and not in its 
instrumentality), it must be illegible” (RF 155).  He explains that whereas written texts 
must continue to rely and “stammer” on with “an apparently signifying substance (words)” 
what Masson’s art achieves through its involvement, instead, with the “non-signifying 
practice” of painting8 is what the written text also longs for but cannot achieve: utter 
incomprehensibility, the “utopia of the text” (RF 156). 
 
The Trace of Language 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Barthes misleads us in an interesting way by referring to painting as “non signifying.” According to the 
classical mimetic tradition, painting does not – and cannot –  ‘play’ with the signifier the same way that 
poetry can.  This is because poetry is a temporal art, rather than a spatial one. The truth-effect of painting is 
achieved due to its fixity in spatial terms, a fixity which the written text can never achieve. The limitations of 
poetry, therefore, are based on this failure to achieve stasis, or stillness.  Crucially, poetry fails to represent the 
spaces between the very chain of signifiers it employs. The limitations of painting on the other hand, as 
Derrida’s consideration of Van Gogh’s “Old Shoes With Laces” in The Truth in Painting makes apparent, are 
based on the significantly restricted range of interpretation, or “connotation” offered by any given pictorial 
sign, or “denotation.”  Derrida reflects on Van Gogh’s shoes: “Their detachment is obvious. Unlaced, 
abandoned, detached from the subject (wearer, holder or owner, or even author-signatory) and 
detached/untied in them- selves (the laces are untied)” (261).  	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But to construe things in this way, to even “conceive” of a “utopia of the text,” or a 
“pure” resonance of phonetics and meaning in a musical “rustle of language” (albeit one 
dependent on an extreme illegibility), is still to suggest precisely the sort of reliance on the 
idea of the “transcendental”—a watch-word of sorts for postmodern and poststructuralist 
writers and thinkers. Even as Jacques Derrida and other deconstructionists, for example, 
have sought specifically to destabilize any idea of the “pure” or the “transcendental” in 
language or interpretation, their project has been in turn criticized by those who would 
claim that “deconstruction” was not in fact a definitive break, or even much of a departure, 
from the metaphysics and Structuralism that it sought to depose.  It is this sort of debate 
that revolves around the “meditative whole” evoked and addressed in Stevens’s work. 
Where one camp would claim that all such Romantic or seemingly “transcendental” 
rhetoric is ironically intended—calculated to undercut the very language it employs9—
others would argue that Stevens has not, for better or for worse, broken with the High 
Romantic tradition at all, or only translated it into his own onto-theological vocabulary, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 And yet even “transcendence” in the High Romantic sense is never something that is actually achieved. In 
Paul de Man’s essay, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” he explores the confusion that still exists concerning the 
primacy of the subject in the literature and approach of the English romantics.   He argues that “the assertion 
of a radical priority of the subject over objective nature is not easily compatible with the poetic praxis of the 
romantic poets, who all gave a great deal of importance to the presence of nature” (196).  The tendency, 
exhibited notably by Coleridge, to “borrow” for the self “the temporal stability” of nature that it lacks, points 
definitively toward “the priority of object over subject that is implicit in an organic conception of language 
[…], [and] puts the priority unquestionably in the natural world, limiting the task of the mind to interpreting 
what is given in nature” (197).  Regardless, what is central to either argument (subject over object, or object 
over subject) is a fundamental disjuncture – a necessary distance of the subject from any originary plenitude, 
which no experience, even the most sublime, can overcome. De Man goes on to consider this disjuncture in 
terms of the ironic mode central to Romantic exposition, which shares with allegory a structure wherein “the 
relationship with sign and meaning is discontinuous” (209).  “In both cases,” explains de Man, “the sign 
points to something that differs from its literal meaning and has for its function the thematization of this 
difference” (209). Irony, “as we now understand it,” de Man remarks further on, “reveals the existence of a 
temporality that is definitely not organic, in that it relates to its source only in terms of distance and difference 
and allows for no end, for no totality. […]  The temporal void that it reveals is the same void we encountered 
when we found allegory always implying an unreachable anteriority.  Allegory and irony are thus linked in 
their common discovery of a truly temporal predicament” (222).  Considered in this light, it is clear that 
ironizing Romantic aims and ideals cannot be considered a definitive break from Romanticism.    
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without changing the terms.10  I believe that Stevens could defend himself, were he so 
inclined, against any charges of a “negative theology” in his work in much the same way 
that Derrida responds to such charges against his own thinking in the aptly titled, “How to 
Avoid Speaking: Denials.” He asserts here that his concept of “différance” was developed 
precisely to resist the hyperessentiality which is at the root of all negative theology. And 
indeed, rather than the “dif-ference” by which Heidegger defines the “middle” space 
between “world” and “thing,” it may—in keeping with Bloom’s pronouncement that 
Stevens was “about a generation ahead of his own time” (WS 168)—shed more light on 
Stevens’s work to consider the “middle” space that he opens up in his own work in terms of 
the Derridean evolution of the term, as a space of différance, where différance, that is, may 
be understood no longer as “a concept” but instead “rather the possibility of conceptuality” 
(MOP 11). “What différance, the trace, and so on ‘mean’—” Derrida explains in “How to 
Avoid Speaking: Denials”  “which hence does not mean anything—is ‘before’ the concept, 
the name, the word, ‘something’ that would be nothing, that no longer arises from Being, 
from presence or from the presence of the present, nor even from absence, and even less 
from hyperessentiality” (MOP 9).    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Harold Bloom places Stevens firmly within the tradition of the great American Romantics, Emerson and 
Whitman (Poems of our Climate 1980), exploring what he deems the inheritance within Stevens’s work of an 
explicitly Romantic ironic sensibility. Frank Lentricchia delineates for Stevens a definite break from the 
Romantic tradition (Modernist Quartet 1994) reading his work in light of a definitively modernist tradition 
and arguing that rather than preserving a space for any notion of a Romantic or transcendent sublime, Stevens 
is guilty of a nihilistic, morally relativistic, and “willfully” thoughtless approach not only to art but to the 
world (ATP 235). While on the one hand, the meditative strains in Stevens’s work convince many critics of 
his ‘Romantic’ lineage and predispositions, on the other hand his atheism and syntactic experimentation 
convince many others of his deep entrenchment within a particularly modernist moment. Although interesting 
aspects of Stevens’s work are brought to light by these differing approaches, the debate, on the whole, is not 
worthwhile.  Stevens has clear connections to the preoccupations of the Romantics, but his modernity shifts 
the impossibility of transcendence in different directions.  The desire to compartmentalize the complex 
influences and impulses at work in Stevens’s poetry into clearly delineated “historic” categories can result 
only in caricature, not only of the poet but also of the time period in which he wrote.  
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However, as Derrida readily admits, “the onto-theological re-appropriation always 
remains possible11—and doubtless inevitable insofar as one speaks, precisely, in the 
element of logic and of onto-theological grammar” (MOP 9).  How then, is it possible to 
“avoid speaking about negative theology?” Derrida asks, and with this question begins a 
series of further questions: “how, in saying or speaking, to avoid this or that discursive, 
logical, rhetorical mode?  How to avoid the inexact, erroneous, aberrant, improper form?”, 
until we arrive at: “Finally, how to say something?” (MOP 15).  This is a question of course 
that “haunts” Stevens’s poetics with increasing intensity as he becomes more and more 
fixated on the idea of language and being as a continuous process of further “cancellations” 
and “negations,” and a never ending series of supplements:  “Or’s,” “as if’s” and ellipses. 
But it is this fixation on “negations,” on the going “without” God or metaphysics, which 
has led to the charge that Stevens has in fact not gone “without” anything at all.  
Though it is not constrained there, the question for Stevens is, at root, not a 
question of metaphysics or of God, but always a question of language, as it is this 
concern—“How to say, how to speak,” along with its inverse, “how to be silent?...how not 
to speak, and which speech to avoid in order to speak well?” (MOP 15)—that provides the 
foundation for any genuine departure into the consideration of any further matter (just as 
Heidegger could not do without the consideration of “tools” but never intended them to 
exist only as “tools” in themselves).  
In a further effort to move beyond the “hyperessentiality” that is at risk of being 
introduced by a fixation on negativity, of the speaking of “without”—which would, as 
Derrida writes, have every negative sentence “already...haunted by God” (MOP 6)—
Derrida turns to Plato’s definition in Timaeus of khora, as a possibility of a space that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  And certainly, for theory after Derrida, “différance” occupies that position.  The most we can do is to be 
aware of that tendency, and to destabilize it whenever possible.	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might exist without the “without,” a formulation that involves neither presence nor absence, 
but rather the concept of the “trace.”12 “This spatial interval,” Derrida explains of the 
khora, “neither dies nor is born”  (MOP 35), it is “the atemporality itself of the spacing: it 
(a)temporalizes, it calls forth atemporality, provokes it immutably from the pretemporal 
already that gives place to every inscription” (MOP 36).   
This “spatial interval,” which can neither die nor be born, remains of course 
evidently within the lineage of thinking (inaugurated, indeed, by Plato, from whom it is 
reclaimed) that also produced Benjamin’s space of “pure” language, Heidegger’s “pure” 
poem, the “pure poetry” of the symbolists, and Stevens’s own conception of “pure poetry.”  
The inescapability of this lineage and the inevitable inheritance of previous models of 
language and thinking is also considered by Derrida in “How to Avoid Speaking”—through 
a reflection on Heidegger’s professed desire to write a theology where the word being 
would not occur at all.  That is: not just “under erasure,” but in no way at all.  “Heidegger 
well knows that this is not possible,” Derrida remarks, “and perhaps it is for this profound 
reason that he did not write this theology.  But didn’t he write it?” (59). A little further on 
he concludes:  
With and without the word being, he wrote a theology with and without God.  He 
did what he said it would be necessary to avoid doing.  He said, wrote, and allowed 
to be written exactly what he said he wanted to avoid.  He was not there without 
leaving a trace in all these folds.  He was not there without allowing a trace to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Khora is that “quasi-entity” designated by Plato for that which, as Dana R. Miller explains, remains 
“beyond the reach of philosophical discourse and conception. The very name […] serves as a kind of 
telegrammation for what is […] “beyond being.”  Why something that is thus “beyond being” is necessary to 
cosmology is left obscure, but […] this is as it should be: ‘khora’ just is obscure” (32).  Obscure, perhaps, but 
not “un-thinkable” as Badiou would be quick to point out—Plato having been the first and most influential 
practitioner of what Badiou calls the “grand style” of philosophy, which “stipulates that mathematics provides 
a direct illumination of philosophy” (7), that refuses to accept that which apparently exceeds “the meager 
resources of human reason” (16), or—worse—translate what is not yet understood into spiritualist or skeptical 
figures, evasions, or abstractions.  	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appear, a trace that is, perhaps, no longer his own, but that remains as if his own 
(MOP 60).  
In concluding thus, Derrida is also certainly pointing to the inevitable failure of his own 
attempts to “avoid” what he wants to “avoid”—his own inevitable failure to “avoid 
speaking” (MOP 15).   
It is a similar acknowledgement of “failure” that can be understood to constitute 
Stevens’s final collection, The Rock.  In the first section of the poem, “Seventy Years 
Later,” Stevens begins: “It is an illusion that we were ever alive” and further on: “The 
houses still stand, / Though they are rigid in rigid emptiness: 
Even our shadows, their shadows, no longer remain. 
The lives these lived in the mind are at an end. 
They never were ...  The sounds of the guitar 
 
Were not and are not.  Absurd.  The words spoken 
Were not and are not.  It is not to be believed. (CP 445) 
 
But the starkness of this introduction does not disallow the affirmative substantial “trace” 
left among, as Derrida writes, the “folds”—among the layers, that is, of both speaking and 
the denial: 
The meeting at noon at the edge of the field seems like 
 
An invention, an embrace between one desperate clod 
And another in a fantastic consciousness, 
In a queer assertion of humanity: 
 
A theorem proposed between the two— 
Two figures in a nature of the sun, 
In the sun’s design of its own happiness, 
  
As if nothingness contained a métier, 
A vital assumption, an impermanence  
In a permanent cold, an illusion so desired... 
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The fecundity of the “trace” is what provides resistance here to the temptation of 
either the “purely” negative or the “purely” positive.  It simultaneously refuses to attach 
itself with any conviction to meaning, and the “moral indignation” (Nietzsche 37) of denial.  
The “trace,” as articulated by Derrida—that which “does not mean anything—(which) is 
‘before’ the concept, the name, the word” (MOP 11) functions as the generative force of 
Stevens’s work and is at the root of the “poetic concept” of the space of différance that is 
rendered palpable in both writers’ work—that is cut against the margins of the said, indeed, 
beyond, and into that margin: into a space of “secretive syllables” that mark the opacity of 
“language itself.”   In his preface to Margins of Philosophy, Derrida enacts this marginal 
relationship and employment of language both literally and formally:  “The mystery—” he 
writes in a narrow column beside the preface’s main text, “if we wish at any price, for the 
purposes of discourse, to give a figure of speech to that which by definition cannot have 
one—can be represented as a margin, a fringe surrounding the object, isolating it at the 
same time as it underlines its presence, masking it even as it qualifies it...” (xxiv).  
Though Stevens would no doubt have been tolerant of Derrida’s formally 
“marginal” rendering of speech, he remarked on numerous occasions—just as he does in 
“A Note On Poetry,” first published in the 1938 edition of The Oxford Anthology of 
American Literature—that he himself was unaware of “anything, respecting form, that 
makes much difference.  The essential thing in form is to be free in whatever form is used.  
A free form does not assure freedom.  As a form, it is just one more form. So that it comes 
to this, I suppose, that I believe in freedom regardless of form” (CP 801).  Though Stevens 
might have ultimately been sceptical, therefore, of Derrida’s formal efforts to disrupt the 
established hierarchies of meaning in order to “liberate” the text by overtaking the 
margins—such a gesture does not, after all, “assure freedom” just as any “negation” does 
not assure “freedom” from that which is negated—he would no doubt have been 
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sympathetic to Derrida’s notion that though the relationship between presence and what 
exceeds presence (that which exists in the margins of presence) can never be understood 
simply as presence, it can neither be understood as “simply absent” (MOP 65).  “Absent, 
either it would give us nothing to think or it still would be a negative mode of presence,” 
Derrida explains.  “Therefore,” he continues, “the sign of this excess must be absolutely 
excessive as concerns all possible present-absence, all possible production or disappearance 
of beings in general, and yet, in some manner it must still signify, in a manner unthinkable 
by metaphysics as such” (MOP 65).  It is here that the “trace” comes into play, as it alone 
“eludes mastery” being neither “perceptible nor imperceptible” (MOP 65).  More 
importantly, it short-circuits the binarized schema of presence and absence: it is neither and 
both.  
In keeping with the “dif-ference” existent between Heidegger’s world and thing, the 
excess of the sign (the thing), can never be understood to name a “presence” (world).  
Presence can never be, that is, “as is commonly thought, what the sign signifies” (MOP 66).  
The trace refers to a presence that is already not there—that is already in excess, and so 
becomes “the trace of a trace, the trace of the erasure of the trace” (MOP 66).  The mapping 
of this trace—an entity which confounds the dichotomy of presence-absence, which for so 
long plagued every metaphysical inquiry—certainly marks a step toward naming that 
difference “still more unthought than the difference between Being and beings” (MOP 67), 
which Derrida indicates as a possibility:  
Such a différance would at once, again, give us to think a writing without presence 
and without absence, without history, without cause, without archia, without telos, 
a writing that absolutely upsets all dialectics, all theology, all teleology, all 
ontology.  A writing exceeding everything that the history of metaphysics has 
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comprehended in the form of the Aristotelian grammē, in its point, in its circle, in 
its time, and in its space (MOP 67).  
Stevens’s own concentration on the grammē, his fascination with the “opacity” of 
“the vital, fatal arrogance” of the letter as such relies, indeed (and in keeping with 
Derrida’s remarks above) on a conception of that which is in absolute excess of, rather than 
that which is or can be contained or expressed by form.  His own comment, that he believes 
“in freedom regardless of form” (CP 801), is one way of expressing this. For Stevens, 
poetry was not the “form” of the words on the page (what was capable of actually taking 
shape there), but instead, what would always be in excess of that form; in other words, what 
would always be “gulping,” in active pursuit, “after formlessness” (CP 355). The impulse 
behind this pursuit would, in Stevens’s conception of it, stem from a “freedom” so absolute 
that it would indeed upset every reified conception of form, and indeed of “freedom” (as 
concept, “rather, the possibility of conceptuality” [MOP 11]), as word).  His refrain 
throughout “The Auroras of Autumn”: “Farewell to an idea...” could well be understood as 
Stevens’s final farewell to his faith in the grammē as a valid method for the representation 
of human experience.  
  
Aristotle’s own criticism of the line, or “gramme,”13 was based on its insufficiency 
as a unit of temporal measure.  Both the point and the line, he had observed—when 
manipulated to represent movement—actually implicate a “multiplicity of points which are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  As Derrida explains, “time in the rigorous sense, is neither movement nor number.  It lets itself be 
numbered only insofar as it has a relation to movement according to the before and after.  The unity of the 
measure of time numbered in this way is the now, which permits the distinction between before and after.  
And it is because movement is determined according to the before and the after that the graphic linear 
representation of time is simultaneously required and excluded by Aristotle” (MOP 59).  That graphic 
representation, the line, or “gramme,” gives to length simultaneously “its continuity and its limit.  The line is 
a continuity of points.  And each point is both an end and a beginning for each part” (MOP 59) but this does 
not mean that “the now is to time what the point is to the line” (MOP 59).  The essence of time can not be 
translated, according to Aristotle into linear representation: the spatial representation, “at least in this form, is 
inadequate” (MOP 59).	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both origin and limit, beginning and end” (Derrida, MOP 59), and therefore result in a 
series of “successive arrests” rather than a model that could possibly serve as a successful 
analogy for time.  In other words, because each point requires to be thought of as two 
points, a beginning and an end, and a line is comprised of a multiplicity of these two-
pointed structures, neither point nor line can model the “now” of time in that the “now” is 
not possibly arrested by either beginning or end; like Plato’s khora, it “neither dies nor is 
born” (Derrida, MOP 35).  As this indicates, however, and as Derrida goes on to point out, 
what Aristotle rejects is not “the gramme as such, but the gramme as a series of points, as a 
composition of parts each of which would be an arrested limit.”  This is, of course, a 
similar criticism to the one that Barthes levels at the word in “Erté, or À la lettre”: “For the 
letter, if it is alone, is innocent” (RF 119).  
This sort of directed attention to language, prevalent among French theorists during 
the 1960s and 1970s, inspired much of the attention that we now see in contemporary 
American poetry—and particularly those poets affiliated with the L-A-N-G-U-A-G-E 
movement14—to a concentration on, and reclamation of, the letter as such.  The task of the 
Language poets was, and continues to be, to release language back—into language itself, 
from which point it might, perhaps, again be “purely spoken” (Heidegger, PLT 188). 
Where Marjorie Perloff convincingly argues, in her 1990 essay collection on modern and 
postmodern lyric, Poetic License, that the “fixation on the gramme or the smallest particle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  The term “Language Poetry” evolved from the magazine launched by editors Bruce Andrews and Charles 
Bernstein in 1971, titled L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E.  Poets associated with the movement include Bernstein, 
Clark Coolidge, Lyn Hejinian, Leslie Scalapino and Ron Silliman, among many others.  These poets are 
united by their concern for detaching words “from their conventional moorings” in order that “something new 
and unprecedented,” that is, not a mere imitation of life or the world, might emerge (Drury 156).  Although 
the existence of this “movement” is now widely accepted, many poets associated with it still deny that it has 
ever existed.  Bob Perelman writes, “there never was any self-consciously organized group known as the 
language writers or poets. […] The positive structures of language writing are socially and aesthetically 
complex and in places strained and contradictory, but the movement has been more united by its opposition to 
the prevailing institutions of American poetry.” Ron Silliman likewise warns: “this impulse to name confuses 
a moment with a movement” (both poets are quoted from Nicholas 85).	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of writing” (68) definitive for the Language poetry movement in the United States can be 
traced directly to the French intellectuals of the 1960s, I would contend that exploration of 
the letter as such was in fact well begun with the late work of Wallace Stevens, a 
generation before.  Stevens is more commonly aligned with the “American Romantic” 
tradition, as defined by Bloom—a tradition for which Stevens supplies the “crucial 
formula” (PC 152) according to Bloom in his poem “Creations of Sounds” where he 
addresses Eliot as “X, the pernoble master” (PC 151), criticizing him for poems that “do 
not make the visible a little hard to see” (PC 152).  For Bloom it is this accomplishment: a 
rendering of the “visible” as “a little hard to see” that characterizes the American Romantic 
tradition of Whitman and Dickinson, and of Frost, Stevens and Hart Crane who followed 
after them, and that is continued by the more contemporary poets Robert Penn Warren, 
Elizabeth Bishop, John Ashbery, and A. R. Ammons—all poets Bloom considers to have 
“maintain(ed) this major tradition of our verse” (PC 152). Stevens is depicted, by Bloom, 
by and large in the role of an intermediary between an older Romantic tradition typified by 
Whitman, and the continuation of the tradition in contemporary poetry, and the many 
aspects of his poetry that do not align with the Romantic tradition that Bloom sketches out 
for us, most notably his emphasis on the materiality of the signifier and a long overlooked 
struggle to work out an ethics through his poetry that would refuse political or social 
dogmatism, are brushed aside. It does both Stevens and the Language poetry movement 
that grew up in his wake a disservice not to recognize what in many cases is a close 
alignment of their poetic efforts and concerns.15  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  In Perloff’s  essay in The Wallace Stevens Journal, “Pound/Stevens: Who’s era? Revisited” (Fall, 2002) she 
delineates “two camps,” one—led by Bloom on the East Coast—championing Stevens as “the great modern 
American poet” (135), and another emerging mostly on the West coast—led by Hugh Kenner at Santa 
Barbara or by “a brief convergence” of academic interest in Pound on the part of Donald Davie, George 
Dekker, William Chace and Albert Gelpi (136).  Perloff reminds us that in the early 1980s, when these camps 
emerged, “the poetic text was not regarded, as it is now, as a social practice or intervention, much less as a 
cultural symptom pointing to subliminal attitudes vis-á-vis race, class, or gender.  The only positioning that 
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In an essay titled “Traduit de l’américain,” Perloff reflects on the—inarguably 
important—relationship between the L-A-N-G-U-A-G-E movement and both French poetry 
and theory.  Where at first, as Perloff explains, Language poetry was influenced by the 
French poets and theorists it now, conversely, both lends its influence and gains its 
audience primarily from that source.  Indeed, the movement has received a warmer 
reception, at least institutionally (Perloff cites numerous examples of the poetry 
movement’s all-but-exclusion from canonical American anthologies), in France. “J’essaie 
d’écrire comme un américain qui tenterait de se traduire en français” (PL 68) writes 
contemporary French poet Denis Roche in a statement that, as Perloff attests, is “worth 
pondering” (PL 68).  One reason for “pondering” the statement is to consider the way that it 
reflects Benjamin’s suggestion that “the basic error of the translator is that he preserves the 
state in which his own language happens to be instead of allowing his language to be 
powerfully affected by the foreign tongue. [...] He must,” Benjamin urges, instead, “expand 
and deepen his language by means of the foreign language” (81).  Though we are not 
dealing here with an actual inter-lingual translation, Roche indicates that he has taken 
Benjamin’s charge, that: “the task of the translator (is) to release in his own language that 
pure language that is under the spell of another, to liberate the language imprisoned in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
took place—and this is as true for Pound as it is for Stevens, was vis-á-vis the poetry of the past.  Was Pound 
to be understood in the light of Browning or did we need to go back to Propertius and Catullus to understand 
him?  Had Stevens been co-opted by those (e.g., Frank Kermode) who put him squarely in the British 
romantic tradition, when the truth was that, as Bloom insisted, he came straight out of Emerson and 
Whitman? […] And, closer to home, was John Ashbery, who was finally getting some recognition, even 
though he had been publishing poetry since 1956, more than an avatar of Stevens?” (136-137).  My intention 
in drawing attention to the allegiances between Stevens’s poetry and the Language movement to emerge in 
the 1970s is less an attempt at establishing Stevens and the Language poetry movement within the same 
historical framework and more the opposite: an attempt, instead, to spring Stevens from his historical context 
long enough to see that certain aspects of his project indeed transcend the categories by which we have been 
trying to understand them.  This is not a call to read Stevens (as, according to Perloff, we do “now”) solely in 
terms of “social practice or intervention,” but it is a call to widen our conception of the tradition beyond 
juxtaposed approaches that are defined, or do not let themselves be defined, by the work itself, but instead by 
the “camp” to which a given scholar would like to belong.	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work in his re-creation of that work” (80) very seriously indeed.  Roche’s appropriation of 
the advice for use in the process of his own—original—language, is further testament to the 
deduction that the notion of a “pure language” is one that exists in excess of the 
consideration of any specific “tongue”; that it has to do, instead, with the problem at the 
root of every language consideration: as Derrida puts it, “how to say something” (15).   
Though he would not have read Benjamin’s essay, and would end his career before the 
concerns of his own later work would be taken up in seriousness by a younger generation of 
poets and artists, Stevens’s own sympathies with the notion of the writer as a possible 
“liberator” of the “pure language” “imprisoned” by the form of his particular tongue, is 
evident in his “fixation” on the elements of language that exceed any attempt at assigning 
them categorically with meaning: the “tintinnabulations” (CP 789) and “secretive syllables” 
(CP 362) of a language that can only remain excessive to every form of representation, in 
that they exist only in the “space of differences” (Jarroway 151) of the trace. 
  
Perloff does not mention Stevens directly in this context, but she does usefully trace 
the American Language school’s “fixation with the gramme” back to the high modernism 
of Yeats and Pound, and, still further, to the Russian Formalists, such as Khlebnikov and 
Kruchonykh—who, in 1913, published their groundbreaking manifesto, “The Letter as 
Such.”  According to Khlebnikov and Kruchonykh’s formulation, “letters are like bodies,” 
and writing, understood as a dance, can express emotion through their physical form. 
Though the “emotive” dimension—and certainly the “spiritual” dimension—to 
Khlebnikov’s preoccupation with mathematics and the gramme has in large part been 
replaced in subsequent generations by what Perloff calls, “an intentional and ironized 
nominalism—a desire to empty the signifier of its accrued symbolic meanings so that 5, as 
in [Jasper] John’s elegantly painted numerals, is always and only 5” (PLT 95), there 
	   
171	  
remains the question as to whether or not such a concentration on the “pure abstraction” 
that the number, and the gramme, necessarily imply, “isn’t itself an example of what 
Khlebnikov called zaum, “beyonsense” (95).  
 Previously, in The Futurist Moment, Perloff had explored the concept of zaum 
extensively.  She explains it as a sort of “transrational” language, which, according to 
Khlebnikov and Kruchonykh, “undermines or ignores the conventional meanings of a given 
word,” allowing sound, instead, to “generate its own range of significations” (121).  
Connotative, that is, rather than denotative significations: again, we see the way that a 
“fixation” with form, with fixity itself, lends itself to the notion of infinite multiplicity and 
expansion beyond, or in Derridean language, in the margins of, that form. In their 
manifesto, Khlebnikov and Kruchonykh use the term “re-char,” which Gary Kern has 
translated as “speechist,” Paul Schmidt as “write-wright,” and Gerald Janecek as “worder” 
(Perloff TFM 125).  Regardless of which translation you choose—or better yet, in 
considering all three—what is evident is a concern, again, for language as language, for a 
“return” to the possibility of the “purely spoken”16—a possibility which can, of course, 
only be imagined within the territory of possibility that is language itself.   
 
“Yet everything matters” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  The distinction should not be confused with the primacy that Saussure affords spoken language against “the 
tyranny of writing” (Derrida OG 41) but should instead be understood as an attempt to lay bear the poetic 
impulse.  It is not, in other words, about the distinction between sign and signifier, where the sign is 
understood as true.  It is instead about the inherent and incommensurable difference between the two, that 
“irreducible absence within the presence of the trace”(OG 47). The “purely spoken” must be understood to 
take place in that “irreducible” gap where language is freed from the “said” but takes place in its “saying,” its 
“becoming.”  What Derrida calls “the unmotivated” trace—that is, that entity which refuses to be reified 
within the structure of signification but exists as signifyingness, as the always-ever becoming of signification 
itself—is “indefinitely its own becoming unmotivated.  In Saussurean language, what Saussure does not say 
would have to be said: there is neither symbol nor sign but a becoming-sign of the symbol” (OG 47).	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Where Stevens ceases to follow this “fixation” is where it begins, in its effort to 
effect a radical separation from sense, to impose a fixed form of its own, which in turn 
begins to impinge upon its own freedom.  Stevens had long associated himself with the 
formalist aesthetics of painter George L. K. Morris, and in fact resisted “abstraction” 
precisely because of what he saw to be its abandonment of meaning.  Later, he recognized 
the “spiritual content” of Piet Mondrian’s art, and it was only then that he allowed himself, 
finally, to “acknowledge his sympathy” to the movement and begin to “come to terms with 
the abstract tendencies of his own art” (McLeod 120). What concerned Stevens, once again, 
was not the “form” of the movement itself, but the possibilities that were rendered by the 
practice of a style that would not, in the end, be tied to form itself. His criticism of 
surrealism ran along similar lines.  It was in a 1942 issue of the Surrealist magazine, 
View—a piece subsequently published as part of his Materia Poetica—that Stevens wrote: 
“The essential fault of surrealism is that it invents without discovering.  To make a clam 
play an accordion is to invent not to discover.  The observation of the unconscious, so far as 
it can be observed, should reveal things of which we have previously been unconscious, not 
the familiar things of which we have been conscious plus imagination” (CP 919). An art 
that “invents without discovering” was specifically what Stevens hoped to avoid, and it was 
because of this that there developed in his work an increasing “fixation” on the “gramme or 
the smallest particle of writing” (68)—not, that is, for its formal qualities, or to, in the 
Russian Formalist sense, detach himself from meaning entirely, but for its possibilities of 
exploring and discovering through the “innocence” of the letter the inter-relationship 
between the opacity of form and the transparency of meaning.   
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Steven’s re-establishment of a time “of innocence” within the final stanza of “The 
Auroras of Autumn” where there could “never (be) a place” is interesting when considered 
in this context, and doubly so if considered also in conjunction with Aristotle’s critique of 
the grammē as being an insufficient measure of temporality, given that its “multiplicity of 
points...are both origin and limit, beginning and end” (59).  Stevens’s “innocence,” as 
should be sufficiently clear by now, is not conceived in terms of any final signification but 
rather in the spatial and temporal dimensions of its very process of signifying; it takes place 
(“if” it does) “as if” in between “origin and limit, beginning and end.”  That is: in-between 
the purely imaginative “idea of it, alone” and the reality of both the limitations of the 
phenomenal world and the words on the page.  What is essential, therefore, for Stevens, and 
what fuels his exploration of the letter-as-such, and indeed his fixation on language as the 
always potential and generative mode by which one might “discover” the world, is a re-
investment of the letter with the innocence that is lost to it in our insistence on it as a 
measure of time and space; in other words, as a measure of meaning.  Imagine, if you will, 
that we might (within the “multiplicity of points” Stevens’s fixation on language reveals 
within language itself) “Lie down like children in this holiness, As if, awake, we lay in the 
quiet of sleep...” That, in doing so, and though we might not be liberated in a space outside 
of time, we might find ourselves inhabiting the very structure of time itself—a structure not 
yet built but always “as if” in the process of being constructed...  Imagine that it is there, in 
that in-between space, that we would be “fated” to remain, bound (“unhappily”) to a 
“happy” world. It is, perhaps, the revelation and acceptance of this position as “no less real” 
than anything else, that constitutes the text’s genuine literary freedom, and affords as well 
the empathetic transcendence of the poem’s final stanzas, wherein the rabbi’s text 
“meditates a whole, / The full of fortune and the full of fate...” (CP 363).   
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“You can do as you please, yet everything matters” (CP 789), Stevens wrote:  
You are free, but your freedom must be consonant with the freedom of others...You 
are free to tintinnabulate if you like.  But others are equally free to put their hands 
over their ears.  Life many not be a cosmic mystery that wraps us round 
everywhere. You have somehow to know the sound that is the exact sound; and you 
do in fact know, without knowing how.  Your knowledge is irrational.  In that sense 
life is mysterious; and if it is mysterious at all, I suppose that it is cosmically 
mysterious.  I hope that we agree that it is at least mysterious.  What is true of 
sounds is true of everything: the feeling for words, without regard to their sound, for 
example.  There is, in short, an unwritten rhetoric that is always changing and to 
which the poet must always be turning.  That is the book in which he learns that the 
desire for literature is the desire for life.  The incessant desire for freedom in 
literature or in any of the arts is a desire for freedom in life. The desire is irrational.  
The result is the irrational searching the irrational, a conspicuously happy state of 
affairs, if you are so inclined” (CP 790).  
But this Freedom cannot simply be “freedom for freedom’s sake.”  Assumed in that sense, 
“freedom” would in very short order certainly impose itself as its own limit.  Instead, 
freedom must—for a poet, and “in spite of the cynicism that occurs to us as we hear of such 
things”—be always essentially un-representable: “a freedom not previously experienced, a 
poetry not previously conceived of...” (CP 790).   
Based on these reflections, it is not surprising that in his 1955 acceptance speech for 
the National Book Award for Poetry, Stevens said: “Now, at seventy-five, as I look back on 
the little that I have done and as I turn the pages of my own poems gathered together in a 
single volume, I have no choice except to paraphrase the old verse that says that it is not 
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what I am, but what I aspired to be that comforts me.  It is not what I have written but what 
I should like to have written that constitutes my true poems, the uncollected poems which I 
have not had the strength to realize” (CP 878).
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four: The Mind 
When the mind is like a hall in which thought is like a voice speaking, the voice is always 
that of some one else  
 
—Wallace Stevens (CP 907). 
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But along with freedom, which is if anything, only an ultimate passivity—an 
openness to the always-infinite and infinitely variable future—there is an openness to 
disaster already inscribed: “the disaster, unexperienced,” writes Blanchot.  “It is what 
escapes the very possibility of experience—it is the limit of writing. This must be repeated: 
the disaster de-scribes” (7). Freedom, and that includes the freedom afforded by anteriority, 
by not being able to read the “limit” that the future will inevitably inscribe upon it, is an 
empty signifier. It is rendered meaningful only by that unforeseen future event—an event 
that is always “disastrous” in its interruption of the un-describable openness of the present 
moment where everything is still possible, waiting to be written.  We are always, as 
Blanchot writes, “on the edge of (this) disaster without being able to situate it in the future” 
(3). We hover there, at the very limit of experience, of the de-scribed, the textual.  
Published in 1942, Parts of a World—Wallace Stevens’s only wartime collection—
is fittingly steeped in the sense of impending disaster.  And indeed this disaster is an 
always-anticipated disaster—written into the future—but yet it remains inseparable from 
the heightened urgency of the poetry’s present-tense.  In “Girl in a Nightgown,” for 
example, Stevens writes:  
Once it was, the repose of night,  
Was a place, strong place, in which to sleep.  
It is shaken now.  It will burst into flames,  
Either now or tomorrow or the day after that. (194)  
 
Similarly, “Connoisseur of Chaos” from the same collection reflects: “After all the pretty 
contrast of life and death  / Proves that these opposite things partake of one, /At least that 
was the theory, when bishops’ books/ Resolved the world. We cannot go back to that” (CP 
195).  There is indeed a sense within this collection of a defining moment having been 
reached—not only within the “theoretical” balance, and contemplation, of the world, but 
within Stevens’s poetry itself. “Connoisseur of Chaos” continues: 
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The squirming facts exceed the squamous mind,  
If one may say so.  And yet relation appears,  
A small relation expanding like the shade 
Of a cloud on sand, a shape on the side of a hill (195).  
 
This “small relation,” unnamed, that expands into a much larger shape when a 
certain light is cast provides a concrete illustration of the ominous futurity that permeates 
this poem and the collection as a whole.  The unnamed “relation” is insignificant in itself 
and is, in the largest part, not responsible for the size or shade of the image that it’s shadow 
casts.  This “small relation” and its limited autonomy over the larger “relation” that it has to 
its environment and to the temporal moment (the play of light that might render it more or 
less imposing) speaks to the limited autonomy of the subject as he in any moment gazes 
ahead—or reflects on the past.  Indeed, the next section turns its attention to history, and 
muses: “Well, an old order is a violent one.” In the next line, however, we read the 
definitive, “This proves nothing.”  Regardless of the directionality of the gaze, it seems that 
we are left hovering at the edge of a disaster that, as Blanchot writes, we are unable to 
“situate”: “it is rather always already past and yet we are on the edge or under threat” (3).  
 
An “intractable reality” 
Stevens’s three post-war collections following Parts of a World—Transport to 
Summer (1947), The Auroras of Autumn (1950) and finally The Rock (1954)—were to be 
criticized heavily for their increasing abstraction, but a tendency toward the abstract had 
certainly been evident, if more consciously resisted, from the early days of Harmonium 
where it was articulated most strikingly by “The Snowman’s” “nothing that is.” The most 
profound shift toward a concept of “abstraction” that would act as a guiding principle in the 
later work is felt in Stevens’s first post-war collection, Transport to Summer, characterized 
by the highly theoretical long poem, “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction.”  
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Parts of a World, then, is indeed a collection poised at an intersection between the 
“harmony” and “Ideas of Order” of Stevens’s earlier career and the definitive move that he 
effects in 1947 with the announcement in “Notes” that: “It Must Be Abstract” (329).  What 
drives Stevens toward this conclusion is precisely the sense evoked in “Connoisseur of 
Chaos” that there is no longer any ultimate resolution possible, in “bishop’s books,” in 
poetry, or otherwise, that: “[t]he squirming facts” are in excess, to and ultimately 
unintelligible, to “the squamous mind” (195); that they are not, indeed, “facts” at all in any 
sense of being knowable, definable, or substantive, but are instead rather like the 
“squirming” phosphorescence off his beloved Florida coast: certainly present, certainly 
living, but in the end utterly ungraspable, either by the human body or mind.  
The idea that the mind cannot contain the ineffable “facts” of the world does not 
presuppose either that the “facts” do not exist in their own right, or that the mind is 
somehow deficient due to its inability to absorb them.  Instead, what “Connoisseur of 
Chaos” introduces most powerfully is that there exists a tangible body of space outside—
excessive of—human ideas of reason and order: 
A. A violent order is disorder; and 
B. A great disorder is an order.  These 
Two things are one. (Pages of illustrations.) (194) 
 
Importantly, this excessive space where “[t]wo things are one” is indicated as being 
potentially figurable, but the figuration—the “pages of illustrations” which are suggested to 
us as a possibility—are emphatically withheld.  It is the space of this withholding that is 
Stevens’s primary concern in Parts of a World—a space where the signified remains 
purposefully in excess of the signifier; it becomes, indeed, nothing other than the process of 
its own articulation, the figure nothing other than the process of its figuration.  
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Again—similarly to the manner in which a camera seeks to capture a moment that 
will always be in excess of the photograph’s material rendering, Stevens seeks to create 
through his poetry a tangible space within which to indicate what will always remain in 
excess to the poem.  Through the careful composition of the poem’s material elements, in 
other words, Stevens hopes to convey what is and must remain exterior to the poem, and 
immaterial. He continually draws our attention to the limit-reach of the poem, what it is 
possible to point to, or represent, and in doing so he emphasizes the complex relationship 
between outside and inside, reality and the imagination, without reducing either relation to 
a schematic binary.   
 Close examination of Parts of a World allows not only a consideration of the 
pressures Stevens’s poetic approach and style were undergoing during the war, which 
would result in the 1947 publication of the unprecedented “Notes Toward a Supreme 
Fiction,” but also the way Stevens’s poetry in this collection shrugs off the lingering 
romance, so evident in his earlier collections, of a higher power located outside of the 
self―in Nature or in God. Instead, Stevens explores and finally inhabits, as he will 
continue to do for the rest of his career, a state of being where the highest power of 
perception is afforded to the individual imagination.  
 Barthes’s consideration of the paradoxical “absence-as-presence” (106) of the 
photographic image—its simultaneous being and non- being rendering it, like the 
“unsayable” absent-but-present subject of a poem, excessive to the material world which 
comprises it—again offers us a tangible method of approaching some of the same issues of 
materiality and representation at work in the poetry of Wallace Stevens. Perhaps, this 
chapter suggests, the duality of the photograph as explored by Barthes (its peculiarly 
tangible rendering of both “absence” and “presence”) can be considered one of the missing 
“illustrations” that were promised, but apparently withheld, by Stevens in the opening lines 
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of “Connoisseur of Chaos.”  
  
 According to Barthes, the advent of photography “corresponds precisely to the 
explosion of the private into the public, or rather into the creation of a new social value, 
which is the publicity of the private: the private is consumed as such” (CL 98). The idea of 
a shared and subjective “system of representation,” however, goes back at least as far as 
Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Reason, in which he argues that not only outer objects but 
inner objects are made up of appearances.  When we become aware, Kant argued, of the 
manner in which appearances “are not things in themselves,” we are quickly able to see that 
they are only “the mere play of our representations” (Collins 73). Although for decades 
artists had been experimenting with the possibilities of representing the fleetingness of 
temporality and sensible perception— famously Van Gogh’s self-portraits, Monet’s 
cathedrals—photography, in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, was beginning to 
develop its own innovative techniques by which to render tangible the conflict between 
“outer” and “inner” senses (71) through a literalization of the ephemerality, or “play of 
representation,” by which those senses themselves are constituted. 
 Though the photograph revolutionized our understanding of the image by exposing its 
ultimately material terms, it remained at the same time, as Barthes writes, “always 
invisible: it is not what we see” (CL 6). An inquiry into this seeming dichotomy serves as a 
powerful entry into the role of representation in Stevens’s work as, essentially, what is 
described here is an intermediate space between the supposedly juxtaposed poles of “outer” 
and “inner,” “reality” and “imagination”; this is precisely the space Stevens strives to 
literalize (to render, like a photograph, in material terms) through his explorations of the 
dialectic between the real and the ideal in the life of the poem and the mind. 
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Although, like Kant before him, Barthes did not conceive of the self as enduring, as 
a “thing in itself” (Collins 128), he sought to know what photography was “in itself” 
(Barthes, CL 3)—and to explore what he perceived, evident within the photograph, to be 
the very “lineaments of truth” (Barthes 100).  Unlike Stevens, whose work has often been 
critiqued for its impersonality,1 Barthes’s search for “truth” in Camera Lucida is highly 
personal, centering on the famous “Winter Garden Photograph” where his deceased mother 
appears as a young girl. Although, in sorting through a variety of photographs of his mother 
shortly after her death, Barthes had not expected to find any “truth” to the images that 
claimed to represent her, Camera Lucida is Barthes’s account of finding what he was not 
looking for:  “the truth for me” (110).  The subjective nature of Barthes’ response to “The 
Winter Garden Photograph” is underlined by the fact that it is the sole photograph that he 
discusses in Camera Lucida that he does not include in the book for the reader’s inspection. 
The photograph is withheld—bracketed, like Stevens’s “pages of illustrations.” It 
demarcates a space of representation so subjective as to be finally un-representable. Or 
rather, it is the space of this impossibility that is demarcated and represented in Barthes’s 
discourse and Stevens’s poem.  
“The photograph,” says Barthes, “has become a new form of hallucination: false on 
the level of perception, true on the level of time” (115).  It is this paradox (the subject 
confronted with physical evidence of his own subjectivity—of the unendurable, 
“hallucinatory” nature of his perception) that makes tangible, in both Barthes and Stevens, 
the conflict between the limited singularity of the viewer and the object viewed.  Barthes, in 
identifying this conflict in the photograph, describes a choice: the viewer, he says, can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Even when a case is made, as it was back in 1967 by Joseph Riddell, that the “impersonality” of Stevens’s 
poems constitutes a “way out of solipsism” (TCE 229), the charge carries with it a heavy weight in the 
context of a highly lyrical American poetic tradition, one that it has not been able entirely to shake: Dan 
Chiasson’s review of the new Selected Poems (Knopf 2009), which takes for granted Stevens’s reputation as 
“anti-realist ... solipsist ... escapist” (New York Review of Books 63) is testament to this.	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maintain for the photograph “the civilized code of perfect illusions,” or he can “confront in 
it the wakening of intractable reality” (119). This “code of illusions” corresponds to what 
fashion photographer Richard Avedon intended by “likeness” when he famously insisted 
that, “(a) portrait is not a likeness” (The Archive  9, emphasis added).  Avedon emphasized 
the creativity inherent in every representation of subjectivity, and thus the creative control 
that the artist exerts over even the most “accurate” journalistic portrait: “the moment an 
emotion or fact is transformed into a photograph it is no longer a fact but an opinion. There 
is no such thing as inaccuracy in a photograph. All photographs are accurate. None of them 
is the truth” (The Archive 9).  The “intractable reality” that Barthes refers to is akin to the 
abstract, amorphous “truth” that Avedon here juxtaposes against concrete, formal 
“accuracy.” Barthes’ decision to leave out the photograph that comes to represent “the 
truth” for him about his mother seems to suggest that providing an “accurate” likeness 
would serve only to distract the reader from the purpose that she actually serves in the text: 
she represents not “Truth” itself, but the continuous, creative possibility of arriving at 
subjective “truth”—“the truth for me.”  
In his essay “Imagination as Value,” Wallace Stevens confronts a similar choice 
between truth and accuracy, or as Barthes phrases it, between “illusion” and “intractable 
reality,” and opts to confront the “intractable reality” not of any “outer” object, but of the 
imagination.  That is, he makes a distinction between life and art that allows him to explore 
the idea of truth only as it might apply to individual perception.  In keeping with the 
pragmatist tradition that influenced him, he attempts to assign a practical value for truth, 
even if—as it was for Barthes—that truth may only be “the truth for me” (CL 110).  “In 
life,” Stevens says, “what is important is the truth as it is, while in arts and letters what is 
important is the truth as we see it” (CP 733).  It is evident from this statement that 
Stevens’s pragmatism situates the perception of truth (as Kant had done before him) within 
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the subjective space of the individual.  Instead of focussing on a subjectively perceived 
reality, however, Stevens draws attention to what he sees as the intrinsic “poetic value” of 
our imaginative experience; and just as Kant does not “justify” the a priori value of space 
or time, Stevens does not justify the value of the imagination: “poetic value is an intuitional 
value and ... intuitional values cannot be justified” (Stevens 735).  For Stevens it is through 
“poetic value” that he seeks to move past representation towards a “space” of blankness 
that exists not as a quantity—an empty container for something unknown and 
ungraspable—but instead as a quality.  He was a poet not, like Williams, of the noun, but of 
the adjective—of the phenomenal rather than the noumenal (although, arguably, he 
ultimately pushes past both).  This is often overlooked, however, in the argument between 
poets and philosophers who would seek either to establish Stevens firmly within, or 
conversely to expel him from, one camp or the other.  Stevens’s poetry, ultimately, is 
invested not in the rational processes of the mind—though these were certainly of 
subsequent interest to him—but in the sensory experiences that exceed cognition entirely, 
and that cannot be “illustrated” or accounted for in formal terms.  
This  “space” beyond a play of representation—defined, that is, not by what is 
present but by what is not—is precisely what Barthes, paradoxically, perceives in the form 
of the photograph.  It will be useful here to revisit in greater depth the distinction that he 
makes between “the Real and the Live”: 
The photograph’s immobility is somehow the result of a perverse confusion 
between two concepts: the Real and the Live: by attesting that the object has been 
real, the photograph surreptitiously induces belief that it is alive, because of that 
delusion which makes us attribute to Reality an absolutely superior, somehow 
eternal value; but by shifting this reality to the past (“this-has-been”), the 
photograph suggests that it is already dead (Barthes, 79). 
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What photography accomplishes, Barthes attests, is “the unheard-of identification of reality 
(‘that-has-been’) with truth (‘there-she-is!’)” so that it “becomes at once evidential and 
exclamative” (Barthes 113).  Identifying this split—between the Real and Live, the “truth” 
and “reality” of a photograph—enables Barthes to move beyond representational value and 
to define a separate “space” for what he defines as “the impossible science of the unique 
being” (Barthes 71).    
The “lineaments” of this “unique being”—an internalization of the notion of the 
subject as singular and autonomous in the sense of pre-existing the relation with the object, 
hence ultimately disconnected and solipsistic—are evident throughout the body of 
Stevens’s poetry and are particularly notable in “Re-statement of Romance” from Ideas of 
Order (1936).  Here Stevens develops a new form of “romance” that locates perceptive 
power not in a larger, all-seeing and unknowable Other, but in an admittedly limited, 
autonomous and transient subjectivity—one that was undoubtedly influenced by the 
“transparent eyeball” of Emerson’s 1849 essay, “Nature.” This was a formative essay for an 
entire generation of pragmatist and modernist writers who followed—a generation that 
included Stevens, Frost, Eliot, Pound, and Stein (Poirier, Poetry and Pragmatism 9).  
Emerson’s “transparent eyeball” had revolutionized American thinking in that it granted to 
individual perception a legitimacy and power that had previously been reserved for God 
alone.  Emerging from an obviously Wordsworthian tradition, Emerson establishes his 
sublime perspective on new and uniquely open American terrain. “Standing on the bare 
ground,” he writes in “Nature,” “– my head bathed by the blithe air, and uplifted into 
infinite space, – all mean egotism vanishes.  I become a transparent eye-ball; I am nothing; 
I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or particle of 
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God” (Emerson 18).2  This transcendentalist shift from “Nature” to “Experience” is evident 
in Stevens’s “Re-Statement” as the poem corrects a previous conception of “romance” that 
imagined the power of the “Universal Being” to exist outside the self and understood 
Nature to “see all,” and therefore to “know all.” The first line of “Re-Statement” flatly 
refuses this notion: “The night knows nothing of the chants of night” (Stevens 118), the 
poem begins.  In this way, it immediately establishes itself within a perspective that is at 
once secular and autonomous3.  
In his “The American Scholar” speech of 1837 Emerson declared that “the poet 
chanting, was felt to be a divine man” (SELP 87), and it is this—the passive receipt of 
knowledge; the idea that the “divine poet chanting” should indicate that “henceforth the 
chant is divine also” (SELP 87)—that Emerson, and later Stevens, resist in their work.  
Stevens’s “Re-Statement” of an old world conception of romance suggests an Emersonian 
desire for an assertion of reason (what is known) over what is mysterious or religious (what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This oft-quoted passage indeed illustrates many of the ideas and enthusiasms central to the transcendentalist 
tradition Emerson has come to typify.  In his 1842 lecture, “The Transcendentalist,” Emerson provides the 
following context for “transcendentalism”—which he broadly defines as a “class of intuitive thought”: “It is 
well known […] that the Idealism of the present day acquired the name of Transcendental, from the use of 
that term by Immanuel Kant, of Konigsberg, who replied to the skeptical philosophy of Locke, which insisted 
that there was nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the experience of the senses, by showing 
that there was a very important class of ideas, or imperative forms, which did not come by experience, but 
through which experience was acquired; that these were intuitions of the mind itself; and he denominated 
them Transcendental forms. The extraordinary profoundness and precision of that man’s thinking have given 
vogue to his nomenclature, in Europe and America, to that extent, that whatever belongs to the class of 
intuitive thought, is popularly called at the present day Transcendental....” (CPW 391) In fact, Stevens’s 
inheritance from the transcendentalist tradition should be considered more broadly, and the ideas that 
permeated the work of Thoreau and Whitman should also be considered, in this light, as significant 
influences.  The active, process-oriented approach to perception and awareness proposed by Thoreau in the 
following passage is particularly resonant with many of the themes developed, and often returned to, by 
Stevens:  “In eternity there is indeed something true and sublime. But all these times and places and occasions 
are now and here. God himself culminates in the present moment, and we will never be more divine in the 
lapse of all the ages.  And we are enabled to apprehend at all what is sublime and noble only by the perpetual 
instilling and drenching of the reality that surrounds us.  The universe constantly and obediently answers to 
our conceptions; whether we travel fast or slow, the track is laid for us.   Let us spend our lives in conceiving 
then” (186).   
3 It is through the “self” then, according to Emerson’s model, that “transcendence” may be achieved. This 
“transcendence” is not an eradication or a remove from the self, nor is it an enlarged solipsism. It can be 
understood most usefully in the Levinasian terms established previously.  Through a concentration on the 
material nature of Being, on the subjective, the “I,” one may encounter the limit of that frame, coming “face 
to face” with what is “Other,” external, unknown. 	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is unknown), as well as of the individual and subjective over the collective or socially 
defined (like the “chants”).  The move toward an individual over a collective 
consciousness, which had already been well established by Emerson, was reinforced by his 
disparagement in “The American Scholar” of those “who set out from accepted dogmas, 
not from their own sight of principles” (SELP 87) and his encouragement to resist “the 
sluggish and perverted mind of the multitude” (SELP 87).  “The one thing in the world, of 
value,” he asserts, “is the active soul” (SELP 88); within this one statement we read the 
future of American pragmatism.  Like Kant before, Pragmatism sought to offer a balance 
between rational and empirical philosophy.  In Emerson, for example, as in the rational 
tradition, the soul is that which “every man is entitled to; (that) every man contains within 
him, although, in almost all men, obstructed, and as yet unborn” (SELP 88).  As in the 
empirical tradition, however, it is only when the soul is made “active” that it “sees absolute 
truth; and utters truth” (SELP 88).  The soul is not a thing “in and of itself,” then, but 
something that necessarily interacts and changes.  It is something—as William James 
would later say of “truth” itself in defining his own particular brand of pragmatism—–that 
“becomes true” (James 77).  
Contrary to his reputation as a High Modernist aesthete, it is a similar impulse 
toward action that defines Stevens’s rejection of Romanticism: “The imagination is one of 
the great human powers,” he says in “Imagination as Value.”  “The romantic belittles it.  
The imagination is the liberty of the mind. The romantic is a failure to make use of that 
liberty” (CP 728).  Interestingly, however, Stevens’s “Re-Statement of Romance” does not 
suggest a move away from “romance.”  “Romance” is re-stated, but it is neither negated 
nor re-defined.  
The night knows nothing of the chants of night. 
It is what it is as I am what I am: 
And in perceiving this I perceive myself best. 
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And you. Only we two may interchange 
Each in the other what each has to give. 
Only we two are one, not you and night, 
 
Nor night and I, but you and I, alone, 
So much alone, so deeply by ourselves, 
So far beyond the casual solitudes, 
 
That night is only the background of our selves, 
Supremely true each to its separate self, 
In the pale light that each upon the other throws (CP 118). 
 
The quality of this reflective light, which is “thrown” upon each “separate self” 
here, is reminiscent of the “relation” that “appears” and expands “like the shade / Of a 
cloud on sand” or “a shape on the side of the hill” in Parts of a World’s “Connoisseur of 
Chaos.” In both cases it is what exceeds and “backgrounds” that “relation”—the “relation” 
itself being dependant on, and reflective of, that greater and more pervasive unknown.  The 
“re-statement,” understood in this way, serves only to shift the notion of romance from the 
“crowd” to the “individual,” and assert for art (the sublime on the scale of the personal, the 
known) the role that religion once played.  This assertion is exemplified in the second line: 
“It is what it is, as I am what I am...”  (CP 118).  Here, the biblical allusion to God’s self-
identification—“I am that I am”—situates the figure of the “night” (that backgrounded 
unknown against which the “relation” flickers only as a shadow—a constituent part, if 
subtly and momentarily articulated as formally separate from that greater darkness) in 
comparison to the figure of God.  As this statement is linked causally, through the use of a 
colon, to a third line: “And by perceiving this I perceive myself best” (CP 118), we see that 
the emphasis is clearly on the individual; therefore, “...as I am what I am” seems not to 
connote an actual figure of God, but instead a God-like understanding of the world and the 
self.  It is through the application of this understanding to the speaker of the poem that the 
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supremacy of the individual, over any figure of God or the religious rites of the crowd, is 
established.    
Once Stevens establishes this supremacy, however—once we, alongside him, come 
to power in a world we must willingly accept as the product of our own limited 
subjectivity—that world necessarily becomes for us “no longer an extraneous object, full of 
other extraneous objects, but an image” (CP 736), and it is our own imagination that must 
be seen as both creator and created.  We, too, therefore, become an image.  We, too, 
become, as in “Landscape with Boat” from “Parts of a World”: “[a]n anti-master-man, 
floribund ascetic” (CP 220), who is as unable to master his own senses, or the scene to 
which his sensibility has been exposed, as he is unable to submit to the authority of a 
higher, all-powerful, all-seeing eye.  This poem continues: 
He brushed away the thunder, then the clouds, 
Then the colossal illusion of heaven. Yet still 
The sky was blue.  He wanted imperceptible air. 
He wanted to see.  He wanted the eye to see 
And not be touched by blue (CP 220).  
 
At the root of the desire depicted in this poem for a vision that would “not be 
touched” by the reality that it perceived is the desire to assume ultimate responsibility: not 
for the scene itself, but for the faculties by which it is perceived, manipulated and 
represented.  The “anti-master-man” would not be master of any thing, but would become 
instead the un-masterable sense of sight itself—wholly extraneous to, and therefore no 
longer contingent upon, the objects of its own perception.  This is, of course, a desire not to 
surrender control but to assume it entirely, to eradicate the distance between the “this will 
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be” and the “this has been” of the image by the grammatical subject of the poem becoming4 
the space of the difference: the image itself.  
It was not as if the truth lay where he thought,  
Like a phantom, in an uncreated night.  
It was easier to think it lay there. If 
It was nowhere else, it was there and because  
It was nowhere else, its place had to be supposed, 
Itself had to be supposed, a thing 
Supposed in a place supposed, a thing that he reached 
In a place that he reached, by rejecting what he saw  
And denying what he heard.  He would arrive. 
He had only not to live, to walk in the dark, 
To be projected by one void into 
Another (CP 220). 
 
The “anti-master-man” is here described as taking up precisely the space of his own 
“supposed” truth.  This position is, admittedly, a fantasy (“It was easier to think it lay there. 
If / It was nowhere else, it was there...”), the ultimate realisation of which may only exist in 
death (“He had only not to live, to walk in the dark / To be projected by one void into / 
Another”).  Nonetheless, what is obtained by the “anti-master” according to the speaker in 
this stanza is a subjective space of his own “truth” arising according to the coordinates of 
his own autonomous imagination.  But this space of “truth” is thrown wide open by the 
speaker when he later reflects, in what I consider one of Stevens’s most beautiful passages: 
He never supposed 
That he might be truth, himself, or part of it, 
That the things that he rejected might be part  
And the irregular turquoise, part, the perceptible blue 
Grown denser, part, the eye so touched, so played 
Upon by clouds, the ear so magnified 
By thunder, parts, and all these things together, 
Parts, and more things, parts.  He never supposed divine 
Things might not look divine, nor that if nothing 
Was divine then all things were, the world itself, 
And that if nothing was the truth, then all 
Things were the truth, the world itself was truth (CP 220-221). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  In the poem’s discourse, the subject is, of course, the ‘he.’ This ‘he’ may be said to be conjugated by the 
predicate, which here is the reiteration of ‘supposed;’ ‘he’ can therefore be understood as manifest in the very 
place where it “had to be supposed” (CP 220).	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This passage is particularly interesting in terms of the way Stevens begins his 
conscious shift toward a universalizing abstract conception of “man” without giving up the 
lineaments of a subjective “truth”—that which constitutes, as Barthes would write, “the 
truth for me.”  When the speaker’s voice interrupts the solipsism of the “anti-master’s” 
reverie by announcing, “He never supposed...”, Stevens introduces a personification of the 
split between the universal and the particular so characteristic of his oeuvre.  Indeed, the 
articulation of this split may be considered Stevens’s most urgent pursuit as he continues, 
with increasing energy in his late collections, to elaborate a middle-space in which the 
representation of perception might capture the peculiar juxtaposition between (as Barthes 
describes for the photograph) a double-consciousness, inherent to the subject, of the 
abstract “this will be”, and the particular “this has been” (CL 96).  It is this double-
consciousness that gives rise, of course, to the “suppositional” nature of subjective 
observation and experience of being.    
 
“The major abstraction” 
History according to Barthes, like the world according to Kant, can be “constituted 
only if we consider it, only if we look at it...and in order to look at it,” writes Barthes, “we 
must be excluded from it.  As a living soul, I am the very contrary of History, I am what 
belies it, destroys it for the sake of my own history” (CL 65).  In essence, this is Emerson’s 
“active soul” as taken up in the poetry of Stevens: the individual consciousness that belies 
not only History but the “outer” world for the sake of an “inner” world of the imagination.  
However, with the establishment of such a self-enclosed system it cannot be otherwise that 
the “active soul” contains, like the photograph, its own end: “I observe with horror” Barthes 
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writes, in speaking of the photograph of the young man on death-row, and then of the 
Winter Garden Photograph of his mother: 
an anterior future of which death is the stake.  By giving the absolute past of the 
pose (aorist), the photograph tells me death in the future.  What pricks me is the 
discovery of this equivalence.  In front of the photograph of my mother as a child, I 
tell myself: she is going to die: I shudder...over a catastrophe which has already 
occurred.  Whether or not the subject is already dead, every photograph is this 
catastrophe (CL 96).5 
For Stevens, this “equivalence” is paramount; the simultaneity of “will be” and “has 
been” is the autonomy—the self-enclosed structure—of the individual mind.  “If the 
imagination is the faculty by which we import the unreal into what is real,” Stevens says in 
“Imagination as Value,” “its value is the value of the way of thinking by which we project 
the idea of God into the idea of man.  It creates images that are independent of their 
originals since nothing is more certain than that the imagination is agreeable to the 
imagination” (Stevens 736).  Therefore, according to Stevens, we create our realities 
through the material of the unreal, but in doing so establish for ourselves a closed-circuit of 
imaginative power in which our “unreality” matches perfectly our “reality,” due to the fact 
that it is that “unreality” which is the very substance of our “reality.”  It is the opposite for 
the photograph, according to Barthes, but the result is the same.  The photograph imports 
the “real” into the “unreal”—it poses as reality, but it is in fact an unreality; its “being” is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  	  Key to this discussion is Barthes’s use of the tense of the future anterior.  This unusual tense is important to 
a consideration of Stevens’s ‘suppositional’ poetics, which is framed by a similar grammatical temporality 
and conditionality before it embarks on any abstract speculation. It is the grammar of the future anterior, the 
articulation, that is, of the difference between what has been and what will be, that opens up the gap between 
descriptive tense (the past) and conditional mood (the future). Barthes’ uncanny encounter of the difference 
between his contemporary observation and engagement with the Winter Garden Photograph, taking place 
after his mother’s death, and the time (unknown to, and un-experienced by, him) when the photograph was 
taken, is the very split Stevens works to elaborate between the particular and the universal—it is this “middle 
space” of temporal difference that grounds the epistemological predicament at the root of Stevens’s oeuvre.	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evidence already of its “having been,” of its “being no longer.”  It is, as Barthes writes, 
“invisible: it is not what we see” (CL 6).   
What is it, then, that we are left with?  What is it that we see? In both cases, it is not 
an object—anything “known” or “material”—but a spaciousness that is inferred.  In “Re-
Statement,” “night” is established “only as the background of our selves,” where “our 
selves” are considered “Supremely true each to its separate self, / In the pale light that each 
upon the other throws” (CP 118).  Stevens has created an infinite system of contingent 
autonomies here.  Again, like a “shade” that might have been cast upon the hill in 
“Connoisseur of Chaos,” the light here serves to both illustrate and undermine the 
autonomy of “each.” The subjects of this poem are self-enclosed and yet still interactive in 
that they are able to “reflect” off one another in a Kantian “shared system of 
representation.” No one is “knowable” to an other, but “each” is nevertheless relative to the 
other and dependent to a certain extent on the other for its “illumination.”  How else does 
one know oneself in the particular than by recognizing what it is not, by perceiving 
“enduring objects” (Collins 137) in the outer world in relation to which we might represent 
the self?  It is in just this way that Barthes is “pricked” by the century old photograph of a 
man on death row, through which he identifies the “imperious sign of (his) future death” 
(CL 97).  This Kantian model of the self that cannot endure is not limiting for either 
Stevens’s or Barthes’s process of self-representation.  Instead, such a paradox allows for 
the split between the evidential (Barthes’s “that-has-been”, Stevens’s “the pale light” of 
illumination—which can only further diminish, having no source of its own) and the 
exclamatory (Barthes’s “there she is!”,  Stevens’s “Supremely true each to its separate 
self”), and allows for an autonomy of the self and imagination that, as the imagination—
being “agreeable to the imagination”—is capable of establishing supreme truth regardless 
of, or rather because of, that truth’s subjectivity and impermanence.  It is from this split that 
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there arises an opening into spaciousness,6 a Barthesian “ecstasy” (CL 119), a Stevensian 
“nothing that is” (CP 8).   
This paradox at the root of the photograph, its “absence-as-presence” (CL 106), is 
demonstrated further in Barthes’s discussion of another old photograph in which two young 
girls are seen to be gazing at a “primitive airplane.” “How alive they are!” Barthes 
exclaims.  “They have their whole lives before them; but also they are dead (today), they 
are then already dead (yesterday).  At the limit, there is no need to represent a body in order 
for me to experience this vertigo of time defeated” (CL 97).  It is this “vertigo of time 
defeated” that acts as the spaciousness encountered by both Barthes’ photograph and 
Stevens’s poetry.  But just as Stevens’s poetry reverses the photograph’s temporal 
structure—which can indicate a “beyond” only by pointing to the ultimate insubstantiality 
of that which it purports to represent—by attesting to a “beyond” constituted from a 
substantial affinity between the “Real” world and the “unreality” of the imagination (the 
“Real” constructed from that “unreality” and vice versa), so the thrust of Stevens’s 
discovery is ultimately different from Barthes’.  Where Barthes is confronted in the 
photograph by the horror of death-in-the future: “I shudder...over a catastrophe which has 
already occurred” (CL 96), Stevens exposes within the structure of the poem the way 
language is “always-ever” alive.   In both cases, however, the impulse, even as it concerns 
itself with the particularities of subject and object, is always beyond the body, beyond the 
representation.   
The paradox of being and non-being is also expressed by Stevens’s now familiar, 
self-professed “reality-imagination complex.” As Theodore Sampson states, it is this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  The trope of “space” is here used not in an attempt to formalize or reify the space “in between” temporality, 
between subject and object, which indeed constitutes the very epistemological predicament of the subject in 
Stevens’s poems but in order to set the concerns of the poet somewhat in relief against the deeply entrenched 
linear trajectory of arriving, via language, at (even the most poetic) meaning.	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“complex” that serves as the “pivotal idea that lies at the heart of Stevens’s poetic 
sensibility and work, and what needs to be said about it is that the very conflict involved in 
this ‘complex’—the opposition between the imaginative and the real, the transcendent and 
the earth-bound—has its roots in Stevens’s own inner division” (6).  It is Stevens’s project 
to “counterpose reality’s pressure with a counterpressure of its own, and in so doing...not 
only keep reality at bay, but also prove imagination’s incontestable sway over it” (Sampson 
6).  This, according to Sampson, is in keeping with the tradition of Emerson, the great 
“American progenitor of modern perspectivism” (8), who uses sight as a metaphor for 
understanding the process of establishing individualized truths (8).  “Truth,” for Emerson, 
“is not only contingent upon the ‘inner eye,’ but...consists of a series of ‘circles’ or 
perspectives, receding into infinite space” (Sampson, 8). “The eye” wrote Emerson, “is the 
best of artists” (as quoted in Poirier, AWE 50) and, as Richard Poirier explains, what is 
most significant in this phrase is an understanding that even while the eye “encircles 
infinitely larger areas and discovers an incomparably greater variety of relationships than 
do other bodily instruments, it remains marvellously unencumbered” (Poirier, AWE 50).   
It is Stevens’s preservation of this “unencumbered” state of perception that allows 
him to perform, according to Sampson, an “Emersonian ‘inner leap’” (23) by which he is 
able to turn “the chaotic randomness and irrational disorder of things in the life-giving 
‘fortuities of earth that solace us and make a world’” (Sampson, 23).  We see this idea 
reflected quite clearly in Stevens’s own “Imagination as Value”: “My final point, then, is 
that the imagination is the power that enables us to perceive the normal in the abnormal, the 
opposite of chaos in chaos” (CP 737).  It is this same stabilizing power, albeit 
“hallucinatory,” that Barthes claims for the photograph: “in a certain photograph I believe I 
perceive the lineaments of truth” (CL 100, emphasis added); that is, through the chaos of an 
unknowable and unrepresentable experience of being, and the concurrent terror of erasure, 
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it is possible in brief “ecstatic” moments for the photograph to be the “opposite of chaos,” 
to be “time defeated” (Barthes 97)—or for “Modern Poetry,” as Stevens memorably puts it, 
to become “the poem of the mind in the act of finding / What will suffice” (218). 
 
In his critical analysis, What I Cannot Say, Thomas B. Byers says that for Stevens, 
notably in “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction,” there exists a “desire to overcome the 
distance between speaker and subject as an approach to bridging the related gap between 
self and world” (43). John N. Serio, in his introduction to the new Selected Poems, 
comments that what he finds most remarkable about Stevens’s poetry is his capacity for 
extending the “reality-imagination complex” “beyond its human scope.”  “This is a 
paradox,” Serio admits, “but it is Stevens’s most distinctive achievement.  In an age of 
disbelief or, what might be worse, one of indifference to questions of belief, Stevens adds a 
metaphysical dimension.  In doing so, he does not imply anything religious, but he goes 
beyond humanism” (xvi).  This “going beyond” often manifests itself in the figuration of a 
“blankness,” a spaciousness as such.  What is “the supreme fiction” with which Stevens 
launches his post-war career, but an invitation to such blankness?  
Begin, ephebe, by perceiving the idea 
Of this invention, this invented world, 
            The inconceivable idea of the sun. 
 
You must be an ignorant man again 
And see the sun again with an ignorant eye 
And see it clearly in the idea of it (CP 329). 
 
That the world exists only as an “invention” invites consideration of what is not invented, 
what is therefore not world.  The opening passage of the poem negates itself again and 
again, as though receding in Emersonian circles “into infinite space” (Sampson 8).  First, 
the notion of the perception that may be possible for an “ephebe” is called into question by 
the ephebe’s presence, which is, in the poem, already an absence.  (Think again here of 
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Barthes’s airplane girls: the antiquated term ephebe connotes a young man who, “dead 
[today], [is therefore]... already dead [yesterday] [Barthes 97]).  Next, it is not only the 
notion of perception that is called into question (given the “invented” quality of the poem, 
and the ephebe), but the “invented world” itself is problematized given that it is the ephebe 
who perceives the world as such, and not that the world is “in itself” as such.  That the 
ephebe is instructed to perceive something “inconceivable” further negates the solidity of 
his perception, and the statement “you must be an ignorant man again” returns, or desires a 
return, to an a priori state of blankness—made impossible by the fact that the man himself 
is already “invented” as a man who, not being “ignorant,” will forever be incapable of 
seeing the sun, or anything, “clearly in the idea of it.”  That the sun is something that can 
indeed be “explained” according to astrophysics underscores that the main purpose that the 
image of the sun serves in the poem is as an object not of astronomy, or even as a material 
object at all. Instead, the sun is an “object” of thought, which is to say an abstraction.  It is 
this quality of “abstraction” that renders the sun “inconceivable.” It follows that when 
“man” is considered not as subject but as object of thought he becomes in Canto X, a 
“major abstraction.”  “The major abstraction,” Stevens writes, “is the idea of man /And 
major man is its exponent, abler in the abstract than in his singular” (CP 336). It is in this 
state of “abstraction,” according to Stevens, blank of particular, that man is able “plainly to 
propound” (CP 336).  
Just as Kant is seen to argue for the “uniqueness of space” in an attempt to 
“eliminate the idea that each subject’s outer intuitions are located in a private space that is 
not spatially related to the private spaces and outer intuitions of other subjects” (Collins 
64), Stevens imagines for us an abstract consciousness, which becomes the “unique space” 
wherein all of our “private spaces” may intersect and ultimately be absorbed.   “Spaces,” 
Kant has argued, “have to be considered to be parts of and not instances of space” (as 
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quoted in Collins 65), just as for Stevens our “private spaces” are expressed more “ably” 
through the “idea of man” (CP 336).  “Happy fecundity,” he says of that “major 
abstraction,” “flor-abundant force, / In being more than an exception, part, / Though an 
heroic part, of the communal, / The major abstraction is the communal...” (CP 336).  It is 
within this space of “abstraction” that Stevens personifies the poetic form:  
...Who is it? 
What rabbi, grown furious with human wish, 
What chieftain, walking by himself, crying 
Most miserable, most victorious , 
 
Does not see these separate figures one by one, 
And yet see only one, in his old coat, 
His slouching pantaloons, beyond the town, 
 
Looking for what was, where it used to be? 
Cloudless in the morning.  It is he.  The man 
In that old coat, those sagging pantaloons, 
 
It is of him, ephebe, to make, to confect 
The final elegance, not to console 
Nor sanctify, but plainly to propound (CP 336). 
 
Conversely, but not incongruously, it is within the space of language— of poetry— itself 
that Stevens claims we may also be able to “find ourselves” (Riddel 11), and it is this 
attention to an “intrinsic” space of abstraction that defines him against a generation of 
imagists and objectivists.   Stevens was never, like Williams, “so much astonished by the 
‘thinginess’ of nature as by the creativeness of imagination” (12), writes critic Joseph 
Riddel.  “He was never so much attracted by the discovery of ‘things as they are’...as by the 
discovery of himself in the act of discovery” (12, emphasis added). 
 It is this same process that entrances Barthes in his perception of the photograph of 
his mother as a child, in which he discovers himself “in the act of discovering” within that 
photograph something that “was indeed essential” (CL 71).  In the act of looking for what 
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was, in the place that it used to be, Barthes is startled to find it elsewhere. He describes this 
process of “discovery” in the following passage: 
The Greeks entered into Death backward: what they had before them was their past.  
In the same way I worked back through a life, not my own, but the life of someone I 
love.  Starting from her latest image, taken the summer before her death (so tired, so 
noble, sitting in front of the door of our house, surrounded by my friends), I arrived, 
traversing three-quarters of a century, at the image of a child: I stare intensely at the 
Sovereign Good of childhood, of the mother, of the mother-as-child.  Of course I 
was then losing her twice over, in her final fatigue and in her first photograph, for 
me the last; but it was also at this moment that everything turned around and I 
discovered her as into herself... (CL 71). 
“As into herself” proposes the notion of “essence,” which Barthes himself has already 
suggested, but it is also indicative of the space of interiority developed by Stevens: space 
that is not so much a “private space” in the Kantian model as a “uniqueness of space” 
wherein all things and subjects are not instances, but parts; that is, a space greater than any 
contained within an individual, and one that may become evident in the split identity 
afforded by the death of the photograph’s subject.  Barthes recognizes an “essence”—
discovers his mother “as into herself”—because he is able to “discover” her as an 
abstraction, as part of a “shared system of representation” of which he himself is also part.  
He becomes, through this process of discovery, an abstraction himself: “in his old coat, his 
slouching pantaloons,” located now beyond any particular representation, “beyond the 
town, Looking for what was, where it used to be...”  Of course, he may only find and 
experience “what was” in an abstract state: once he moves to the particular, once he 
attempts a detailed examination of the same photograph (which has just a moment ago 
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caused him to exclaim with such delight and assurance: “There she is!  She’s really there!” 
[CL 99]), his assuredness begins immediately to falter.  Inspired, however, by his 
identification with the subject in its abstraction, he desires a return to that initial state of 
identification and believes that still further knowledge of the subject may be possible: “I 
want,” he writes, “to enlarge this face in order to see it better, to understand it better, to 
know its truth” (CL 99).  But it is here that the photograph re-asserts its illusory dimension: 
its very flatness, “platitudinous in the true sense of the word” (CL 106).  “Alas,” Barthes 
admits of his attempt to know his mother’s image, “however hard I look, I discover 
nothing: if I enlarge, I see nothing but the grain of the paper...In front of the Winter Garden 
Photograph I am a bad dreamer who vainly holds out his arms toward the possession of the 
image...Such is the Photograph: it cannot say what it lets us see” (Barthes 100).  Here 
Barthes discovers, in practice, the “hallucinatory” property of the photograph (CL 115).   
A hallucination of an object is something that becomes possible, however, only 
through the recombination of concrete items perceived in reality.  That is, only after their 
initial apprehension in reality can objects reappear in hallucination, imagination, or dream. 
Hallucination cannot be considered a pure “unreality”; therefore, Barthes’s experience of 
his mother’s “essence,” that “kindness” he recognized so powerfully, is not an unreal 
experience but one produced by an initial apprehension of the “kindness” that he identified 
with her in reality.  As Kant had proposed, it is because “inner” things must necessarily be 
representative in this way of some initial apprehension of “outer” things that the distinction 
between the two becomes increasingly vague.  For him, “the problem of hallucination” 
becomes, as Arthur Collins explains,“...not that the object exists but only in the mind,” but 
that “the object does not exist at all” (77).  In Otherwise than Being, Emmanuel Levinas 
claims that it was Kant who showed “in the very objectivity of an object its phenomenality” 
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by demonstrating the incompatibility between the conception of temporal succession and 
“the in-temporal (or synchronic?) series conceived by the understanding of the other” (17).  
While Heidegger and Hegel, in an effort to “denounce the idea of a subjectivity irreducible 
to essence,” attempted to re-introduce temporality into the conception of being—thus 
positing that everything should be understood to fall under the dominion of (for Hegel) the 
Absolute, or (for Heidegger) Dasein: those modes by which “essence manifests itself” 
(17)—Levinas, on the contrary, is concerned with what exceeds or is  “otherwise than 
being” (17).  He writes:  
Our inquiry concerned with the otherwise than being catches sight, in the very 
hypostasis of a subject, its subjectification, of an ex-ception, a null-site on the hither 
side of the negativity which is always speculatively recuperable, an outside of the 
absolute which can no longer be stated in terms of being(17).  
It is this ex-ceptional space, “otherwise than being,” that Barthes is confronted with 
in the Winter Garden Photograph.  The impasse confronting him is clearly not that what he 
recognizes in the photograph does not exist for him, but that it does not exist.  “In this little 
girl’s image I saw the kindness which had formed her immediately and forever” (CL 69), 
says Barthes of his discovery. Yet he can find “nothing” in the space of the photograph—
characterized by its perfect flatness—to correspond to the reality that he apprehends.  Still, 
as he pores over the enlarged photograph, faced with nothing more substantial than the 
“grain of the paper,” Barthes is still able to perceive those “lineaments of truth” (CL 100).  
This “truth” that Barthes discovers through the revelation in the photograph of his mother’s 
actual kindness can be profitably understood along the lines of Levinas’s notion of 
goodness, which is always-ever in excess of Being. “Arising at the apex of essence, 
goodness is other than being,” writes Levinas:  
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It no longer keeps accounts; it is not like negativity, which conserves what it 
negates, in its history ...The exceptional, extra-ordinary, transcendent character of 
goodness is due to just this break with being and history.  To reduce the good to 
being, to its calculations and its history is to nullify goodness. The ever-possible 
sliding between subjectivity and being, of which subjectivity would be but a mode, 
the equivalence of two languages, stops here.  Goodness gives to subjectivity its 
irreducible signification (18).  
 The “null-site” that Barthes perceives in the Winter Garden Photograph is, then, in 
direct concordance with the “truth” that he is able to detect within it.  It is what remains—
goodness—finally and utterly exterior to being that paradoxically is at last able to reward 
Barthes with what he seeks in his mother’s photograph: her “irreducible signification.”  
 
An “impossible science” 
Stevens’s declaration in 1947 that “It Must Be Abstract” similarly affirms what he 
had always known but resisted: that it was the most “abstract” of his poetry that held the 
promise, for both himself and his readers, of the most individuated truth.  For Stevens, it is, 
indeed, through the abstraction itself that poetry becomes highly personal and that we may 
“find ourselves” (Riddel 11).  But the process of doing so is, at the very least, a difficult 
and ambiguous one due to the fact that the space we are provided with is none other than 
the abstract space wherein, like the photograph, the poem cannot say “what it lets us see” 
(Barthes, CL, 100).  
DeSales Harrison, in his book The End of The Mind, explores the way that Stevens 
works to push past intelligibility into intuitive reality beyond the mind—a territory in which 
we learn what we “cannot learn, cannot know, cannot do with words”(Harrison  68).  
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“Stevens,” Harrison says, “dedicates himself to the task of determining how his writing can 
preserve a degree of ‘imagelessness,’ of hesitation on the brink of representation” (76).  He 
does so by resisting any attempt to describe “imagelessness,” instead attempting to enact or 
embody it (77).  A nod to the Emersonian influence on Stevens—to the impulse forward 
that Stevens and other artists inherited from Emerson’s insistence that “life only avails, not 
the having lived”; that “power ceases in the instant of repose” (SELP 163)—is evident in 
Harrison’s reading of Stevens’s poetry.  In “Montrachet-le-Jardin,” Stevens describes the 
wind as a “never rounding O” (Stevens 237), and Harrison asserts that “the challenge for 
the poet is to find a way to keep the wind a ‘never rounded O,’ to preserve within the letter 
‘O’ an attribute of voicelessness, of the zero, or the surd” (77).  The use of “alphabetical 
elements” (Harrison 77) in Stevens’s poetry produces a precision so extreme that it 
becomes an abstraction, thus mimicking the fate of the photograph, which in its specificity 
loses hold of significance: “of all the objects in the world: why choose (why photograph) 
this object, this photograph, rather than some other?” (Barthes, CL 6).  “The A B C of 
being” (CP 257), as expressed in Stevens’s poem “The Motive for Metaphor,” identifies the 
“literally literal ‘here’ of speech” in which Stevens seeks to locate the “primary nakedness” 
of language (Harrison 77).  At the end of poem, the “vital, arrogant, fatal, dominant X” (CP 
357) serves as this “primary nakedness”: the blankness toward which Stevens turns again 
and again in his poems.  It expresses a “tear or pucker in speech” (Harrison 80), the 
expression of which can be managed only by “writing X instead of saying what X stands 
for” (Harrison 80).  It is in this way that the poem acts as an image, manifesting in itself the 
same “absence-as-presence” identifiable in the photograph.  X becomes a blank within the 
poem, an abstraction in which the reader is able to “find” herself—in which, for brief 
moments, there exists the potential for her to experience “the truth for me” (Barthes, CL 
110).   
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But, as Harrison points out,  
even if one acknowledges that any description of reality is by definition at a remove 
from reality...a focus on the (joyous, infinite) possibilities of profusion distracts 
from the X’s inherent opacity, the fact that X stands for something which, by 
definition, cannot be.  The X is not a site to be filled with any number of possible 
substitutions, but the site of a removal, a fundamental absence, by definition 
undecipherable, imageless, a ‘never-rounding’ O (Harrison 80).   
The X is also, then, “platitudinous in the true sense of the word” (Barthes, CL 106).  Its 
“truth” may be immediately perceived, but if examined further there will, again, be 
“nothing to discover.”  However, “nothing” here can be understood to possess a certain 
value—to exist not as a description but as an “enactment” of “absence,” which is not and 
cannot be a “thing in itself” but must necessarily exist as “presence,” in a constant process 
of being or non-being.  It is remaining aware of this process, maintaining the ‘never 
rounding O” (Harrison 80) of language, that Harrison identifies as the true “challenge for 
the poet” (77).   
Even in Harmonium, Stevens demonstrates a concern for providing a space within 
his work for the “attribute of voicelessness” (Harrison 77).  This is, again, most 
conspicuously demonstrated by the “The Snow Man,” where the “nothing that is” 
constitutes both a quantity and a lack.  As Harrison goes on to explain, this space—the 
“never rounding O”—is both vacuum and source.  “As a vacuum, it draws description 
toward itself, though it can never be filled.  As a source, it resembles a white-hot solar 
origin, like ‘the inconceivable idea of the sun’” (81).  In a similar way the photograph is 
involved in an infinite process of referring to its own absence, of thus creating endlessly its 
own “vacuum of referentiality” that it can never substantially fill.   “The Photograph,” 
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Barthes says, “mechanically repeats what could never be repeated existentially.  In the 
Photograph, the event is never transcended for the sake of something else: The Photograph 
always leads the corpus I need back to the body I see; it is the absolute particular, the 
sovereign contingency, matte and somehow stupid, the This...(this photograph, and not 
Photography)” (CL 4).  
Yet it is within the specificity—indeed, because of the specificity, the “this-ness” of 
the Winter Garden Photograph—that Barthes is able to discover the “lineaments of truth” 
(CL 100).  The “essence” of the impossible thing that he had sought is finally yielded to 
him—if only in a hallucinatory flash, and outside of any disappointing “likeness,” or other 
ordinary method of representation.   “Likeness leaves me unsatisfied and somehow 
skeptical” (CL 103), writes Barthes, explaining that “the sad disappointment” (CL 103) he 
experienced in looking at the photographs of his mother (photographs which presented him 
with nothing other than a “likeness” to the woman that he knew) did not yield to him 
anything he felt to be actually “true” about that woman at all. “I missed her being,” he 
writes, “and therefore I missed her altogether” (CL 66)7.  When an image is unable to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 “[N]othing,” Freud declared, “can be apprehended in effigie, in absentia” and yet at the same time 
transference (the redirection of feelings from one subject or object to another), which is of course the basis of 
language itself, must be understood as being characterised by absence, by the creation or maintenance of an 
“effigy” of the real. In chapter four of his The Four fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, “Tuché and 
Automaton,” Lacan explains that the term “tuché”—a term he borrows from Aristotle who had used it “in his 
search for cause” (53)—represents for him “the real as encounter—the encounter in so far as it may be 
missed, in so far as it is essentially the missed encounter” (55).  This conception of “the missed encounter” 
first arose in the discourse of psychoanalysis in relation to trauma.  And “[i]s it not remarkable,” as Lacan 
asks, “that, at the origin of the analytic experience, the real should have presented itself in the form of that 
which is unassimilable in it—in the form of the trauma, determining all that follows, and imposing on it an 
apparently accidental origin?  We are now at the heart of what may enable us to understand the radical 
character of the conflictual notion introduced by the opposition of the pleasure principle and the reality 
principle—which is why we cannot conceive the reality principle as having, by virtue of its ascendency, the 
last word” (55). “The missed encounter” supplements Freud’s model of repetition, which is linked to the 
drives, and in particular to the death drive.  The drives will continually circle around the object of their desire 
but can never coincide with it.  “The missed encounter,” which lies at the very heart of this structure, is not 
merely elusive.  Its absence is constitutive of the ‘contact’ with the real described by the term “tuché,” of that 
which lies beyond all signification.  But if we are not to simply abandon ourselves to the idea that “life is a 
dream” (55) beyond all possible definitions of “reality,” Lacan urges that we must learn to identify “those 
radical points in the real” that he refers to as “encounters,” and by which we are able “to conceive reality as 
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match the original “outer object” the disparity is made apparent by the jarring of that 
“outer” image with the “inner copy” of that object—a “copy” that continues to exist in the 
mind of the viewer, a sort of “hallucination” (Collins 77).  For this reason, it is in the space 
of an abstraction (which will not jar so forcibly against the “inner copy” of a specific 
object in the mind) that the particular is found: “the only (photograph) which has given me 
the splendour of her truth,” Barthes says of his mother, “is precisely a lost, remote 
photograph, one which does not look ‘like’ her, the photograph of a child I never knew” 
(CL 103).  This problem of “likeness” within, and to, a perceived reality—as well as the 
problem of “identifying” that reality—is central to Barthes’s study.  “In order to designate 
reality,” he writes in the opening pages of Camera Lucida, “Buddhism says sunya, the 
void; but better still: tathata, as Alan Watts has it, the fact of being this, of being thus, of 
being so; tat means that in Sanskrit and suggests the gesture of a child pointing his finger at 
something and saying: that, there it is, lo! But says nothing else” (CL 4-5).  
It is toward such a quality of “this-ness” that the blankness Stevens develops in his 
poetry over the course of his career finally yields.  The “absolute particular...the This” (CL 
4), articulated by Barthes’s analysis of photography is strikingly similar to what is arrived 
at in Stevens’s “The Man on the Dump” from Parts of a World:  “Where was it one first 
heard of truth? The the” (CP 186).  
According to Harrison, “The the” can be read not only as “a designation and a 
specification” but as “a shying away from the definition promised by the definite 
article.[…] ‘The the’ enacts a pull backward from designation, away from the image,” so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
unterlegt, untertragen, which, with the superb ambiguity of the French language, appear to be translated by 
the same word—souffrance [“in suspense,” in abeyance,” “awaiting attention,” “pending”]” (55-56).  Reality 
is always pending, awaiting our attention, and can be apprehended only through the “experience of rupture” 
inherent to the unconscious, that experience of a “non-temporal locus” between perception and consciousness, 
a locus which, Lacan concludes, “forces us to posit what Freud calls, in homage to Fechner […] the idea of 
another locality, another space, another scene, the between perception and consciousness” (56).   
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that what is “ultimately asserted...is not so much the lack of ‘proper names in the language 
of poetry,’ but the ‘incipient realizations’ accomplished by such a pull away from 
intelligibility” (76).  It is again the extremity of the designation that allows the poem to 
retreat from designation entirely.  So it is in its abstraction, in the discovery of its own 
“blankness,” that the poem is able to create a space of absence within which we may 
suddenly and for brief, necessarily unrestful, moments “find ourselves”—as though 
inhabiting, for an instant, “the nothing that is” (Stevens, 8). We experience this “nothing” 
not as a private “instance” but rather as a “part” (Collins 65) of that greatest abstraction, a 
“uniqueness of space” (Collins 64) that must necessarily remain opaque and unknowable: 
“a fundamental absence” (Harrison 80).  It is, after all, the very insatiability of this absence 
that allows us to move beyond representation into the exposed “blankness” between reality 
(“that-has-been”) and truth (“there-she-is!”) and discover, therein, “the impossible science 
of the unique being” (Barthes, CL 71).  As Levinas writes of the paradoxical insistence 
with which that which is, and must remain, “beyond being” always-ever shows itself in 
being, “in the said”: “This diachrony is itself an enigma: the beyond being does and does 
not revert to ontology; the statement, the beyond, the infinite, becomes and does not 
become a meaning of being” (OTB 19). 
  Returning again to “Re-Statement of Romance,” we can, by contrast, clearly 
determine the way that this enigma of “blankness,” as it pertains to the individual in 
Stevens’s poetry, is expressed.  Although what is most certain is the self (“I perceive 
myself best...”[CP 118]), it is only through the perception of the unknowable that this self is 
perceived.   Knowledge in the poem—just as in Wordsworthian romanticism—can be seen, 
then, to both come from and return to the unknown.  It is the unwritten (absent) “source,” 
from which both the “I” and the “you” in the poem must necessarily have attained their 
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reflected “pale light” and which acts as the “central blank, both source and absence” 
(Harrison 81), that is so recurrent in Stevens’s poetry.  Therefore, the poem’s “re-
statement” of this traditional romantic origin/return split lies not in the refusal of such an 
infinite process, but in the fact that the power of perceiving that process has been shifted 
away from the unknown and onto the individual: “The night knows nothing” (CP 118); it is 
the self that perceives best.  By asserting for the “I” of the poem an Emersonian supremacy, 
allowing it to be “part or parcel of God” (Emerson, SELP 18), Stevens seeks to establish 
the imagination as one of “the great human powers” (CP 727, emphasis added), creating for 
it a space that is at once “source and absence” (Harrison 81) and therefore independent 
from any other system of imposed meaning—religious or partisan.  “One sits and beats an 
old tin can, lard pail,” says the man on the dump: 
One beats and beats for that which one believes.  
That’s what one wants to get near. Could it after all 
Be merely oneself...? (CP 185) 
 
A new romance has ripened for Stevens in Parts of a World. The romance of a 
space of exploration, en-actment—if not of ultimate understanding—of that which would 
continue to exceed the rational, cognitive “order” of the world (and there was nothing after 
the war but a sense of precisely this excess).  This new romance did not, however, fully 
surrender the pre-War hope that would remain fundamental to Stevens: that by dissolving 
“all mean egotism” (Emerson, SELP 18) and assuming an abstract quality, the “human” 
might still achieve a transcendent power: a “liberty of the mind” (Stevens 727), “which I 
shall call, in conclusion, the photographic ecstasy” (Barthes 119)
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five: The Act 
One reads poetry with ones nerves  
—Wallace Stevens (CP 919). 
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The transcendent “liberty of mind” (CP 727) that Stevens sought to achieve, via 
poetry, beyond the singular and objective, can be profitably understood in the terms that 
Emmanuel Levinas, in Totality and Infinity, uses to describe the movement, via 
“representation” itself, beyond “theory” or “theoretical” relation.    “Theory,” as that which 
remains “knowledge, relationship,” specifically disallows, according to Levinas, “all 
ecstatic behaviour” and, more specifically, “the entering into the Beyond, by ecstasy” (48).  
It remains tied to singularity, to the separation between the “I” and the “Other,” as well as 
between “I” and “God.”1 “Representation” is privileged because it offers the possibility, not 
of accessing or constituting a “primordial relation with being,” but of “recalling” exactly 
this space of separation, within which Levinas locates “the idea of the infinite.” This idea is 
crucial to any “ecstatic” transcendence beyond the “theoretical,” or “known,” and is alone 
“exceptional,” Levinas writes—distinguishable from other ideas, including “mathematical 
and moral notions”—in that “its ideatum surpasses its idea [...] The distance that separates 
ideatum and idea here constitutes the content of the ideatum itself” (49).   Infinity, is, 
therefore, according to Levinas: “absolutely other.  The transcendent is the sole ideatum of 
which there can be only an idea in us; it is infinitely removed from its idea, that is, exterior, 
because it is infinite” (49).  To think of it, to think “the infinite, the transcendent, the 
Stranger, is hence not to think an object,” Levinas concludes.  “But”—and this last remark 
would no doubt have resonated strongly with Stevens in the latter part of his career— “to 
think what does not have the lineaments of an object is in reality to do more or better than 
think” (49). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This separation is one that Levinas links to what he refers to as “the ambiguity of Descartes’ first evidence” 
whereby the “I” and “God” are revealed as “two distinct moments of evidence,” which, while “mutually 
founding one another” never actually “merge” (TI 48).	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“After the final no, there comes a yes” 
It is into this negative-space of representation, beyond “the lineaments of an 
object”—a space of “infinite remove”—that Stevens invites us within “The Ultimate Poem 
is Abstract” from The Auroras of Autumn.  In keeping with the poem’s “Ultimate” aim, the 
poem begins not with an objective statement, but with an abstract question: “This day 
writhes with what?” This question is addressed to us by a comic “lecturer” who is 
presenting on the following topic:“This Beautiful World of Ours.”  Stevens recounts in the 
poem the manner in which his fictional lecturer “composes himself,” then “hems the planet 
rose and haws it ripe, // And red and right” (CP 369).  It is “the question which is in point” 
we are assured, so that “if the day writhes, it is not with revelations.”  A “revelation,” 
would, of course, be quite sideways to the theme. “One goes on asking questions,” Stevens 
writes. “That, then, is one / Of the categories” (CP 369). But it is here that there is a crucial 
turning point within the poem: “So said,” the poem continues, “this placid space is 
changed.” As soon as the “category” of questions in and of themselves—considered as 
finally separate from any anticipated “revelation”—is acknowledged, we move into a quite 
different realm; the title of the lecture, which has kept us at some remove from any genuine 
consideration of the subject matter (“This Beautiful World” might as well be a shiny 
artefact, with which we ourselves have very little to do, and know, on our own, very little 
about), loses its comic hold and we actually enter into consideration of the subject:  
...It is not so blue as we thought. To be blue, 
There must be no questions.  It is an intellect 
Of windings round and dodges to and fro, 
 
Writhings in wrong obliques and distances, 
Not an intellect in which we are fleet: present  
Everywhere in space at once, cloud-pole 
 
Of communication.  It would be enough 
If we were ever, just once, at the middle, fixed 
In This Beautiful World Of Ours and not as now, 
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Helplessly at the edge, enough to be 
Complete, because at the middle, if only in sense, 
And in that enormous sense, merely enjoy (CP 371). 
 
Stevens manages, within the brief space of this poem, to designate an intermediate 
region of différance between being and representation of being, Theory and experience, and 
finally between the immediate moment of the poem—always “hopelessly at the edge”—
and the idealized fixity of an imagined centre. The “idea of the infinite” resides, finally, not 
in the inaccessible ecstatic space the poem gestures toward, but cannot arrive at—where 
one might “merely enjoy”—but in the relation between the hopeless “edge” of the present 
moment and an absent “fixity” at the centre.   It is the elaboration of a negative-space 
between and inclusive of centre and edge that allows for the configuration of what is 
arrived at: the “enormous sense” of that relation. The poem can be seen, in this regard, to be 
in conversation with “Anecdote of a Jar”—where the contingent, temporary stability of the 
jar lends shape to the “slovenly wilderness” of abstractions that surround it. In “The 
Ultimate Poem is Abstract” this limited stability of an imagined fixity is further 
displaced—existing only in the wistful conditional, “If we were ever, just once…” 
Crucially for the realization of the poem’s “ultimate” abstraction, however, that stability is 
not entirely abandoned.  It is indeed critical to the poem that the “enormous sense” of 
divine “enjoyment” arrived at in the final lines is located within the structure that the 
lecturer imposes—within the quotation marks, so to speak, of his lecture’s preposterous 
title. It is due to the imposition of this structure that the ideal, fixed “middle-point” that 
provides the discussion’s focus manages to escape the limits of the discussion entirely. The 
poem’s failure to locate the infinite as a fixed point—a centre, which could not possibly 
hold—is what moves us finally beyond that fixed point and therefore constitutes its success 
at evoking an “enormous sense” of the infinite. What is delineated by the poem is a space 
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of the difference of representation itself, in which “the middle,” the “fixed” exceeds the 
very “lineaments” by which it seeks to be bound.  Again, Levinas: “The infinite in the 
finite, the more in the less, which is accomplished by the idea of infinity, is produced as 
Desire—not a Desire that the possession of the Desirable slakes, but the Desire for the 
Infinite which the desirable arouses rather than satisfies.  A desire perfectly disinterested 
(goodness)” (TI 50).  
What is finally expressed in this poem is, once again, similarly articulated in 
Barthes’ analysis of the Winter Garden Photograph wherein he locates—in the “infinite” 
trace of his mother’s “goodness”—the “truth” that he manages at last to recognize.  It is 
not, indeed, the “truth” or the “infinite” at all—nor is it even a desire for the “truth” or the 
“infinite.” It is, instead, simply, desire.  Within the delineation of this space of desire 
resides, for Stevens, not only a disinterested goodness—that which may be “merely 
enjoyed”—but also the possibility of authentic action.  Recall here the echo: “poesis, 
poesis,” syllables which are described by Stevens in “Large Red Man Reading,” as the very 
“syllables of (the) law” when it comes to “being and its expressing” (CP 365).  The “law” 
referred to here is, importantly, written in potential—in “the literal characters, the vatic 
lines,” which require “feeling” in order to be “spoken” (CP 365).  It is this feeling which is, 
as the last line concludes, “what they had lacked” (CP 365), and this feeling that is required 
for the “literal characters” of the text to take on the fullness of “being and its expressing” 
(CP 365).  Aspiring, and eventually (perhaps) attaining this feeling, is of course never a 
process that can be categorically complete; it is, instead, an ongoing process, the result of 
which the text promises the possibility of, but cannot possibly produce.  The text itself must 
always remain a site of un-satiated desire—but it is the very presence of this absence, this 
“lack,” that guarantees that the site of the text will remain active and potential.  It is for this 
reason that desire in Stevens’s poetry is consistently portrayed as insatiable—existing not 
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in order to be fulfilled, but instead in order to promote itself, constantly and consistently, as 
a space (always potential) of desire itself.   
As is shown in “The Ultimate Poem is Abstract” this space of desire is often created 
by an oscillation between the two points of reference that describe a middle-space.  This 
oscillation is perhaps most systematically rendered in “The Well Dressed Man with a 
Beard,” from Parts of a World.    “After the final no there comes a yes, / And on that yes 
the future world depends,” the poem begins, and with this declaration Stevens establishes 
the conflict that will continue throughout the poem, culminating in the definitive 
irresolution of the poem’s final line: “It can never be satisfied, the mind, never” (CP 224).  
It is indeed by juxtaposing, from the start, the assured “yes” of the present moment 
of—simply—being, against an accompanying critical consciousness of the fallibility of that 
being (of that which is unknown, and ultimately beyond being) that Stevens arrives at his 
conclusion.  In other words, the central conflict explored in the poem is the mind’s impulse, 
on the one hand, to understand itself as existing solely within the present moment—in the 
“yes” of a passive, affirmative, receipt of its experience of being and time—and on the 
other, due to a consciousness of that reception, to spatialize and objectify its experience; 
ultimately, that is, to reject, like the ticking of a clock, each present moment in turn.  It is 
this latter impulse, of course, that gives rise to the subject’s experience not of time, but of 
duration.  
This conflict between the simply “being” of time and a “consciousness” of duration, 
of a being in time is fundamental for Stevens, contributing to a fixation on the idea of 
absence and lack that has led many critics to complain that the work remains ultimately too 
abstract, and—ungrounded in the real world—remote and ineffective.  Even Randall Jarrell, 
who was usually sympathetic to Stevens’s work, complained that he was “obsessed with 
lack, a lack at last almost taken for granted, that he himself automatically supplies” (as 
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quoted in McLeod 37).  This obsession with absence and lack—along with its 
corresponding fixation on the perennial dissatisfaction of the mind that must continuously 
grapple with it—must, I argue, be understood neither in terms of a loss, nor as intellectual 
failure, or despondency.  Instead, the “lack” that is delineated and explored in Stevens’s 
work must be considered as an exploration and representation of the process by which we 
experience being itself, a process which is inherently active, and upon which all possibility 
of action depends.  As Stefan Holander observes of “The Man on the Dump,” the line “One 
beats and beats for that which one believes” (CP 185) hinges on the fact that the word “for” 
does not indicate an objective set of beliefs that have been previously delineated.  Indeed, 
the whole phrasing, “for that which” (preposition-pronoun-relative pronoun) describes the 
sequence through which the reader must move toward the unnamed and the unnameable. 
The ambiguity that results from the phrasing serves, Holander observes, to signify “both 
end and origin of poetry’s  ‘beating’; an origin which is not only as yet unformulated but in 
principle unattainable.  It, whatever it is, will not let itself be possessed, but remains 
something one ‘wants to get near’” (118).   
In another example, “The Well Dressed Man with the Beard,” the speaker’s longing 
for a single solid “thing”—“One thing remaining, infallible, would be / Enough! Ah! Douce 
campagna of that thing” (224)—is undercut by a knowledge of the ultimate fallibility of 
that “thing.”  But though the speaker laments this, it is apparent that it is not, in fact, the 
“thing” itself on which he ultimately depends, but his own longing.  Were the subject to 
experience or enact any one “thing” as infallible, finally “a thing affirmed,” and give up the 
vacillation between the “yes” and “no” of his experience (time understood as duration) that 
experience—and therefore his own subjectivity—would be immediately annulled. It is not 
upon the “yes” in itself, then, that “the future world depends,” but—as the opening lines 
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more precisely suggest—upon a recommencement of the conflict by the “yes” that the 
“final no” has attempted to quell.   
Just as Freud’s death drive cannot take the easiest route—ending the organism’s life 
immediately—but must instead, due to an opposing repetition compulsion, continuously 
defer its own end,2 so, too, the mind is as unable to reject the idea of the possible solidity, 
and durability, of the “thing” (its own subjectivity, its thoughts, and its language included) 
as it is to find adequately stable ground on which to support that idea. So that at the same 
time that the speaker of Stevens’s poem is impelled to invent the critical “no,” his 
conflicting desire for an affirming “yes” does not permit the “no” to take ultimate hold. 
That is, the “finality” of the “no”—the mind’s own consciousness of itself—is undone at 
once by a simultaneous consciousness of its limits, and therefore the limits of its own 
“final” assertion.  “After the final no, there comes a yes”:  the “afterwards” of a 
consciousness that is able to assert itself in this way is always assured ahead of time, so that 
the mind is obliged to run continuously, and without recourse, between the assured 
consciousness of duration and the always-ever “yes” of simple existent-being.   
 
The “eternal child” 
The human species, writes Giorgio Agamben in Idea of Prose (1995), has 
ultimately been “cast out of himself”; that is, unlike other living beings who “develop only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  “It would be in contradiction to the conservative nature of the instincts,” Freud assures us in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, “if the goal of life were a state of things which had never yet been attained.  On the 
contrary, it must be an old state of things, an initial state from which the living entity has at one time or other 
departed and to which it is striving to return, by the circuitous paths along which its development leads.  If we 
are to take it as a truth that knows no exception that everything living dies for internal reasons—becomes 
inorganic once again—then we shall be compelled to say that ‘the aim of all life is death’ and looking 
backwards, that ‘inanimate things existed before living ones’” (45-46).  Freud explains that the “hypothesis of 
self-preservative instincts,” which seems to be starkly opposed to the idea that “the instinctual life as a whole 
serves to bring about death,” is explained through “the fact that the organism wishes to die only in its own 
fashion.  […]  Hence arises the paradoxical situation that the living organism struggles most energetically 
against events (dangers, in fact) which might help it to attain its life’s aim rapidly—by a kind of short-circuit.  
Such behaviour is, however, precisely what characterizes purely instinctual as contrasted with intelligent 
efforts (47).	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infinitely repeatable possibilities fixed in (their) genetic code,” the human species is 
released, not into a particular environment to which he is genetically adapted, “but for the 
first time into a world” (96). In a chapter titled “The Idea of Infancy,” Agamben’s 
discussion hinges on the neoteny exhibited by the axolotl,3 a species of albino salamander 
native to the freshwater lakes of Mexico.  Neoteny is the property by which an organism 
reaches full sexual maturation without undergoing the process of metamorphosis. The 
axolotl’s neoteny is particularly interesting to medical scientists today in that it is linked to 
the organism’s remarkable ability to regenerate lost or damaged limbs (when 
metamorphosis has been artificially triggered in axolotls by scientists this ability has been 
found to decrease significantly).  The discovery of neoteny, as Agamben explains, has also 
provided scientists with substantial—and surprising—clues to the human being’s own 
evolutionary development: “It is now supposed,” he writes, “that man did not evolve from 
individual adults but from the young of a primate which, like the axolotl, had prematurely 
acquired the capacity for reproduction [...] Characteristics which in primates are transitory 
became final in man, thereby in some way giving rise, in flesh and blood, to a kind of 
eternal child” (96).   Rather than abiding strictly by genetic law, the neotenic infant, 
prolonging its larval state “indefinitely,” is able, instead, “to pay attention precisely to what 
has not been written, to somatic possibilities that are arbitrary and uncodified” (96).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Julio Cortazar’s short story “Axolotl” provides an interesting fictional counterpoint to Agamben’s 
discussion.  The story depicts a man who, obsessed by the axolotls at the Jardin des Plantes in Paris, goes to 
visit them every day and eventually, due to the extremity of his identification with them, becomes one.  He 
then observes—from his new position behind the glass—his human “self” observing his axolotl “self.”  Once 
he has metamorphosed into an axolotl the human “self’s” interest in the axolotl wanes, and the axolotl “self” 
observes that he comes to visit less and less. The story ultimately emphasizes the continuously regenerative 
process of creative identification and representation, and the crucial role of the imagination.  In speaking of 
his relationship with his former “self,” the protagonist (speaking from the perspective of an axolotl) 
concludes: “I am an axolotl for good now, and if I think like a man it’s only because every axolotl thinks like 
a man inside his rosy stone semblance. I believe that all this succeeded in communicating something to him in 
those first days, when I was still he. And in this final solitude to which he no longer comes, I console myself 
by thinking that perhaps he is going to write a story about us, that, believing he’s making up a story, he’s 
going to write all this about axolotls” (9).	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Finding himself in this condition—free from “genetic prescription” but 
simultaneously having “nothing to say or express,” the human being begins, “like Adam,” 
to name things (96-97).  “In naming,” writes Agamben, “man is tied to infancy, he is for 
ever linked to an openness that transcends every specific destiny and every genetic calling” 
(97).  It is precisely this proto-transcendent “openness” that transforms the “yes” of a 
genetically-prescripted existence into an active, distinguishing, “no” of Being.  The “no” is 
what names; it is what, in Agamben’s words, is “truly listening to being” (96, emphasis 
added) rather than simply just (a closed and passive “yes”) being.  
Drawing from Heidegger’s exploration of the differences between man and animal 
in Being and Time, Agamben writes in a later text, The Open: “Dasein is simply an animal 
that has learned to become bored, it has awakened from its own captivation to its own 
captivation.  This awakening of the living being to its own being-captivated, this anxious 
and resolute opening to a not-open, is the human” (70).  It is this “opening to a not-open” 
that makes room, as Agamben further argues, for the development of human language—as 
well as, and by the same route, for the unconsummated desire of Stevens’s dissatisfied 
mind.   
 
Indeed, the desire that takes shape in many of Stevens’s later poems is precisely a 
desire for language itself to become “thing”; fixed, infallibly, to meaning.  “And being 
unhappy, talk of happiness,” he writes in “Extracts from Addresses...”, “And, talking of 
happiness, know that it means / That the mind is the end and must be satisfied” (CP 232).   
Language, of course, always falls short of this—and every—goal.  “Talking” of happiness 
does not, and cannot ever take the place of the experience itself that is expressed as or 
interpretable as such, and even if the mind, as in “Extracts to Adresses...” “[s]ometimes at 
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sleepy middays” actually does succeed at producing a “redeeming thought,” the thought 
itself is produced, as Stevens writes, “too vaguely” to be written down (CP 232).    
Language cannot help but fall short of experience,4 because, as Agamben helps to 
make clear, it is language itself that defines the human condition in its perpetual openness 
to “that which has not been written” (TO 96).  It is this perpetual openness—to a 
closedness, to the limitations of the language by which, and through which, the human has 
the capacity to be open—that allows for the possibility in the first place of the defining 
“no”; indeed, for definition at all.  The possibility of the mind’s satisfaction is at once both 
revealed and concealed, as the (open) idea of the “thing” is set at odds with a (closed) 
reality of that which refuses to be named, leading ultimately, of course, to the “final no” 
with which Stevens concludes “The Well Dressed Man with a Beard”: “it can never be 
satisfied, the mind, never” (CP 224).  
 
But, of course, after “the final no, there comes a yes.”  Indeed, “The Well Dressed 
Man with the Beard” is constructed with its own in-built repetition-compulsion, and it is 
upon this repetition, on the perpetuation of a fundamental conflict rather than any 
resolution to that conflict, that—like “the future world”—the poem depends.   
Even so, the animal (that is, bare, biological life) has been traditionally 
characterized in the West only in terms of the “yes” of being—reserving the “no” of 
judgement for the uniquely human.  In Rilke’s eighth Duino Elegy, for example, which 
Heidegger takes up in his own analysis, and which, in turn, is taken up by Agamben in The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  That this is consistently true in Stevens is precisely why Bloom has identified him so definitively with the 
Romantic tradition. The vibrancy of poetic inspiration and experience is, as it was for Shelley, always 
“transitory”—excessive of the poet’s efforts to transcribe it except in “inconstant” bursts.  In The Defence of 
Poetry, Shelley had written: “the mind in creation is as a fading coal which some invisible influence, like an 
inconstant wind, awakens to transitory brightness” (as quoted in Bloom, TVC 302). For both poets experience 
remains exterior to expression, and yet the two are integral to one another.  As Bloom reminds us regarding 
the line by Shelley quoted above, “the poem’s colour still comes from the power within the mind” (TVC 302).	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Open, the animal—in distinct contrast to man, who is depicted as “facing opposite” his 
world—is described as immersed within a “nowhere without the no” (57).  The human 
being, alone, says “no.” The human being, alone, in saying no, is cast out of his own 
environment, and—in being set at odds, in facing opposite his own world—thereby 
permitted to enter it.   
The world that the human being enters, however, will be perpetually split, by the 
very act of his conceiving it, between the blunt facticity of its thing-ness (which it 
necessarily retains), and the appropriation of the concept of “thing-ness” into human 
consciousness and language.   It is precisely this awareness and appropriation of “thing-
ness” by the human—along with a simultaneous awareness that that “thing-ness” can never 
resolve itself in the thing itself (nor language in experience, nor consciousness of Being in 
the bare fact of being at all) that both constitutes the “world” for the human and casts him 
out of it.  No matter how much he may desire a resolution to this fundamental split, 
resolution is made functionally impossible for the human by his very conception of “desire” 
at all. 
 
 
A Peculiar Potency  
It is precisely this rupture—between thing and “thing,” being and “Being”—that is 
elaborated upon in “The Well Dressed Man with a Beard,” even down to the poem’s title, 
where a specificity of the description (which regards, presumably, the form of the speaker) 
fails to correspond directly to the content of the speaker’s thoughts or the experiences 
represented in the poem.  This incompatibility between form and content serves to illustrate 
a more fundamental disjuncture: that between the apperception of the self and the self that 
exists beyond apperception (what Levinas would call the idea of infinity) wherein the 
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speaker constructs for himself (in order to fill the apparent void between the perceivable 
and the conceivable) the idea of the mind.  As a result, it is the mind to which the speaker 
subsequently attributes his insatiable desire.  As Thomas A. Carlson writes in The 
Indiscrete Image: Infinitude and the Creation of the Human, “the mind’s being-able-to-see 
surpasses its being-able-to-conceive, and in that excessive gap, which it sees in looking 
upon itself, the human mind fulfills itself as image of unimaginable possibility” (112).  
In keeping with the thinking of Agamben and Heidegger before him, Carlson asserts 
that it is, indeed, the opening of this “excessive gap” that constitutes the human.  “Forever 
incomplete and indeterminate,” writes Carlson, the “neotenic” human “must invent 
language and world, must become technological, within the irreducible openness of mortal 
potential” (199)—an openness that, as Carlson goes on to write, implies of him “both 
irreducible unknowing and immeasurable responsibility” (117).    
  
Though the perception of Stevens as an “anti-realist, a solipsist, an escapist” persists 
due to what has long been considered his lack of engagement with the “world of fact,” he 
remains, despite these claims, as Dan Chiasson writes, “the great poet of the continuity of 
thought” (63).  It is true that Stevens managed to isolate himself from the upheavals of 
early twentieth century American history with a degree of success remarkable for a poet of 
the time, especially for one who once ambitiously asserted that he wanted to write poems 
that would help us to “live our lives” (CP 665), but—as Chiasson suggests—we should not 
be over-quick to dismiss this ambition, or even its achievement, as unrealistic to Stevens’s 
poetry.  
I would submit, however, adapting Chiasson’s observation, that in fact, ultimately, 
Stevens is not a poet of thought’s continuity, but instead of the awareness of thought’s 
inevitable discontinuity.  Awareness, that is, of the manner in which the mind is ultimately 
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split between the “yes” of its passive, repetitive compulsion toward existent-being, and the 
“no” of its critical awareness of that being: its openness, in other words, to the possibilities, 
as well as the limitations, of its “world.”  
  A similar split—between a passive pre-conscious state and the activated critical 
consciousness of the cogito—is formulated by Levinas in Totality and Infinity. “Before the 
cogito existence dreams itself, as though it remained foreign to itself,” writes Levinas. “It is 
because it suspects that it is dreaming itself that it awakens.  The doubt makes it seek 
certainty” (86).  Again, we see here the oscillation between the conscious doubting “no,” (It 
is all a dream! All has been, or will be, illusion, slid “over the western cataract”! [Stevens, 
CP 224]) and the irrepressible desire on the part of the cogito itself for the “yes” of pre-
cogito being; for a pre-conscious time, before words and conception (“Ah! douce 
campagna, honey in the heart, / Green in the body, out of a pretty phrase, out of a thing 
believed, a thing affirmed” [Stevens, CP 224]).  However much she desires it, however, the 
cogito will be unable to remain in this pre-conscious dream-space, this “douce campagna” 
of the “thing affirmed,” for long.  Soon she will be returned, having “suspect(ed)” she was 
dreaming, to the limits of her own fallible, known world: this “openness to (the) 
closedness,” after all, is what constitutes her Being.    
The space of oscillation that is described by Levinas between dream and doubt is 
precisely the space of oscillation between the “yes” and “final no” of Stevens’s dissatisfied 
mind—and it is from this space, therefore from the “dissatisfied mind” itself—that 
language issues.  Levinas writes: “In fact signification is maintained only in the breach of 
the ultimate unity of the satisfied being...Thus consciousness itself has been derived from 
this breach.  The intelligible would result from the non-satisfaction, the provisional 
indigence of this being, its remaining short of its accomplishment” (TI 95).  It is highly 
“significant,” therefore, that it is within a space of inherent dis-satisfaction that the mind of 
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Stevens’s poem, and that language itself, should “sustain itself” (Stevens, CP 224), as it is 
precisely this dissatisfaction, this awareness of the extreme, and always-prior, fallibility of 
human thought—its “irreducible unknowing,” and the subsequently always provisional 
nature of language and other human technology—that constitutes what Carlson has referred 
to as humanity’s “immeasurable responsibility” (117). It is this dissatisfaction with what 
has already been “said” that constitutes the potential of—and the responsibility to—an 
active, renewable, “saying.” 
 
Indeed, according to Jean-Paul Marion, the “greatest danger” that humanity faces 
today is a predilection for its own violent, exclusionary definition (Carlson 120). “For every 
de-finition5 imposes on the human being a finite essence,” states Marion, “following from 
which it always becomes possible to delimit what deserves to remain human from what no 
longer does” (as quoted in Carlson 121).  It is the human capacity not for determinateness 
(a “no” that remains a “no,” imagining that it understands the full import of what it is 
rejecting), but instead for indeterminateness that creates space for the cultivation of the 
creative, perpetually generative space of the mind as imagined by Stevens—and it is, 
indeed, the cultivation of this space that may still, as Stevens once hoped, help people to 
“live their lives.” That is, it may help us to continue to exist within the realm of possibility 
proper to the human: “a possibility irreducible to the horizon of actuality [...] disclosed but 
invisible in all beings (and nonbeings) just as light is invisibly disclosed in all visible things 
[...] or language silently spoken in all things said, or Being absently present in all beings” 
(Carlson 111-112).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Marion here plays with the French word finition, meaning “finish” or “finishing,” and often used to refer to a 
surface coating.	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But what does it mean to be concerned primarily with what exceeds actuality, what 
may never properly be contained by the poem at all? “Is there a poem that never reaches 
words?” asks Wallace Stevens in “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction,” and indeed it is to the 
possibility of this poem that Stevens is dedicated, rather than to its realization.  In “Notes” 
is enacted—perhaps for the first time, and certainly most overtly—the declaration Stevens 
had made ten years earlier in The Man With the Blue Guitar: “Poetry is the subject of the 
poem” (CP 144). “Is the poem both peculiar and general?” inquires Stevens further on in 
the same section of “Notes,” replying: “There’s a meditation there, in which there seems // 
To be an evasion, a thing not apprehended or / Not apprehended well. Does the poet / 
Evade us, as in a senseless element?” (CP 343).  The tension evident in these lines, between 
the peculiar and the general, the sensible and the abstract, the singular “I” and that which 
exceeds the “I,” is of course fundamental to Stevens’s poetics, and is what gives rise, 
effectively, to a negative-space of representation in the work.  This is a space defined 
neither by the “abstract” nor by the “concrete,” neither the “I” nor the “non-I,” but that is, 
instead, inclusive—and generative—of both.  
Just as in a photograph, or indeed even a written word on a page, where it is the 
negative-space of the image and not the imaged thing that gives rise to that which is 
perceived, so it is with the negative-space developed especially in Stevens’s late poems. 
Importantly, however, it is not a frozen negative-image itself, a stasis of the neither/nor, 
that Stevens endeavours to explore within this space, but instead the fecund momentum of 
the “and.” Here there is a synthesis of the abstract and concrete that moves toward 
(“toward” being of course a crucial clue in the title of “Notes” as to the poem’s central 
concern—a poetics of motion) what at the end of Section IX Stevens articulates as “[t]he 
peculiar potency of the general” (CP 343, emphasis added).  
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It is this “peculiar potency”—which Stevens describes further, using a characteristic 
play of language, as a “compound” of “the imagination’s Latin with/ The lingua franca et 
jocundissima”6—that is suggested to be the poet’s true aim.  However, it is ambiguous by 
the section’s end if that ultimate goal is not indeed also, and ultimately, an “evasion.”  This 
ambiguity is central to the concerns of the text, as well as to the concerns of the poet; 
Stevens was plagued throughout his career by the question of the “practical” efficacy of his 
own poetic aims.  Was a meditation on poetry itself—the “abstraction” of language from 
speech so much that it becomes, as Stevens writes, “a speech only a little of the tongue”—
indeed a “potency,” a veritable “poetry” (as in poesis, a making), or was it only an evasive, 
rhetorical move? One that adheres finally neither to the sensible nor to the abstract, but falls 
instead—in an “intricate evasion” (CP 414)—precisely in the middle? Stevens’s greatest 
fear would have been precisely this: that his poetry was not, in the end, a making of 
anything at all, but only something made. That it was, therefore, in fact, not “poetry” at all, 
but only a series of “poems.”  
 
Because ultimately Stevens’s poetry is not about what can be contained within, or 
become the “subject” of any “poem,” but about what will always evade both poem and 
poet, the question of what and for what the poem actually speaks is bound to continually 
recur when considering Stevens’s poetry.  It is significant in light of this question that, in 
“Notes,” Stevens radically distances himself from the voice of the “Canon Aspirin” (a voice 
that can, in keeping with Harold Bloom, be safely identified with a High Romanticism) 
precisely at the point that the voice moves away from evasion and begins instead to impose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  This “compound” between the English adjective “jocund” and the Italian superlative ‘issima’ is typical of 
Stevens’s enthusiastic word play.  The emphasis on the jocund here – the lighthearted, the joyful – 
underscores the role of “play” itself to Stevens’s conception of language and meaning production, which he 
saw to be ever-evolving and infinitely malleable.	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“orders as he thinks of them, / As the fox and snake do” (CP 348).  In other words, it is 
language’s ability to evade, to be abstract, rather than to name anything precisely, that is 
recognized in the poem as its true power.  It is the imposition of “orders” that inevitably 
leads, the poem indicates, to the building of “capitols” where “in their corridors, / Whiter 
than wax, sonorous, fame as it is, / He establishes statues of reasonable men” (CP 349). 
Language, in other words, when considered not as process, but as object, can lead only to 
the proliferation of the concrete—capitols, statues of reasonable men—and it is this that 
Stevens would like, specifically, to avoid.  In Heideggerian terms, “Notes” can be 
understood to mark the beginning of a new emphasis in Stevens’s work—rather than on the 
relationship between word and meaning, on that which exceeds both in a  “manifold 
enunciating” (Heidegger PLT 195). 
“Everyone knows that a poem is an invention,” Heidegger once wrote.   “In the 
poem’s speaking the poetic imagination gives itself utterance.  What is spoken in the poem 
is what the poet enunciates out of himself.  What is thus spoken out speaks by enunciating 
its content.  The language of the poem is a manifold enunciating” (PLT 195). Language is 
not, in other words, a “naming” that would “merely,” as Heidegger goes on to write, “deck 
out the imaginable familiar objects and events...with words of a language” (PLT 196); 
poetry (and it is specifically the poetry of Hölderlin that provides Heidegger with the 
material and inspiration for this claim) offers the possibility of a naming that “does not 
hand out titles,” or “apply terms” but instead “calls” something into being (PLT 196).  “The 
naming calls,” he writes. And:  
[c]alling brings closer what it calls.  However this bringing closer does not fetch 
what is called only in order to set it down in closest proximity to what is present, to 
find a place for it there.  The call does indeed call.  Thus it brings the presence of 
what was previously uncalled into nearness.  But the call, in calling it here, has 
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already called out to what it calls.  Where to?  Into the distance in which what is 
called remains, still absent (PLT 196). 
Language is that which one “beats and beats an old tin can, lard pail” (CP 185), as 
does Stevens’s “Man on the Dump.”  It is, in Holander’s words, “the end and origin” of 
poetry itself, and the belief of that “distance” between end and origin is precisely what “will 
not let itself be possessed, but remains something one ‘wants to get near’” (118).  The 
calling is not a naming, then, but a repetition compulsion—a rhythmic, non-figurative 
“beating,” which results in the demarcation of the empty space where the call itself 
originates and must remain.  It is not to language itself, therefore, but this space of “the 
call” that Stevens gestures toward with the question, “Is there a poem that never reaches 
words?”  It is within such a space—beyond the speaking of the poem, beyond the naming—
that the active imagination by which “the call” (and therefore the eventual content of the 
poem) is produced can be made present, even though the generative force or “call” itself 
will forever remain absent from the text.   
Where Stevens, once again, departs from Heidegger’s formulation, is in the 
description of the poem as the “purely spoken” (205).  As discussed at greater length in 
Chapter Three, Stevens’s conception of “pure poetry” differs significantly from 
Heidegger’s, as well as from the Symbolist’s7. For Stevens the true poetic concern should 
not be for “transcendence” in the sense of a departure or flight from the “reality” of the 
world, or from the noisiness and “jocundissima” of speech, but instead for locating a 
broader “Reality”—and a more supple tongue with which to express it.  This broader 
“Reality” was one that Stevens hoped might accommodate the always-ongoing and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  His use of this term confused critics for years.	  	  As James Logenbach has importantly noted, Stevens’s 
understanding of “pure poetry” owes less to Mallarmé than it does to the writings of Benedetto Croce.  For 
Croce, the truly “pure” poem dwelt not beyond the poem, but in a middle ground between the extremes of 
reference and music, between the life of the world and the life of the text (151), much like Roland Barthes’ 
“Rustle of Language.”	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relational interaction between the phenomenal world and the life of the mind.  So that even 
where Stevens would seem to agree with Heidegger’s formulation of “world” and “thing” 
as traversing a middle-space where they are “at one” (PLT 199)—where he would also 
seem to agree that poetry, as Heidegger writes, “is not a higher mode of everyday language 
(but) rather the reverse,” that “everyday language, is a forgotten and therefore used-up 
poem, from which there hardly resounds a call any longer” (PLT 205)—he ultimately 
distances himself from Heidegger’s analysis.  For Stevens, poetry is not the High Romantic 
rhetoric of the Canon Aspirin, but the speech of a blended, garbled “compound” tongue—
which even then can only account for a “part” of what is spoken.  Stevens is always careful 
to maintain this emphasis on what (will always) exceed even the most inclusive 
“jocundissima”; what will remain ultimately outside of the poem,“only a little of the 
tongue.”  It is because of this that he develops, increasingly as his career progresses, and in 
accordance with his simultaneous increasing conviction that “It Must Be Abstract,” a 
fixation on the articulation of a negative-space within his poetry wherein the processes and 
materiality of representation itself might be accommodated and expressed.  “Notes Toward 
a Supreme Fiction” provides a vanguard example.  
It is indeed the decidedly un-transcendental space of “dif-ference” (by which 
Heidegger defines the “middle” space between “world” and “thing”) that constitutes this 
space in Stevens’s work, but it can again be better understood in terms of the Derridean 
evolution of the term: that is, as a space of différance, where différance is to be understood 
no longer as “a concept” but instead “rather the possibility of conceptuality” (MOP 11). In 
reference to the orders “imposed” by the Canon Aspirin, for example, we are reminded: 
“But to impose is not to discover,” and a little later (betraying the unfashionable optimism 
that would have him labelled a disengaged “hedonist” for years): “It is possible, possible, 
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possible.  It must / Be possible.  It must be that in time / The real will from its crude 
compounding come...” (CP 348).  This space—not of the “possible,” but of the “call” to a 
“possibility” of the possible—is the negative-space within which Stevens’s poetry begins to 
take shape.    
Certainly, the repetition of the word “possible” evokes at this point in the poem—
rather than Heidegger’s “peal of stillness”—a noisy attempt at communication.  Where a 
“stillness” of language (achieved through the “purely spoken”) is, for Heidegger, “not 
anything human,” Stevens’s “pure poetry” is instead precisely this: a stuttering, most 
human, cry. The repetition of the word, and the further insistence, “it must / Be possible,” 
resounds less as assertion than as a desperate desire for that possibility to arise.  It is made 
clear, however, that this possibility must arise not through words, but out of that which 
exceeds language—the “fiction of an absolute” with which Stevens concludes this Section.  
“Angel--,” he writes, “Be silent in your luminous cloud and hear / The luminous melody of 
proper sound” (CP 349).  This indeed cannot be construed as an invitation to, nor a 
celebration of, silence, but rather as the opposite: the “luminous melody” of attempted 
speech, a noise, or sound; it is this that is “proper” to the human, and thus that is the 
“proper” subject and  “proper” speech of the poem.  
But if even this—the “absolute,” the “properly” human—ultimately must be 
understood as a “fiction,” it is no wonder that Stevens continues in Section VIII: “What am 
I to believe?” Bloom has asked: “What kind of a question is this, open or rhetorical? And 
which of these words is to be emphasized: what? am? I? believe?” (WS 212).  All of these 
are valid inquiries, of course—questions which the phrasing of Stevens’s own question 
seems to demand.  What is invalid—that is, what is not elicited by the question, or by the 
poem—is the assurance with which Bloom provides an answer.  “ ‘I’ is the answer,” Bloom 
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writes, “and the question is rhetorical, implying the single answer, “I am to believe in a 
fiction of the self, in a trope of myself  (WS 212). 
 “It is impossible,” as J. Hillis Miller has written, “to find a single one-dimensional 
theory of poetry and life in Stevens” (146). This is not, in philosophical terms, a sign of 
weakness or lack of focus in his thinking, but rather of a departure from the conventionally 
“imposed” methods of writing both philosophy and poetry. Simon Critchley’s 2005 book, 
Things Merely Are: Philosophy in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens, though highly interesting 
and relevant to Stevens studies, makes it quite clear that there continues on the part of 
critics a desire to claim Stevens either for the side of the poets or for the philosophers.  On 
the other hand, there is the equally divisive reaction against him: claims from the 
philosophers that his philosophy is too poetic, and, with chiastic logics, from the poets that 
his poetry is too philosophical.  Stevens himself was not concerned with such categories.  
Instead, what concerned him was an inclusive space between these categories and 
disciplines that might allow one to dispense with them altogether. Such a space would be 
one of which one could posit, along with Nietzsche, that there may exist “a more laudable 
truthfulness in every little question mark that you place after your special words and 
favourite doctrines (and occasionally after yourselves) than in all the solemn gestures and 
trumps before accusers and law courts” (36).    
For Stevens, of course, your “favourite doctrines” after which a question mark 
might be legitimately placed, includes poetry itself. This explains the advent of his 
explicitly metapoetic explorations in “Notes,” continued in his later poems—notably in 
poems such as “Looking Across the Fields and Watching the Birds Fly,” and “The Poem 
That Took the Place of a Mountain,” which enact what Rosalind Krauss, in relation to 
visual art, has termed a “redoubled vision”—a “seeing and a knowing that one sees” (19). 
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But Stevens’s real goal lies beyond a questioning of the “doctrines” of poetry and 
philosophy; instead, it is Nietzsche’s aside—“occasionally after yourselves”—where he 
would most emphatically place his interrogative mark.  Stevens’s is a questioning not only 
of language or of principle but of Being itself, and as he moves in the later poems toward 
what Hillis Miller calls a language of “flickering mobility, a poetry in which each phrase 
moves so rapidly it has beginning and ending at once” (153), this becomes strikingly clear.   
This “flickering mobility” is indeed quite the opposite of the “stillness” that Heidegger 
evokes for the “purely spoken,” and it is perhaps those readers and critics who persist in 
equating poetry to that “stillness”—as that which might indeed be spoken “purely”—who 
resist the philosophical strain of Stevens’s poetry, criticizing it for its incongruencies, 
before recognizing that it is precisely that space of incongruence, the space between the 
peculiar (language) and the general (the world to which that language ultimately refers) that 
constitutes the very fundament of Stevens’s poetics.  In the terms delineated elsewhere by 
Heidegger as “the open”—the interval within which man is “awakened from its own 
captivation to its own captivation” (Agamben, TO 70)—it is a particularly human space.  
Stevens’s is not, that is, a poetry that strives to transcend the space of captivation, but 
instead one that strives to place a question mark after it. 
 
In Heidegger’s analysis of the work of Hölderlin in his essay “What Are Poets 
For?” he reflects on the following fragment: “But where there is danger, there grows / also 
what saves,” considering first the implications of the word “danger” and finally what it 
means for “salvation” to inhabit, or to emerge, from that shared space. “What is deadly is 
not the much-discussed atomic bomb” (PLT 114) he wrote in this lecture of 1946; “...The 
danger consists in the threat that assaults man’s nature in his relation to Being itself” (PLT 
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115).  Heidegger’s technophobia may be ultimately limiting to his thinking, and his utopian 
vision of retreat from the scientific and technological world is surely sideways to any 
worthwhile consideration of our contemporary world, but what is at root of Heidegger’s 
denouncement and fear is still, if not more than ever, relevant to us here. As Carlson 
reflects, it is the “thoughtlessness that Heidegger [...] sees at the heart of a modernity 
consumed by research, (that) manifests itself in a mode of thought that is all too 
understanding and hence that excludes the possibility of any amazement in which not 
understanding would, in fact, be the precondition of genuine—that is, truly questioning or 
truly philosophical—thought”(Carlson 50).8  
What Heidegger rejects, in other words, in keeping with his radical critique of a 
philosophy of presence in Being and Time, is the ultimate reliance of technology and 
science on the ontology of presence, on the physical: “What threatens man in his very 
nature is the willed view that man, by the peaceful release, transformation, storage, and 
channelling of the energies of physical nature, could render the human condition, man’s 
being, tolerable for everybody and happy in all respects” (PLT 114).  What, on the other 
hand, Hölderlin’s poetry makes possible, according to Heidegger, and what, I argue, 
Stevens’s metapoetic negative-space of representation also affords is ultimately—the “I” 
placed eternally in question—a space of danger.  It is in this space that the “I” risks—as 
Plato had feared, thus his banning of the Poets from the “Republic”—dissolving entirely. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  To a certain extent, as Foucault made clear through his critique of episteme, this is the problem with which 
all investigation and critique is faced. Any investigation is, as Foucault pointed out in The Order of Things, 
limited from the outset to the parameters that the investigation itself has drawn—the findings limited to what 
the investigation is already prepared to find.  Every critique is restricted most rigorously, therefore, by its 
anticipated outcome, and so needs to move away from any outcome at the same time that it attempts to arrive 
at one. As Judith Butler writes in her essay, “What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue”: “Critique is 
always a critique of some instituted practice, discourse, episteme, institution, and it loses its character the 
moment in which it is abstracted from its operation and made to stand alone as a purely generalizable practice. 
But if this is true, this does not mean that no generalizations are possible or that, indeed, we are mired in 
particularisms. On the contrary, we tread here in an area of constrained generality, one which broaches the 
philosophical, but must, if it is to remain critical, remain at a distance from that very achievement” (eipcp, 
May 2001).	  
	   
233	  
But this “danger” indeed constitutes the poetry’s “saving power.” As Stevens once wrote, 
“The poet represents the mind in the act of defending us against itself” (CP 911)—a 
statement with which critic James Logenbach pairs the following passage by Kenneth 
Burke, a thinker whose wariness toward the confusion of art and politics, and their 
respective strengths and roles, matched Stevens’s own: “An art may be of value purely 
through preventing a society from becoming too assertively, too hopelessly, itself” (265).   
But where does this leave us? What are poets for? Where does what looks very 
much like an endless questioning lead us?  How can such a question be legitimately asked?  
Let alone answered?  
Perhaps it leaves us in the space from which we came: an in-between space—not of 
an excessive reliance on presence but neither on a pure negativity: a space of danger, of 
Being placed in question—of being called, in the questioning, suddenly near.  Perhaps it is, 
after all, this: an ability to be drawn into proximity with the ambiguous space of Being, and 
to not become the space itself, that is our “saving power.” That is, our ability to “face 
opposite” our world, as artists, and as human beings, to risk empathy, to encounter the 
Other—an encounter which is not, and could never be, a forfeiture of our own subjectivity 
as Plato had feared, but is instead, in Levinas’s terms, the primordial ethical action, the 
“ultimate situation of the face to face” (Levinas 81).  
The possibility of a return to this primordial relation, a manifestation, through 
language, of that original confrontation—the very space of the human as first defined by 
Carolus Linnaeus (not, that is by any description but only by the imperative: nosce te 
ipsum, know yourself [Agamben TO, 25])—is indeed what constitutes that space in the first 
place.  It is the ability to “face opposite,” to be “amazed”—“captivated” by our own space 
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of “captivation”—that allows us to resist becoming too “assertively, too hopelessly, 
ourselves” (Logenbach 265).   
 
A Saving Power 
“It is not the insufficiency of the I that prevents totalization,” writes Levinas, in 
Totality and Infinity, “but the Infinity of the Other” (80).  The space of that relation exists, 
however, not finally in the territory of the Other, but in the in-between territory of the 
peculiar and general, the “I” and the “non-I,” the fictive and the real, the “mind and the 
sky.”  This is the active, inter-spatial territory that Stevens spent his poetic career working 
to delineate.  In keeping with this, Holander provides a convincing analysis of “Waving 
Adieu, Adieu, Adieu,” from “Ideas of Order,” in which he observes that “to be one’s 
singular self” (as the poem, according to Holander, suggests “one should”), “would not 
only be to bid farewell but perpetually to ‘be bidding farewell,’ to ‘be waving adieu.’” (80).  
The poem’s final stanzas conclude as follows, further emphasizing the active, always-ever 
transitional territory conceived of within the poem:  
To be one’s singular self, to despise 
The being that yielded so little, acquired 
So little, too little to care, to turn 
To the ever-jubilant weather, to sip 
 
One’s cup and never say a word, 
Or to sleep or just to lie there still, 
Just to be there, just to be beheld, 
That would be bidding farewell, be bidding farewell.  
 
One likes to practise the thing.  They practice, 
Enough, for heaven.  Ever-jubilant, 
What is there here but weather, what spirit 
Have I except it comes from the sun? (CP 104).  
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Importantly, like so much of Stevens’s poetry, the grammatical structure of this passage is 
conditional; it is written in the speculative mode (“That would be the bidding…”), the 
grammatical mode of philosophy.  The gerund “bidding” becomes, as Holander states, “part 
of a non-finite infinitive clause,” which thus defines “the individual as isolated in self-
identity” (80), but this—it must be remembered—is achieved by Stevens while retaining 
the collective and investigative grammar of the speculative mode. Another important 
grammatical observation is made by Holander regarding the phrase, “To be one’s singular 
self,” where he observes that Stevens “turns the copular use of ‘to be,’ which would 
normally link two different terms, into an existential one” (80).  According to this usage, 
Hollander notes: “it is just to be.  This inward turn is simultaneously envisioned as a turn to 
the natural world” (80).  “Being” needs to be understood, Holander urges, as both a verb 
and a noun within the poem, positioning itself  “in between” the pure exteriority 
represented by “the weather” and the pure interiority of the “singular self.”  To achieve this 
grammatical positioning is precisely the work of the gerund. The gerund “being” works 
within the poem to indicate, as Holander writes, its “complex involvement with a reality of 
others, a common yet discordant world of collective but conflictive fictions and languages” 
(81).   
The final stanza makes a clear separation between those who would “practice” for a 
fixed idea of “heaven” that is finally separate from a notion of an “ever-jubilant” being, and 
those, like the speaker, who translate the necessity of “waving adieu” (“à-Dieu”[Holander 
181]) in personal terms as a practice in itself—something “non-final and constant” and not 
merely a rehearsal for an event over which they have no control, and are not now a part.  
“The difference between the atheist speaker and the religious others,” explains Holander, 
“is also formulated as a difference between necessity and pleasure, vocation and vacation, 
between those who need to practice the thing, since their final leave-taking  (as they 
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believe) will initiate a transport to heaven, and one that, although the sense is also that he 
has to do it—and cannot but do it—tries to claim to enjoy doing so” (Holander 81).  
 The atheist conceives of himself as an inherent part of the whole, and the processes, 
“practices,” that contribute to that whole: “what spirit / Have I except that it comes from the 
sun?” (CP 104). It is precisely in these terms that the poet considers himself in relation to 
language: poetry being the active, “non-final and constant” process by which language is 
continually “called” into being, which resists calcification in the imposition of an “order” 
that Stevens laments in “Notes Toward A Supreme Fiction” (CP 343).   
In the final section of “Notes,” Stevens concludes with the following plea: “Soldier, 
there is a war between the mind / And sky, between thought and day and night.  It is for that 
the poet is always in the sun” (CP 351). The poet, in other words, is he who speaks in the 
“non-finite infinitive clause, defining these de-personalized activities as constitutive of 
existence” (Holander 80).  He speaks, in other words, in the imperative— “know 
yourself”—of Being.  That is—for Stevens—what poets are for. “The soldier is poor 
without the poet’s lines,” he writes, and, most movingly: “How simply the fictive hero 
becomes the real” (CP 352).   
It is not the real alone that creates its reality—a causa sui that would be, as 
Nietzsche writes, “a sort of rape and perversion of logic” (21); it is the constant 
interpenetration of reality and the imagination that creates our experience in the world, and 
it is this that Stevens’s poem is finally testament to.  We are constantly shaping and re-
shaping our realities through the interaction between the fictive and the real, through our 
encounters with the Other, and the limitations and possibilities of the empathy that each 
encounter allows. “These external regions, what do we fill them with / Except reflections, 
the escapades of death, / Cinderella fulfilling herself beneath the roof?” (CP 350).  It is up 
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to us, Stevens suggests, to fill “our external regions” (CP 350) with the reflections of the 
sort of imaginative hero by which we would like, in reality, to be one day “saved.” 
But Stevens’s conception of poetry as “a mystical, spontaneous creative process 
bringing opposites together,” his elaboration of an in-between space where fact and fiction 
can marry, where “Cinderella” can at last be “fulfilled,” does not address the schism 
between that imagined “fulfillment” (a satisfaction that is forever deferred), and the 
“actuality” of the dearth that remains.  The risk that Stevens runs in representing the 
imagination and the poetic process as “a kind of immanence, an essence residing in its 
representation yet not equalled by it” (Holander 105) is one, as Holander duly notes, of  
“‘isolating art’ against its own intentions” (105).   Through emphasis on a world of the 
imagination that is always “immanent,” that can never be accessed in concrete terms, the 
schism between reality and the imagination risks being understood as unbridgeable—rather 
than allowing that “immanence” to form the desired and constantly projected bridge. The 
“alienating moment implicit in art” emphasized in Stevens’s reliance on rhetorical figures 
like “subman” in “Owl’s Clover” and “major man,” in “Notes,” serve to underscore, on the 
one hand, the “semantic impenetrability or otherness, but on the other...the possibility of 
(re)interpretation” (Holander 105). Holander posits that Stevens’s disruption, through the 
use of these figures, and of the oppositions inferred between “art and reality, ‘creation’ and 
‘rhetoric,’ suggests that deconstruction is itself a Hegelian enterprise,” and that what is 
accomplished by the “negative work” of long poems like “Owl’s Clover”—and certainly, I 
would add, of “Notes”—is “if not a resolution or synthesis, a positive new understanding of 
the oppositions between which it pretends to mediate” (105).   
But Stevens’s insistence on an existent negative-space between, and in surplus to 
both reality and the imagination—a space that cannot be subsumed into any universal idea, 
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let alone a reality of any named “heaven”—opens up a space of encounter not only with 
“semantic otherness” but a more fundamentally “external region” beyond mediation.  In 
contrast with the Western philosophical tradition, Stevens navigates a space of identity and 
spirituality beyond “consciousness, thematic exposition of being, knowing” (Levinas, OTB 
99).  Like Levinas, his concern is not with knowledge, but with sensibility, which he 
understands “not as a knowing but as proximity” (OTB 99). Both Levinas and Stevens seek 
within language contact and sensibility “behind the circulation of information it becomes” 
and attempt to “describe subjectivity as irreducible to consciousness and thematization” 
(OTB 100).  Rather than the space of equality (“self equals self”) by which, for Hegel, 
consciousness is described, Stevens is concerned with the far more anarchic space 
described by Levinas: the obsessional space of “the-one-for-the-other” (OTB 100).   
The point that Levinas makes about this space is in essence very simple.  The 
relationship between self and other, “I” and “non-I,” is only partially accounted for by the 
information to which we are able to reduce it through our senses—primarily of sight.  There 
is an aspect of “proximity” to the other that remains irreducible to images.  It is with this 
purely subjective relation—that of proximity—rather than with any objective or imagistic 
measurement of distance that both Levinas and Stevens are primarily concerned.  What 
remains “beyond visibility” cannot be reduced to a “sign,” but nonetheless is not exempt 
from the process of signification.  In fact, as Levinas argues, it is “the very transcending 
character of this beyond that is signification” (OTB 100, emphasis added). Just as the 
“saying” is not reducible to the “said,” so “proximity” refers to the relationship to the other 
that is irreducible to consciousness or identity:  “The relationship of proximity,” writes 
Levinas, “cannot be reduced to any modality of distance or geometrical contiguity, nor to 
the simple ‘representation’ of a neighbour; it is already an assignation, an extremely urgent 
assignation—an obligation, anachronously prior to any commitment” (OTB 100-101).  
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“The-one-for-the-other” of proximity which cannot properly be “represented” is precisely 
this “surplus of responsibility” that constitutes “the very signifyingness of signification!” 
(Levinas, OTB 100).  To be clear: before any information resolves itself in images, in the 
“said,” in the encounter of the “face to face,” or in “knowledge,” there is an invisible 
process beyond-signification through which signification—all images, all “knowledge”—
takes place, but which remains always in surplus of that signification.   It is to this 
“surplus” (a measurement that exceeds objective distance but not the subjective 
measurement of proximity) that we are indebted, bound by an anteriority “ ‘older’ than the a 
priori” (Levinas, OTB 101).   
It is important, however, that this “surplus of responsibility” that exists “beyond” 
representation, mediation, and indeed of consciousness itself, be understood not in terms of  
“‘further’ than everything that appears, or ‘present in absence,’ or ‘shown by a symbol” 
(Levinas, OTB 100).  Barthes’s photograph, Stevens’s “fatal, dominant X,” in and of 
themselves, do not articulate this space: they remain fundamentally “subject to a principle, 
to be given in consciousness” (Levinas, OTB 100).  What is “beyond” is that which 
essentially refuses to be “tamed or domesticated by a theme,” which “loses its own 
signifyingness and becomes an immanence as soon as logos interpellates, invests, presents 
and exposes it, whereas its adjacency in proximity is an absolute exteriority” (Levinas, 
OTB 100).  It is, therefore, that which escapes Barthes’s photograph, that which refuses to 
be named by Stevens’s X, which enters into the space of “transcendence” beyond 
representation, and also why the photograph as “representation,” the poem as “the said,” 
and finally the “mind” as a self-equalizing consciousness cannot be “satisfied”: all three are 
contingent upon a territory “beyond” that is absolutely anarchic, un-representable.  
Objectively, Stevens can get no nearer than Levinas toward a representation of the 
“beyond”: he cannot close in on “signifyingness” itself, but can only work to articulate the 
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ongoing process by which Being is constituted by “a responsibility for the other” that goes 
finally “beyond” Western categorical knowledge; he can only disrupt the notion of 
“equality of self with self” (Levinas, OTB 102).  Through an exploration of the anarchic 
space of “proximity,” which is the very territory of language itself (understood, that is, in 
terms of a poetic capacity not to name, but rather to apprehend, and communicate, a “call”) 
Stevens works to bring that which is called, that which is un-thematizable into “presence.”   
In this sense, he resists submitting language to domestication or “theme,” encouraging 
instead only a “nearness”—a “proximity” to the subject, which will (and must) remain 
forever “absent” (Heidegger, PLT 196), always in “surplus” of that which could be 
“present-ed,” “re-presented” or “named,” but which nonetheless offers us if not knowledge, 
then a “sense” of Being itself as the “very signifyingness of signification” (Levinas, OTB 
100).  
 
The Pure Present 
Stevens’s formulation of the “poetic concept” as ultimately incompatible with a 
Western philosophical tradition, which would seek to understand poetry, and language 
itself, in terms of a “still-point” of “knowledge,” is what ultimately causes him to shift the 
emphasis in his work from the already completed moment of the “said” to the immanent 
“saying” power of language: the “dizzle-dazzle of being new / And of becoming...Of that 
which is always beginning, over and over (CP 449).  For Stevens the present participle 
(“being,” “becoming”) is always more replete with possibility and than the dead-end of the 
preterite with its illusive suggestion of a definite end point of any verb. Stevens’s primary 
“poetic concept” is definitively one of movement, action, and change.  So much is this the 
case that in the later collections the poetry becomes increasingly obsessed by its own 
inability to name that movement, action, or change.  Far from giving up on the idea that 
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language might come to “present” that which must remain absent, Stevens emphasizes 
instead the manner in which “logos”—and precisely through its very exteriority—
delineates a space of absence that, though it cannot be “named,” presented “as such,” can 
be made proximate, “brought near,” in much the same way that the physical limits of the 
body delineate a space of absence between the self and the other.  Regardless of the fact 
that the distance that is delineated cannot at last be reduced to “geometrical contiguity” 
(Levinas, OTB 101) and that it therefore cannot ultimately be either represented or bridged, 
the exteriority of the physical limits of the body, the encounter of the “face to face,” remain 
at the root of all signification—and therefore all possibility for encounter and inter-action. 
The idea of “absolute exteriority” as the limit from which all interiority, as well as all 
potential inter-action between subjectivities begins, is explicitly worked out in The Rock’s 
“Note on Moonlight.”  
The one moonlight, in the simple-colored night, 
Like a plain poet revolving in his mind 
The sameness of his various universe, 
Shines on the mere objectiveness of things (CP 449) 
 
This simile structure, whereby the natural, exterior, “objective” world is explored in terms 
of the interior “subjectivity” of the individual, is common to Stevens: it is the same 
comparative structure that was developed in his earlier “Re-Statement of Romance,” where 
he disrupts the roles of the individual beholden to the “sublime” Nature/God; in “Re-
statement” it is the individual, “supremely true each to its separate self,” through which the 
universe may be “best” understood.   What Stevens points toward is something intrinsic to 
all simile per se: the dialogue between the external world of perceivable objects (what we 
might, for simplicity’s sake, call “reality”) and subjective perception (or, equally, the 
“imagination”).  The comparison, in “Re-Statement of Romance,” of “I am what I am” to 
the way in which the world, exterior to the self, “is what it is,” both accepts and works to 
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reveal the basis of the simile structure itself, which is always one of comparison and 
relation—never one of equivalence or of subjugation. The “imagination” is never 
“beholden” to “reality,” but is instead, as it is written in “Waving Adieu Adieu Adieu,” 
“beheld”(CP 104).  An autonomy over and above the disinterested natural world  
(“reality”)—its “ever-jubilant weather”—is asserted, but not in a manner that either simply 
reverses a pre-existing power-structure between “reality” and the “imagination,” or asserts 
the supremacy of one over the other. Stevens’s poetic investigations into the “singular self” 
hinge not on that “singular self’s” ability to “behold,” or be “beholden” but on the way in 
which the self is always ever “beheld” by that which remains—irreducible to consciousness 
or knowledge and “‘older’ than the a priori” (Levinas, OTB 101)—beyond being.  
 
But what does remain when the investigation of selfhood is stripped of its insistence 
on a ground of knowledge where “self” must equal “self”? When there is, to the contrary, a 
space afforded for the call of language to echo in “proximity” to being without being forced 
to “present” itself (resulting in “the mere objectiveness of things”), as well as for the 
lingering question as to what exceeds the “lineaments” of the object?  Any ontological 
insistence on a self-equalizing system of “knowledge” must always account for the gaps in 
“knowledge”—for what remains “beyond” knowledge; it is for this reason that one Western 
philosopher after another has been accused, against their intentions, of resorting to 
metaphysics.9   Poetry, on the other hand, which does not assume to “name” but only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Heidegger’s specific project in Being and Time is outlined in the heading of section one of the Introduction: 
“The Necessity for Explicity Restating the Question of Being.”  This is a question that, though as Heidegger 
notes, we may “deem it progressive to give our approval of ‘metaphysics’ again,” has in actuality been 
“forgotten.” (BT 2).   For Heidegger, as Simon Critchley explains, metaphysics, “or, more properly, first 
philosophy, conceives of beings in terms of a unifying ousia and ultimately a divine ousia.  Heidegger 
therefore describes metaphysics as discourse which states what beings are as beings” (E 20).  As previously 
noted, Heidegger does not, in Being and Time, conceive of anything outside of Being, or (therefore) outside 
the question of metaphysics.  However, in his 1962 lecture, “On Time and Being,” Heidegger reformulates his 
exploration, this time actually enacting the process he had called for in Being and Time—that of placing 
	   
243	  
“calls” language into nearness, and which is not, therefore, obliged to fill or explain away 
the gaps and holes that necessarily show when the “said” is purported to represent 
“saying”—when “signifyingness” is purported to reside fixedly within the “sign” of the 
“signified”—can with some “certainty,” as Stevens goes on to do in “Note on Moonlight,” 
discuss the “absolute exteriority” of the “mere objectiveness” of things.  
It is as if being was to be observed, 
As if, among the possible purposes, 
Of what one sees, the purpose that comes first, 
The surface, is the purpose to be seen, 
 
The property of the moon, what it evokes. 
It is to disclose the essential presence, say, 
Of a mountain, expanded and elevated almost 
Into a sense, an object the less; or else 
 
To disclose in the figure waiting on the road 
An object the more, an undetermined form 
Between the slouchings of a gunman and a lover, 
A gesture in the dark, a fear one feels 
 
In the great vistas of night air, that takes this form, 
In the arbors that are as if of Saturn-star (CP 450).  
 
Note here the repetition of the word “disclose,” a word that connects the language of 
distance and proximity to that of exposure and revelation. Proximity is, in this context, 
revelation.  It is the “expansion” and “elevation” of objective distance into a subjective, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Being under question—by replacing the accustomed sentence construction, “Time is…”, “Being is…” with 
the expression, “es gibt Sein,  and “es gibt Zeit” (“there is Being,”  “there is Time”)(Critchley, E 20).  The 
separation of Being from the language of metaphysics in this formulation establishes Being as belonging “to a 
prior giving, the giving of an ‘It.’” To thus “think Being without beings […] is to think without metaphysics” 
(Critchley, E 22-23).  But the question remains open as to whether any of these attempts at reformulating the 
question of being or the representation of subjectivity—independent of metaphysics—have succeeded, and 
another question—more interesting, perhaps—remains at the root.  Regarding the long history of 
philosopher’s reaction against the perceived reification of a metaphysics of subjectivity, Simon Critchley 
asks: “Has there ever existed a unified conscious subject, a watertight Cartesian ego?  Or is the subject some 
phantasy or abstraction that is retrospectively attributed to a past that one wants either to exceed, betray or 
ignore?  That is to say, is not the subject a fiction that Kant finds in Descartes without it being in Descartes, 
that Heidegger finds in Kant without it being in Kant, or that Derrida finds in Husserl without it being in 
Husserl? […] In light of such sceptical questions, all we seem to be left with is a series of caricatures, or 
cartoon versions of the history of metaphysics, a series of narratives based upon a greater or lesser misreading 
of the philosophical tradition.  Such narratives may well be necessary and unavoidable fictions, but they are 
fictions nonetheless” (E 59-60).	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proximal “sense” of an “essential presence” that must be understood to exist beyond all 
objective representation or experience of “presence.” Once again, we are deeply entrenched 
within a simile structure intent on drawing out the relationships between the internal and 
the external, rather than on arriving at any possible equivalence, or asserting any final 
authority over either one. This is the simile structure, per se. Even more committed to the 
revelation and expansion of relation and difference over authority or equivalence is the 
hypothetical simile, “as if,” which—as is evidenced by the passage above—is used 
frequently by Stevens.  The “as if” structure’s fundamental grounding in conjecture 
underscores the “gaps” or distances intrinsic to the processes of signification itself, but at 
the same time, and perhaps paradoxically, it is the very grammar of apprehension.  Its 
structure is that of the leap toward a figuration and understanding that lies on the far side of 
language: it is, in short, the syntax of proximity.   Stevens’s familiar strategy of stacking 
these “as ifs” one on top of the other works to further emphasize these gaps—as well as 
their potential figurative and communicative power.  The relationship between the interior 
“subjective” world (represented by the poet), and the exterior “objective” world 
(represented by the moonlight) is sketched out in “Note on Moonlight” according to a 
simile structure that accentuates distance as well as—or more accurately, in order to 
attain—proximity.  Moonlight, “like a plain poet,” invents his “various universe” only in 
terms of what is familiar to him—in terms, in other words, of “sameness.”  This is not to 
suggest that for either poet or moon, the world outside of the illumined, “invented” reality 
(that is, for the poet, the metaphors or “samenesses” with which he may seek to expose and 
understand that reality) is any less real than if a more comprehensive or objective mode of 
apprehension was available. The world continues to exist as a formal “reality,” and will 
remain—ultimately exterior, but ever-available to the “imagination” (“an object the 
less...an object the more”) that the light casts upon it.  “Reality,” is thus, and again, as the 
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poem goes on to expound, ever-potential, existing within the permanent, and ever-potential 
structure of conjecture: the “as if.” 
So, then, this warm, wide, weatherless quietude 
Is active with power, an inherent life, 
 
In spite of the mere objectiveness of things, 
Like a cloud-cap in the corner of a looking glass, 
A change of color in the plain poet’s mind, 
Night and silence disturbed by an interior sound, 
 
The one moonlight, the various universe, intended 
So much just to be seen—a purpose, empty 
Perhaps, absurd perhaps, but at least a purpose, 
Certain and ever more fresh.  Ah! Certain for sure ... (CP 450).  
 
That this world that remains aloof (though always at the potential disposal of) the 
inventiveness of both poet and moon is depicted as “weatherless” emphasizes the “absolute 
exteriority” of a “reality” that can at last not be subsumed into the “imagination”—into the 
“sameness” of the “I.”  The opposition between the “singular self” and the “ever-jubilant 
weather” is finally dissolved in the poem—into “weatherless quietude”—but, crucially, the 
terms of their relation are always preserved.  Indeed, as Krauss would say of the 
apprehension of visual objects according to the figure-ground relation, they are “preserved 
all the more surely in that they are cancelled” (OU 15). Just “like” a simile, it is this 
preservation of a certain distance between the two relative terms that underscores their 
proximity as they come into contact. It is the third term, however, that which remains 
always in surplus to the opposition—in “Note on Moonlight,” a “weatherless quietude” (not 
the “weather,” and not the “self”)—that remains “active with a power” (CP 450).   Exterior 
to every comparison, as well as to all knowledge and consciousness, this “quietude” is at 
the same time absolutely essential to all three—it signifies, in other words, the very 
signifyingness of signification itself.  
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“The one moonlight, the various universe,” begins the poem’s final stanza—
accentuating, with this simple concluding phrase, the final and absolute imbalance between 
an active “saying” power, and what is possible to be “said.” This is far from a dismissal or 
denigration of the “said” for its inability to capture “the various universe,” and it is even 
farther from an assertion of any final authority over it.  The emphasis—and the ellipsis that 
concludes (or fails to conclude) the poem underscores this—is on that which the “said” 
illuminates as always-excessive to the poem.  The gap that the “said” delineates is precisely 
that active, ever-generative space of “purpose, empty / Perhaps, absurd perhaps, but at least 
a purpose,/ Certain and ever more fresh” (CP 450), which is the “call” of language itself: 
“Ah! Certain for sure ...”  
Is this “certainty” that Stevens affirms at the end of “Note on Moonlight” meant to 
assuage any part of the dis-satisfaction that was so categorically professed to be inherent to 
the mind: “It can never be satisfied, the mind, never” (CP 224)?  Or is the “certainty” that is 
directed at an “empty purpose” precisely the root-cause of the dis-satisfaction the mind can 
presumably never hope to overcome?  The ellipsis by which the “certainty” arrived at in 
“Note on Moonlight” is conjoined to the rest of the poem suggests that “certainty” itself is 
something that must always be attained in conjunction with a process that exceeds 
“certainty”; it is only by this route that purpose can be “ever more fresh.”  “The oneself 
does not rest in peace under its identity” writes Levinas, “and yet its restlessness is not a 
dialectical scission, nor a process equalizing difference” (OTB 118).  There remains a 
“variety” that is irreducible to the “sameness” of “one moonlight,” one imagination; there 
remains the “absolute exteriority” of a world “intended / So much just to be seen” that will 
not be “seen.”  The endeavour to “see,” however, to “say” what one sees in a way that may 
be “ever more fresh” is (Stevens would, with “certainty,” allege) a worthy purpose.   In a 
passage that, appearing within the poem, “The Planet on the Table” from The Rock, one 
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cannot help but read as reflective of Stevens’s own feelings toward his body of work to 
date, and demonstrating an uncharacteristic strain of optimism—not for what remains 
possible, but what has already been accomplished—Stevens writes:   
Ariel was glad he had written his poems. 
They were of a remembered time 
Or of something he liked. 
 
Other makings of the sun 
Were waste and welter 
And the ripe shrub writhed. 
 
His self and the sun were one 
And his poems, although makings of his self, 
Were no less makings of the sun. 
 
It was not important that they survive. 
What mattered was that they should bear  
Some lineament or character, 
 
Some affluence, if only half-perceived, 
In the poverty of their words, 
Of the planet of which they were a part (CP 450).  
 
 Here again the conflation between the “ipseity” of selfhood with the sublime 
autonomy of Nature or a god, does not seek to reverse a pre-existing power-structure but to 
disrupt the very notion of the opposition itself.  What is expressed here in the form of Ariel 
and the specificity of the “poems” that he is happy enough to have written is, in Levinas’s 
words, “the oneself” as “singularity, prior to the distinction between the particular and the 
universal.  It is, if one likes, a relationship, but one where there is no disjunction between 
the terms held in relationship, a relationship that is not reducible to an intentional openness 
upon oneself, does not purely and simply repeat consciousness in which being is gathered 
up, as the sea gathers up the waves that wash upon the shore” (OTB 118).   The 
“relationship” that serves to hold poem, poet, and world together in “The Planet on the 
Table” is one that exists in excess of every part of that relationship.  The poet is, prior to 
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every consciousness of either himself or the world and thus prior to every poem, indebted 
to “the Planet” which exceeds him, but, likewise (and it is this that constitutes the 
satisfaction that the poem is able to express in what has already been “written”) every 
poem, according to the formulation of the relationship where self and sun are one, and his 
poems are “makings of his self,” is also a “making” of the sun.  Though the poem speaks to 
that which has been “written,” note that its content is still addressed in active, gerund form, 
as “makings” rather than as the “made.”  It is this ability for language to remain “active 
with power” even when implemented—to remain a “making” even when “made”—that 
affords poetry its “affluence” even “in the poverty of their words.”   The “affluence” that is 
referred to here is perhaps one of Stevens’s most direct comments on the power of poetry, 
and importantly refers not to anything “accumulated” or “achieved” but toward that which 
exceeds all achievement, what Levinas would call an extreme passivity which remains 
always prior to and in excess of being and yet is constitutive of that being.  As he explains 
in Otherwise than Being, the very existence of the body is based on that body’s a priori 
exposure and indebtedness to the other. The body is “a recurrence to oneself out of an 
irrecusable exigency of the other,” Levinas writes: 
a duty overflowing my being, a duty becoming a debt and an extreme passivity prior 
to the tranquillity, still quite relative, in the inertia and materiality of things at rest.  
It is a restlessness and patience that support prior to action and passion.  Here is 
what goes beyond having, but makes giving possible.  This recurrence is 
incarnation.  In it the body which makes giving possible makes one other without 
alienating.  For this other is the heart and the goodness, of the same, the inspiration 
or the very psyche of the soul (OTB 109).   
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In “The Planet on the Table,” Ariel’s poems exist both as and beyond “the lineament or 
character” with which they were written.  Their “affluence” is their very embodiment—
which is also their extreme passivity: their incarnation “out of an irrecusable exigency of 
the other” (OTB 109). It is for this reason that “[i]t was not important that they survive”— 
they do not participate in the entrenched delimitations and oppositions between presence of 
absence, self and other. Though the embodiment—the “lineament and character”—of the 
poems is what exposes their relationship to that which exceeds them (the seeing eye, and 
the conscious, insatiable mind), the “satisfaction” that results from their delineation comes 
from that which they have not, and could not, have delineated at all.  This is not, finally, a 
retreat from the world, but its opposite: an exploration of precisely that “restlessness and 
patience that support prior to action and passion”; it is the “affluence” beyond any 
consideration of “having”—that which “makes giving possible,” which constitutes the 
“singular self” as an always anterior commitment to the “other” and is the “very 
signifyingness of signification” (OTB 100).   
This is representation itself: representation considered in the Platonic mode as that 
“absolute, creative freedom” that clears the way to the goal, indeed, makes “the vision of 
that goal” possible by its projection prior to any “venturesome course” (Levinas, TI 125).  
“Representation,” expounds Levinas, “is this very projection, inventing the goal, that will 
be presented to the still groping acts as won a priori.  The ‘act’ of representation discovers, 
properly speaking, nothing before itself” (125).  It is because of this “pure spontaneity” that 
characterizes the “act” of representation that it can be described, as Levinas goes on to do, 
as a “pure present.”  “The positing of a pure present without even tangential ties with time 
is the marvel of representation,” he writes:  “It is a void of time, interpreted as eternity. To 
be sure the I who conducts his thoughts becomes (or more exactly ages) in time, in which 
his successive thoughts, across which he thinks in the present, are spread forth.  But this 
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becoming in time does not appear on the plane of representation: representation involves no 
passivity” (TI 125).  Representation is always a “pure” moment of concentrated activity in 
which “the I is not marked by the past but utilizes it as a represented and objective element” 
(Levinas, TI 125).  It is in this manner that duration may be collated—through the 
examination of a series of “objective” elements that are forced to stand in opposition to an 
“eternity” that represents the always-already escaped moment of representation itself.  The 
extreme passivity that constitutes being itself is, in each conscious (measured) moment, 
substituted by a correlative “objective” element: the “I” in the singular.   The “I” that is 
forced by the “other” (to which he is a priori exposed; this always antecedent exposure 
constituting the “sameness of his various universe” [Stevens CP 449]) to identify himself, 
replaces each moment of extreme passivity with an active effort of self-equalizing 
representation.  “I” is understood to equal the representation of myself to myself, and no 
longer to exceed the limits of either consciousness or corporeality.   It is in this manner—
through representation that allows for the I of the “same” to determine the “other” without 
himself being determined by that other—that the subject makes his world, and specifically 
his own subjectivity, intelligible to himself.   A “disappearance, within the same, of the I 
opposed to the non-I” (124), allows the I to fix its identity at once in both space and time as 
singular and exclusive.   
This fixity is exactly what troubles Stevens in his exploration of the “outward blank” 
as that which, as is shown in the following passage from “St. Armorer’s Church from the 
Outside,” exists outside of history, circumstance, and indeed of identity itself. 
It is like a new account of everything old, 
Mattisse at Vence and a great deal more than that, 
A new-colored sun, say that will soon change forms 
And spread hallucinations on every leaf. 
 
The chapel rises, his own, his period, 
A civilization formed from the outward blank, 
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A sacred syllable rising from sacked speech,  
The first car out of a tunnel en voyage  
 
Into lands of ruddy-ruby fruits, achieved 
Not merely desired, for sale, and market things 
That press, strong peasants in a peasant world,  
Their purports to a final seriousness— 
 
Final for him, the acceptance of such prose, 
Time’s given perfections made to seem like less 
Than the need of each generation to be itself, 
The need to be actual and as it is. 
 
St. Armorer’s has nothing of this present, 
This vif, this dizzle-dazzle of being new 
And of becoming, for which the chapel spreads out  
Its arches in its vivid element, 
 
In the air of newness of that element, 
In an air of freshness, clearness, greenness, blueness,  
That which is always beginning, because it is part 
Of that which is always beginning, over and over. 
 
The chapel underneath St. Armorer’s walls,  
Stands in a light, its natural light and day, 
The origin and keep of its health and his own.  
And there he walks and does as he lives and likes (CP 449).  
 
Stevens’s focus within this poem, as in many of his poems of the period, is on that which 
remains outside of any consideration of being itself, but is and must necessarily be 
considered constitutive of that being: again, a sort of “nothing that is”—“is” intended here 
not to indicate a separate existence for the “blank,” which would be remote from or in 
opposition to the “I,” but instead an absorption within that singular being, and therefore that 
identity.  In order to expose this absorption that is representation at its most elemental level, 
and therefore which is also the fundamental constituent of language, Stevens must disturb 
the equanimity with which the self is equalized; he must disrupt the balance between “I” 
and “non-I” which representation would seek to establish, erasing “difference.”  Stevens’s 
implementation of foreign or invented words, as demonstrated in the passage 
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Armorer’s” quoted above, seeks to expose the “lineament or character” of language itself, 
pointing to the “outward blank” that must exist beyond language—a negative-space, that is, 
against which those “lineaments” are described.  As this study has attempted to show, this 
negative-space beyond language, beyond the opposition of “I” and “non-I,” indeed, beyond 
being, is one that is evoked by Stevens’s work as a whole. Stevens’s “St. Armorers” as a 
text can be understood in the same way that “what is left” of the Church is understood in 
the poem: a place where “reverberations leak and lack among holes,” a place which—like 
Ariel’s poems in “The Planet on the Table” (“it was not important that they survive” [CP 
450])—was not built to last and now exists simply as “an appearance made / For a sign of 
meaning in the meaninglessness” (CP 448).  A reduction to the surface-value of its 
“appearance” is precisely what affords the Church in Stevens’s poem to evade the “present” 
and therefore to exist outside of representation as representation itself.   
If “representation” is the occurrence of a “pure present” that is exempt from time 
(Levinas, TI 124) than “St. Armorers’s’” is an instance of this “purity”— an attempt at 
capturing a “represented and objective element” exempt from the linear and hierarchical 
trajectory of time and history. Put differently: an attempt at a “photographic ecstasy” that 
might liberate the image of the photograph from the “absence-as-presence” (Barthes, CL 
106) of the photograph. “At the limit, there is no need to represent a body in order for me to 
experience this vertigo of time defeated” (97) writes Barthes in Camera Lucida, and 
likewise, for Stevens, the “defeat” of linear time is one that occurs not through the 
representation of the form, or body, but of the processes of representation itself.   The 
chapel, which is described as “something seen / In a mystic eye, no sign of life but life, 
Itself,” is that very “presence of the intelligible / In that which is created as its symbol” (CP 
448).   
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It is entering into the “presence” of this symbol of the intelligible that allows the 
poem a space within which time may be sprung from chronology, and “sacred syllables” 
may rise from “sacked speech,” constituting the very “sing of meaning in the meaningless” 
(CP 449).  The poem creates, in other words, its own microclimate of intelligibility.  This is 
not an exemption from time but a re-envisioning of its structure, a dismantling of the 
prejudice toward the present moment over the future or the past.  The insistence on the 
repetitive, ever-regenerative nature of time (“that which is always beginning because it is a 
part / Of that which is always beginning, over and over”) ensures us of that continuance, 
and suggests that—though St. Armorer’s “has nothing of this present”—it has not 
dislodged, and cannot dislodge, itself from the repetitive process that is the very basis of 
the structure of time.  Instead, it refuses stasis in any conceivable fixed “present” or 
definable past and embodies time as it exists and is understood in the present participle: that 
which is “always beginning, over and over.”  This structure does not exempt the subject 
from time, but links it to a larger reality through repetition, and the logics of synecdoche 
(that which is “always beginning” is, of course, only part of “that which is always 
beginning…”).  This is the “pure present,” which the repetition of the present participle 
serves to enforce through its disruption of entrenched, chronological time—that which 
could be rendered preterite, completed—and insistence on an active, ever-generative 
conception of time that never could be. St. Armorer’s as “symbol” of the “intelligible” is 
placed at a remove from the repetition-compulsions of time (it is this that allows it to 
become “intelligible), but it is not exempted from them.  Indeed, the achieved distance 
enables within the poem a figuration, and perhaps a brief apprehension, of the structure 
itself.   
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The tension that is created within the poem between the “outside” and the “inside” 
of “St. Armorer’s Walls,” also serves to establish a middle-space in which to conceive of 
the difference between the “I” and the “non-I,” between world and thing.  Rather than being 
absorbed into one another, the difference between an active identification of the singular 
and a passive absorption within the other are permitted to stand apart.  It is this that allows 
for St. Armorer’s delineation against the surrounding “dizzle-dazzle of being new / And of 
becoming” (CP 449) in a “pure present,” and in doing so renders it a “symbol” of the 
intelligible—a mode of reading and understanding, that is, the processes of intelligibility 
itself.  Within this enlarged space one may indeed, as “St. Armorer’s” concludes, “do as 
[one] lives and likes” and yet one is always, irreducibly connected to the greater outside 
structure—we are, indeed, the very material out of which that structure is made.  Perhaps 
the a priori responsibility to that which lies beyond or outside of the chapel “walls” (inside 
of which we are—falling back on ourselves repeatedly—maintained by the light that we 
ourselves project upon those walls, our “natural light and day”) is actually summarized best 
in Stevens’s “The Irrational Element of Poetry,” where he writes, “You can do as you 
please, yet everything matters” (CP 789).   
 
The Open 
“To be sure,” writes Levinas, “representation is the seat of truth” (TI 124).  
Representation, in Stevens’s work, of the very processes of representation itself opens up a 
space to explore the manner in which “truth” is constituted, hinging on the root difference 
between the “I” and the “non-I.”  It is the elaboration of this space, of both separation and 
difference, seeing and knowing that one sees, that allows Stevens’s poetry to transcend 
categorical definitions of self and other.  This space is one that has been further explored by 
generations of American poets and artists who came after Stevens; his refusal to 
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acknowledge the boundary between contemplation and action has affected a vast range of 
styles ranging from the new “American Romantic” poets identified by Bloom (PC 152) to 
the Postmodern experimentation of poets like Robert Creeley, John Ashbery and Michael 
Palmer (Schaum 169).10  The traces of Stevens’s “new knowledge of reality,” which would 
incorporate rather than subordinate the imagination, helped to open up a space of 
exploration in American poetry between world and thing, truth and representation, and 
made important steps toward the amendment of a centuries old confusion between the 
conception of praxis and poiesis. This distinction, commonly understood as that between 
action and production, goes back—according to Robert Bernasconi in Heidegger in 
Question: The Art of Existing—to Aristotle’s exposition of the two terms in his 
Nicomachean Ethics (2).  Bernasconi contends that while Aristotle’s distinction remains the 
major source for our current understanding of action and production, doing and making, 
that in the naming the distinction, the distinction itself was “transformed” (2, emphasis 
added).  The concern that characterized Heidegger’s Marburg period for the teachings of 
Aristotle, made a significant impact on the work of two of his most talented students: 
Hannah Arendt (specifically her The Human Condition), and Hans-George Gadamer’s 
Truth and Method.  Both thinkers take up the question of the original distinction made by 
Aristotle between praxis and poiesis, and agree it is not just failing to make, and preserve, 
this distinction that has “distorted our understanding” of politics and the human sciences, 
but rather that poiesis (production) and techne (art, craft) have so subordinated praxis 
(activity) and phronesis (intelligence) that the latter concepts have effectively “fallen into 
oblivion” (Bernasconi 3).   In what can be considered an attempt to correct this imbalance, 
Heidegger—in his discussion in Being and Time of the four Greek senses of the “thing”— 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  John Ashbery is identified by both “camps” – a most telling support of Bloom’s characterization of 
Ashbery as Stevens’s primary heir; his concerns, like Stevens’s, exceed critical attempts at clear canonical 
and historical divisions. 	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defines praxis “in a truly wide sense, neither in the narrow meaning of practical use, nor in 
the sense of praxis as moral action: praxis is all doing, pursuing and enduring, which also 
includes poiesis” (Bernasconi 7).  But this definition does not come much closer to 
circumventing the fundamental ambiguity, inherited from Aristotle, who wrote in 
Nicomachean Ethics: 
Thought alone moves nothing, but only thought for-the-sake-of-something and 
concerned with action.  This indeed governs poiesis also, since, whoever makes 
something always has some further end in view: that which is made is not an end 
in itself, it is relative and for someone.  Whereas that which is done is an end in 
itself, since doing well is the end and what desire aims at (as quoted in Bernasconi 
8)  
In Bernasconi’s commentary on this passage he writes, “It is striking that Aristotle appears 
to accomplish the reverse of what he intends.  For when praxis is construed as the goal of 
poiesis, does it not cease to be praxis?” (8).  This question, perhaps more than any other, 
has been central to the consideration of poetics from Aristotle onward, and its motivating 
force in the poetry of Wallace Stevens is something that I hope that this project has 
articulated and begun, at least, to explore.  The “commitment of an approach” (Levinas, 
OTB 5) that is engendered in Stevens’s poetry seeks to reverse the subordination of praxis 
to poiesis—disrupting a conception of the relationship that would persist in measuring 
praxis against the limits of its practical application; in a world increasingly concerned with 
production, that would consider it only in material terms, as “craft” or logos, rather than in 
“active” terms of intelligence, process, or “saying.” What is opened up is a space of active 
reflection on what Levinas, in Otherwise than Being, articulates as “the responsibility for 
another”; a responsibility that “is precisely a saying prior to anything said.  The surprising 
saying which is a responsibility for another is against the ‘winds and tides’ of being, is an 
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interruption of essence, a disinterestedness imposed with a good violence” (43). The gerund 
here is the very ground of the act, and it is also the ground (“beginning” as part of “that 
which is always beginning” [449]) upon which the false opposition between poeisis and 
praxis is dismantled within Stevens’s poetry.   
Intelligibility or responsibility for the other that establishes itself within a primordial 
relationship beyond being, does not free itself utterly from the practical material realities of 
Being itself, however.  An emphasis on the gerund form, the very ground of the act, does 
not translate into action itself.  In short, by upending the relationship between praxis and 
poiesis, we do not necessarily interrupt or make any impact at all upon the practical 
realities of the world around us, and it is precisely this that raised concern during Stevens’s 
lifetime among his critics and fellow writers.  In not specifically addressing the issues and 
“realities” of his time, was he not actually shirking the responsibility of an artist?   Stevens 
was explicitly aware of the tensions that existed between the poetic and the practical, and in 
retrospect his oeuvre can indeed be considered an exploration of just this tension—
elaborating through the process of exploration a space within which that which exceeds 
both might be in some way figured and understood.  
The process of “saying,” as Stevens knew well, exists always in relation to, but 
always, in excess of the “said.”  There is no other way, however, of entering that which is 
beyond the “said,” than through the “said,” no other way of entering beyond being than via 
being itself.  As Levinas writes:  
To enter into being and truth is to enter into the said; being is inseparable from its 
meaning!  It is spoken.  It is in the logos.  But the reduction is reduction of the said 
to the saying beyond the logos, beyond being and non-being, beyond essence, 
beyond true and non-true.  It is the reduction to signification, to the one-for-the-
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other involved in responsibility (or more exactly substitution), to the locus of the 
non-lieu, locus and non-lieu, the utopia of the human (OTB 45). 
The “non-lieu” that Levinas evokes here contains important traces of Rilke’s “Open,” 
which Heidegger influentially discusses in “What Are Poets For?”   “The Open,” Heidegger 
explains, “is the great whole of all that is unbounded.  It lets the beings ventured into the 
pure draft draw as they are drawn, so that they variously draw on one another and draw 
together without encountering any bounds.  Drawing as so drawn, they fuse with the 
boundless, the infinite.  They do not dissolve into void nothingness, but they redeem 
themselves into the whole of the Open” (104).  The “open” is not to be understood in 
spatial terms (“sky, air, space; they, too are ‘object’ and thus ‘opaque’ and closed to the 
man who observes and judges” [105]), but in terms of that which exists beyond all spatial 
categories, that which exists only as “that indescribably open freedom which perhaps has its 
(extremely fleeting) equivalent among us only in those first moments of love when one 
human being sees his own vastness in another, his beloved, and man’s elevation toward 
God” (106).  “The open” thus corresponds to the primordial responsibility for the other 
(usually absorbed into the “same” by the process of intelligibility) and revealed in moments 
of “love.” It is at these moments, when the “I” is able to recognize itself  “(extremely 
fleetingly)” in the “non-I,” that a space of différance is established and the subject’s 
responsibility for the other is effectively felt. This proximity—between the “I” and “non-I,” 
which is paradoxically the establishment of a space of différance against which the 
neighbour’s proximity can be felt—is precisely what poetry maintains the potential to 
“call” into being.  It is the exploration of this proximity—the “proximity of one to the 
other...the one for the other”—which, in turn, as Levinas has written, is “the very 
signifyingness of signification” (OTB 5).  Poets to whom, as Heidegger writes of Hölderlin, 
“the nature of poetry becomes worthy of questioning” (PLT 139), engage in an exploration 
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of the very nature of signification. In opening up a space of precisely this sort of 
questioning within his work, and thereby establishing a vantage point from which the 
reader, alongside the poet, might both “see” and “know that he sees,” Stevens explores not 
only the nature of signification, but the transcendental nature of human being: the 
primordial encounter of the “face to face.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion: “An Unexplained Completion” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   
261	  
The presencing of what cannot be made present—the attempt not to behold but to 
“be beheld” (CP 104) by that which exceeds both presence and absence: that most illusive 
of substances, the “nothing that is”—permeates Stevens’s work from the early days of 
Harmonium. His concern was not to discover through language any essential or original 
essence or meaning, but to afford, through language, a manner in which to continuously 
seek that which is prior to utterance, origin or meaning. Stevens was as deeply sceptical of 
fixing language in  “the said” as Levinas.  He searched, through the medium of language, 
for a method of transcending it—of re-inscribing, through language, the primordial 
recognition of exteriority, of being as otherness, and therefore as desire.  This primordial 
recognition Levinas would later describe as “the first ethical gesture” (TI 174), but—like 
Stevens, and every practitioner of language—he was doomed to a discourse on the subject 
that would always dissimulate it.  As Alphonso Lingis writes in the “translator’s 
introduction” of Otherwise than Being:  
The very sentences of this book—thematic, synchronic time, systematic language, 
constantly making the verb to be intervene in phrases that profess to express what is 
antecedent to the work of being – can only be a continual transposition, and 
dissimulation, of the prethematic alterity, the diachronic time of the contact with the 
other, the non-presence of one term to another, which these phrases mean to put 
forth (xliii).  
Stevens’s challenge, like Levinas’s, was to seize on this inevitability (the manner in which 
being is inscribed into every statement, even or especially, when one tries to speak past it) 
in order to expose it, and, in those brief moments of exposure, glimpse what remains, 
always, beyond being—and on the far side of language.  For both, the process of thinking 
and writing was a “continual transposition, and dissimulation, of…prethematic alterity” 
(Lingis OTB xliii), and yet there was only language with which to grapple with what 
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remained, always, beyond language. Neither could conceive of a metalanguage by which, 
as Lingis goes on to write, “one (might) establish oneself so as to control the meaning and 
the evidence of the text and the pre-text” (xliii).  All the poet, as equally as the philosopher, 
could do was to “live this effort to reduce the said to the saying, and be confounded by the 
ever-unfaithful text that that yields” (xliii).   
Poetry, like philosophy, as Lingis explains, necessarily exists in the ambivalence 
that this effort describes—“between the intelligibility of system and synchrony and the 
intelligibility of signifyingness itself which is asymmetry and diachrony” (xliii).  In other 
words, both philosophical and poetical thought reside within the space of tension between 
the static a-temporal sign (the “said,” that which appears as a “fixed” thought on the mind 
or the page) and the continuously shifting, temporal “signifyingness” (beyond the “said”) of 
“saying.”  Rather than the adaptation of the asymmetry and diachrony of signifyingness to a 
synchronic system of signification, however, poetry may adopt as its primary concern 
signifyingness itself, leaving aside, at least to a certain degree, its translation into a 
symmetrical rendering.  Poetry affords the possibility of an attention to and absorption 
within the reverberation of language as it exists prior to and in the wake of symmetrical 
meaning—with, that is (rather than any description or investigation into the “to be” of 
Being), Being itself.  In this regard, poetry blurs the definition of both praxis and poiesis—
at the very least resisting any rigid distinction (our inheritance from Aristotle) between the 
two, if not outright subverting it. Stevens’s “commitment to approach”—his pointed refusal 
to attend to any previously defined line between poetry and philosophy, and his resistance 
to the “pressures of reality” through his insistence on the value and aesthetics of the 
imagination—helped to carve a new territory for a contemporary American poetry that 
would continue, and further, this resistance and subversion.  
Thanks to the inexorable influence of Bloom, John Ashbery is still resoundingly 
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considered to be Stevens’s most direct heir—and for good reason.  Ashbery takes up many 
of Stevens’s key poetic themes, pushing the exploration of his own “reality-imagination 
complex” into new territory—particularly in regard to the representation of subjectivity.  
Given the emphasis within Stevens’s oeuvre on the continuously regenerative nature of 
poetry, the continuity between the two poets’s work exists primarily in the active re-
imagining and enframing of self in relation to the dominant discourses of representation in 
their time.  
An early Ashbery poem like “The Painter” continues Stevens’s investigative 
approach to representation while at the same time portraying a surrealist impulse towards 
associative (il)logic; this combination establishes a new ground of exploration for Ashbery. 
At the time that “The Painter” first appeared in Ashbery’s first published collection, Some 
Trees, which came out with the Yale Younger Poets Series in 1956, Ashbery was (although 
only twenty-eight years old and relatively unknown to the poetry world) already well-
placed within the contemporary art scene.  He would later find work as a “sort of an art 
critic” while living abroad in Paris following a Fulbright fellowship that originally brought 
him to the city in 1955.1  Like Stevens before him, Ashbery’s concern for the visual arts 
pervades his work, and he often relies on metaphors of ocular perception and representation 
in order to address these same issues on a broader scale.  “The Painter”—similarly perhaps 
to Stevens’s “Idea of Order at Key West”—can be read as an early Ars Poetica for 
Ashbery; it describes the maturation of a young artist’s concept of representation as he 
encounters the limits and potentialities inherent within his own perception.   
Sitting between the sea and the buildings  
He enjoyed painting the sea’s portrait.  
But just as children imagine a prayer that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Ashbery inherited a friend’s position at the Paris Herald Tribune in 1960.  He had little notion then that the 
temporary job would lead him to work—in his words—as a “sort of an art critic” for the next twenty-five 
years, publishing in journals such as ArtNews, Newsweek, and New York (Bergman, xi). 	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Is merely, silence, he expected his subject 
To rush up the sand, and, seizing a brush, 
Plaster its own portrait on the canvas. (SP 20) 
 
What the young artist “forgets” in this opening stanza is the manner in which he is 
other than the world he seeks to represent.  The “sea” becomes, for him, inextricable from 
himself—the opposition between “I” and “non-I” effectively disappearing into the “pure 
present” of the sea’s intelligibility (Levinas, TI, 124-125).  By dissolving the exterior world 
in this way into his own experience of subjectivity, the young artist also dissolves his 
agency over the image, as well as his experience of it.  His receipt of the world is depicted, 
at this stage, as one of extreme passivity.   
So there was never any paint on his canvas 
Until the people who lived in the buildings  
Put him to work: “Try using the brush  
As a means to an end.  Select, for a portrait, 
Something less angry and large, and more subject 
To a painter’s moods, or, perhaps, to a prayer. (SP 20) 
It is only in this, the poem’s second stanza, that the painter is depicted as being able 
to differentiate between “the object of representation” and “the act of representation” 
(Levinas, TI 123).  Still, the painter encounters the world around him and renders it 
intelligible in such a way that the perceived object is “interior to thought: despite its 
independence it falls under the power of thought” (Levinas, TI 123).  The “clarity” of the 
image he perceives is attained, again in Levinas’s words, through a  
total adequation of the thinker with what is thought, in the precise sense of a 
mastery exercised by the thinker upon what is thought in which the object’s 
resistance as an exterior being vanishes.  This mastery is total and as though 
creative; it is accomplished as a giving of meaning. (TI 124)  
The (a priori) intelligibility of the scene with which the painter is confronted is substituted 
for an alternate meaning, one rendered no longer by the “object” but “the act” of 
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representation.  In thus allowing the moment of his apperception to remain within the “pure 
present” of intelligibility without an effort to objectify it or his perspectival relationship to 
it (experiencing it as he does seemingly from within—as “interior” to his thought—
annulling, therefore, the borders between interior and exterior so that they would seem not 
to exist at all) the painter has failed to represent anything at all. His canvas is bare; the 
moment has not been ended and thus there is no way for it to now begin anew. We are here 
in a space outside of time, a space of “prayer,” which is (as children might imagine it) 
“merely silence.” This is a space very similar to that of Stevens’s “St. Armorers’s Church 
From the Outside”—beyond meaning, beyond Being—where silence is left un-translated 
into intentionality.  The repetition throughout the poem of the word “prayer,” each time 
with a slightly different meaning, disrupts the possibility of attributing a larger symbolic, or 
over-arching religiosity, to the word. The word is merely indexical, and yet the cumulative 
effect of its repetition adds up to something in excess of the value of each iteration.  The 
repetition itself points to an excess of the denotative value of the word within the poem as a 
whole, and yet in each case the denotative value is preserved. “Prayer” is, with each use, 
exactly what it says—its meaning specific to the context of each individual stanza—and at 
the same time more than it can say. In any one case it does not refer to any larger system 
beyond itself (God, Faith, Ideology), but through its continually shifting denotative value 
and its ultimate resistance to connotation, meaning, and even to sound, it refers as a whole 
to the system and constraints of representation itself.    
How could he explain to them his prayer 
That nature, not art, might usurp the canvas? 
He chose his wife for a new subject, 
Making her vast, like ruined buildings, 
As if, forgetting itself, the portrait 
Had expressed itself without a brush. (SP 20)  
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What at first appears to be the painter’s naivety (his inability to differentiate 
between passive receipt of experience and time and an active representative rendering of 
that experience, which would presuppose a separation and distance between the subject and 
its object) becomes at this point in the poem an active, if impracticable, aspiration; it is 
desire that occurs, then, in the gap between the extreme passivity of being and the 
possibilities of active representation.  This desire is, of course, only for an extreme 
passivity to “usurp the canvas”—for the passivity of a “prayer” or mode of representation 
that would be again “merely silence” to overtake the creative act of representation on the 
part of the artist.  The artist, in other words, desires that which is beyond being to be 
presented within Being itself; he wishes to depict a sort of “absence-as-presence” (Barthes 
106) that would be at once the “pure present” characteristic of representation itself, while 
simultaneously securing a vantage point from which that moment could be actually 
witnessed and described.  In still other words: what the artist desires is the simultaneous 
“this will be and this has been” (Barthes, CL 96) of the photograph—a simultaneity that, 
detected by Barthes in Camera Lucida, permits access to what he refers to as an “anterior 
future” in which, and though “death is the stake” (96), provides the opportunity, briefly, for 
contact with something beyond representation. He refers to this “something” variously as 
“truth,” “pity,” and “love.”  
It is, indeed, this possibility that Barthes suggests at the end of Camera Lucida—of 
encountering, even “extremely-fleetingly” (Heidegger, PLT, 105), this certain “something” 
beyond the bounds of what it is possible to represent, that, to a certain and very general 
extent, is granted by every artistic pursuit.  It is certainly toward this possibility that the 
cumulative “prayer” of Ashbery’s “The Painter” is aimed.  Indeed, this possibility of 
“contact” beyond the limits of subjectivity and representation is elevated within the poem 
to a sublime and impossible goal. “The painter” reads into the idea of “re-presentation” a 
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potential far greater than that which is, or could ever be, simply present on the page.  His 
ability to render his wife “vast,” and her analogous relationship to “ruined buildings,” fuels 
his desire to contain more and more of the “vast,” more and more of what is destined to, at 
least physically, remain absent from even his most perceptive depictions.  
Slightly encouraged, he dipped his brush  
In the sea, murmuring a heartfelt prayer: 
“My soul, when I paint this next portrait 
Let it be you who wrecks the canvas.” 
The news spread like wildfire through the buildings: 
He had gone back to the sea for his subject. 
 
Imagine a painter crucified by his subject! 
Too exhausted even to lift his brush,  
He provoked some artists leaning from the buildings 
To malicious mirth: “We haven’t a prayer 
Now, of putting ourselves on canvas,  
Or getting the sea to sit for a portrait!” 
 
Others declared it a self-portrait.  
Finally all indications of a subject  
Began to fade, leaving the canvas  
Perfectly white.  He put down the brush. 
At once a howl, that was also a prayer, 
Arose from the overcrowded buildings. 
 
They tossed him, the portrait, from the tallest of the buildings; 
And the sea devoured the canvas and the brush 
As though his subject had decided to remain a prayer. (SP 21) 
 
We are returned here, in the final lines—after a disastrously failed pursuit to represent that 
which it would be impossible to represent—to an extreme passivity, a prayer that is once 
more in this context “merely silence,” void of meaning, and yet at the same time (through 
the cumulative energy that the word has obtained through its repetition) directed beyond 
that denotative silence, toward the (always connotative) beyond of Being. The final split 
between the “I” and the “non-I” ruptures the passive receipt of the object of representation 
during the painter’s “act,” but it is precisely this rupture that brings about the desire for a 
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reintroduction of unity between the two—and simultaneously prohibits it.  This prohibition 
is, in turn, however, what brings the “I” and the “non-I,” or “Other,” finally into proximity. 
Importantly, “the painter” is represented at odds with a faceless antagonism 
represented by the people in “the overcrowded buildings.”  The isolation of his limited 
subjectivity, as well as the insignificance of that subjectivity in relation to the “vastness” 
and otherness of the crowd, is—through this conflict—accentuated.  The classic Romantic 
struggle that is depicted between the painter’s ambition (to follow his subjective vision) and 
the opposition to that ambition by the jeering crowd (“try using the brush as a means to an 
end” they advise, reminding the painter of the “reality”—the contingency—to which he is 
ultimately bound), dramatizes what years earlier Stevens had called his “reality-imagination 
complex.”  
“To be, in Ashbery’s verse,” as John Shoptaw has observed, “is to be unperceived” 
(143).  That “unperceived” being, however, is always caught in prismatic relation with what 
lies outside or beyond itself—both defining and threatening its imagined state of (again 
“unperceived”) being. There is always a “you” that interrupts and defines the “I.”  This is 
depicted quite literally in Three Poems (“In you I fall apart” [CP 253] Ashbery writes) 
where a play of pronouns keeps subjectivity permanently unfixed and unmoored—but for 
the express purpose of effecting “a greater naturalism.”2  W.S. Piero’s commentary on the 
prose sections that intersperse Three Poems further emphasizes the way that instability or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  In a 1973 interview, Ashbery explained: “The personal pronouns in my work very often seem to be like 
variables in an equation. ‘You’ can be myself or it can be another person, someone whom I’m addressing, and 
so can ‘he’ and ‘she’ for that matter and ‘we’; sometimes one has to deduce from the rest of the sentence what 
is being meant and my point is also that it doesn’t really matter very much, that we are somehow all aspects of 
a consciousness giving rise to the poem and the fact of addressing someone, myself or someone else, is what’s 
the important thing at that particular moment rather than the particular person involved. I guess I don’t have a 
very strong sense of my own identity and I find it very easy to move from one person in the sense of a 
pronoun to another and this again helps to produce a kind of polyphony in my poetry which I again feel is a 
means toward greater naturalism” (quoted in Perloff, PL 280). 
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inconstancy in Ashbery’s work can actually serve to strengthen and intensify both its poetic 
and communicative aims. 
When lesser talents try to write “prose poems,” they do so in order to create merely 
gratuitous effects. The results are usually tedious and flimsy. Ashbery, however, 
resorts to a prose format in order to achieve a heightened concentration of 
sensibility, a firmer unity of feeling and thought which would otherwise be 
impossible to achieve in stanzaic verse. The prose sections in [Three Poems] cannot 
be broken down into lines of free verse. They can exist as poems only when 
rendered in prose (40).    
As de Piero observes, it is not any identifiable formal element, but the process of 
destabilizing, “unpinning,” the anticipated structure of “free verse” that allows for the piece 
to “exist as poems.”3 It is a similar process of destabilization that also results, according to 
de Piero, through Ashbery’s “heightened concentration” on “sensibility” and the subject.  
“Ashbery has always been possessed by a desire to posit a person or relationship at a 
particular point in time then slip that unit of time into the larger sequence of past and 
future,” he explains.  Continuing: “It’s an attempt at redemption which strives to account 
for both visible and invisible aspects of life” (40).   
Like Stevens, it is ultimately neither the one nor the other, the “visible” or the 
“invisible,” “reality” or the “imagination,” that Ashbery seeks, but an intermediate space 
between the two—a space in which, as “The Painter” had envisioned, one might transcend 
his own singular nature in order that nature itself, “not art,” might, in “forgetting 
itself...(express) itself without a brush.”  In other words, what is desired by both poets is a 
space where the pure passivity of simply being might be contained within the activity of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  It is thus the content of the poem, the reality at its base, that the poem is subject to; as Stevens affirmed, 
poetry serves reality, not the other way around: “The great well of poetry is not other poetry but prose: 
reality,” he wrote in his Materia Poetica, “However it requires a poet to perceive the poetry in reality” (919).	  
	   
270	  
Being itself—where the “pure present” of ecstatic being might be, if “extremely fleetingly,” 
realized, as in Barthes’s analysis of the photograph, or Stevens’s depiction of “St. 
Armorer’s Church.” What is key here—and to any conception or reality—is a refusal of 
stasis; for the maintenance, instead, of that internal element by which the external is 
maintained: constant motion, activity, change.  
Like Stevens, Ashbery is motivated not by a desire to “represent” the world around 
him but by a desire to inquire into the nature and processes of representation itself, as well 
as the way that those processes—the incessant motion and change that characterize them—
also characterize subjectivity: the relationship between the “I” of the same and “the other” 
that always exceeds it. The disappearance of “the other” into the “same” that Levinas 
describes as the moment of intelligibility or representation is a process that both Stevens 
and Ashbery work against.  For both poets it is the distance between “the I” and “non-I,” 
between subject and object, praxis and poiesis, reality and imaginative desire, that is 
emphasized and explored.   As Levinas—who considers the terms intelligibility and 
representation interchangeable (TI 124)—writes: “in representations the I precisely loses its 
opposition to its object; the opposition fades, bringing out the identity of the I despite the 
multiplicity of its objects, that is, precisely the unalterable character of the I” (TI 126).  It is 
this assuredness—with which the “I” is foregrounded—that both Stevens and Ashbery seek 
to trouble in their work, this “unalterable character of the I” that both wish to interrupt—
and alter.   
Stevens worked conscientiously throughout his career to open up a negative-space 
of representation where the speaker, freed from the allegiances of either “reality” or the 
“imagination,” might articulate himself beyond “the said.” It was within this territory—a 
negative territory of the “outward blank”—that an encounter between the “I” and the “non-
I” (each no longer either subsumed within the same nor juxtaposed, in the Romantic model, 
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against one another in absolute opposition) becomes possible.  Ashbery continues to 
delineate the space of this encounter. What Marjorie Perloff refers to as his “discontinuous 
writing” style4 is indeed a concerted attempt at initiating a poetics through which, as 
Stevens says of “St. Armorer’s Church,” “reverberations leak and lack among holes” (CP 
448).  The shapeliness of the double negative created by this phrase (that which is figured 
as  “lacking” among “holes”) is precisely the shapeliness that Ashbery seeks to create in the 
gaps resulting from his “discontinuous” style. His concern is not (or not primarily) the 
disruption of linear narrative, but rather the disruption of a linear understanding of Being 
and time. The “discontinuity” of the work is concentrated mostly on identity language: the 
constantly shifting pronouns, which often lack antecedents, are what most strikingly disrupt 
the notion of a singular, isolated subjectivity within the poetry.  What Stevens identifies as 
an “outward blank”—a negative-space from which Stevens’s speaker, in resistance to any 
singular, positive identity, speaks—is articulated within Ashbery’s work as the collective 
“we.”  That is: where Stevens had worked to create a space within which the speaker’s 
voice might be permitted, figuratively, to exceed representation through a singular 
subjectivity, Ashbery’s “speaker” is literally represented (following, along with Stevens, in 
the tradition of Whitman, only going a step further) as a collective.  This destabilization of 
identity is furthered by a surrealistic montage effect that Ashbery develops in his work—a 
technique that Perloff has compared to Barthes’ autobiographical writings in Barthes by 
Barthes.  The photo sequence with which Barthes begins this text is interpreted by Perloff 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  In her essay, “Barthes, Ashbery and the Zero Degree of Genre,” Perloff comments of the similarities 
between Barthes and Ashbery’s work (observations that are also interesting in regards to W.S. de Piero’s 
comments on the “prosaic” element of Ashbery’s poetry in Three Poems): “Lineation aside, we are dealing 
with two very similar modes of writing.  In both cases, the fragmentary, discontinuous form breaks up what 
Barthes calls ‘the smooth finish, the composition, discourse constructed to give a final meaning to what one 
says, which is the general rule of all past rhetoric” (PL 279).  But Ashbery’s “discontinuous” style goes 
farther than Barthes in his removal of all narrative scaffolding, particularly in terms of the structuration of 
subjectivity and point of view, leaving the reader without any of the customary orientation typical of 
rhetorical or lyrical writing styles. 	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in the same manner as Ashbery’s “fragmentary, discontinuous” style: both act as 
“dictées...the effect (of which) interspersed in the text is a kind (of) Brechtian Verfremdung 
[distancing, alienation]” (PL 279).  
The influence of surrealism—which such adjectives cannot help bring to mind, is 
indeed explicit in Ashbery’s work.  The title poem of his 1992 collection, “Hotel 
Lautréamont,” for example, directly refers to the famous statement of Isadore Ducasse 
(alias Comte de Lautréamont), which became a slogan for the surrealist movement: 
“Beautiful as the chance meeting upon a dissecting table of a sewing machine and an 
umbrella.” Perloff argues that the effect of the dictées in Barthes’s autobiographical text is 
a disruption of any holistic understanding of the work, let alone the individual who the 
work is purported to represent.  Identity in the text is “called into question by the series of 
fragments that constitute the rest of the book” (PL 271). In Ashbery’s work, through his use 
of fragmentation, surrealist collage and a “discontinuous” style, it is not only identity and 
subjectivity that are disrupted: representation itself is called into question.   
Ashbery wilfully refuses to fix moments, thought, or language—to ground them in 
the “said”—but allows them instead to open off onto multiple, seemingly infinitely 
deferrable, meanings.  This is a process that sometimes serves to disrupt meaning entirely.   
The long poem, “Grand Galop” (named, like many of the poems in this collection for a 
piece of music, this one of Liszt’s), included in his Pulitzer prize winning collection of 
1975, Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror, provides a remarkable example of the manner in 
which Ashbery’s poetic process is embodied in its product—of the way that meaning takes 
shape within the work not in the form of a linear trajectory, but radially.   “All things seem 
mention of themselves,” he writes.  “And the names which stem from them branch out to 
other/ referents. / Hugely, spring exits again. The weigela does its dusty thing/ in fire-
hammered air.” (SP 172). Here “the weigela” exemplifies the poem’s opening claim—
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“weigela” connoting both a flowering plant and its namesake—the German mystic Valentin 
Weigel.  The connotations from there (or, as the poem suggests, from any point and in any 
direction) are uncountable.  “An Ashbery poem does not articulate a process,” Perloff cites 
Lawrence Kramer as having written, “but simply lets a textured consciousness persist 
shimmeringly for a given duration...The nature of this flow is to be quirky, inconsistently 
coherent, and, contrary to conventional expectations, non-linear” (quoted in Perloff, PL 
279).   
Ashbery’s poetry is certainly a poetics of “duration” in two senses: in the temporal 
sense, as in “Grand Galop’s” emphasis on “waiting....only waiting” (SP 172), as well as in 
an objective sense—the “durability” of objects, of language itself, is continuously tested 
within the work, as though the speaker was himself the knife wielded over the “dissecting 
table” of the poem.  Kramer’s comment is apt, therefore, in that it draws attention to 
temporality within Ashbery’s work, but it misses the mark profoundly in its refusal to 
acknowledge the fundamental role that process plays in the representation of temporality in 
the poems.  Essential to what Kramer—rightly, I believe—calls the “shimmeringly” 
textured consciousness of the poems and that “given duration,” is the question: what is 
duration? It is the process of first asking, and then considering this question that is the 
driving force behind much of Ashbery’s work. “Only waiting, the waiting:  what fills up the 
time in between?”  The question itself.  The materiality of the words on the page (which 
point beyond the text—beyond the linearity of the words on the page), and the process of 
the questioning (which can do nothing other than establish itself linearly and materially).   
Unlike Barthes’ photo essay, the poem does not exist in stalled fragments; instead, it 
proceeds with a constant, cinematic flow. It is indeed this flow that provides the “texture” 
of the poem.  But because “[n]othing takes up its fair share of time,” there is always a 
surplus of images, of signifiers, so that the cinematic momentum of the poems cannot be 
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absorbed into the “conventional expectations” of a linear narrative.  Instead: “The wait is 
built into the things just coming into their own. / Nothing is partially incomplete, but the 
wait / Invests everything like a climate” (SP 172).  The “wait,” the “pause,” is, in the 
tradition of Stevens, in direct conflict with any notion of a stalled, Heideggerian purely 
spoken (PLT 192) or by T.S. Eliot’s “still point.”5  For Ashbery, as for Stevens, the “wait” 
exists rather as a hyper-temporal charge “built into...things.”  Even before they “come into 
their own” they are “invested” with a delay—the exact opposite of a “still point.”  This is a 
rendering visible of the process of time, not an objectified pause or gap in that progression. 
A “still point” is always open to the possibility of absorption into the linear system—what 
is a line, after all, but a succession of “still” points? It is essential to both Stevens’s and 
Ashbery’s work that the “pause” be conceived as outside of the poem—as something “built 
in,” inherent to the structure, but also in permanent excess of it, as Levinas understood the 
beyond of Being, or Derrida understood différance.  
Arguably, this space beyond, this différance, could be located within Eliot’s “Burnt 
Norton”—within the conceptualization of a space “in between” temporal figuration:  “In 
my beginning is my end” (FQ 23), “Here is a place of disaffection / Time before and time 
after...Neither plenitude nor vacancy” (FQ 16). But a plenitude, a stillness, is established by 
Eliot in this poem nevertheless.  A Hegelian “self equals self” equilibrium (Levinas, OTB, 
100) is maintained—even if at times the poem resorts to locating a direct referent within the 
represented object itself:  The kingfisher’s wing answers “light to light”; “only through 
time time is conquered” (FQ 16).  It is this agreement— reference to referent—that enables 
Eliot to locate the “still point of the turning world.”    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  “At the still point of the turning world; neither flesh nor / fleshless; / Neither from nor towards; at the still 
point, there the dance / is, / But neither arrest nor movement.  And do not call it fixity, / Where past and future 
are gathered. Neither movement / from nor towards.  Neither ascent nor decline.  Except for the point, the still 
/ point, / There would be no dance and there is only the dance” (From “Burnt Norton,” The Four Quartets 15)	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Stevens’s poetry disrupted this “stillness”—and, paradoxically, through his own 
conception of a “pure poetry” that would concern itself not with any fixed point, any 
exterior “purity” that the poem might somehow attain, but with the processes of language 
and representation themselves. Ashbery’s poetry, in keeping with the precedent that 
Stevens’s notion of “pure poetry” had set, goes skittering from the “point” altogether.  “It’s 
getting out of hand,” writes the speaker in “Grand Galop.”  “As long as one has some sense 
that each thing knows its place / All is well, but with the arrival and departure / Of each 
new one overlapping so intensely in the semi-darkness / It’s a bit mad” (SP 174).  “Each 
new one” here of course refers not to anything in particular but to an endlessly 
supplementable catalogue of experience and description. The poem suggests that the poem 
itself cannot help but be the thing that it bemoans: a “pocket history of the world, so general 
/ as to constitute a sob or wail unrelated / To any attempt at definition” (SP 174).  But 
because the “fragments” of Ashbery’s “discontinuous writing” are not “still points” they 
can never be fixed—as in a dictionary—to any one meaning, but instead constantly move 
beyond the borders of their own definitions.  They do not define themselves in terms of an 
essential, original, quality: “light to/as light” “time to/as time,” but, instead, as in 
Benjamin’s definition in “The Task of the Translator,” they render both the “original” 
(meaning) and the “translation” (word on the page that can never apparently be fixed to that 
meaning) “recognizable as fragments of a greater language, just as fragments are a part of a 
vessel” (78).  This “greater language” must necessarily be understood in conjunction with 
Benjamin’s idea of a “pure language”—a language he hoped would manifest itself within a 
work that had been translated literally. A “literal” language would exceed the constraints—
time and place-bound—of the “original” language and be permitted to access, beyond 
language, the text’s transcendent meaning.    
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The connections between Benjamin’s lofty vision for a greater, transcendent 
language to the earlier French Symbolist definition of “pure poetry” must also, of course, 
be taken into account, but Benjamin’s attention to the materiality of language grounds his 
ambitions, concentrating it within the territory of the immediate and everyday. Both 
Stevens and Ashbery, though also undoubtedly influenced by the Symbolists, work 
definitively within this more literal territory. The focus in Stevens’s work on the letter as 
such—the literal units by which we measure meaning—is continued within Ashbery’s work 
with an even greater intensity, so that any “transcendence” that is sought through attention 
to the materiality of language needs even more urgently to be placed within qualifying 
quotation marks. The disruption of reference and meaning in Ashbery’s poetry often seems, 
indeed, to undermine not only the prospect of establishing a “pure” language or poetry, but 
of establishing a reliable method of communicating through language at all.  Ashbery’s 
“difficult” style has resulted in a range of critical response; in di Piero’s 1973 review he 
deems the polarization and extremity of the critics’s views “almost amusing” (39). “On the 
one hand,” he observes,  
are those who berate him for lacking the Audenesque “censor” (that little editing 
machine in a poet’s head which deletes all superfluous materials) or who accuse 
him simply of being willfully and unreasonably perverse. On the other hand are 
those reviewers who, queerly enough, praise the difficulty of Ashbery’s verse as if 
difficulty were a positive literary value in itself, while ignoring what the poet is 
saying. I think that Ashbery’s “difficulty” (grammatical ellipses, misapplied 
substantives, fragmented verb phrases, etc.) is a function of his meaning, which is a 
simple and unoriginal way of saying that sometimes the poet’s methods work to 
support his meaning and sometimes they don’t (39).  
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Just as it was the destabilization of “free verse” through “prose” in Three Poems that results 
in its poetic value, and the decentering of the subject that results in a heightened 
concentration on subjectivity itself, it is here the presumed disruption of meaning in 
Ashbery’s poetry that reveals itself as the very “function” of meaning.  Meaning is not 
cancelled out or made subservient to disruption, it continues to function through, and as a 
result of, its disruption.  The alternative assumption, that Ashbery’s poetry “doesn’t mean 
but is” (Perloff, NJA) is often employed by critics in order to explain away what appears an 
avoidance in Ashbery’s work of meaning in favour of a sort of “isness” of language— 
language presented as an object, or fact in itself.  This assumption is, according to Marjorie 
Perloff, always a mistake (NJA).  Investing Ashbery’s poetry with too much of this 
facticity, or “isness,” is to undermine the dominant force of the poems, which is one of 
incessant forward momentum.  The stasis of any factual “isness” is abandoned in favour of 
the pursuit, the continual drive, toward meaning.  As even the title of “Grand Galop” 
betrays, Ashbery’s poems are characterized by a restlessness.  When the poem concludes: 
“The road just seems to vanish / And not that far in the distance, either.  The horizon must 
have been moved up” (SP 178), the motion of the poem seems almost to devour itself.  The 
result is what Kramer referred to as the “shimmering” quality of the work—a quality 
achieved not by a photo-montage-like “stillness” conceived of outside of time, but by a 
constant, frenetic, and intrinsically time-bound motion.  The speaker can neither distance 
himself from this motion nor be absorbed into the flow. Instead, as in Stevens’s “St. 
Armorer’s Church,” the speaker achieves a doubleness of vision and experience: he sees, 
and he knows that he sees. He speaks and he understands both the heaviness and 
possibilities of the words he employs.  
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Where ordinarily the “gap” between sign and signifier is sealed over in the moment 
of intelligibility and representation, Stevens and Ashbery’s insistence on the temporality of 
language work to open them up—thus revealing the “astonishing divergence of the 
identical with itself” (Levinas, OTB 28). In Levinas’s words:  
The getting out of phase with the instant, the ‘all’ pulling off from the ‘all’ – the 
temporality of time – makes possible...a recuperation in which nothing is lost.  
There is a disclosing of being; disengaged from its identity, from itself (what we are 
here calling a getting out of phase) and rediscoveries of truth; between what shows 
itself and the aim it fulfills there is monstration. (OTB 28)   
It is precisely this: the in-between space of monstration that both Stevens and 
Ashbery work to elaborate in their poetry.  Both seek to reveal, indeed to embody, the 
tension that results between what Levinas describes as “the ‘all’ pulling off from the ‘all’” 
(28). This is, after all—according to Levinas—the very space of truth.   “Truth,” he writes,  
is rediscovery, recall, reminiscence, reuniting under the unity of apperception. There 
is remission of time and tension of the recapture, relaxation and tension without a 
break, without a gap.  There is not a pure distancing from the present, but precisely 
re-presentation; that is, a distancing which the present of truth is already or still is; 
for a representation is a recommencement of the present which in its “first time” is 
for the second time; it is a retention and a protention, between forgetting and 
expecting,6 between memory and project.  Time is reminiscence and reminiscence is 
time, the unity of consciousness and essence. (OTB 29) 
A “rediscovery” requires not just time, but also a vantage point from which the 
retention of the “first time” might be perceived from the next.  It requires, that is, the sort of 
“redoubled vision” that Krauss describes for Modernist visual art—where the relationship 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Recall here Barthes’s “this will be and this has been” (CL 96) of the photographic image.	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between the terms figure and ground are simultaneously “preserved and cancelled” (OU 15) 
so that (as demonstrated so remarkably in “St. Armorer’s Church”) outside and inside begin 
to “take on a deductive relation to one another” (OU 16). In Ashbery’s “Grand Galop” it is 
made clear that, though the speaker suggests that it has, the horizon has not, in fact, been 
“moved up.”  It is just that the motion—absorbed without apparent gap by the speaker and 
at first “unrecorded”—is only retrospectively established in the poem. The moment of 
intelligibility, in this way, has effectively been slowed, so that what is articulated in the 
poem is this space of “redoubled vision: ...a seeing and a knowing that one sees” (OU 19).  
Vision, according to Krauss, “dispenses with narrative” (19). It offers perhaps our 
most immediate experience of the “all-at-onceness” of representation: the instantaneous 
divergence from, and re-alignment of, the identical with itself (Levinas, OTB 28). It offers 
us, in other words, the most tangible and immediate, as well as most reproducible, re-
presentable, experience of “Truth,” if it is to be understood in the terms that Levinas spells 
out, of “rediscovery, recall, reminiscence” (OTB 29).  What Ashbery’s “discontinuous 
writing” and Stevens’s “outward blank” can be understood to aspire toward is the 
elaboration precisely of this space of “Truth”: that “astonishing divergence between the 
identical and itself” (OTB 28).    In opening up this space, in which the instant of 
representation gets “out of phase with itself” (before the moment of recuperation after 
which we find that “nothing is lost”)—in revealing the gap between the “saying” and the 
“said”—both poets explore that which is in excess to truth and representation and indeed, 
“beyond totality,” to being itself. 
As Levinas reflects, however: “totality should not leave anything outside.”  It is for 
this reason that “the transcendence of the totality thematized in truth is produced as a 
division of the totality into parts” (OTB 29).  But the question remains: “How can these 
parts still be equivalent to the whole, as is implied when exposition is truth?  By reflecting 
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the whole.  The whole reflected in a part is an image.  Truth then would be produced in an 
image of being” (OTB 29).  It must be remembered, however, that what Levinas is 
describing is the ordinary processes by which we assemble everyday images into 
corresponding “truths”—the process by which we render the world intelligible, that we 
absorb the “other” or “non-I” into the “I” of the “same.”  What Stevens and Ashbery effect 
through their poetry is a slowing down or lengthening of this process so that what would 
ordinarily be absorbed is instead figured—made present. This requires not an exemption 
from signification and temporality but instead a profound integration of both.  It is through 
this deep integration that the elaboration and exploration of that “excluded middle”— 
which, beyond essence, signification, being and non-being, is (truly) what “signifies” 
(Levinas OTB 29)7—is acheived.   
 
It is also along these lines that Ashbery’s interest in “surrealism” runs.  His interest 
extends well beyond the visual arts movement that identified with that name—as well as 
beyond Stevens’s grievance that the movement “invents without discovering” (OP 203).  
Ashbery’s more inclusive idea of the term is shaped profoundly, however, by Stevens 
poetic approach and conceptualization of an intermediate space (a space later influential not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  In Errol Morris’s investigation into the mystery of which of the two available versions of Fenton’s iconic 
photograph, “The Valley of the Shadow of Death,” came first (the photograph that includes cannonballs 
strewn on the road—posed or otherwise, that is the question—or the photograph in which they are absent, 
excluded), he grapples with questions of authenticity, as well as legitimate and illegitimate intentions and 
interventions by the artist. Though at the end of the article he arrives at a satisfyingly decisive thesis as to 
which of Fenton’s photographs did come first (it is the one that excludes the cannonballs), he concludes: 
“Couldn’t you argue that every photograph is posed because every photograph excludes something?  Even in 
framing and cropping?  Someone has made a decision about what time-slice to expose on the emulsion, what 
space-slice (i.e., the frame) to expose on the emulsion” (65).  Fenton could have had an elephant in the 
photograph, Errol somewhat preposterously suggests in order to prove his final point—but he does not.  “The 
photograph is posed not by the presence of the elephant but by its absence. Isn’t something always excluded, 
an elephant or something else? Isn’t there always a possible elephant lurking just at the edge of the frame?” 
(65).  It is not the “elephant” but the possibility of the elephant, of that which is excluded in order to constitute 
a measured, representable, experienceable slice of both space and time, that makes the existing photograph 
possible. It is, likewise, that which lies in excess to truth, representation and being that makes possible the 
conception of truth, representation, and being itself.	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only to Ashbery, but also to the Abstract Expressionist painters, with whom Ashbery was 
well acquainted) between and inclusive of both reality and imagination.  Indeed, the 
“surrealism” that Ashbery speaks of is one that he noted in a December 1967 article in 
ArtNews, “is still continuing, even in the minimal, post-painterly or ‘scientific’ art of the 
present which at first seems so far from ‘dreams’ (RS 12). Ashbery resists the definition of 
artistic movements according to particular historical moments, and reads the whole of art 
history, instead, as a continuum. Romantic, modernist, and minimalist art projects are, for 
Ashbery, all aligned in their shared exploration of a “sur-reality.”  “The dream of escaping 
from dreams is a dream like the others,” he writes.  What is essential to art is a shared 
“Romantic” vision of “reality” and a commitment to representing it in an expanded or 
heightened, that is, a “sur-real” way: “The space of dreams—” Ashbery concludes, 
deep shallow, open, bent, a point which as no physical dimensions or a universal 
breadth—is the space in which we now live […] there is no real alternative to 
innovation, and the artist, if he is to survive, cannot leave art where he found it.  
Dreamers are insatiable expansionists, and the space of dreams rapidly becomes 
overcrowded. (12)  
It was with this sense—of a need to expand the territory of exploration of both 
language and reality—that the L-A-N-G-U-A-G-E poetry movement began to explicitly 
shift their concern from the poem as product to the process by which it is conceived and 
written. The space within Stevens’s poetry dedicated to an investigation into “the letter as 
such” was further defined and elaborated by the Language poets—poets who, through their 
attention to language, sought specifically to distance themselves from the lyrical and 
aesthetic tradition Stevens was, and continues to be, associated with. They identified 
instead with a lineage stemming from William Carlos Williams, whose work has long been 
considered more concrete. Unfortunately, an often overly simplistic interpretation of 
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Williams’s famous dictum, “No ideas but in things!”8—which dismisses much of the 
complexity of Williams’s approach to “thing-ness”—has also been the bequest of the 
Language poets and the complex questions at work in their poetry has often been 
understood only as a blunt offering of the facticity of language.  Despite the increased 
intensity with which contemporary poets, especially those associated with Language and 
experimental poetry have worked to reverse the subordination of praxis to poiesis, the 
ambiguity between the two terms that Bernasconi identifies as our inheritance from 
Aristotle’s initial distinction, remains. Language poetry’s explicit concern for the 
materiality of language—its potentially generative power, but also its inherent limitations—
is paralleled, and troubled by, a duel concern for social action and change; the question, 
therefore, remains explicit within the movement, and (just as it was for Stevens’s work) 
fundamental to its continuance: where do poetry and practice meet? Is there a distinction, 
and if so, of what nature is the distinction? Does praxis include poiesis, as Aristotle 
suggests?  Or is poiesis always, necessarily, an “end,” a sharp break from, the more 
fundamental “all doing” of praxis?   
Although poetry—which etymologically stems from the ancient Greek, poieo, 
meaning “to make,” (containing therefore within itself this central ambiguity between 
process and production)—is now commonly understood to oppose itself to praxis 
(conceived of here in the sense of a pragmatic “doing”), the problems inherent in such an 
oversimplified opposition are apparent, and it is these problems that the Language poets 
have sought to uncover and explore.  The “presentness” of the visual arts, which offers an 
immediately tangible venue for taking up this question and exploring the connection 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  As Marc Elihu Hofstadter reminds us: “notice Williams doesn’t say ‘only things,’ or ‘no ideas, just things,’ 
but ‘no ideas but in things.’  Williams never denied the importance of ideas, but believed that, when ideas are 
embodied in verse, they should be just that—bodied forth in concrete images.  The common misconception 
that Williams was a simpleminded namer of chickens and wheelbarrows misses the infinitely varied and 
subtle ways Williams thinks through things” (15-16).	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between making and doing—something that Stevens had anticipated in the 1930s with his 
interest and reliance on the language and vision of the New York art world—established its 
influence more fully on the field of contemporary poetry in the 1970s and 1980s.  Indeed, 
the increasingly close relationship between the two fields can be traced to the impact of 
Stevens’s inspirational phrase, “the pressure of reality,” on the early Abstract 
Expressionists (McLeod 140). What was perhaps most attractive to contemporary poets 
who were looking for a method with which to explore and address this “pressure” without 
giving up their chosen mode of exploration, was the idea, crucial to both mediums, that—as 
Lyn Hejinian, quoting from Heidegger, claims in her book of essays, The Language of 
Inquiry—“one must philosophize not ‘about’ factual life but ‘from inside’ it” (363). The 
absorbing qualities of non-figurative visual art—which seeks to rely entirely on sensory 
information rather than mimesis—has been of particular interest to Language poets, many 
of whom make use of visual art within their texts, or have collaborated with visual artists,9 
thus further emphasizing the process-oriented, sensory nature of language, and—by 
extension—experience.  Language, art, and philosophy are for the Language poets—just as 
they were for Stevens—inextricably linked; what is essential to all three, beyond any 
potential category of exploration or thought, is—as Hejinian explores with the help of 
Heidegger, above—that any question regarding the nature of Being acknowledges the fact 
of its own position within Being. There is no possible way, Hejinian affirms, of thinking 
outside of that fundamental framework, and any presumption of doing so—in being so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Michael Palmer has collaborated with numerous well-known painters, including Gerhardt Richter and the 
Italian painter, Sandro Chia; Lyn Hejinian’s book, The Traveller and the Hill and the Hill (Granary 1998) 
which intersperses text with paintings by Emilie Clarke is one of her many collaborative projects with visual 
artists. “Poetry Plastique,” an exhibition in 2001 at the Marian Boesky gallery in New York curated by 
Charles Bernstein and Jay Sanders highlighted the interrelationship between visual arts and contemporary 
poetry. In his preface to the exhibition catalogue Bernstein explains that the exhibition showcases, “[n]ot 
words and pictures but poems as visual objects (read: subjects). Not poems about pictures but pictures that are 
poems. Not words affixed to a blank page but letters in time. Not works closed in a book but hanging on a 
wall or suspended from the ceiling or rising from the floor or sounding from inside a figure or embedded with 
paint on a canvas or written in the sky or flickering on a screen” (7).  
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intrinsically ill-, or rather, unfounded—will certainly lead in the wrong direction.  Key, of 
course, to Hejinian’s text is the passage from Being and Time considered in Chapter One, 
which is worth returning to, and quoting at greater length:   
What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right 
way.  This circle of understanding is not an orbit in which any random kind 
of knowledge may move; it is the expression of the existential fore-structure 
of Dasein itself.  It is not to be reduced to the level of the vicious circle, or 
even of a circle which is merely tolerated.  In the circle is hidden a positive 
possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing. (195)10 
Similarly, Heidegger contends—and Hejinian goes on to quote this in her own text—that 
the foundation for philosophy must be “the radical existential intervention and the 
production of questionableness; placing oneself and life and the crucial implementations 
into questionableness is the basic concept of all, and the most radical, illumination” (363).  
This questionableness, insists Hejinian, must not be considered a departure from (that is, as 
being directed toward the production of a new—extra-ordinary—concept), but rather as “a 
return to the ordinary condition of things [...] to the inside of the everyday” (363).  
Because we are always, inevitably, surrounded by the everyday details of our own 
lives, we are never able to look at it as a whole, but are only able to experience—again 
Hejinian quotes Heidegger—“ ‘this’ and ‘this’ and ‘this’...This thisness is hard to bear.” 
(363). Contemporary art—and Hejinian’s poetry is a key example of this—struggles to 
reinstall itself (in resistance to a closing in upon the “that”) within the “unbearable” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In other words, there is never any “outside” from which—no “metalanguage” with which—to theorize.  
This is the central philosophical problem that contemporary thinkers have been left to grapple with. Think of 
Levinas’s inquiry into subjectivity, the difficulties of which could be expressed by the problem he poses in 
Otherwise than Being: “totality should not leave anything outside” [29]).	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continual process of the “this.”  This process amounts to a “questionableness” (this is the 
“unbearable” part, of course) of its being at all.    
It is, understandably perhaps, precisely the “unbearable” nature of the “this” (if we 
are to understand “this” in the active process of its “doing”) that lends itself to chronic 
subjugation by the “that”—that is, by an “ending” of doing in making, in the static form of 
the word or the object.  The process can once again be profitably understood in terms of 
Freud’s death drive, wherein—Freud theorizes—the living entity instinctually strives to 
return “by the circuitous paths along which its development leads” toward its initial 
“inanimate state” (BPP 46).    “It would,” remarks Freud, “be a contradiction to the 
conservative nature of the instincts if the goal of life were a state of things which had never 
yet been attained” (BPP 45).  But if we are to accept this, we are faced with the highly 
“paradoxical situation” of being forced to admit that the organism, should it really wish to 
return to the “inanimate state” in which it began, might certainly “attain its life’s aim more 
rapidly—by a kind of short circuit” (BPP 47), succumbing to all manner of illness and 
danger, which—on the contrary—it does everything in its power (at least for a time) to 
avoid. What this “paradoxical situation” occasions, Freud explains, is a two-fold process 
whereby germ-cells working “against the death of the living substance” actually succeed in 
winning for it “what we can only regard as potential immortality, though that may mean no 
more than a lengthening of the road to death” (BPP 48).    
What is described within the bounds of this “paradoxical” two-fold process if not 
the fundamental ambiguity between praxis and poiesis, which we must therefore consider 
at the root of any consideration of Being at all? On the one hand Freud’s theory describes 
Being’s attempt to maintain its activity of Being for the sake of the activity itself, and on the 
other hand it describes the manner in which Being strives to end its “unbearable” situation 
(“unbearable” here because “never yet...attained,” therefore ultimately and painfully 
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unknowable; or, rather, knowable only in a fragmentary procession of disjointed instances 
of the “this”) through return to its initial inanimate form.  It is this “unbearable” 
intermediate space that contemporary poets including Ashbery and Hejinian, working 
consciously in Stevens’s wake, as well as many other contemporary experimental or 
Language poets—Steve McCaffery, Susan Howe, Erin Mouré, Michael Palmer, Christian 
Bök—who may not specifically identify with the Stevens tradition, can be understood to 
explore.  What is shared among these poets is the desire, and concentrated effort, to resist, 
and work against, the preterite—the “said”—toward the realization of the continuous 
process of the gerund: the “saying.” Just as for Benjamin’s “literal” translators, theirs is 
often an attempt to reveal language’s opacity rather than any of its (possible) transcendental 
qualities.  It is only in the revelation of the materiality of any object, after all, that that 
which lies beyond the object may be, if “extremely fleetingly” glimpsed.  Indeed, according 
to Rilke, whose consideration of the subject is central to both Heidegger and Agamben’s 
later analyses, consciousness of the world’s opacity is fundamental to the human 
conception, and therefore possibility, of that which transcends the human—what he refers 
to as “The Open.” “The animal’s degree of consciousness, ” Rilke writes in one of his last 
letters, “sets it into the world without the animal’s placing the world over against itself at 
every moment (as we do); the animal is in the world; we stand before it by virtue of what 
peculiar turn and intensification which our consciousnesses has taken” (quoted in 
Heidegger, PLT 105).  The man “faces opposite” his world, says Rilke, but he does so 
without exempting himself from the world of objects, within which he remains necessarily 
a part. It is by virtue, therefore, according to this reading, that as man sees, he “(knows) that 
he sees” (Krauss, OU, 19 emphasis added), that he is set at odds, “opposite,” his world. But 
it is also by virtue of his being so set at odds that the human being is able to experience 
“the Open” at all.  Where “the animal, the flower, presumably is all that [“opaque,” 
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“object”], without accounting to itself,” it is surrounded at all times by “that indescribably 
open freedom”: the Open (PLT 105). Here “the Open” is not that which can be consciously 
experienced but instead connotes only a limitless immersion within experience. It is only 
“man,” Rilke, writes “who observes and judges” (quoted in Heidegger, PLT 105), and who 
can also therefore experience “the Open” (if fleetingly) as an “opaque” object of his 
consciousness.  This ability, as Heidegger would later formulate, is what constitutes man’s 
will.   
Plant and animal do not will because, muted in their desire, they never bring the 
Open before themselves as an object.  They cannot go with the venture as one that is 
represented.  Because they are admitted into the Open, the pure draft is never the 
objective other to themselves.  Man, by contrast, goes ‘with’ the venture, because he 
is the being who wills in the sense described. (PLT 108)   
It is at the remove of “desire” then, according to Heidegger, that man is set against “the 
Open,” thus rendering it visible and objective; set at odds with “the pure draft,” “man” 
becomes technician and draftsman, he “rises up as the producer who puts through, carries 
out, his own self and establishes this uprising as the absolute rule” (PLT 109).   
If, however, it is understood that “desire” is what brings “the Open” into proximity 
with the human being “as an object” it follows that desire must remain insatiable.  Though 
“man” may be set apart from the “pure draft”—in a position of absolute authority—it is not 
over the draft itself but over his conception of the draft that he has risen.  His rendering it 
visible to himself is precisely what separates himself from it.  Through his desire, man 
“brings the Open before (himself) as an object” and in doing so renders it absolutely 
impenetrable—opaque.  But without this process (essentially of constituting within 
experience an always-ever insatiable, negative-space of desire) there would not also be the 
“extremely fleeting” moments that Rilke affords: “those first moments of love when one 
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human being sees his own vastness in another, his beloved, and in man’s elevation toward 
God” (quoted in Heidegger PLT 106).  
 
Fundamental to the possibility of these “moments of love” is of course the opacity 
of “the other”—an utter exteriority that takes the form of a “face” within which one might 
recognize oneself, not as one is but as one what is not.  It is only in formal, “objective” 
terms that an encounter and therefore a recognition of the Other—of the Otherness that is 
selfhood—is made possible. Only, that is, by “facing opposite” the Other can one 
experience the possibility of the “simultaneity of need and desire,” which Levinas defines 
as love: “the equivocal par excellence” (255).  Every act of representation, every encounter 
with “the other” must contain, therefore, this possibility—just as within every act of 
representation there must remain an opening, a non-equivalence: the “astonishing 
divergence of the identical with itself” (Levinas, OTB 28), which is quickly closed again in 
the moment of intelligibility.  
Language, being in no way equivocal, goes “less far” than love in that it retains in 
its signifyingness no possibility of equivalence or simultaneity with signification.  Desire in 
language is always in excess of the object, as well as need.11  In this way language parallels 
the unequivocal nature of “man” himself who, in being cast out from “the Open” is 
permitted, by means of his own desire, to bring it before him “as an object.” Language 
contains within its very structure not the possibility of equivalence, but of the exposure of 
the space of  “différance” fundamental to “man”—a space that makes possible the “call” by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 “Let us again note the difference between need and Desire: in need I can sink my teeth into the real and 
satisfy myself in assimilating the other; in Desire there is no sinking one’s teeth into being, no satiety, but an 
uncharted future before me.  Indeed the time presupposed by need is provided me by desire; human need 
already rests on Desire” (Levinas, TI, 117).  
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which he may be brought into proximity with that which must always remain excessive to 
him: “the Open,” “the Other,” and language itself.   
By focussing not on the object itself and its resolution in a moment of intelligibility 
but on the manner in which the object is “objectified,” brought into proximity “as an 
object,” the poetry of Wallace Stevens and his inheritors works to break down the 
relationship between the “I” and the “non-I,” the “draftsman” and the “draft,” in order that 
a space of genuine encounter might take shape in the intermediate space of their 
divergence.   
 
In closing, I would like to suggest that the evolution of the interpretation and 
representation of representation itself characterized by Stevens continues, true to his vision 
of the connectivity between the arts and with philosophy, beyond the realm of 
contemporary poetry. The work of the contemporary South African artist William 
Kentridge and British artist David Hockney are striking examples of the evolution of 
Stevens’s poetic vision beyond the page. Reading the work of these artists along the poetic 
lines described by Stevens, as equally as reading Stevens’s work along those delineated by 
these more contemporary artists, can be both instructive and illuminating.  Similarly to the 
“re-doubled vision” effected by Stevens’s poems such as  “The Poem That Took the Place 
of the Mountain” discussed in Chapter One, Kentridge’s focus is in large part on the 
indeterminacy by and through which his own work is determined.  His stop-motion 
animation and film work often includes representations of Kentridge himself—at work on 
the drawings that constitute (at any given moment) the “finished piece.”  This process 
naturally calls into question over the course of the film the idea of there being a “finished 
piece” at all.  In keeping with the impulse behind much of Stevens’s poetry, Kentridge 
challenges the entrenched subordination of praxis to poiesis.  It is this challenge that for 
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both artists constitutes the ethical drive of their work. “I believe that in the indeterminacy of 
drawing,” explains Kentridge, “the contingent way that images arrive in the work, lies some 
kind of model of how we live our lives.  The activity of drawing is a way of trying to 
understand who we are and how we operate in the world.  It is in the strangeness of the 
activity itself that can be detected judgement, ethics and morality” (Pressplay 43).   
Similarly, David Hockney’s recent exhibit (October 2010 to January 2011) at the 
Yves St. Laurent Gallery in Paris, “Fleurs Fraiches: Dessins Sur Iphone and Ipod,” draws 
attention to the primacy of praxis in artistic representation, and in fact forces the question: 
is it—can it—be anything else?  The exhibit—which for practical as well as ideational 
reasons, was at first difficult to place12—featured a continuously cycling series of drawings 
on ipods and iphones, which recorded not only the “finished” image (“finished” in this 
sense can only be understood to mean the last and most detailed stage of development in an 
ongoing process of renewal) but the process by which it had been created: the viewer 
watches as the images continually take shape, forming and reforming slowly on the screen 
just as they did when first produced by Hockney using a computer drawing program.  As I 
watched last January, the words, “Made for the screen, totally on the screen, it’s not an 
illusion” slowly appeared on one of the ipad screens—drawing attention to the “surface” 
quality of the work, but also, and due to that very quality, its absolute “reality.”  Here, I 
thought, is Stevens’s “reality-imagination complex” at a new and more literal level.  
Another screen read, “It is thought that new technology is taking away the hand (I’m not so 
sure). If you look around a lot is opening up.”  Underneath these words appeared the word 
“Love,” accompanied by a network of vividly coloured lines emanating from the word in 
multiple directions.  By highlighting the ambiguous terrain between “reality” and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  The show was subsequently installed at the Royal Ontario Museum in Toronto and exhibited from October 
2011 until January 2012. 
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“imagination,” and challenging the assumption that his art—in being “made for the screen” 
(that is, not “real”—“objective” or “concrete”—in the sense that we have become 
accustomed to in visual art), Hockney emphasizes the idea that our encounter with the 
world is one that, in “reality, ” occurs primarily at the “surface.” This emphasis also serves 
to remind the viewer of the fundamental role of  “the all-at-onceness” of consciousness and 
vision.  Hockney’s attention to the surface, in other words, takes us beyond the surface—it 
acknowledges and explores the manner in which that which is “visible”—immediately 
apprehensible: the word “LOVE,” for example—is brought before us at all. Because we 
confront that which exceeds us “as an object” there remains, necessarily, an inherent gap 
between the intelligible world and our position “opposite” it.  This gap (usually eradicated 
in a moment of intelligibility—in knowledge) can also be elaborated in the space of the 
question of intelligibility itself.  I would conclude that it is this, finally—the elaboration of 
the space of this question—that poets, and other artists, “are for.”13 
“To communicate is indeed to open oneself,” writes Levinas, “but the openness is 
not complete if it is on the watch for recognition.  It is complete not in opening to the 
spectacle of or the recognition of the other, but in becoming a responsibility for him” (TI 
119). Communication is not, in other words, a simple equivalence.  It is not substitution—
language for meaning, myself for the other.  “The openness of communication is not a 
simple change of place, so as to situate a truth outside instead of keeping it to oneself. [...]  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Heidegger’s essay, “What are Poet’s for?” concentrates its argument around Rilke’s conception of and 
articulation of “the Open” as that unifying “widest orbit” that surrounds “all that is”—which is, therefore, in 
Heidegger’s words “the Being of beings” (PLT 120).  What poets “are for,” according to Heidegger, is 
precisely the confrontation of this “Being” through language, which is the very “precinct (templum), that is, 
the house of Being.  The nature of language does not exhaust itself in signifying,” Heidegger insists, “nor is it 
merely something that has the character of sign or cipher. It is because language is the house of Being, that we 
reach what is by constantly going through this house.  When we go to the well, when we go through the 
woods, we are always already going through the word ‘well,’ through the word ‘woods,’ even if we do not 
speak the words do not think of anything relating to language” (PLT 129).	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Is it not then,” Levinas asks, “first of all a communicating of communication, a sign of the 
giving of signs, and not a transmission of something in an openness?” (TI 119).    
Is it not precisely this “openness” that is developed within the poetry of Wallace 
Stevens, where a “redoubled vision” allows both speaker and reader to experience an 
expansiveness across which  “one sees and knows that one sees” (Krauss, OU 19); a 
transcendence, certainly, but one by which the opacity of the world is located, and 
confronted, rather than finally escaped.  Where, as in “The Poem That Took the Place of a 
Mountain,” one searches:  
For the outlook that would be right, 
Where he would be complete in an unexplained completion: 
 
The exact rock where his inexactness 
Would discover, at last, the view toward which they had  
edged, 
 
Where he could lie and, gazing down at the sea, 
Recognize his unique and solitary home. (CP 435)  
 
 This search, for an “outlook that would be right,” is one that characterizes Stevens’s 
career, and therefore must be at the root of any understanding of his poetics.   A search for 
an “outlook,” that is, from which point might be drawn the process of the “outlook’s” very 
conception: the effort by which each “exactness of representation” comes to stand in for an 
“inexactness”—that which remains in excess of any possible representation.  In section six 
of “Things of August,” this gap is explored in terms of the relationship between the world 
and the “beholder.” “The world imagines for the beholder,” the section begins—evoking 
both the fundamental inequality between the power of reality (the world) and the subjective 
imagination (of the beholder) and yet also, and above all, the creative, imaginative power 
that exists between beholder and world.  The beholder is “the blank mechanic of the 
mountains, / The blank frère of the fields” (CP 420), involved in the labour of imagining 
the world into being—into reality—through his being, through his reality, without ever 
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affecting the greater reality which lies beyond (and yet is always inclusive of) this relation.  
What is that beyond, the text asks? “The world?  The inhuman as human?  That which 
thinks not, / Feels not, resembling thought, resembling feeling?” (CP 420). Even, or 
especially, in the conceptualization of that which lies beyond “the beholder,” we move 
immediately into a territory of resemblance.  “World” does not exist except within this 
territory, and yet—it does.  Its existence beyond the “human” is what makes it representable 
to the human, and the human representable to himself. The “beholder” is always ultimately 
passive in his observational, intellectual and sensory powers (“He is the possessed of sense, 
not the possessor” [420]), and his relationship with “world” is always unequal. But it is this 
fundamental inequality that constitutes the negative-space of encounter between him and 
the world—between, in other words, the “Other,” and “Being” itself.  It is this inequality, 
this infallible gap between the “inhuman” and the “human,” “world” and “thing,” “reality” 
and subjective “imagination,” that, as Stevens writes in the closing lines of “Things of 
August’s” section six, “habituates” the beholder  
to the invisible,  
By its faculty of the exceptional,  
 
The faculty of ellipses and deviations,  
In which he exists but never as himself. (CP 420)   
 
It is the invisible, that which always exceeds “the beholder’s” powers of apprehension and 
comprehension—as well as the “faculty of the exceptional, // The faculty of ellipses and 
deviations”—by which the world operates beyond, and independent of “the beholder’s” 
own powers of perception and representation that makes perception and representation 
(being itself, understood and confronted as such) possible. Subjectivity is explored in this 
passage as intrinsically tied to representation, and representation is explored as an inclusive 
space—where subjectivity is not yet divided, where “the beholder” exists and understands 
himself to exist but “never as himself.” Stevens opens up a negative-space of representation 
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here beyond individual subjectivity.  The individual is de-centered, no longer existing “as 
himself” but revealing instead a more inclusive structure of being.   The process of 
representation—by which non-meaning is rendered, or made to “resemble” meaning; by 
which the inhuman is made to “resemble” (rendered “as”) the human—is explored in 
Stevens’s poetry in and of itself.  It is the delineation of this negative-space that allows for 
an engagement with what it means to be human at all, and that actively works, through an 
open engagement with this question, to describe and re-imagine the “human” itself14.   
This emphasis in Stevens’s work on that which will remain always excessive to the 
work itself—its “openness,” in other words to a “closedness,” to its own limiting terms—
displaces the central concern of the work from any definitive meaning or result to the 
process by which that meaning is (continuously) derived.  It is this displacement—an 
emphasis on incompleteness rather than completeness—that constitutes its efficacy as, in 
William Kentridge’s words, “a way of trying to understand who we are and how we operate 
in the world” (Press Play 413).  It is within what Kentridge has called the very 
“strangeness” of the activity of drawing, after all—within a space of attention, that is, to the 
processes and approach to representation itself, to the rendering of exactness with an 
inexact line, of inexactness with exaction—“that can be detected judgement, ethics and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 When the Swedish founder of modern taxonomy, Carolus Linnaeus, first developed the classification Homo 
sapien (which he first identified by using only the word, Homo) he did not record, as he did for other species, 
any specific identifying characteristic, but—as mentioned previously, in Chapter Five—“only the old 
philosophical adage: nosce te ipsum {know yourself}” (Agamben, TO 25).  Even later, with the further 
designation sapien, there was no evidence that the complete term corresponded to a description, as such. 
Instead, the addition of sapien acted only as a simplification of the original. “It is worth reflecting,” writes 
Giorgio Agamben, that this “taxonomic anomaly...assigns not a given, but rather an imperative as a specific 
difference” (TO 25). In other words: according to Linnaeus, the human being has no specific identifying 
characteristics that might separate him from other animals other than his ability to recognize himself (TO 26). 
“To define the human not through any nota characteristica, but rather through his self-knowledge, means that 
man is the being which recognizes itself as such, that man is the animal that must recognize itself as human to 
be human” (TO 26).   
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morality” (Press Play 419). All three, it is implied, must be considered not as an end, but 
(like the activity of drawing) a means.  Poetry, as Stevens and the poets and artists working 
within the broad tradition I have attempted to sketch out in these final pages make clear, is 
uniquely adapted to explore the processes by which “judgement, ethics and morality” are 
delineated “from inside” (Hejinian 363)—from within the processes of their (necessarily 
continual) approach. Resistance among these artists to the pronouncement of any specific 
“judgement, ethics and morality” reveals not an evasion of political interest or motivation 
but instead a deep engagement with the broader question of intelligibility and 
representation itself, and therefore a “face to face” engagement with the defining reality of 
the way that meaning arises, and takes shape, in the world.
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